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Abstract
This thesis explores, from both a theoretical and practical basis, how and why Serbian 
and Croatian nationalist elites used victim centred propaganda to legitimate new state 
creation during the collapse of Communist Yugoslavia (1986-1999). This often involved 
applying imagery from the Jewish Holocaust, with overt comparisons between Jewish 
suffering and the imagined genocides of Serbs and Croats. Chapters ‘One’ and ‘Two’ discuss 
why a rhetoric of victimisation and persecution has been an enduring aspect of national 
identity, from the ancient Hebrews onwards. This theoretical section develops a model for 
analysing nationalist teleology, comprising a Golden Age, a Fall from grace, and a 
Redemption. It also provides a critique of nationalism theory, analysing its successes and 
failures in understanding the importance of victim centred propaganda and the Holocaust in 
nationalism writings.
Chapters ‘Three* to ‘Nine’ examine how a fear of genocide was used by Serbian and 
Croatian nationalists to push their people into wars of “self defence”. Through a detailed 
examination of primary source material, these chapters dissect many of the arguments 
advanced during the conflicts in, Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Important 
comparisons can be made about how history was revised and what purpose these revisions 
served. Serbian and Croatian propaganda is divided into specific time periods. The time 
periods examined include the earliest eras, from the 3rd to the 15th centuries AD, followed by
it. At.
the medieval era, and the 19 century. The 20 century is divided into several periods, 
beginning with the first kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918), World War II, Communist 
Yugoslavia, the breakdown of the Federation, and the rise of nationalism and violence. A 
chapter on Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Bosnian Moslems demonstrates how effectively 
Serbian and Croatian propaganda was applied to a third party.
5
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Ambassador John Fraser, Dejan Gizina, and Professors Carl Jacobsen, 
Zlatko Isakovic, and Mihailo Cmobmja, for shaping my early interest in the Balkans and its 
people. Thanks to Vesela Mrden at the Croatian Embassy (Ottawa), and Aleksander Mitic at 
the Serbian Embassy (Ottawa), for getting me started with all the latest views and 
information about the war in Yugoslavia, from 1992 to 1995. Many thanks to Silvija Letica at 
the Matica Hrvatska Iseljenika for her illuminating insight on the people of Croatia. Thank 
you to the Hamza family in Sarajevo for their colourful, and at times distressing, stories about 
the war in Bosnia, and of course, their wonderful hospitality.
A special thanks to the editors of Slovo at the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies for having published two of my articles. These were based on two conference papers, 
which were in turn based on several aspects of my doctoral research. Some of that 
information collected during my time as a PhD student can be found within this thesis.1 
Thanks also to Nick Bisley, for his rigorous editing skills and suggestions during the second 
draft of this thesis. Thanks very much to my supervisor, Spyros Economides, for ploughing 
through much of the good, bad, and horribly disfigured, with consummate and tireless skill.
Thank you to the Regina Industrial Parks Rotary Club for funding two years of my 
doctoral research through the Rotary Ambassadorial Scholarship. My time at LSE would 
have been impossible without their gracious assistance. Thanks also to the Stepney Rotary 
Club for their kind hosting of me during my time in London. Their tasty lunches and witty 
conversation will not soon be forgotten.
I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Dana Wensley, for her loving support during this 
long, drawn out, but relatively fun-filled process, and of course to my parents, Bruce and 
Olive MacDonald, for their love and financial sacrifices, which made it possible for me to 
live and study in London and create this thesis.
David B. MacDonald 
Ecole Superieur de Commerce de Paris (ESCP-EAP)
Paris, July, 2000.
6
Introduction
‘There is a saying in the Balkans that behind every hero stands a traitor. The 
difficulty, as often as not, is to determine which is which. Again and again, there is 
something heroic about the traitor and something treacherous about the hero. '
- Fitzroy MacLean, The Heretic -
Introduction:
In 1991, the world watched in amazement as the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia was split apart by fratricidal civil war. Formerly peaceful republics, joined for 
almost five decades under the banner of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, ended their coexistence, as 
the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) rolled into Slovenia. Soon after, Serbian irregulars 
instigated violent clashes with Croatian paramilitary forces, followed by the intervention of 
the JNA. As the conflict spread through Croatia, from Eastern Slavonia to the Krajina, and 
then south east to Bosnia-Hercegovina, it was clear that Europe was witnessing its first major 
military conflict since World War II.
While several constituent nations, such as the Macedonians, Montenegrins, and 
Slovenians, played a peripheral role in the conflict, the principal actors were to be the 
Kosovar Albanians, the Bosnian Moslems, the Serbs, and the Croats. The wars that followed 
the collapse of Yugoslavia would be dominated by an intense Serbian-Croatian rivalry. While 
extremely bloody wars would be fought on the ground, a war of words took place through 
magazines, journals, newspapers, and books, as well as on television, the radio, and the 
Internet. All modem means of communication were actively subordinated to the goals of 
ethnic nationalist leaders in Serbia and Croatia, seeking to promote revised images of their 
respective histories.
This thesis is designed to explore the rather strange predicament western observers 
encountered when trying to understand the collapse of Yugoslavia. Seven distinct national 
groups, each with their own religious traditions, colonial history, and other cultural trappings, 
had lived in peace since 1945. Now four of these sought to advance the same claim -  that 
they were the victims of the first major genocide in Europe since World War II. Serbs, 
Kosovar Albanians, Croats, and Bosnian Moslems each claimed to be defending themselves 
from annihilation. They argued that one or more dangerous enemies were trying to destroy 
their nation, according to an age-old blueprint for hatred and treachery. Images of Serbian, 
Croatian, Bosnian Moslem, and Kosovar Albanian genocides and ‘Holocausts’ frequently
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appeared in the popular media. In all cases, genocide was invoked, and the reader, listener, or 
Internet surfer, was berated with a continuous stream of material, all seemingly arguing the 
same thing: “we are the victims first and foremost -  our war is legitimate because we are 
fighting against annihilation”.
French Slavicist Paul Garde, at a recent gathering in Paris to unveil the second edition 
of his 1992 classic Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie, noted that at the beginning of the war, in 
1991, he was severely hampered by a lack of information, not only in terms of factual 
reporting, but more importantly -  viewpoints, as to how each side was justifying its role in 
the conflict. Nine years later, he had exactly the opposite reaction -  there was a superfluity of 
information, and contemporary books on Yugoslavia adorned two entire walls in his large 
study. In 1991, there was practically nothing to be found on the conflict. Within two years, a 
war of journals, books, pamphlets, newspapers and Internet sites had begun. Slavenka 
Drakulic described this early period in Balkan Express,
Long before the real war, we had a media war, Serbian and Croatian journalists 
attacking the political leaders from the opposite republic as well as each other as if in 
some kind of dress rehearsal. So I could see a spiral of hatred descending on us, but 
until the first bloodshed it seemed to operate on the level of a power struggle that had 
nothing to do with the common people.2
Former American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, added this more 
prescient comment during the escalation of hostilities in 1992, ‘What we witnessed was 
violence-provoking nationalism from the top down ... Many people in the Balkans may be 
weak or even bigoted, but in Yugoslavia, it is their leaders who have been criminal.’
Historian Noel Malcolm described the climate in Serbia before the war as comparable to, ‘all 
of television in the USA [being] taken over by the Ku Klux Klan.’ This was often true of 
Croatia as well.
This thesis will address two particular problems: the manipulation of victim imagery, 
and the powerful war of words that accompanied and often preceded military violence. Of 
central importance is understanding how and why each side so assiduously chose to portray 
itself as a victim of genocide, not just in the present, but also in the past. Anyone who 
followed the conflict from 1991 onwards would have been struck by the constant emphasis 
on historical victimisation and suffering. This situation paradoxically gave rise to view that 
the wars in Yugoslavia were the result of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’, between traditionally 
hostile ethnic groups. Such propaganda would confuse, rather than clarify.4 While it is 
important to explore the nature of such imagery, it is also important to understand the
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philosophical and theological underpinnings of a victim-centred strategy in nationalism, 
while systematically unravelling and comparing Serbian and Croatian propaganda. This 
involves charting how different periods of history have been revised to make a nation’s 
history one of constant danger, defeat, and martyrdom.
There have been several attempts to understand the nature of Serbian propaganda. 
Some examples of Serbian propaganda analysis include Branimir Anzulovic’s Heavenly 
Serbia, Anto Knezevic’s Analysis o f Serbian Propaganda, and Philip Cohen’s Serbia’s 
Secret War. Of these, only Anzulovic’s analysis does not overtly advance a Croatian 
nationalist line. Whatever the motivations of these writers, their greatest sin by far has been 
to study Serbian writing by itself, without reference to what Croats, Kosovar Albanians, or 
Bosnian Moslems were also arguing at the same time. This has only decontextualised Serbian 
nationalism, removing it from the environment in which it was written and distributed. Since 
many Serbian propagandists were actively debating facts about historical dates, numbers, and 
people, studying only one side ignored the motivations and provocations of the Serbs.
Without a clear view of Serbian and Croatian arguments, half of the debate was 
missing. Clearly, a comparative study of Serbian and Croatian propaganda is long overdue. 
While it is obvious that the Serbs were the main aggressors in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, 
there is no doubt that Croats, Kosovar Albanians, and Bosnian Moslems were not simply 
innocent bystanders, waiting to be ‘ethnically cleansed’. There were many examples of these 
other three groups either instigating violence, or responding to it with force of their own.
To many, it might seem obvious why Serbs and Croats would have wished to portray 
their histories as long periods of suffering and decline, why playing the victim should now, 
more than ever, seem like a good idea. Since the introduction of the United Nations 
Conventions on Genocide and Human Rights in 1948, many people have felt a greater sense 
of responsibility for human rights abuses around the world. Rather than a policy of non­
interference in the internal affairs of other countries, we have become more concerned about 
what goes on behind closed doors, and more interventionist than ever before. Many feel that 
the existence of UN conventions gives us the right and the duty to ‘care’ for the treatment of 
other people living under despotic regimes.
Since 1945, many western academics have assured themselves that the heyday of 
Nietzschean nihilism is past. Most no longer believe that the weak are extinguished by 
history, nor do they believe that the ‘will to power’ is all that one needs to control the world. 
Rather, there is a tendency to sympathise with the victims rather than the aggressors. The 
type of ‘touchey-feeley’ human rights sociology favoured by journalists and academics such
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sas Michael Ignatieff demonstrates that the rights of others, or as he terms it ‘the needs of 
strangers’ override our more common impulses to stick to our own business and keep our 
noses out of trouble.5 The obvious solution to nations struggling to free themselves from 
decades of Communist rule was to play the victim -  to appeal to a heightened sense of global 
responsibility and morality. While Serbs and Croats both shared a historic belief in their own 
victimisation as nations, this sense of victimisation was increased during the Tudjman and 
Milosevic eras, and became one of the central pillars of national identity. The NATO-led 
bombing of Bosnian Serb positions in 1995, and ramp-Yugoslavia in 1999, clearly 
demonstrated that violence against minorities (at least in Europe) would not be tolerated. 
Sadly, this was not true of Rwanda, East Timor, or Chechnya.
The rise of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), with tremendous resources and 
media power, should also alert our attention to the very real benefits to be gained by 
portraying oneself as the victim of aggression. Human Rights NGOs now control the 
international arena; by 1994, some 67% of the European Union’s relief aid was channelled 
through such organisations. According to the International Red Cross, NGOs collectively 
disburse more money than the World Bank. One quarter of Oxfam’s £98 million budget 
comes from governmental sources, while World Vision US gained some $55 million worth of 
aid from the American government.6 Moreover, these groups have a direct line to 
governments around the world. More than anyone else today, they define who is a victim and 
how victimised they are. They also wield considerable power in determining the identity of 
victims and aggressors.
Generally, we live in a world where victims are now the subject of pity and financial 
assistance, not scorn. While these are compelling reasons which explain the practicalities of 
playing the victim, this does not explain why we as outside observers have become more 
receptive to this sort of propaganda. Clearly neither Serbs nor Croats were seeking to curry 
the favour of NGOs, nor did they invoke international conventions against each other. 
Certainly both sides were seeking international recognition for the new state of affairs in their 
respective republics. The breakdown of federal authority and legitimacy in Communist 
Yugoslavia after Josip Broz Tito’s death in 1980 changed the nature of the country 
considerably.
Republics, rather than the federal centre, became the new loci of power, as republic- 
based elites began building networks of power and influence. Tito’s Communism was never 
able to guarantee the withering away of the state. While he promised that the borders of 
Yugoslavia’s individual republics were nothing more than Tines on a marble column’, it was
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clear that borders continued to play a pivotal role in Yugoslavia. After his death in 1980, 
every aspect of his system was open to dispute, including the administrative divisions of the 
country, which in some cases were also national.
It is important to not only understand why Serbs and Croats sought to reconstruct 
their histories as periods of suffering and persecution, but also why western policy makers 
appeared receptive. Chapters ‘One’ and ‘Two’ will explore how and why victim centred 
propaganda has become important. ‘Chapter One’ will examine how early nationalisms 
developed myths in order to advance a unique view of their place in world history. For the 
ancient Hebrew nation, a cyclical form of teleology, composed of a Golden Age, a Fall, and a 
Redemption, constituted what Northrop Fiye and others have termed a ‘covenential cycle’. 
Covenants imply faith in an omnipresent, omnipotent god, able to guide the nation in times of 
distress and hardship. In return for obedience and faith, the Hebrew god assured his people of 
their divine election and their ‘chosenness’ -  making them a more spiritual, more special 
people than any other. Ideas of Covenant, chosenness, Golden Age, Fall, and Redemption 
have formed the core of several modem nationalisms. x
Another important aspect of cyclical teleology has been the constant battle between 
good and evil throughout history -  the ‘chosen’ nation versus its many enemies. The links 
between such mythology and Serbian and Croatian nationalism will become obvious, as both 
subscribed to a cyclical view of history. Both groups saw themselves as ‘chosen’ and unique, 
while at the same time, they portrayed their own histories as a series of battles against 
powerful enemies. Both groups consistently held that by proving their own Falls throughout 
history, they could legitimate the struggles necessaiy for Redemption.
In ‘Chapter Two’, the 20th century application of these early ideas of Covenant, 
chosenness, Golden Age, Fall, and Redemption will be understood with reference to the 
Jewish Zionist movement. There was much in Serbian and Croatian nationalism which relied 
on the Zionist contribution to the history of ideas. For 19th century Zionists, the presence of 
anti-Semitism confirmed that their struggles were continuing throughout history, and that the 
only way to be free from persecution and the threat of destruction was through Redemption in 
a territorially bounded nation-state. Zionists modernised cyclical teleology and used it to 
create their own state. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Jewish example, however 
was something over which they had little control. The Holocaust, which occurred between 
1941 and 1945, saw almost 6 million Jews systematically killed by the German Nazi regime. 
The Holocaust was to be the greatest Fall in the history of Judaism. Some viewed the creation 
of the State of Israel in 1948 as the greatest recompense and Redemption since the restoration
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of the Kingdom some 2000 years before. Thus, the greatest Fall and Redemption of the 20th 
century followed one after the other within a three year period.
An important concept throughout this thesis will be the idea of performing, or acting 
out a genocide. Based on the legacy of Jewish suffering and the instrumentalisation of the 
Holocaust by Zionist leaders to achieve the State of Israel, many up and coming nations, 
including the Romani, the Armenians, and the Ukrainians have played on the Holocaust, 
comparing their own historical persecution to that of the Jews. Such historical revision has 
formed the basis of a ‘comparative genocide debate’. This has pitted a minority of Jewish 
historians (who argue that the Holocaust is a unique and unprecedented event in modem 
history) against another group of historians, who advance that their own group’s experience 
of suffering is equal or worse than that of the Jews’. For many national groups, articulating 
myths of persecution and victimisation has become an essential part of reconstructing 
histories and legitimating state-building projects. As I will demonstrate in the six chapters 
following ‘Chapter Two’, Serbs and Croats entered into this timely and controversial debate. 
Both groups used claims of victimisation and persecution to legitimate their own state- 
building or state-expanding projects, with often violent consequences.
Both the Judeo-Christian covenential culture and the instrumentalisation of Holocaust 
imagery have been of central importance in structuring Serbian and Croatian representations 
of the past and present. History was reinvented in the 1980s and 90s, from the moment of the 
Great Schism onward, to paint the nation as the long suffering victim of ancient, predatory 
enemies, bent on its destruction. The following chapters will discuss how Serbs and Croats 
used such imagery to their advantage. For both groups, portraying history as a series of never 
ending ‘ancient ethnic antagonisms’ or ‘centuries of hatred’ performed an important function. 
Events in the 1980s and 1990s were presented only an extension of past conflicts. By proving 
that the other had been an aggressor throughout history, one could prove that history was 
repeating itself, that the nation was simply defending itself against yet another attempt at 
annihilation.
As Yugoslavia slowly collapsed during the late 1980s, the process of revising Serbian 
and Croatian national history began in earnest. Gone was any ambiguity or inner reflection 
about how one’s nation might have committed historic atrocities. A manichean morality 
pervaded both sides, where the other was unequivocally evil, and the self could do no wrong. 
Any periods of friendly association or harmonious political projects (such as Illyrianism) 
were excised from a history which became more and more decontextualised. The real 
enemies of history, namely the Ottomans, the Bulgarians, the Austro-Hungarians, and the
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Italians, were quietly brushed aside as mere backdrops to the more important contest between 
Serb and Croat. Even Nazi Germany was presented as a facilitator of Serb and Croat evil, 
rather than a genocidal power in itself.
‘Chapter Three’ begins with the rise of nationalism in Serbia, from the death of Josip 
Broz Tito in 1980, to Slobodan Milosevic’s historic speech in 1987 to the Kosovo Serbs, 
pledging to defend their national rights in Kosovo, no matter what the cost. Milosevic’s 
genius was to identify the Kierkegardian ‘right moment’ in Serbian politics, when he was 
able to transform himself from a Belgrade banker to a nationalist phenomenon. Milosevic, 
however forceful a speaker, was never much more than an opportunist. Nevertheless, his own 
lack of fundamentalism would be mitigated by the presence of dozens of nationalist zealots, 
from author-politicians Dobrica Cosic and Vuk Draskovic, to paramilitary leaders such as 
Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan and Vojislav Seselj.
Central to the Milosevic appeal was his promise to protect Serbs throughout 
Yugoslavia, even if this meant transgressing the borders of other Yugoslav republics. The 
invention of ‘Serbophobia’, often likened to anti-Semitism, was another curious facet of the 
conflict. Serbs would continually compare themselves to the Jews as fellow victims in world 
history. This invariably involved a tragedising of history, from the 1389 Battle of Kosovo to 
the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution -  every aspect of Serbian history was seen to be another 
example of persecution and victimisation at the hands of external negative forces. The 
Kosovar Albanians, as the first group within Yugoslavia to experience a national awakening 
(in 1981), were the first targets of Serbian nationalism. Kosovo is important here only as a 
template or pattern for the more important propaganda war against the Croats -  Serbia’s most 
significant enemy during the 1990s. This chapter will concentrate on the early threats of 
Croatian nationalism -  its strong links to a supposedly xenophobic and expansionist Roman 
Catholic Church, its genocidal ambitions against Serbia during the 19th century, and its hatred 
of diversity and compromise in the first Yugoslavia.
For Croats, the issue of persecution would be of equal importance. ‘Chapter Four’ 
will begin with the rise of Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ). 
Tudjman was a true believer in the nationalist cause. For this reason, the process of 
centralising power and propaganda was more thorough in Croatia than in Serbia. Croatian 
propagandists focused most of their attacks on Serbia, which was in the process of invading 
and occupying one third of their newly independent country. This chapter explores Croatian 
reappraisals of history, beginning with the conjuring up of a ‘Greater Serbia’ -  an evil, 
expansionary, annihilatory other, seeking to first invade, then enslave, then exterminate the
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Croatian people. From the time of the Great Schism between Catholic and Orthodox worlds, 
Croats were supposedly confronted with a Serbian desire to destroy small and ‘peaceful’
tV»nations. Other key historical periods include the 19 century, when the ideals of ‘Greater 
Serbia’ were supposedly put into practice, through to the First Yugoslavia after World War I, 
when Serbs and Croats entered, along with the Slovenes, into political association for the first 
time in their history.
Other important myths include the Antemurale Christianitatis, the belief that Croatia 
represented the western most outpost of European civilisation. Across the divide were the 
Serbs, often presented as being on a lower level of civilisation, with a ‘Asiatic’ mentality, 
different racial and psychological features, as well as different linguistic and cultural forms of 
identity. Such forms of differentiation would buttress Croatian arguments, that at all levels, 
Serbs were more backwards, barbarous, and warlike. These innate or primordial 
characteristics were cited as the cause of Yugoslavia’s breakdown, and the wars that 
followed.
Chapters ‘Five’ and ‘Six’ examine World War II history, arguably the most important 
historical period for both sides. Serbs and Croats accused each other of being willing and 
zealous collaborators with the Nazi occupiers. Each accused the other of being an enthusiastic 
participant in the Final Solution against Yugoslavian Jews, through membership in the 
Serbian Cetniks or the Croatian Ustasa. Each side also claimed to have suffered a ‘Holocaust’ 
at the hands of the other -  the Serbs at the Ustasa run death camp Jasenovac, the Croats, after 
the war, at the Austrian town of Bleiburg, when (Serbian) Communists massacred escaping 
collaborators. Inflating the number of one’s victims, while reducing the numbers killed by 
one’s own side became a full time occupation for many academics. Croatian writers inflated 
Bleiburg beyond recognition, while reducing Jasenovac to the status of a medium sized 
massacre. Serbs, by contrast, inflated Jasenovac to make it the third largest death camp in 
Europe -  often labelling it the ‘Serbian Auschwitz’. The purpose of such revisions was clear. 
Both sides needed a powerful example of the genocidal capabilities of the other, in order to 
prove that more contemporary atrocities were simply a repetition of the past.
‘Chapter Seven’ will be divided into two parts, the first dealing with Serbian and 
Croatian views of Tito’s Communist Yugoslavia, a country which suppressed nationalism, 
while preaching a form of consensus and harmony. Predictably, both groups would claim to 
have been the victims of continued persecution by the other, who they claim dominated the 
federation. Typically, the borders of republics were attacked, as well as the ethnic imbalances 
in the military, the government, and the civil service. The second and more important part of
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this chapter will detail how both Serbs and Croats put their past together, and how they drew 
parallels between past and contemporary events. Predictably, World War II comparisons 
were the most important, particularly for the Serbs. While the Croats too have used this 
period of history to their advantage, they also used earlier periods, such as the 19th century, 
and the First Yugoslavia, to argue that the Serbs had followed a continuous pattern of 
genocide for over a century.
‘Chapter Eight’, explores Serbian and Croatian propaganda from a fresh angle -  
through their reactions to a third party. The war in Bosnia-Hercegovina displayed both sides 
at their most cynical and opportunistic. Tudjman and Milosevic had already divided the 
republic on paper before a single shot was fired. Both sides committed war crimes, which 
included ‘ethnic cleansing’ (forcing people from the villages where their families had lived 
for centuries), the establishment of collection centres (where victims were beaten, tortured, 
raped and often killed), the destruction of physical property (including the destruction of 
1400 mosques), and numerous massacres of civilian populations. Bosnian Moslems were 
presented as little more than an invented artificial nation, with no historic claims to territory. 
At best, they were members of either the Serbian or Croatian ‘authentic’ nation, which meant 
that their lands and their language could be brought back into the national fold. At worst, the 
Moslems were the harbingers of a dangerous Islamic conspiracy, poised to take over the 
Balkans and Western Europe.
While large numbers of Serbs and Croats supported this immense propaganda 
campaign, there were some notable exceptions. While this thesis is concerned with distinctly 
nationalist literature, there have been conscientious writers on both sides, attempting to 
debunk many of the myths which emerged as a corollary to nationalism. The independent 
press in both countries was highly critical of their respective regimes, often infusing the 
debate with strong attacks on extreme nationalism within the government. Similarly, some 
writers and academics stood firm against the onslaught of nationalism. In Croatia, Dubravka 
Ugresic and Slavenka Drakulic deserve special mention, as does former Croatian diplomat 
Vane Ivanovic. During the war, numerous Croatian academics collaborated in a well known 
edited work by Rada Ivekovic, deploring the rise of nationalism and the escalation of 
violence in their country.7
In Serbia, several attempts were made to combine impartial Serbian scholarship with 
analysis from western academics and politicians. One such work, edited by Michael Freeman, 
Dusan Janjic, and Predrag Veselinovic, carefully analysed the importance of liberal theories 
of justice and their applicability to minority rights in Yugoslavia.8 Another ambitious work
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entitled Religion and War, contained critical lectures and articles published by Serbian 
academics who had fled Serbia in the 1980s.9 Such publications entailed certain risks, but 
demonstrated that not everyone had fallen into the nationalist trap, despite the strong 
jingoistic mentality that pervaded almost every aspect of life. It should also be noted that not 
every national politician was a nationalist as such. Many politicians who certainly had the 
best interests of their nation at heart did not participate in the violence as such, and openly 
condemned Tudjman and Milosevic for their excesses. The new group of elected officials -  
Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Racan, and Croatian 
President Stipe Mesic are just a few national leaders who did not subscribe to an exclusivist 
or distinctly violent view of national identity.
As will be clear throughout this thesis, both Serbian and Croatian nationalist writers 
have distorted and given a distinctly nationalist slant to many of the events of the 20th century 
and before. Of course, the question arises as to whether there are any “real” or accurate 
representations of history. Hayden White takes issue with the idea that there are any “correct” 
historical narratives, with only “certain rhetorical flourishes or poetic effects” to distract 
readers from the truth of what they are reading.10 Rather, White argues that all forms of 
historical narrative, be they “annals”, “chronicles”, or “history proper”, are all subject to a 
process of narrativising, whereby historians try to create a story from the “real events” of 
history, often a story with a beginning and a conclusion, and some type of moral lesson that 
can be learned. As White, argues, the biases, desires and fantasies of the historian cannot 
considered separate from the events he is describing. Which events are chosen and how they 
are presented will depend on a number of very personal factors. As White explains,
What is involved then, in that finding of the “true story”, that discovery of the “real 
story” within or behind the events that come to us in the chaotic form of “historical 
records”? What wish is enacted, what desire is gratified by the fantasy that real events 
are properly represented when they can be shown to display the formal coherency of 
a story? In the enigma of this wish, this desire, we catch a glimpse of the cultural 
function of narrativising discourse in general, an intimation of the psychological 
impulse behind the apparently universal need not only to narrate by to give to events 
an aspect of narrativity.11
While there is perhaps no “true story” or “real story” that can emerge from any 
historical appraisal, both the Serbian and Croatian cases often show deliberate attempts to 
mislead, by either altering or removing aspects of historical events, so that these alterations 
cast the nation in a favourable light. In short -  they do not even strive for “truth” in any sense 
of the word. For White, the historian’s objectives are often an “enigma”, the product of
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“psychological impulses”. In this thesis -  the objectives are far less personal and far clearer 
than the rather opaque medieval texts White reviews. The process of “narrativising” was 
certainly heightened during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, to the extent that fantasies and 
desires of nationally oriented writers replaced any semblance of presenting a “real story” a la 
White. While this is certainly not a process confined only to Serbs and Croats, this pernicious 
aspect of identity creation during the 1990s was crucial to legitimating a wide variety of 
nation-building activities -  many of them violent. One objective of this thesis is to compare 
and contrast these very nationally biased views of history, to highlight the discrepancies 
between them, and to understand how the conflicting “desires” and “fantasies” of these 
writers have impacted on the creation of new histories.
A Note on Methodology:
The term ‘propaganda* has many negative connotations, but it is not intrinsically so. 
Political parties and corporations around the world use propaganda, or spin doctoring, on a 
daily basis, to outlaw fox hunting, promote the Euro, or sell soap. For a definition, I defer to 
Oliver Thomson, who, in his excellent study of mass persuasion techniques, described 
propaganda as, ‘the manipulation of public opinion by means of political symbols and of the 
management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols.’ In terms of 
how it is spread, Thomson argued that it includes, ‘any means of projecting or transmitting 
images, ideas or information which influences behaviour in every active or passive sense.
This covers every aspect of art and communication, because nearly all messages have either 
deliberately or accidentally some persuasive content.’12
This is a very general definition of propaganda, which covers almost everything. 
Within the context of this thesis, Thomson’s definition needs to be narrowed down. I will not 
be discussing accidental forms of persuasion, but rather -  deliberate attempts by Serbian and 
Croatian nationalists to manipulate public opinion in support of mobilisation for war, and the 
maintenance of war, both in Croatia, and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Often, this propaganda was 
closely related to nationalist governments in each country.
Throughout this thesis, I will be using a form of discourse analysis to explore the 
themes, ideas and vocabulary present in Serbian and Croatian propaganda. I have used a 
qualitative method of analysing primary material, isolating their most important themes and 
images. This is in line with Oliver Thomson’s suggestion of paying attention to ‘the more 
obvious pattern frequencies that come from a general view of contents.’13 This thesis will not 
only present an analysis of general themes and ideas in Serbian and Croatian historical
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revisions -  it will also analyse the vocabulary and structure of the language, and how it has 
been used.
While I have chosen a form of qualitative discourse analysis, I do not discount the 
role of quantitative analysis. In a 1993 study commissioned by the Stryelsen for Psykologist 
Forsvar (Centre for Psychological Research) in Sweden, Maijan Malesic and a team of 
researchers evaluated 213 newspaper articles from Serbia and Croatia (between August, 1991 
and January 1992). Using a quantitative approach, they drew up tables, charting the 
frequency of certain topics and terms used by the media to describe its own nation and its 
perceived enemies.14 The results of this study were illuminating. In Croatia, the team noted 
frequent ‘homeland related metaphors’, based on what they called ‘blood and soil imagery’. 
The media described the government’s actions and those of Croatian forces as ‘peace 
oriented activities’, and there was an emphasis on countering accusations that Tudjman was a 
proto-fascist.15 The team noted similar themes in the Serbian press, with an emphasis on the 
self-defensive nature of their activities. Tudjman was frequently denounced as a fascist, while 
the persecution of the Serbs in Croatia was constantly stressed.16
The team’s findings were in some ways similar to my own. They found that, 
‘communications in abnormal and extreme situations are characterised by generalisations 
combined with the use of stereotypes, labelling and value-weighted, emotionally charged 
attributes.’ They further noted that,
Such simplifications can be productive in the short term, especially in abnormal 
situations, since they ensure the required speed and simple identification. At the same 
time the effect of categorical patterns of thinking and of labelling is still further 
enhances by the use of value weighted and emotionally negatively charged 
characterisations, which possess a powerful mobilising force ... Mass media 
completely accomplished the role of political propaganda and war-mongering given 
them by the politicians.17
Even in an analysis of newspaper articles from the early stages of the conflict, it was 
clear that both sides were mobilising their people for an escalation of hostilities. Thus, either 
method of discourse analysis should furnish a clear picture of how Serbian and Croatian 
nationalist elites justified the rise of nationalism and escalation of hostilities to their own 
people, as well as to the outside world.
Hopefully, this thesis will be a new contribution to the expanding field of 
International Relations. Recently, Iver Neumann remarked in his challenging new book, The 
Uses o f the Other, ‘The discipline of international relations (IR) is witnessing a surge of 
interest in identity and identity formation. This development has been permitted and
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facilitated by the general uncertainty of a discipline which feels itself to have spent the 1980s 
barking up the wrong trees. A lack of faith in the old has made it easier for the new to break 
through.’18 Fresh insight into the links between the Holocaust, nationalism theory, and 
contemporary warfare is long overdue. This thesis should provide scope for new reflection on 
these and other issues.
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Chapter One: Nationalist Myths and Structure: Towards a 
Teleological Model o f Nationalism
The tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, 
they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them 
names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in 
this time honoured disguise and borrowed language.
- Henry Tudor in Political Myth (1972)-
Introduction:
For Serbian and Croatian nationalists, the manipulation of myths and national history 
performed an incredibly important role during the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1980s, and 
the wars of succession that followed after 1990. Before analysing these national myths, and 
their specific political objectives, it will be useful to understand what species, or general 
types of myths have been used -  and why. Reviewing the works of many of the major 
nationalism theorists, this chapter will introduce a useful analytical model to help understand 
the nature of Serbian and Croatian myths, the types of imagery they invoke, and how they are 
structured. This will lay the ground work for a more detailed study of how national myths 
have been used instrumentally in Serbia and Croatia to promote self determination, the 
shifting of borders and populations, and the installation of despotic and corrupt regimes.
Another goal of this chapter is to examine the legacy of the Biblical tradition on 
conceptions of nationalist myths and views of time in history. This will involve applying 
Northrop Frye’s cyclical view of history (Biblical teleology) to explain why certain myths 
(myths of Covenant, divine election/chosenness, and myths of Fall/persecution) have been so 
frequently used in the wars following the collapse of the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY). The use of Biblical teleology will also allow us to structure many of the 
pre-existing theories of nationalism into an analytical framework, with myths of Covenant, 
Fall, and Redemption, acting as hubs in a cyclical view of how nationalists portray mythical 
time in history.
Central to my analysis is that an examination and understanding of Jewish 
nationalism, and its importance in the development of general species of national myths. 
Jewish nationalism does not figure as a third case study in this thesis. However, specific 
aspects of Jewish nationalism have formed a template which Serbian and Croatian authors, 
politicians, and other leaders, used to legitimate many often violent acts of state-craft. That
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every Fall leads to a Redemption through a covenential relationship was a central theme of 
Jewish nationalism, an idea which was assiduously assimilated by Serbs and Croats.1
While such a cyclical view of nationalism can be seen in the work of many 
contemporary theorists, there are some notable detractors. Writers of the Modernist school, 
for example, have generally dismissed the importance of mythology in the formation of 
nationalism, and many have rejected the concept of negative myths (Fall and persecution) as 
important aspects of nationalist legitimacy. Equally obvious is Modernism’s paucity in 
dealing with how and why nationalist cohesion is created. While Modernism certainly has its 
positive aspects, it ignores much which is highly pertinent to the study of nationalism in 
Yugoslavia.
Myths of the Nation: Teleology and Time:
A central tenet of this thesis is that Biblical history and teleology have contributed 
greatly to the evolution of nationalism. Liah Greenfeld, in her study of nationalism, posited 
that the return to Old Testament narratives and myths of divine election were of central 
importance in the development of the first nationalism, (which she locates in early modem 
England) and by extension to all subsequent national movements. Similarly, Michael Walzer 
has noted the importance of Biblical exodus history, and how it has shaped the ‘civic-political 
aspirations of national liberation movements’.2
Certainly the Biblical tradition has played an important role in the development of 
European history and philosophy, and in the evolution of nationalism. As Conor Cmise 
O’Brien and Adrian Hastings have both argued, Hebrew nationalism in the Old Testament 
was one of the first instances of territorial nationalism, functioning as a template for future 
generations. O’Brien posited that a territorial ‘promised land’ was always seen to be 
synonymous with the Jewish ‘Heaven’, an idea which was rigorously removed from the 
Christian Bible, when redemption was advocated through the suffering of Christ.3 Hastings 
asserted that, ‘nations originally “imagined” ... through the mirror of the Bible’.4 For this 
reason, he also placed the Hebrew Bible at the centre of early nationalism, with ‘the true 
proto-nation’ being responsible for the development of nationalism in Christian countries, 
inspired, by rather than hindered, by religion.5
While the Old Testament certainly provided an example of a tribal group seeking, 
then gaining a homeland, one of the main features of Hebrew nationalism was the covenantial 
culture it created—a special relationship or series of agreements made between a people and 
their deity. Much of Zionism, and indeed nationalism in general, revolved around the concept
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of status reversal, or Covenant, the promise of deliverance in the midst of hardship. The 
Covenant was absolutely central to Jewish identity, in particular their concept of 
‘chosenness’, according to historian Donald Harman Akenson.6 Zionist writer Martin Buber 
placed the Covenant as central to the transformation of the Jewish people from ‘tribe* to 
‘Israel’.7
Following from this idea, Hans Kohn isolated three essential aspects of nationalism 
introduced by the Jews: ‘the idea of the chosen people’; ‘the consciousness of national 
history’; and ‘national messianism’.8 For Kohn, the invention of the Covenant was the 
defining moment in Jewish nationalism. While other tribes maintained a dialogue between 
elites and their deities, a Covenant between God and the ‘people’ made each person an equal 
member of the nation. Such a distinction gave the Hebrews a ‘national ideal and purpose’ to 
history.9 More importantly perhaps, a sense of direct Covenant eliminated the need for a 
specialised caste of priests and other elites functioning as intermediaries with the divine. A 
form of democratic nationalism was the result. Such a covenential culture provided a cyclical 
view of history, a teleology where hardships would be followed by rewards for the faithful, as 
long as they kept their Covenant with their god.
A reading of philosopher Northrop Frye’s critical appraisal of Biblical myth and 
structure is a useful method by which to understand how Biblical teleology operates. For 
Frye, a cycle of ‘rise, fall and rise again’ figured as the primary method by which history 
progressed in the Bible, what Frye dubbed a ‘covenential cycle’. Here, each negative event 
was followed by an equally positive reward -  or Redemption. Frye posited that biblical myths 
were in many ways of a common type, ‘express[ing] the human bewilderment about why we 
are here and where we are going, and include myths of creation, of Fall, of exodus, of 
migration, of destruction of the human race in the present (deluge myths) or the future 
(apocalyptic myths), and of Redemption’.10 But while the myths themselves were common, 
the uniqueness lay in the structure of Biblical narrative, which Frye describes as cyclical, a 
‘Divine Comedy’, where:
[The] apostasy [is] followed by a descent into disaster and bondage, which in turn is 
followed by repentance, then by a rise through deliverance to a point more or less on 
the level from which the descent began. This U-shaped pattern recurs in literature as 
the standard shape of comedy, where a series of misfortunes and misunderstandings 
brings the action to a threateningly low point, after which some fortunate twist in the 
plot sends the conclusion up to a happy ending. The entire Bible, viewed as a Divine 
Comedy, is contained within a U-shaped story of this sort, one in which man loses the 
tree and water of life at the beginning of Genesis and gets them back at the end of 
Revelation.11
22
Thus Biblical history, and the history of the world for practising Christians, was U- 
shaped. Within a large U-shaped cycle, which encapsulated the totality of Biblical history, 
were series of smaller U-shaped cycles. As Frye described, ‘In between, the story of Israel is 
told as a series of declines into the power of heathen kingdoms: Egypt, Philistia, Babylon, 
Syria, Rome, each followed by a rise into a brief moment of relative independence’.12 Some 
small cycles covered several days, while the largest comprised the entire history of the world 
-  from its creation to its destruction. Of interest to the study of nationalist mythology was the 
metaphorical linking together of all important Biblical events and symbols, what Frye called 
a ‘sequence of mythoV. In the hands of early myth-makers, the Garden of Eden, the Promised 
Land, Jerusalem, and Mount Zion became interchangeable symbols for the home of the soul. 
Similarly, Egypt, Babylon and Rome all became symbols of a Hebrew national Fall.13
While geographic location constituted symbols of Rise and Fall, good and evil, 
individual characters also came to embody parts of a general agency or force -  either positive 
or negative. Positive actors advanced the Hebrews forward towards a common teleological 
destiny, while negative actors brought about a series of Falls. Thus, the Pharoah of the 
Exodus, Nebuchadnezzar, Antiochus Epiphanes, and Nero were spiritually the same person, 
personifying negative forces. At the same time, the deliverers of Israel — Abraham, Moses, 
Joshua, the Judges, David, and Solomon, were all prototypes of the Messiah or final 
deliverer.14 Evil forces caused Falls, good forces engendered Redemptions. For Frye, this 
constant antagonism propelled Biblical history forward, ultimately allowing for the 
deliverance of the righteous. In this sense, both positive and negative were essential, one 
negated the other. The presence of both created a ‘non-self-contradictory’ ethical system, 
where the Hebrews were redeemed, while their enemies were destroyed.
Frye described several main Falls in the Bible, beginning with the physical 
banishment from the Garden of Eden. This represented humankind’s alienation from nature, 
and allegorised humanity’s acquisition of sexual knowledge, and the knowledge of good and 
evil.15 The myth of the Tower o f Babel (Genesis 11: 1-9) became significant, as an attempt to 
build an edifice to overcome the Fall, to bridge the gulf between man and God. Babel’s 
ambitious architects ultimately failed, leading only to the confusion of tongues -  and a 
second great Fall. This not only continued the alienation between man and nature, but 
heightened the alienation of man from man. The Fall was now complete, with human beings 
now alienated from God, nature, language and each other.16
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It is from this low point that the epic struggle of the Hebrew people began. At this 
third stage of the cycle, the individual dispersed units joined together. Here, the concept of 
‘kerygma’ provided the chosen with a knowledge of the divine plan, imparting to them the 
idea of destiny and teleology. Kerygma figured as a means of ‘revelation’ -  the conveying of 
information from an objective divine source to a subjective human receptor. This 
‘kerygmatic’ process occurred throughout Biblical history, as the Hebrew people received 
instructions and laws to govern their interactions and worship.17 What emerges from a 
reading of Frye is the importance of a strict teleology in Biblical narratives, the axiomatic 
link between Fall and Redemption, imparting hope in the midst of hardship. Equally 
important is the constant battle between positive and negative forces. The Hebrews as the 
divine elect were constantly delivered when negative forces plotted their destruction. 
Emerging from such a narrative was the view of a righteous and progressive nation, fighting 
against negative forces in history, in a continuous battle between good and evil.
Historian Norman Cohn has argued that a cyclical teleological view of history 
emerged from Jewish experiences of oppression, and their need to create hope for the future. 
Prophesies were used as a means of rallying members of a group together against the threat of 
external attack. While Cohn noted the use of prophesy amongst the Jews, such myths were
1 ftincorporated into Christianity as well. As Cohn elaborated, ‘Precisely because they were so 
certain of being the chosen people, Jews tended to react to peril, oppression and hardship by 
fantasies of the total triumph of and boundless prosperity which Yahweh, out of his 
omnipotence, would bestow upon his elect in the fullness of time.’19 Thus the greater the 
calamity, the greater the belief in recompense. Fall and Redemption were intimately bound 
together.
From an instrumentalist perspective, the belief in a covenantial cycle kept Jews loyal 
to their faith, and to the culture which sustained it. It provided hope for the future, as well as a 
belief in historical destiny and a sense of predictability in history -  perhaps also a passive 
acceptance of hardship, and a faith in future Redemption. What emerges from a critical 
reading of Biblical myth and structure are three distinct types of myth, each essential to a 
belief in the veracity of a covenantial culture.
• The first is a belief in the structure itself, a belief that every Fall will automatically lead to 
a Redemption for the faithful, through the intercession of some benevolent and divine 
being. Thus the idea of history as a series of turning points is very important.
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• The second concerns the divine or chosen status of the nation, how and why it deserves to 
be saved. These types of myths deal with the greatness, heroism, faithfulness and overall 
goodness of the nation, stressing those positive traits which make it a candidate for 
deliverance.
• The third type of myth revolves around the importance of Fall myths -  the nation as a 
victim of evil, ahistorical and eternal negative forces, which forces it to suffer before 
Redemption can come about. In this sense, the third is largely based on the other two 
types. One has to believe that one’s people will be saved, and that one is deserving of 
being saved, before such an eventuality can realistically be contemplated.
Of these types of myths, the first is usually assumed. If a nation is divine and good, 
and it can prove its persecution at the hands of evil forces, then it will be delivered. The 
second needs to be enshrined as part of the founding myth of the nation. As such, these types 
of myths can remain more or less unchanged, although they require constant reiteration and 
repetition to retain their influence. Of the three, the third type is the most important, since 
each Redemption or deliverance depends on proof of continued persecution.
Before proceeding further, it is important to understand how a nationalist teleology or 
covenential cycle can be situated within the confines of existing theories of nationalism. This 
will involve more detail about each stage of the cycle, as well as an examination of the 
subdivisions within each group. The result will be a workable analytical model, which will 
prove extremely useful for analysing and describing the nature and character of nationalist 
movements in Serbia and Croatia. The first group of myths I have termed ‘myths of Covenant 
and renewal’. The second group of myths, focussing on the chosenness or divinity of the 
nation, I have termed ‘primary myths of identification’ since these, in the pseudo-history of 
nationalism, describe the moment or series of events when the nation was either created or 
chosen, and imbued with righteous qualities. The third group of myths I have termed 
‘negative myths of identification’, simply because they rely on negative forces or agencies, 
seeking to subvert the nation’s destiny, or in more extreme cases, to assimilate or destroy the 
nation altogether.
Myths of Covenant and Renewal:
In his useful study of political myth, Henry Tudor argued that most political myths 
employed a teleological view of history, to give national members a fixed point of reference, 
allowing them to express their feelings and explain their experiences of suffering.20
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According to Tudor, the political myth-interpreter orders his experience on the assumption 
that the present is an episode in a story, enabling him to distinguish between what is 
significant and what is not. Myths allow individuals to understand their nation’s role in 
history, and the specific stage or time in history where the nation finds itself. Tudor linked the 
concepts of political mythology with Biblical mythology, in its teleological similarities. Both 
are cyclical, and as Tudor asserted, ‘Mythical time is reversible; What was done is not 
forever lost. It may in the fullness of time repeat itself. Every myth is a story of death and 
rebirth, of an end or eschatos with simultaneously a new beginning.’21
Events in the past or present fit into a complex paradigm by which the world is 
viewed, thus claiming significance far beyond their present day reality. As Tudor has argued, 
this applies not only to historical events, but also to land, where national territory can carry 
with it certain mythical and emotional connotations,
Depending on the myth to which he subscribes, he [the myth-interpreter] will see a 
particular tract of land as part of the territory from which the chosen people were 
expelled, a particular year as the one in which Christ will establish his kingdom on 
earth, a particular trade-unionist as an agent of a world-wide communist conspiracy, 
or a particular industrial dispute as a crucial incident in the class war?2
Dusan Kecmanovic has similarly discussed what he terms a ‘watershed’, or the 
‘theme of the right moment’ in the life of a nation or group. Paraphrasing a nationalist view 
of teleology, he explains, ‘we went through a period of national decline, of dissolution of 
corruption and anarchy, our national interests were more or less systematically suppressed 
and ignored to the point where we must do something to radically change our destiny, to take 
it into our own hands, to make a new order emerge.’23 Thus, a nation which is partially 
destroyed or suppressed, due to a Fall, may reawaken when the time is right. Of course it is 
the national leader, not “History” as such, which determines when this period of national 
renaissance will begin. George Schopflin has termed such imagery ‘myths of rebirth and 
renewal’, which also encapsulates the ‘palingenetic’ or messianic tradition of Judaism and 
Biblical teleology. Here, like Kecmanovic and Tudor, Schopflin describes these myths as 
ones where, ‘rebirth can create a sense of a clean state, a new start, in which the awfulness of 
the past can be forgotten’.24
What emerges from this view of national history and time is the importance of 
chosenness and Fall as the keys to Redemption. At a certain point, a nation is given the 
opportunity to reawaken, and to redeem itself after having suffered a Fall. History is thus 
composed of Falls and Redemptions, as well as positive and negative forces and individuals -
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those who help the nation, and those who hinder its progress. While there is seemingly a 
guarantee that the nation will always come out ahead, there is still a sense of constant threat 
from the outside world, forcing co-nationalists to rally together to preserve their customs and 
traditions.
Primary Myths of Identification:
In this series of mythology, two distinct types are present. The first deals with the 
deification of the nation, as holy and chosen, an ideal based on the Jewish example. The 
second type deals with more secular or ‘classical’ myths of the nation as heroic and 
triumphant. These types of myths can exist exclusively, or can underwrite each other. Each 
claims strong links between the nation and its national territory, from which it draws it 
strength.
The concept of national chosenness is primarily based on the Jewish example.
William Pfaff has described how nationalism elevates the nation to ‘a simulacrum of the 
Deity’.25 Peter Alter has seen the process of national myth creation as a time when, ‘the 
religious is secularised and the national sanctified’.26 Many theorists of nationalism have 
attempted to understand exactly how and why nationalism bears many similarities to religious 
belief. As Kecmanovic has understood the process, support for traditional religion declined in 
the 19th century, and people began to abandon their faith in heavenly salvation and eternal life 
after death. They began looking for more meaning here on earth, and a traditional view of 
religion was successfully replaced by the ‘pseudo-religious qualities of ethnic 
identification.’27 The elevation of the nation to something mystical and eternal, creating a 
new focus of loyalty, encouraging people to sacrifice everything for their national lands, even 
if this meant laying down their lives.28 Thus, the adoption of religious imagery by nationalist 
leaders was an instrumental process, designed to protect a specific territory or legitimate the 
expansion of the borders of an existing nation state.
Schopflin has similarly advanced his ‘myths of election’, where the nation believes it 
has been specially chosen by God or History to perform some special mission, because of its 
unique or noble virtues. While such myths are rooted in the Christian tradition, the 
secularisation of religion in nationalism has forced nationalists to look for other forms of 
proof that the nation was superior to its rivals. Thus, a nation’s capacity for ‘civility’,
‘literacy’ or ‘Europeanness’, would rank it above rival neighbouring groups, legitimating an 
assumption of moral and cultural uniqueness and pride.29
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Kecmanovic has advanced a similar view, arguing that, ‘A fixed belief that they are 
brighter, more courageous, more honest, more righteous, more freedom loving, and the like 
helps to explain and justify their insufficient regard for their rights and interests of people of 
other ethnonational groups...’30 Further, these myths were often applied in times of crisis, 
such that, ‘“we”... have better warriors and more skilled in arms and military dexterity than 
“our” foe. At the negotiation table the nationalists will claim to be more tolerant, more fair 
and more respectful of their given word than their counterparts on the other side of the
I
table.’ As Kecmanovic and Schopflin have both argued, secularised religious imagery and a 
sense of national superiority have grown out of a religious tradition, even if national 
‘believers’ possess only vestiges of religious belief.
Certainly, religion, whether in vestigal form or is its full glory, can often be an 
important aspect of national identity. In many cases, nationalists have adopted and 
manipulated, rather than condemned religion. In the conflict between Serbian Orthodoxy and 
Croatian Catholicism, the examples of the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, the 
Palestinians and Jews in Israel, the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, or even the Quebecois in 
Canada, a rise in national awareness and sense of chosenness was often accompanied, or 
preceded, by a return to religion as a strong focus of identification. While religion may not 
have been the primary cause of conflict, it did become a legitimate justification for the 
escalation and maintenance of it. Linkages at different levels between nations and their 
religion can be of central importance in convincing national members that their consolidation 
into national units is somehow part of a divine plan, or the outcome of natural forces.
The Golden Age of Nationalism:
Certainly the most complete analysis of Golden Age mythology has been undertaken 
by Anthony Smith, although his zeal has led to a certain myopia. Arguing for a more secular 
interpretation of primary identification myths, Smith has taken pains to reduce the importance 
of religious identification, while similarly marginalising myths of persecution. For Smith, 
nationalism’s most attractive feature is its ability to make members of the nation immortal, 
‘through the judgement of posterity, rather than through divine judgement in an afterlife.’33 
Nationalism’s ability to create secular heroes, saints, and great leaders allows co-nationals to 
dream of a glorious destiny within their own national history. Smith, perhaps as a result of his 
own classics and art history background, has seen nationalism as a secular and aesthetic 
phenomenon, one which relies heavily on myths of the Golden Age. These are further 
buttressed by ‘the foundation charter’, and ‘ethnic title deeds’, derived from a nation’s long
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attachment to the land.34 Such reasoning is similar to that of Pfaff, Alter, Kecmanovic and 
Schopflin, but has many notable differences.
For Smith, the Golden Age is the central component of nationalism and national 
identity. It promises, ‘a status reversal, where the last shall be first and the world will 
recognise the chosen people and their sacred values.’35 Nationalists look to their ancient past 
for inspiration and self love. Further, as Smith has argued, a nation’s ‘immortality’ (its eternal 
or historically significant qualities), has been based on its ability to, ‘unfold a glorious past, a 
golden age of saints and heroes, to give meaning to its promise of restoration and dignity.’36 
He has termed this, ‘the myth of the historical renovation’, where one is returned to a basic 
national ‘essence’, a ‘basic pattern of living and being’ -  the ‘Golden Age’ of the nation.37 
Thus, we are presented with descriptions o f ‘poetic spaces’, ‘nature’, ‘authenticity’, as well 
as, ‘vivid recreations of the glorious past of the community’. While this bears some 
similarity to myths of Covenant and renewal, the purely secular bent of Smith’s thinking, 
coupled with his aversion to any negative myths of identification makes it somewhat 
different.
Smith’s taxonomy of myths is also rooted in this type of national mythology, which 
he has argued both, ‘define the historic culture community’, while at the same time endowing 
it with a ‘particular energy and power’. His taxonomy includes: myths of origin (ancient 
and unique origins of nations rooted in folklore); myths of descent (noble lineage and 
genealogy of nations, myths of founding fathers or tribes); and myths of the heroic age (the 
golden age or high point of the original nation). These types of myths, he has argued, more 
than any other, ‘set a standard of culture and achievement that has rarely been equalled and 
can act as a model for subsequent generations and other communities.’40
Smith has therefore argued from an instrumentalist perspective. The communal past 
of a nation forms a ‘repository or quarry from which materials may be selected in the 
construction and invention of nations’.41 History becomes nothing more than a ‘useable past’, 
where nationalists select the myths they need in order to advance certain views of the nation, 
necessary for rallying people together to reclaim national greatness.42 Unfortunately, Smith 
has prioritised these types of myths, to the extent that he sees no other. While he has argued 
for the importance of warfare as an important, ‘mobiliser of ethnic sentiments’, and as a, 
‘provider of myths and memories for future generations’, he has also concluded that, ‘it 
would be an exaggeration to deduce the sense of common ethnicity from the fear of the 
“outsider” and paired antagonisms.’43 As will become obvious from the Serbian and Croatian 
cases, it was indeed the fear of powerful expansionary empires, complete with alien systems
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of government and religion, which forced people to stand together and forge a sense of 
common identity.
In his discussion of ‘anti-colonialism’, Smith has also dismissed any sort of fear or 
loathing of others. Consolidating national identity by means of a hatred of ‘conquering 
outgroups’ is denounced as a ‘simple and untenable’ theory. ‘Men’, he has written, ‘do not 
seek collective independence and build states simply to react to a “common enemy’” .44 Smith 
has accused colonised groups of exaggerating the problems they have encountered through 
colonialism. He has even criticised the use of the labels ‘foreigner’ and ‘alien’ to describe 
colonial leaders, since even foreign masters eventually became part of the landscape.45 In his 
taxonomy of groups (tribe, ethnie, and nation) Smith has included ‘In-group sentiment’ as an 
important criteria, but excludes any mention of how fear or loathing of the outgroup could 
also be important.46 Curiously, the fear of persecution, Fall, or any aspect of national decline, 
has not played a role in spurring nations to band together. Rather, Smith described ‘lifting 
present generations out of their banal reality’, as the true motive of national mythology 47 
Such imagery attributed national resurgence to the product of a mundane existence, a theory 
squarely at odds with reality.
Rather than engage with those who see persecution as central to national 
identification, Smith has deflected criticism by the term ‘ethnicism’, a form of identity for 
ethnic groups separate from nationalism. The basis of ethnicism, but not nationalism is to, 
‘resist... perceived threats from outside and corrosion within’. Smith has described 
‘Ethnicism’ as ‘fundamentally defensive’, only appearing in times o f ‘military threats’, 
‘socio-economic challenges’, and ‘culture contact’ (when a less developed culture come into
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prolonged contact with a more developed one). While ethnicism gets closer to other ideas of 
nationalism, Smith has failed to discuss the relevance of these threats, or how ethnic groups 
were able to mould external threats into myths for collective action. Additionally, by dividing 
certain groups into ‘ethnies’, Smith has been able to deflect challenges to his narrow 
definition of what constitutes a ‘nation’. By dismissing myths of persecution or threat as 
‘anti-colonial’ or ‘ethnic’ only, he has avoided analysing them as part of the nationalist 
phenomenon. This artificial separation of nationalism and ethnicism is obviously at odds with 
the reality of many nationalist movements around the world.
Problematically, while Smith has described a ‘useable past’ for nationalism, anything 
to do with ethnicity is seen as decidedly different. He has derided those who would seek to 
use ‘ethno-history’ in the same way as a nation’s cultural history. Thus his extremely 
patronising statement, ‘Ethno-history is no sweet shop in which nationalists may “pick and
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mix”; it sets limits to any selective appropriation by providing a distinctive context and 
pattern of events ... It furnishes a specific but complete heritage which cannot be 
dismembered and then served up a la carte.,49
In one of his most recent works on nationalism theory, Smith purposely excluded 
discussion of genocide, ethnic cleansing, national minorities and several other current topics, 
first, in order to save space, and secondly, and more importantly, because, ‘while analyses of 
these issues are vital and immensely valuable in their own right, it is by no means clear that 
they can further the task of explaining the origins, development and nature of nations and 
nationalism.’50 His limited view of national mythology excludes any discussion of negative 
elements, which could explain why certain nations have pursued genocidal policies against 
national minorities within their own borders. Certainly during the pre-modem period in 
Europe, as well as during Europe’s colonial debacles in the 18th and 19th centuries, genocide 
and the forced transfer of populations were integral to creating homogenous cultures, on 
which modem nation state or colonies could de constructed.
While Smith has overestimated the importance of the Golden Age in his study of 
nationalism, his analysis is nevertheless rigorous and well argued. The Golden Age is 
certainly an important part of nationalist identity, and credit needs to be given where it is due. 
Moreover, his ‘myths of origin’, ‘myths of decent’, and ‘myths of the heroic age’ provide 
invaluable sub-species of myths which are of use in dissecting nationalist historical 
narratives. Nevertheless, there is much more to nationalism than Smith’s Golden Age.
Other theorists of nationalism, such as Ernest Gellner, have been more dismissive of 
the Golden Age, labelling it a ‘putative folk culture’, drawn from myths of the ‘healthy, 
pristine, vigorous life of the peasants’.51 While Gellner found it laudable that indigenous 
cultures were able to stand up to oppression and subjugation by an ‘alien high culture’, he 
argued that in most cases, an ‘invented high culture’, was introduced after nationalism had 
been successful, rather than any sort of traditional Tow culture’ on which the aesthetics of the 
nationalism were drawn.52
Gellner’s argument is valid, in that nations rarely attempt to recreate any form of 
‘authentic’ Golden Age, when an idealised history is far more flattering. Nevertheless, 
inauthentic reproductions of past national culture do not diminish the importance of this type 
of imagery. Seen first and foremost as an instrumental construction, ‘primary myths of 
identification’ allow the nation to dream of a glorious and heroic past, positing origins of 
chosenness or divine election. This gives national members a feeling of self-worth, while at 
the same time forcing them to look to the past for their inspiration. These myths also
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reinforce a sense of tragedy, that the nation has somehow fallen from grace, and must 
therefore be redeemed. That the nation was great and somehow Fell, due to internal or 
external forces must be a central element in spurring a nation to reassert itself. Smith’s 
insistence on marginalising Fall myths is a major failing of his approach, even if his analysis 
of the Golden Age is extremely lucid.
Negative Myths of Identification:
Throughout my thesis, I will argue that negative myths have formed the nodal point of 
Serbian and Croatian nationalism, providing a much-needed stock of metaphors and imagery. 
Such myths enabled nationalists to legitimate many insalubrious and violent acts of state­
craft. Myths of persecution and Fall explain why the nation has fallen from its Golden Age. 
These myths situate the nation within a teleological framework, where external forces 
persecuting the nation will be judged and dealt with as the nation struggles to deliver itself. 
Without these types of images, a national revival is simply unnecessary.
For those writing on the Jewish example of nationalism, persecution and Fall were a 
result of a unified negative force in history. Hugh Trevor-Roper argued that such imagery 
became normal in European nationalism, and his definition of ‘normal nationalism’ included 
a sense of persecution and victimisation. Nationalism, as he saw it, was, ‘the expression of 
wounded nationality: the cry of men who have suffered great national defeat, or whose 
nationality is denied, or who live insecurely on exposed national frontiers, surrounded, and in 
danger of being swamped by foreigners.’ In other words, it was both understandable and 
common-place for nations to invoke a sense of persecution or victimisation in order to justify 
defensive action against external enemies.
Peter Alter, while not including a sense of persecution or oppression in his ‘common 
structural components’ of nationalism, has identified, ‘disrespect for and animosity towards 
other people’ as an important aspect of identity.54 He has further argued that, ‘social groups 
also tend to define their national identity and national consciousness in negative terms ... 
Encounters with “alien”-  other forms of language, religion, customs, political systems -  
make people aware of close ties, shared values and common ground.’55 Thus, contrary to 
Smith’s proposition that only positive imagery is important in nationalism, Alter argues that 
negative encounters with external ‘others’ are also crucial in creating a cohesive national 
identity.
Kecmanovic has also argued for the centrality of the other in identity formation. 
‘Counteridentification’, as he has explained, reinforces a mandatory respect for ‘national
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standards’ and the ‘observance of proscribed rituals’. The identification of a ‘group enemy’, 
‘smoothes, buffers, or completely neutralises intragroup antagonisms’. 56 Indeed, without a 
sense of discrimination and aggressiveness against strangers, it is very difficult to maintain 
strong bonds of friendship or co-operation amongst co-nationals. Counteridentification is 
close to Kecmanovic’s theory of ‘pseudospeciation’, a term which describes the human 
tendency to split off into separate groups, creating ‘pseudospecies’ which behave as if they 
were separate species -  with completely different traditions, cultural habits, and 
psychologies.57 This appears to be little more than a modernised definition of racial 
consciousness, echoing the 19th and early 20th century idea that each race had separate 
unchangeable physical and psychological characteristics which make it behave differently 
from other races. Again, the main issue here is that of differentiation between one’s own 
group -  be it a nation, pseudospecies, or race, and an external negative force trying to destroy 
it.
Claude Lefort’s image of the ‘People as one’ similarly invokes the importance of an 
external negative force to the creation of an internally coherant system. For Lefort, 
membership in the nation is considered the highest form of association, with one’s most 
important duty being loyalty to the nation, and one’s pledge to defend it. Lefort’s work has 
very much dealt with the relationship between Communist states and nationalism,
At the foundation of totalitarianism lies the representation of the People-as-one. In the
so-called socialist world, there can be no other division than that between the people
and its enemies: a division between inside and outside, no internal division...the
constitution of the People-as-one requires the incessant production of enemies. It is
not only necessary to convert, at the level of phantasy [szc.], real adversaries of the
regime or real opponents into the figures of the evil Other, it is also necessary to 
58invent them.
Lefort’s conception invoked the centrality of the other to the formation of a stable and 
homogenous internal identity.
As Marc Howard Ross has further explained the phenomenon, the isolation of 
enemies who, ‘contain unwanted parts of ourselves’, can allow the nation to purge itself of 
many negative attributes, leaving only the good characteristics. Shared images of the world 
and plans for action are predicated on a shared conception of difference between one’s own 
group and others. As he has described, ‘Outsiders can then serve as objects for 
extemalisation, displacement and projection of intense negative feelings like dissenting 
perspectives, which are present inside the group but denied.’59 Thus, a nation which has been 
traditionally seen as warlike or hostile, can portray itself as a victim of aggression. A nation
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with a reputation of repressing its own national minorities will claim that its own people in 
far away lands are being abused, and are in need of protection.
A similar argument was picked up recently by Michael Ignatieff, who has made ample 
use of Sigmund Freud’s ‘narcissism of minor differences’ to analyse the conflict in 
Yugoslavia. As he has explained, ‘the smaller the real difference between two peoples, the 
larger it was bound to loom in their imagination’. He thus comments wryly, ‘Without hatred 
of the other, there would be no clearly defined national self to worship and adore.’60 It would 
be hard to imagine a theory more diametrically opposed to that of Smith.
What these theorists share is a view of national identity which needs an other, an 
external enemy, to consolidate support for an exclusive ‘in group’. In many ways, such a 
view of nationalism appears more plausible than that of Smith. Such imagery is important, as 
it creates a need to belong to the nation, for protection, and defence against external ‘others’ 
seeking to destroy the nation. Of course, national loyalty is also derived from positive aspects 
as well -  national symbols, characteristics, and shared memories worth preserving. 
Nevertheless, it is only when these positive aspects are threatened that they become truly 
appreciated. The instrumentality of such national imagery is clear—proving national Falls 
becomes the key to organising a national movement.
Kenneth Minogue’s analysis is particularly useful here. Minogue identifies a three 
stage process of nationalist awakening: ‘stirrings’-  when the nation ‘becomes aware of itself 
as a nation suffering from oppression’; ‘struggle’-  when the nation is sufficiently organised 
to fight for its independence; and ‘consolidation’-  when the nation-state has actually been 
attained.61 For Minogue, the central aspect in nationalist ‘stirrings’ is a reaction against 
oppression as an organised unit. The banding together of co-nationals to rectify the wrongs of 
history becomes a strong rallying cry. Clearly, the links between fear and hatred of an 
external enemy and national consolidation appear to be quite strong, according to a wide 
variety of theorists of nationalism. Most of these theories are in tacit opposition to Smith and 
his Golden Age. For many of these writers, negative threats from the outside, rather than 
great marvels of national history, determine the need for national membership.
A Taxonomy of Fall and Persecution Myths:
Both George Schopflin and Dusan Kecmanovic have created useful ‘taxonomies’ or 
classifications of Fall myths. Schopflin has identified two types and Kecmanovic -  five. The 
purpose of such taxonomies has been to further analyse and deconstruct negative imagery, 
and its role in nationalism theory. Schopflin’s first type of Fall deals with ‘myths of
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redemption and suffering’, consisting of ‘myths of powerlessness and compensation for the 
powerless’ -  both of which stress the importance of status reversal. These, as Schopflin 
argues, turn fatalism and passivity into virtues, while making suffering nations morally 
superior to their rivals.62
The second type are ‘myths of unjust treatment’, where, ‘history is a malign and 
unjust actor that has singled out the community for special, negative treatment’.63 Schopflin 
has stressed the purposeful nature of collective suffering, endowing persecution and 
victimisation with meaning. Thus, like Biblical teleology, national Redemption follows 
naturally from a Fall. As he paraphrases the argument, ‘the world ... owes those who have 
suffered a special debt... the victims of suffering are helpless because they suffered for the 
wider world and the wider world should recognise this, thereby legitimating the group’s 
special worth.’64 Schopflin has placed Holocaust myths here, as well as myths which copy the 
Holocaust, appropriating its symbolism.65
Kecmanovic’s myths or ‘themes’ are similar to those of Schopflin, although each is 
not mutually exclusive. ‘The theme of damage’ highlights how frequently the nation has been 
deprived, economically, legally, religiously, or socially. Competition between rival groups 
for scarce resources within a state naturally favours one group over another. This leads 
invariably to a lower level of economic and cultural development for the group being 
oppressed. As Kecmanovic □ argues, this cultural submergence and economic exploitation is a 
common theme in nationalist writing.66 The next theme deals with ‘threat’ -  both from 
internal and external forces. Internally, those who refuse to acknowledge the decomposition 
of the nation do nothing to prevent the nation from crumbling. Externally, ‘threat’ comes 
from outside groups who seek to undermine the nation, by destroying its socio-economic 
potential, while similarly ‘deaden[ing] then* national self-consciousness’.
Thirdly, Kecmanovic has identified the theme of the ‘universal culprit’, where, 
‘Nationalists perceive the members of another nationality as the source of all evil and as
ro
responsible for all the ills that have befallen them.’ Kecmanovic has also isolated a forth 
theme of ‘plot’, where nationalists find enemies around the world, not just among their 
neighbours. Thus, international organisations, the KGB, the Vatican, Freemasons, or other 
groups are blamed for all the ills of the nation. Such foreign and seemingly omnipotent forces 
are implicated in sinister plots to undermine the nation, creating a paranoia which stresses a 
sense of national uniqueness in the face of attack from multiple sources.69 The final theme is 
that of ‘victim and sacrifice’, where nationalists become, ‘victims of envy, of the hegemonic 
and expansionist tendencies of other people, victims of minority or majority groups that
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70continuously demand greater autonomy or more rights.’ In this final case, external forces 
try to destroy the nation to gain its power for themselves.
What Kecmanovic and Schopflin share is the view that negative identification is 
central to the formation of national myths, certainly as important as positive forms of identity. 
Both writers have argued that this type of imagery ‘proves’ to national members that they 
either deserve recompense and special status from outside, or the recognition that their own 
‘self help’ remedies are justified. Both see these types of myths as instrumental, and both 
advance the importance of negative myths in reinforcing a sense of uniqueness and self- 
righteousness. Negative myths buttress positive myths by stressing that what is good and 
noble in the nation needs to be preserved, and can only be preserved by national unity and 
loyalty.
What emerges from an overview of ‘myths of negative identification’ is their 
fundamental importance within a teleological and ethical framework. Because a ‘chosen’, 
‘noble’, and ‘golden’ nation has fallen, due to outside influences, it deserves to be given its 
rightful place in the family of nations. Not only does a nationalist understanding of history 
teach that a suffering nation deserves Redemption, an understanding of teleology posits that it 
will eventually be redeemed, should co-nationals band together to accomplish national 
objectives. Using Minogue’s analysis, we see how such imagery can be instrumentalised by 
nationalist leaders. As previously discussed, a nationalist teleology is largely assumed to be at 
work in the history of nations. What needs to be proved in order for that teleology to come 
about are myths of the past greatness of the nation, and myths of its persecution and Fall. The 
construction and perpetuation of national myths is an instrumental phenomenon, where elites 
order events, according to their view of history, creating an ethical system where right and 
wrong are clearly demarcated.
Modernism and its Approach to Nationalism:
Since the 1960s, an important branch of nationalism theory has been Modernism, 
which accounts for the rise of nations as a concomitant of the industrial revolution and the 
spread of literacy and the printing press. Modernists have generally had little interest in 
nationalist mythology, seeing nationalism as a solution for the problems of industrialisation 
and mass urbanisation, not as an end in itself. While views on the character of nationalism are 
wide ranging, they basically share a common theme: that negative imagery (or myth) is an 
insignificant factor in the development, structuring and articulation of nationalism. For most 
Modernists, it has generally been irrelevant what types of national mythology have been
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used, what aspects of history have been reinterpreted, or why nationalism has been chosen 
over some other form of association, such as Communism or Fascism.
Ernest Gellner, for example, begins from the stand point that there was little intrinsic 
worth to nationalism, since it is, ‘not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it
71invents nations where they do not exist.’ While admitting that there are some ‘pre-existing 
differentiating marks’ that might form part of the basis of nationalism, these are seen as 
secondary to the larger process of nation-building which occurred in modernity. Such ‘marks’ 
are relevant only insofar as every nation seemed to have them in its past.72 The nature or 
extent of such ‘marks’ failed to enter into Gellner’s discussion, who argued that ‘The cultural 
shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions. Any old 
shred and patch would have served as well.’73 Thus nationalist symbols are seen as 
instrumental only -  they could be anything, as long as they performed a certain social and 
political function -  that of channelling popular support for the nationalist elite.
John Breuilly’s observations are similar in many respects. Breuilly sees little intrinsic 
worth to nationalism, other than its ability to, ‘exploit the sense of loss modernity creates ... 
providing] simple concrete labels for friends and enemies.’74 Nationalism is seen as little 
more than an institutional instrument for gaining power, useful, Breuilly posits, for 
opposition groups seeking to gam power within a state. There is nothing here to suggest that 
nationalism has any intrinsic features which make it better than other forms of association, 
nor that nationalism has any special types of symbolism or imagery at its disposal. 
Throughout this thesis, I will argue that the opposite is often true, that the nation has to chose 
its ‘shreds and patches’ very carefully. There is nothing arbitrary about nationalist mythology 
at all.
Other Modernists, such as Eric Hobsbawm, have a more ambivalent view of the role 
of negative imagery. Characteristically, Hobsbawm encounters difficulty with the concept of 
negative identification. For him, ethnic and national identification are divided into separate 
categories. While he sees that external attacks on the ethnic group may well help that group
7 f \bind together, he does not see nationalism suffering from the same process. Hobsbawm is 
careful not to dismiss racial and ethnic identity outright as an aspect of nationalism. He 
admits that prejudice based on colour and other physical characteristics has played an 
important role in politics. Nevertheless, he adds that, ‘negative ethnicity is virtually always
• 77irrelevant to proto-nationalism... ’
Hobsbawm later contradicts himself, finding that while racism itself may not be 
important in developing a proto-nationalism, it becomes crucial as nationalism becomes more
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widespread, and gains mass appeal. This ‘democratisation’ of nationalism, as Hobsbawm 
recalls, often implies an era when, ‘popular nationalist, or at all events xenophobic sentiments 
and those of national superiority preached by the new pseudo science of racism, became 
easier to mobilise.’78 Reviewing 19th century nationalism, Hobsbawm draws a positive 
correlation between nationalism and out-group violence, arguing, ‘there is no more effective 
way of bonding together the disparate sections of restless peoples than to unite them against 
outsiders.’79 In this approach, modernity creates the conditions for a more xenophobic and 
racially based nationalism. Further, his analysis prescribes nationalism as a potential cure for 
the onset of modernity, and its concomitant alienation of various groups in society, looking 
for some form of identity. The fear of losing traditional ways with the onset of increased 
urbanisation made it easier for national elites to gain support by convincing the populace that
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they were being persecuted because of their national group.
In this way, Hobsbawm blends together some of the Modernist ideas of Gellner and 
Breuilly concerning industrialisation and the importance of urbanisation in creating a milieu 
wherein nationalism can come about. While he seemingly rejects racism and negative views 
of out groups at the beginning of nationalism, he finds negative forms of nationalism to be 
crucial later. The question “Why only later?” is never answered, and this creates several 
problems. The first is that elite or proto-nationalism is somehow seen as free of racism or 
negative views of the other, while there is an implication that the masses somehow need 
someone to hate in order to rally behind a nationalist leader. While ethnic groups and the 
masses are seen to be xenophobic, the national elites are somehow above such attitudes. How 
and why this is the case is not explained.
If Hobsbawm rejects enemy images in the development of early nationalism, Benedict 
Anderson has completely rejected its importance throughout the process of national 
development and ‘democratisation’. He posits that, ‘nations inspire love, and often 
profoundly self sacrificing love,’ and goes on to argue that, while national love inspires 
‘poetry, prose fiction, music and plastic arts ... how truly rare it is to find analogous
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nationalist products expressing fear and loathing.’ Anderson even went so far as to posit 
that colonised people felt little hatred for their former colonial overlords. He was astonished,
Q*y
at, ‘how insignificant the element of hatred is in these expressions of national feeling’. 
Anderson’s select examples from South East Asia ignore the reality of those many nations 
who based at least part of their nationalism on threat and fear. While love of the nation is an 
important ingredient in activating national sentiments, Anderson’s rejection of negative 
imagery ignores half of the picture.
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Tom Naim’s view of nationalism differs in many respects from others of the 
modernist school. Adopting a more populist perspective, he sees the involvement of the 
masses as the cmcial step in nationalism, as well as its source of legitimacy. As such, myths 
of ‘popular revolution’ or ‘national liberation struggle’ form the basis of modernist national 
myths, making nations appear democratic and desirable.83 Tracing its more recent history, 
Naim examines the importance of nationalism for weaker nations, as an ideology which was 
used, particularly in Latin America and Indo-China, as a way of rallying people together to
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fight against ‘alien oppression.’ His basic goal is to tie modem nationalism to 
underdevelopment in developing countries. Again, nationalism is a solution to economic 
backwardness.
Unlike Gellner, Breuilly and Anderson, Naim sees negative views of foreigners and 
out-groups as central to emerging national consciousness. In fact, a strong aversion to 
colonial powers forms the basis of nationalism. As Naim explains, ‘Their mlers ... had to 
mobilise their societies for this historical short cut. This meant the conscious formation of a 
militant, inter-class community rendered strongly (if mythically) aware of its own separate 
identity vis-a-vis the outside forces of domination.’85 This view completely opposes that of 
Smith and Anderson. Naim’s emphasis on ‘mobilisation’ stresses the need for emerging 20th 
century nationalism to focus on ‘differentiae’ as the lynchpin of nationalist struggles. 
However, like Gellner’s ‘shreds and patches’, the specific symbols and images of nationalism 
are irrelevant, merely a cobbling together of, ‘inherited ethnos, speech, folklore, [and] skin 
colour’, with certain external structures of nationalism, such as a capital city, a currency, a 
government, a military, and other such trappings.86 Naim puts the point more succinctly in a 
later work, describing nationalism simply as, ‘the effort by one “backward” culture and 
people after another to appropriate the powers and benefits of modernity for their own use’, 
largely in reaction to imperialism and colonial domination.87
Naim’s view of nationalism as a populist movement, based on a collective will to 
appropriate the structures of a ‘modem’ state is in many ways naive. What he presents is a 
utopian vision of how such states should have worked, a view which ignores the unfortunate 
excesses and corruption of many nationalist leaders, who did more to exploit their own 
people than did their former colonial masters. As well, the focus on external colonial forces 
as the subject of negative imagery is not easily applied to other cases. In many African states, 
as with India and Pakistan, for instance, conflict between ethnic groups (or potential nations) 
was sometimes far more severe and bloody than any stmggle against colonialism.
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In conclusion, while Modernism advances several intriguing explanations for the rise 
of nationalism, it does little to explain why nations evolve as they do, why certain types of 
myths and ideas are important while others are not, and more importantly, why nationalism is 
seen to be the best instrumental method of acquiring power within the state. None of the 
Modernist writers surveyed ascribe any intrinsic worth to nationalism, seeing it merely as a 
tool in the struggle for power. The appeal of nationalism remains elusive. People become 
nationalists, either because they are confused and dislocated by industrialisation and 
modernity, or adopt nationalism in order to create an industrialised and modem state. Few 
conclusions are offered to prove or disprove that such a view of nationalism is historically 
accurate.
Critics such as Anthony Smith have rightly signalled many emerging nationalisms 
which disprove the Modernist case. At the same time, he questions how receptive people 
have actually been to ‘official school culture’, rightly asking, ‘Is the sacrifice for the
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fatherland really a defence of an educationally sustained high culture?’ In most cases, 
important symbols and traditions, rooted in pre-national culture seem to be at work. Some of 
these traditions may be more deeply felt than nationalists realise. Indeed, the drive to use the 
past to make sense of the present opens a Pandora’s box of differing values and 
interpretations of the past, resulting in struggles to see whose version of reality will prevail.
In short, Modernism fails to address the continued importance of nationalist myths and 
traditions. Explorations into what sort of national myths and traditions are useful in the 
development of nationalism, how national time and history is conceived, as well as analyses 
of the structure of national myths and ideas, are simply not relevant to Modernist studies of 
nationalism.
Conclusions:
A model comprised of these three general varieties of myths should allow for a 
systematic analysis of Serbian and Croatian nationalist myths, including how these myths 
were selected, and how they were used instrumentally. Of these three types of myths, the first 
type is largely assumed. Without the promise of a status reversal, there can be no teleology in 
history, and the nation is deprived of its destiny. Because it has so long been anchored in the 
Biblical tradition, any group which can prove itself to be chosen, and to have suffered 
national Falls, can look forward to such a change in status.
‘Primary myths of identification’ are equally important. They create a utopian vision 
of what the nation can be, making nationalists proud of their history and traditions. While
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these myths help a nation understand its own unique character and historical significance, 
they are less important than ‘negative myths of identification’. The reason for this stems from 
the importance of the Jewish example, and the creation of a post-Holocaust ethic in the 
western world, which privileges an aesthetic of victimisation. Proving one’s Golden Age 
serves primarily to increase the tragic aspects of the national Fall, thereby demonstrating a 
greater need for national Redemption. In sum, the first and second category of myths are of 
central importance as ‘givens’. They must be entrenched for the third type of myth to be 
operationalised.
Throughout this thesis, priority will be given to an analysis of ‘negative myths of 
identification’. While the other two types of myths will be vigorously reviewed, these 
negative myths have proven the most useful in rallying people together under a common 
cause, namely -  the defence of the nation from external attack. Such myths convince 
members of a nation that they are in danger, should they choose not to adhere to the national 
traditions and prescriptions laid forth by their leaders. As will become increasingly obvious, 
strong propaganda campaigns replete with Fall imagery and the fear of genocide, preceded 
much of the irredentist behaviour and ‘ethnic cleansing’ that so traumatised the Yugoslav 
region. Proving guilt of the other in trying to destroy the self became a central preoccupation 
of Serbian and Croatian nationalists seeking to legitimate many of their often violent 
activities.
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Chapter Two: The Functionalisation of Jewish Nationalism
'For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them e.g. 
men becoming builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we 
become just by just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave 
acts... ’
-Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics1-
‘Where once it was said that the life of Jews would be "a light unto nations ” - the 
bearer of universal lessons -  now it is the “darkness unto nations ” of the death of 
Jews that is said to carry universal lessons ... Individuals from every point on the 
political compass can find the lessons they wish in the Holocaust; it has become a 
moral and ideological Rorschach test. '
-Peter Novick, The Holocaust and Collective Memoirf-
Introduction:
One of the central arguments of this thesis is that negative imagery has been a crucial 
building block in Serbian and Croatian national myths. These myths have been used to 
legitimate the forced shifting of borders, the ethnic cleansing of populations, and various 
other violent aspects of state formation. Equally important had been the frequent use of the 
Jewish Holocaust as a template for restructuring nationalist histories. The Holocaust as a kind 
of ‘Super-Fall’ has left a lasting impression on nationalist propagandists. Three concepts are 
of importance here: firstly, the universalisation of the Holocaust as a series of stock themes 
and metaphors for national suffering; secondly, a debate among historians comparing the 
Holocaust to other instances of genocide in the 20th century and before; and thirdly, the 
concept of ‘performativity’ -  the theory that nations create forms of discourse to convince 
themselves and others that they are indeed victims, even if an impartial view of history might 
prove otherwise.3
Serbian and Croatian national projects proved to be relatively successful in rallying 
co-nationals against perceived external threats, convincing them of the need for self­
defensive action to save the nation from attack. During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, ‘acting’, or pretending to be a victim, formed a central part of Serbian and 
Croatian propaganda, and served to legitimate the violence necessary to create an expanded 
homeland. Perhaps this is the ultimate irony of the 20 century, that the Jews, formerly the 
consummate ‘others’ of history, should find their symbols and actions so copiously studied 
and borrowed by other nations.
In this study of Serbian and Croatian nationalism, I will argue that Jewish myths of 
Covenant (palingenesis or status reversal), myths of a Golden Age (primordial heroism and
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nobility) and myths of Fall (national persecution and genocide), have provided a template for 
nationalist ideologues in the Yugoslav region. Seeking to legitimate a form of national ‘self- 
help’, nationalists in these two countries have produced a legacy of ethnic cleansing, rape, 
forced population transfers, and irredentism, as the products of their own feelings of 
victimisation.
Also important has been the targeting of specific enemies trying to destroy the nation. 
As Branimir Anzulovic has remarked in his review of genocide in Yugoslavia, ‘the modem 
age has added another motive for genocide: the utopian promise of a perfect society through 
the elimination of the groups accused of preventing its realization’.4 Further, ‘The self- 
defensive “kill so that you may not be killed’” , is, according to Anzulovic, never enough to 
mobilise one’s national group for conflict. Rather, ‘the victim must be seen as a demon, and 
his killing as a universally beneficial act.’5 Certainly the quest for perfection is not new -  it 
goes back to the ancient Aryan invaders of India, who introduced the vama system, and to the 
ancient Greeks, among others. What has certainly changed however, are the wide variety of 
means available in the modem state to achieve a racial utopia -  means which never existed 
before the onset of modernity. These means allow “demons” to be killed far more easily than 
at any other time in history.
An analysis of Serbian and Croatian mythology, with direct reference to its 
instrumental and often violent consequences, will demonstrate some of the practical 
implications of creating a self righteous nationalism, based on myths of Fall and Redemption. 
This is, of course, not to suggest that the legacy of Zionism has been genocide. Rather, the 
case of Yugoslavia provides an example of how Jewish victimisation and national renewal 
bred a host of bastard children, seeking to piggy-back off of a national form which they did 
not invent nor fully understand.
Biblical and Jewish Ethics: Nationalism and Zionism:
Frye’s analysis of biblical structure demarcated a clear ethical system, where good 
and evil were at odds with each other, driving history forward. The idea that there was an 
axiomatic link between Fall and Redemption provided an understanding of how Jewish 
nationalism would structure its own aspirations for statehood, using the legitimacy of this 
model to guide them through the 19th and 20th centuries. Indeed, there was little doubt that the 
Jews had celebrated a Golden Age. Nor was there much doubt as to the persistence of myths 
of Jews as chosen, and as the elect of God. What did need to be recreated for Jews to again 
situate themselves in the covenential cycle, to once again dream of Redemption, was proof of
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the continued presence of an ahistorical negative agency, able to bind the Jews together, able 
to again place them within their historical teleology.
This force, this evil which would help restore a sense teleology in history -  was anti- 
Semitism. While the reality of it arguably stemmed from Roman times, the term was first 
coined by Wilhelm Marr in 1879, and adopted into his Antisemiten-Liga.6 While anti- 
Semitism was articulated to denote a fear of ‘Jewish Internationalism’, implicating Jews in a 
conspiracy to overthrow nation-states, many Jewish writers saw the potential of adopting it 
for their own purposes. Hannah Arendt argued convincingly that Jews began to place it at the 
centre of their emerging nationalism, along with more positive myths of divine election and 
Covenant. Anti-Semitism provided the necessary means for the Jews to confront their 
‘otherness’ when they found themselves outsiders in the development of the nation state, and 
the industrial revolution in Europe.7
While the Jews had for centuries been the victims of religious inspired aggression, 
Arendt argued that anti-Semitism only arose as an instrumental term, when it was politically 
expedient to channel Jewish experiences of victimisation towards a concrete objective, in line
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with Minogue’s three stage model . In the beginning, this was simply the desire to safeguard 
existence, while later it was used in promoting collective action. Thus,
Jews concerned with the survival of their people, would, in a curious and desperate 
misinterpretation, hit on the consoling idea that antisemitism after all might be an 
excellent means for keeping the people together, so that the assumption of eternal 
antisemitism would even imply an eternal guarantee of Jewish existence. This 
supposition, a secularised travesty of the idea of eternity inherent in a faith that 
chosenness and a Messianic hope would, has been strengthened through the fact that 
for many centuries the Jews experienced the Christian brand of hostility which was 
indeed a powerful agent of preservation, spiritually as well as politically.
For Zionist thinkers, the role of anti-Semitism as a constant foil to Jewish aspirations 
was to figure as a central component of Jewish national identity. Zionist writers, seeking 
justification for the creation of a Jewish state, readily used both persecution myths and the 
covenantial cycle to argue that a Jewish state was viable, and historically necessary. Theodor 
Herzl placed the Jewish Fall at the centre of his movement for a national homeland. Positing 
that the Jews of the Diaspora constituted ‘one people’, Herzl advocated a mass exodus from 
Europe, since, ‘We have sincerely tried everything to merge with the national communities in 
which we live, seeking only to preserve the faith of our fathers. It is not permitted us’. Herzl 
came to adopt ‘the Jewish tragedy’ as the ‘driving force’ of nationalism.10
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The centrality of persecution myths to pre-World War II Zionism forced Jews to 
confront the reality of their otherness within Europe, and led directly to efforts to both create 
a coherent Jewish ‘nation’, while channelling productive energies towards the establishment 
of a homeland in Palestine. Using anti-Semitism as a rallying call proved useful in 
establishing a link between Jewish historic victimisation as an apatride people, and their 
future Redemption as a rooted people on historic soil. Zionist writings often explored deep 
into the ancient past, exposing a continuous and unending stream of anti-Jewish 
consciousness, similar to the negative force Frye identified in Old Testament narratives.
For post-Holocaust Zionists, struggling with the genocide of 6 million Jewish people, 
the return to Zion would take on new and more urgent meaning. The basic tenet of Zionism, 
that Jews remained ‘history’s orphans’, the ‘universal outsider’, had relegated them to the 
margins of humanity, and had itself been a prime reason for the advent of the Final Solution. 
As one writer put it, ‘The lack of an independent state doomed those defenceless human 
beings to the realisation of Adolf Hitler’s diabolic final solution.’11 Anti-Semitism and its 
ugliest manifestation, the Holocaust, made it clear that Jews were no longer safe in the 
Diaspora. Nevertheless, the creation of the state of Israel so soon after the tragedy proved that 
their faith in divine deliverance was not in vain. The Holocaust acted to reify the dangers of 
anti-Semitism for the Jewish people, transforming them from a weak people to one in full 
possession of a plan for Redemption and deliverance. This even allowed triumphalist Zionists 
like Yehuda Gothelf to argue,
Anti-Semitism ... [can] serve as a force for moral renewal, and for uniting the masses 
of Jews to make them struggle for their national and individual liberation ... Zionism 
is not only the outcome of Anti-Semitism; but it puts in concrete form the longing for 
redemption, the national-religious yearning of the past two thousand years.12
Religious Zionists would claim a direct link between Fall and Redemption. Yaakov 
Herzog described Israel as the ‘immediate recompense and revival’ after the ‘greatest crime 
in history’, 13 while for Rabbi Jung, the ‘incredible restoration of the homeland’ that followed 
the Holocaust was proof not only of ‘the beginning of the emergent redemption’, but also of 
the Jewish people’s ‘timeless faith in the Divine covenant.’14 Again, the centrality of 
covenantial or messianic arguments was clear -  Jews had gained a homeland because they 
had suffered. They had been redeemed because of their faith in the teleology of history, and 
their Covenant with God.
Nevertheless, while Zionist triumphalism was the order of the day for those who 
believed in the redemptive powers of Israel, other Jewish (non- or a-Zionist) writers
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concerned themselves with life outside Israel, as well as the legacy of Hitler’s Final Solution, 
and its impact on western consciousness. Those dealing with the philosophical implications 
of the Holocaust, the nightmarish result of the dream of western enlightenment, and the 
development of the modem nation state, found little solace in the fact that the Jews possessed 
a narrow strip of earth, threatened on all sides by countries which wanted to drive them into 
the sea.
Universalising the Holocaust:
For many, the lessons of the Holocaust were so immense that they could not simply 
be applicable to the Jews. The death of six million people in such a systematic and barbaric 
way signalled to many that the fundamental axioms which underpinned western society were 
fatally flawed. Philosophers and world leaders entered the 20th century filled with hope that 
peace and prosperity would reign, due to advances in technology, efficiency, and 
communications. Rationalism and industrialisation were to bring greater prosperity and well 
being for everyone. With the Holocaust, such dreams were irretrievably shattered. Some, like 
Jewish philosopher George Steiner, went so far as to describe the Holocaust as a Hell on 
earth, which forever destroyed our faith in the progress of civilisation. As he wrote of the 
death camp system,
L’univers concentrationnaire has no true counterpart in the secular mode. Its 
analogue is Hell, The camp embodies, often down to the minutiae, the images and 
chronicles of Hell in European art and thought from the twelfth to the eighteenth 
centuries. It is these representations which gave to the deranged horrors of Belsen a 
kind of “expected logic”. It is in the fantasies of the infernal, as they literally haunt 
western sensibility, that we find the technology of pain without meaning, of bestiality 
without end, of gratuitous terror.15
The horrors of the camps for Steiner would create a ‘post culture’, an era 
characterised by malaise and a lack of utopia, where no one seemed to have faith in western 
civilisation’s promise of moral and cultural evolution. Steiner described the creation of a, 
‘formidable gap in the co-ordinates of location, of psychological recognition in the western 
mind.’16 The world lost its traditional sense of morality, of good and evil. It had abandoned 
its faith. While some turned to Communism, which Steiner labelled ‘the modem totalitarian 
state’, others simply lived in fear, waiting in terror for the re-emergence of a ‘Hell above
1 7ground.’
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As far as Steiner was concerned, Hell had now became immanent. It was an everyday 
reality -  a monster which could re-awaken at any moment. New forms of ethnic, national, or 
other fratricidal warfare could develop at any time, because our previous ideas of good and 
evil were destroyed -  we were no longer able to distinguish between right and wrong. But 
what were we to do about this state of affairs? For Steiner, the key to the future lay in 
creating new ethical poles of good and evil -  a new morality. The new Devil, the new Hell, 
would become associated with Hitler and the Holocaust. Good and evil in the world would 
therefore be judged in relation to the Nazis. Goodness would be defined in relation to the bad 
that human beings had done in the 20th century, not by the fanciful imaginings of theologians 
or engravers in earlier times.18
For Steiner, those who indeed capitalised on this change in morality were, 
unsurprisingly, the Jews themselves. They were the ones who emerged as the archetypal 
victims of history, and therefore the only truly good people after World War II. Steiner’s 
second work on the Holocaust, The Portage to San Cristobal o f A.H. allegorised the Jewish 
preoccupation with the Nazis, and how their lives have changed since 1945. In fictional 
dialogue between good and evil, Steiner’s characters combed the South American jungles in 
the 1980s, hunting for the still living Hitler, who continued to personify the evils of Nazism. 
In this novella, the creator of Hell, the secularised Satan, was hunted down and captured by 
the very people he tried to destroy decades before. Steiner tapped into the essence of 
Zionism, and its reliance on negative myths of persecution and Fall. His fictional dialogue 
demonstrated how the other served to imbue the Jewish nation with an identity separate from 
mere religious symbology or mythical understanding. But while he echoed this Zionist 
argument, it was with a great deal of irony. As Hitler was brought to trial at the end of the 
book, the frail and sickly ‘Fuhrer’ seemed conscious of his ‘world historic role’ as the 
(re)creator of the Jewish nation. As Steiner’s Hitler queried,
[D]id Herzl create Israel or did I? ... Would Palestine have become Israel, would the 
Jews have come to that barren patch of the Levant, would the United States and the 
Soviet Union, Stalin’s Soviet Union have given you recognition and guaranteed your 
survival had it not been for the Holocaust? It was the Holocaust that gave you the 
courage of injustice, that made you drive the Arab out of his home, out of his field, 
because he was in your divinely ordered way ... Perhaps I am the Messiah, the true 
Messiah, the Sabbatai whose infamous deeds were allowed by God in order to bring 
his people home ... The Holocaust was the necessary mystery before Israel could 
come into its strength}9
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In this sense, negative created positive, just as for early Christians, Satan became 
central to a belief in the fundamental goodness of God. But in a sense, Steiner also paralleled 
Hitler with a sort of Moses like figure, who led the Jewish people into the wilderness, so that 
they could find their promised land. For Steiner, the Jews needed Hitler to live in the modem 
world, because to kill him, as Friedrich Nietszche ‘killed’ God, would destroy the cultural 
and ethical boundaries of the ‘post culture’. In this sense, the creation of Hell brought about a 
sort of Heaven for the Jewish people. Their ‘abstract’ nature, long a central point in anti- 
Semitism, was transformed, and a new dichotomy emerged -  with a concretised Heaven and 
a concretised Hell. Wilsonianism, and the belief in Redemption through the nation state 
became the ultimate god-send for nations, while a national Hell (the Holocaust) threatened 
rootless or fragmented nations who were unable to defend themselves. Hitler became as 
essential to the morality of our ‘post cultural’ world as Satan was to the early Christians. In 
this work, Hitler emerges as the latest incarnation of evil threatening the Hebrew people. If 
we follow Frye’s list of Hebrew enemies, Hitler is no different from the Pharoah of Exodus, 
Nebuchadnezzar, or Nero. He is but the latest in a long string of evil agents trying to destroy 
the Jews.
Yet in other respects, Hitler is very different from the others. He is the only modem 
manifestation of evil, the only modem force capable of rallying the Jews together into a 
cohesive national group capable of creating their own nation-state. Hitler is also a Devil that 
the whole world can hate. He is not just the enemy of the Jews, but also of the Russians, the 
Americans, the British, the French, the Yugoslavs and the Poles. Indeed, the list is endless. 
Making Hitler the Devil means that while he is primarily the enemy of the Jews, and fits 
snugly into their own teleology. He is also the enemy of many other people, and they too can 
claim some sense of victimhood too, since he did not simply destroy the Jews -  he also 
destroyed western civilisation in the process.
In this sense, the lessons of the Holocaust are specifically applicable to the Jews, but 
universally applicable to everyone else. Because Hitler destroyed Christian morality, Jews 
have no choice but to share their Devil with the rest of the world, even if they were his 
primary target. Without Hitler and the Jews, morality for Steiner does not exist. As Harold 
Kaplan explains, ‘[A]ll men have become “jews” (with the small “j” in Jean-Frangois 
Lyotard’s usage) and must adopt that suffering at Dodz and Warsaw as the gentiles of old 
adopted that of Christ. Hitler and his followers were the anti-Christ, because, as vulgar 
Nietzscheans, they would overthrow a traditional “morality of the weak” for its presumption 
against nature’s law.’
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Even postmodernists have joined the fray, as Julia Kristeva and Slavoj Zizek both 
engage in a species of philosemitism. Through specialised jargon, Jews are transformed into 
the ‘nexus’, ‘trope’, or ‘signifiers’ for the ‘decentered, destabilized, postmodern subject in a 
theoretical system that persists in defining (or “fetishizing”) them from without.’ Fetishising 
Jewish ‘otherness’, they make it something to be embraced, something useful in 
understanding the self, in the process, as Elizabeth Bellamy recalls, ‘privileg[ing] the very 
figure of the Diaspora Jew anti-Semitism has traditionally scorned’.21 In contemporary 
philosophy, Jews now become heroes through their suffering, in a universalised setting where 
philosophers, like therapists, find it necessary to ‘feel their pain’ in order to continue.
Certainly, there are many well-meaning philosophers and historians who have sought 
to universalise the lessons of the Holocaust, irrespective of how opaque their vocabulary 
might appear. Nevertheless, there are inherent dangers in such an exercise. One of the chief 
dangers is that of trivialisation. Those who attempt to universalise the Holocaust can forget 
that its lessons originally applied to the Jewish people, and not the entire human race. Judy 
Chicago’s work is a typical example of how universalism can be misapplied. For her, the 
Holocaust has become, ‘a window into an aspect of the unarticulated but universal human 
experience of victimization.’22 The Holocaust also becomes a, ‘bridge towards the creation of 
“a new global community based on human shared values’” .23 As Lawrence Langer has 
astutely noted, while it is laudable to try to understand the universal implications of the 
Holocaust, one must also be wary, lest its original meaning be lost in a sea of meaningless 
banal optimism. While trying to extract some abstract good from the ashes of the Final 
Solution, there is the real danger that Chicago and her contemporaries merely belittle the 
suffering of survivors by trying to apply the Holocaust’s lessons to everyone.24
French intellectual Alain Finkielkraut has taken a position similar to that of Langer, 
raising concerns about the universalisation and metaphorisation of the Jewish tragedy. For 
him, maintaining the Jewish nature of the Holocaust is of central importance. As part of the 
post-Holocaust generation, Finkielkraut has often described the tremendous moral value 
attached to being Jewish after the Holocaust, even as one bom after 1945. Being Jewish after 
the war meant inheriting the identity of a victim without ever having to suffer from genocide. 
It is a moral legacy, passed on, generation after generation. All Jews become heroes, because 
they have endured, despite Hitler’s evil plans. While this was a positive aspect of his early 
childhood, this heroising of the victim has been a worrying aspect of Jewish identity. In 
coming to terms with the rise of ‘negationism’ or Holocaust denial in France, Finkielkraut 
has severely criticised Zionists who have manipulated the Holocaust for their own ends, in
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the process, ‘mitigate[ing] the genocide by looking for meaning to its absurdity and 
entertaining the notion that such an affront is reparable.’26 He criticises Zionists such as 
Gothelf, Herzog, and Jung, since for these people, ‘the existence of Israel gives a minimal
97justification to the genocide’.
While Steiner raised ontological and philosophical questions about universalising the 
Holocaust, Finkielkraut has spoken openly against universalisation, arguing that this 
‘minimal justification’ in a philosophical sense has led to concrete problems of Holocaust 
revisionism in France. Much of Finkielkraut’s writing deals with the lessening importance of 
the Holocaust as a warning, and as a metaphor. He blames Jews who reduce the Holocaust to 
a few symbols and ‘these few majestic words, Auschwitz, Holocaust, the Six Million.' Such 
reductionism, he has argued, leads invariably to a trivialisation of the Holocaust’s
9Rimportance, while contributing to a ‘growing lapse of memory’. In other words, the 
Holocaust becomes so watered down that it loses its original flavour.
The primary problem he sees with this sort of ‘lazy’ remembrance is that it promotes 
misuse, creating problems for those who are tasked with keeping Holocaust memories alive. 
As he laments, ‘Used in contexts to which it does not apply, weakened by its metaphorical 
use, and degraded by needless repetition, the term “genocide” is wearing out and dying. The 
exhaustion o f meaning makes it easier for the workers for the negation to do their job.’29 The 
more the Holocaust is invoked, Finkielkraut fears, the more it is trivialised and divorced from 
its original meaning. The Holocaust therefore becomes seen simply for its instrumental uses, 
to give the Jews special rights because they have suffered more than any other nation.
While Langer is clearly critical of non-Jews who try to universalise the Holocaust 
without fully grasping its meaning, thereby belittling its significance, Finkielkraut attacks 
Jewish Zionists who have belittled the Holocaust’s significance by manipulating its imagery 
for political purposes. For him, the danger involved in such an exercise is obvious. Not only 
can Holocaust deniers accuse the Jews of manipulating their own genocide, other non-Jewish 
groups can follow the Zionist example. Echoing Steiner’s view about the creation of a Devil- 
Hitler, Finkeikraut has also offered his views on this new morality,
[UJniversal conscience formed itself anew by putting the face of Hitlerism on 
absolute evil... Nazism is invoked almost religiously to represent civilization’s Other; 
and to represent Nazism, one invokes its supreme horror, the physical annihilation of 
peoples or ethnic groups denied human status ... Satan was incarnated in the person of 
Hitler, who from then on was merely the allegory of the demon. Nazism, the ultimate 
truth of oppression and the model for all abominations past and future, also became 
the reference for all accusatory discourse. The event was seized, taken in, and 
abstracted by the Idea, and the Idea eventually deteriorated into insult: if everyone
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agrees on a single definition of the enemy, everyone is tempted to apply that image to 
his own opponent in order to justify the battle he is fighting.31
For Finkielkraut, as for Steiner, Hitler has become the world’s secularised Devil, and 
the Holocaust has become the world’s worst tragedy -  ever. This literally invites non-Jewish 
groups to apply the imagery of the Holocaust to their own situations, and use it to their 
advantage. Secularising Satan and Hell has spawned a new and dangerous breed of discourse, 
which, while reducing the importance of Jewish suffering, has allowed other groups to 
increase their relative power. As Finkielkraut again explains,
Since Hitler’s time, every villain is a fascist, and every victim wears the yellow star.
There is no revolution, no revolt, no struggle, no matter how minor its object, that 
fails to go rummaging through the past only to end up presenting itself in terms of 
this particular period of history. Every oppressed minority from women to 
Occitanians saw fit to declare its genocide, as if doing anything short of this would 
render that minority uninteresting, incapable of being recognized; as if the 
revindication of genocide were the cornerstone of the justice of the minority’s cause 
and the validity of its aspirations. By using the word invented in 1944 to designate the 
putting to death of entire peoples, today’s minority groups affirm their identity and 
legitimate their existence ... Antifascism had established the Jews as value: as the 
gold standard of oppression, as the paradigm of the victim.32
Here clearly is the danger of over generalisation, a process which appears to be all but 
inevitable to Finkielkraut, as well as to Steiner. What Finkielkraut is attacking is the extent to 
which general myths of Fall and Redemption have become specifically intertwined with the 
Jewish example. If one is to use Fall imagery to promote nationalism, there seems now to be 
a stronger impulse than every before towards using Jewish Fall imagery instead. Rather than 
being a victim of ‘genocide’, one is now a victim of a ‘Holocaust’. Aggressors become Nazis, 
victims become Jews. This, for Finkielkraut, is the legacy of too much manipulation of the 
Holocaust by opportunistic Zionists. Finkielkraut is certainly not alone. As more and more 
non-Jewish groups have seen the instrumental value of Jewish suffering, its lessons have 
become universalised, and incorporated into a wide variety of movements. Ronnie Landau 
has described this process as ‘hijacking’, lamenting, ‘It is indeed difficult to conceive of any 
subject that has been quite so regularly misunderstood, misused and misrepresented...’33 No 
doubt because of this, many Jews, frustrated by the repetition of ‘Holocaust’, have dropped 
the term in favour of the Hebrew term for desolation -  ‘Shoah’.34
What emerges from a philosophical reading of the Holocaust and its aftermath is a 
confusion among writers on how to address the lessons of the Final Solution. Should they be 
universalised, or not? For some, like Steiner, universalisation is an inevitable process, one 
that can no longer be controlled by the Jews. Like the suffering of Christ, it becomes part of
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history and western thought. Others, like Lyotard, Kristeva, Zizek, Todorov, and Chicago cite 
the merits of universalisation. Everyone can now live under the same moral rules and 
obligations, thanks to a new secularised Devil that we can all share. If genocide is a ‘crime 
against humanity’, then the human race must collectively come to terms with the 
consequences. Still others, like Langer, Finkielkraut, and Landau, worry that, like the 
crucifixion itself, the west soon forgets its Jewish origin, somehow twisting historical 
memory to the extent that Jews themselves are seen to profit from their own destruction.
For good or ill, the universalisation of the Holocaust, both in a symbolic and historic 
sense, is a reality. It is a reality approved by a large number of historians and philosophers, 
despite those who rightly caution against it. Throughout this thesis, the importance of the 
Holocaust as a series of metaphors and symbols will be stressed. The Holocaust has proved to 
be a useful template for many social groups and nations, seeking to articulate (by analogy) 
their own real or imagined experiences of victimisation and suffering. While specific images 
of the Holocaust are often stirred up to legitimate social or national projects, even a general 
view of one’s nation as suffering from genocide carries tremendous moral weight.
The Comparative Genocide Debate and the Holocaust:
Holocaust universalisation has created a new forum for non-Jewish national and 
social groups in the modem world. ‘Hijacking’ the Holocaust has proven to be a useful means 
of articulating historic victimisation. It is certainly an effective means of gaining attention, 
even if the parallels between one group’s suffering and that of the Jews are far from obvious. 
A recent trend of the 1980’s and 1990’s has been a two pronged questioning of the 
Holocaust’s importance and relevance. The field of ‘comparative genocide studies’ has 
attempted to relativise the Holocaust by comparing it to other tragedies.
Using the Holocaust as a frame of reference, proponents of relativism argue that their 
attempted genocides were equal or worse than that suffered by the Jews, while the other side, 
primarily composed of Jewish writers of the ‘Functionalist’ school, has reduced the 
importance of other genocides, in an attempt to maintain the Holocaust’s pre-eminence. As 
Kaplan has discussed, succeeding generations after the Holocaust have appropriated its 
ethical components, ‘as their standard of measure for right and wrong, good and evil in the 
growth of moral civilization.’35 In this sense, comparing one’s own tragedy to the Holocaust 
situates it positively in an ethical system. One cannot be in league with the Devil if one’s 
suffering is comparable to the Jewish ‘gold standard of oppression’.
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Ronnie Landau, in discussing the debate amongst historians, divides the extreme 
positions between ‘Scylla’ (insistence on uniqueness), and ‘Charybdis’ (surrender to 
banality). Adopting a pure emotional approach, the ‘Scylla’ school demonises Nazism, views 
the lessons of the Holocaust as relevant only for Jews, and finds all non-Jews responsible for 
‘Planet Auschwitz’. Using a dispassionate and academic approach, the ‘Charybdis’ school 
finds the Holocaust, ‘a mere symbol for the baseness of human nature’, rendering it infinitely 
susceptible to analysis. Further, this school attempts to de-Judaise the subject, submerging it 
in moral education, philosophy, psychology, and theology -  a process which obscures and 
marginalises the actual events.36 Landau’s dichotomy is unique, as it privileges neither 
position, while pointing out the dangers of each. While stressing the Holocaust’s uniqueness 
and importance, he also speaks out against the ‘grotesque competition in suffering’, which 
has been the inevitable result of such debates, to the extent that “Mine [my suffering, that is] 
is bigger than yours! Only my genocide is therefore real genocide.”
Holocaust and the State of Israel: Anti-Zionism or Anti-Semitism?:
Of central importance to the debate on the Holocaust’s uniqueness is the moral status 
of those who question the Holocaust, and the right of the Jews themselves to do as they 
please within the State of Israel. Certain Jewish historians and philosophers have linked anti- 
Zionism and anti-Semitism together. This is both a new and controversial argument, 
advancing that since the Holocaust is unique, so too is the State of Israel. By extension, the 
moral authority enjoyed by the victims of Holocaust is transposed onto the State itself, and 
Israel may excuse itself from any international judgements concerning its own human rights 
abuses. As discussed above, the demonisation of Hitler and the Nazis, and the Redemption of 
Jews in 1948 has impacted on definitions of the nature of the State of Israel. If a ‘chosen’ 
people are redeemed on ‘sacred soil’, is the outcome of that process, (the modem 
technological, military, and political state) to be a state which is also chosen and unique? For 
many, the answer is in the affirmative, such that any questioning of Israeli policy becomes 
tantamount to heresy. Elie Wiesel, for example, has asserted that ‘antisemitism and anti- 
Zionism are one’, implying that attacks to the Jewish nation state constitute attacks on the 
nation itself.38 As Irwin Cotier elaborated, at a recent conference exploring these links,
The new antisemitism is a denial of the right of Israel, of the Jewish people, to live as 
an equal member of the family of nations. What is intrinsic to each form of 
antisemitism, common to both is the notion of discrimination. It has simply passed
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from the realm of discrimination against Jews as individuals to discrimination against
Jews as a collectivity, against Jewish peoplehood.39
Important in any evaluation of criticism levelled at Israeli policy is the nature of its 
intent. Not all criticism is unhealthy and malicious, and fetishising the state does little to 
boost its international prestige, nor does it convince others that Israel is respecting human 
rights within its borders. While it is true that many anti-Semites are anti-Zionist, it is certainly 
true that many anti-Zionists are not anti-Semitic. One can oppose the policies of a state 
without attacking its constituent people. Clearly, anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism are not the 
same thing. However, this type of association has a direct impact on theories of the 
Holocaust. If Israel is unique and moral because the Holocaust is unique and moral, then 
logically, if the Holocaust is not unique and unprecedented, then the raison d ’etre of the State 
of Israel falls into question. This is precisely the crux of Finkeilkaut’s argument -  that Israel’s 
legitimacy as a country should not depend on the facts of the Holocaust. While Zionist 
triumphalism has legitimated the state of Israel, it has also invited criticism of it, something 
which was perhaps expected and inevitable.
The Holocaust as Unique in the Annals of Comparative Genocide:
As Steiner, Kaplan, Finkielkraut, and others have discussed, the Holocaust is unique 
from many perspectives: technologically, philosophically, numerically, and on many other 
levels as well. Where scholars such as Steven Katz and Seymour Drescher have differed is in 
their need to downplay the atrocities of other groups in order to assert their own theories of 
uniqueness. In this sense, they commit the error of becoming ‘comparative genocidalists’, 
initiating an ugly turf war over who is relatively the worst victim.40
Katz’s work is highly controversial. His articulation of the uniqueness thesis has 
involved down-playing, indeed denying, the existence of many other genocides in the 20th 
century. Rejecting the long history of genocide against the North American indigenous 
peoples, Katz has used selective statistics to ‘prove’ that most of the 18th and 19th century 
Indian deaths were the result of disease and accident, not deliberate policy. 41 Similarly, in his 
discussion of the famine in Ukraine (1932-34), Katz refuses to use the term genocide, since 
Stalin was not trying to kill all Ukrainians, a highly contentious point, in light of Robert 
Conquest’s conclusion that more than 7 million Ukrainians died in the disaster 42 The 
Armenian genocide is similarly dismissed, since Armenians were killed for being 
‘secessionists’, ‘Russian spies’, and ‘fifth columnists’, not because they were the victims of a 
‘totalistic’ ideology of hate, based on their destruction.43 In all cases, Katz has denied the
54
label genocide for any other 20th century tragedy, as if such a label would destroy the 
Holocaust’s moral appeal.
In a similar vein, Seymour Drescher has similarly dismissed any concept of a ‘black 
genocide’ deriving from the Atlantic slave trade, since slaves were able to survive and 
develop, ‘religion, family life ... leisure and arts, independent economic activities, 
consumption patterns ... complex patterns of human relationships’.44 Drescher posits that 
since Blacks were ‘part of a durable system’ in which they played a key part as ‘actors’, their 
experiences were in no way similar to those of the Jews.45 Much of this type of Functionalist 
thinking stems from a generalised feeling of victimisation, a view that the entire western 
world bears some measure of responsibility for the Holocaust. The Nazis are therefore only 
the most violent and obvious exponant of anti-Semitism.
Writers such as Daniel Goldhagen and Richard Rubenstein are quick to accuse not 
only the Germans, but all non-Jewish Europeans, for failing to save the Jews, or actively 
combating Nazism when they had the chance. Rubestein argues that, ‘far more Europeans 
objected to the methods Hitler employed to eliminate the Jews than to his objectives’ 46 Such 
dubious philosophising reflects Finkielkraut’s observation that every Jewish person since the 
Holocaust has inherited a beautiful ‘gift of suffering’ without having to pay for it, and the 
status of a hero without having to do anything to earn the distinction.47 Since very Jew is bom 
a hero and a victim in Finkielkraut’s world, does this imply a certain level of guilt on the part 
of non-Jews? For uniqueness theorists, there are no groups unworthy of attack, even 
American Blacks, Armenians, Ukrainians, and the Romani. While these groups do not 
express any overt anti-Semitism, the fact that they advocate an alternative interpretation of 
history (advancing their own genocides) might be potentially destabilising, creating an ethical 
ambiguity. In questioning the pre-eminence and uniqueness of the Holocaust, they open up 
the debate to German Historikerstreit writers, American Neo-Nazis, and French negationists. 
They also introduce the possibility that other groups might also be heroes at birth -  a 
troubling thought for Katz and his associates.
Against Uniqueness: Multiple Genocides and Holocausts in History:
From a more ‘Charybdis’ perspective, David Stannard has been one of the most 
voracious critics of the uniqueness thesis, which he feels has allowed the Israeli government 
to conceal and condone their own, ‘on-going genocidal actions’. Engaging in a species of 
conspiracy theorising, he dismisses the uniqueness theory as, ‘the hegemonic product of 
many years of strenuous intellectual labor by a handful of Jewish scholars and writers who
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have dedicated much if not all of their professional lives to the advancement of this 
exclusivist idea.’48 As Stannard laments, anyone questioning the uniqueness of the Holocaust 
is automatically labelled as an anti-Semite. Stannard has thus attacked those, like Katz and 
Drescher, who have lumped comparative genocide historians with Holocaust ‘deniers’ and 
neo-Nazis. Stannard denounces those who rigorously deny other national groups the right to 
articulate their own experiences of victimisation.49 Moreover, by seeing the Jews as ‘chosen’, 
other groups are by definition ‘ww-chosen’. Their deaths are therefore less important.50 These 
types of ethnical and substantive questions seem to be more popular today than ever before.
In support of this argument, right wing American pundit William F. Buckley has also 
attacked those who label as anti-Semitic any and all who criticise Israel. This has made 
Buckley question whether, ‘the shadow of the Holocaust has been made to stretch too far in 
contemporary polemics’.51 Buckley divides Jews who discuss the Holocaust into two groups, 
‘There are Jews who continue to fear that the fires that lit the Holocaust might one day be 
rekindled. But there are also Jews who, comfortable with the protocols built up around 
Auschwitz, are disposed, so to speak, to prolong the period of de-Nazification indefinitely.’52 
Negationists such as Serge Theon have spoken out against the ‘embalming of memories’ by 
Jewish writers, such that, ‘Certain people are not far from believing that we are witnessing 
the birth of a new religion, that of the Holocaust, with its dogmas and priests.’53 It is clear 
that many non-Jewish writers are questioning the Holocaust’s relevance in the 21st century, 
now that more than 55 years have gone by without another attempt to exterminate the Jews.
Jewish historians have also raised doubts about the uniqueness thesis. Israel Chamy, 
executive director of the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem, has 
strenuously objected to what he describes as, ‘a fetishistic atmosphere in which the masses of 
bodies that are not to be qualified for the definition of genocide are dumped into a conceptual 
black hole, where they are forgotten.’54 This fetishizing, he argues, ignores the reality of other 
peoples’ suffering, substituting sympathy and compassion with what has been termed ‘moral 
bookkeeping’.55 Still other Jewish historians have attacked the uniqueness thesis as 
‘gerrymandering’, and ‘an intellectual sleight of hand’. A common argument is that 
uniqueness theorists have picked specific aspects of the Nazi Holocaust which distinguish it 
from other gencocides, while ignoring important similarities that join many different nations 
together as fellow sufferers.56
In their quest to raise the profile of their own national genocides, historians such as 
Vahakn Dadrian and Ian Hancock have situated Armenian and Romani genocides within the 
Holocaust tradition. Dadrian, for example, posits that the Armenian genocide was worse than
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the Holocaust on an individual level, since the emphasis was not on a quick or 
technologically advanced form of mass killing. Rather, it focussed on, ‘dying as a prolonged 
and agonising experience’, which involved the use of common farm implements to horribly 
mutilate bodies. Unlike the Nazi genocide, which was, ‘streamlined, mechanised and 
systematic through the use of advanced technology’, and which used ‘special cadres’, the 
Armenians were brutalised by local Turkish populations, who killed in whatever manner they 
chose.57
Dadrian’s primary concern, however, is that the Armenian genocide has been 
purposely omitted from Israeli school text-books, in order to make Jewish experiences appear 
more unique.58 Thus, the Armenian genocide has been forgotten, now that it has been 
eclipsed by the Holocaust. Another problem concerns the way in which the history of 
genocide has been expressed in evolutionary terms. The Armenian genocide has been 
historicised as little more than a template, or a trial run, for the real genocide which was to 
follow some 35 years later -  the destruction of European Jews. We can understand to some 
extent his insistence on somehow proving that the Armenian genocide was worse than the 
Holocaust in some way, even if it is difficult to agree with.
Hancock has made a convincing case for the Romani genocide as a primary part of 
the Holocaust, since the Romani were also singled out for the Final Solution, and had 
proportionally more of their people killed than did the Jews. Hancock has also claimed that 
the Romani genocide was worse in some respects, since the Nazis maintained a deliberate 
policy of killing them from the beginning, unlike the ‘Jewish Question’, which first focussed 
on deportation and resettlement.59 Hancock, like Dadrian, has attacked the marginalisation of 
his people, specifically the fact that Romani were dismissed as ‘others’ in most of the 
Holocaust literature, and in the Holocaust Museum in Washington DC.60
Writers on this side of the debate are characterised by their anger and frustration at 
what they feel is an unfair double standard, and a deliberate attempt on the part of Jewish 
Holocaust historians to dismiss their sufferings, in the hope of perpetuating the uniqueness of 
their own experiences. Unfortunately, while these writers do raise important issues about how 
history should be presented, their attacks on the relative importance of the Holocaust only 
marginalise them further. Rather than asserting their own experiences as unique, they ‘piggy­
back’ off of the Jewish Holocaust, which can at best succeed in making public perceptions of 
their suffering poor copies of the original ‘frame of reference’. Asserting their own claims of 
genocide, completely separate from that of the Jews’ would be a far more convincing means 
of articulating the uniqueness of one’s national suffering. It is primarily their anger at the
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moral monopoly of the Holocaust which invites these parallels. While their factual evidence 
is no doubt correct, there seems to be a certain ‘anti-establishment’ rhetoric here. Jews as the 
‘establishment’ of victims are somehow obliged to accept criticism, but when they do debate, 
their own perspectives are further condemned.
Reacting against what they perceive as a moral monopoly, Stannard and Buckley are 
right to criticise the generalised use of the label ‘anti-Semite’ for those who question Israeli 
governmental policy. At the same time, their conspiratorial tone raises questions about their 
own motivations. That groups need to compare themselves to the Jews tacitly supports the 
uniqueness thesis, and is in many ways self defeating. Whether the Jews as the archetypal 
victims of genocide are being challenged or not, there is an acknowledgement that the status 
quo is clearly on the side of uniqueness arguments. Those who attempt to downplay the 
Holocaust to upgrade their own national groups do themselves no favours. They make 
recognition of their own nation’s suffering contingent on some sort of ‘mild’ Holocaust 
denial, which leaves a bitter taste in most mouths.
On the other side, those who deny the importance of other genocides trivialise and 
downgrade the importance of the Holocaust, demonstrating a lack of sympathy and respect 
for those who have also suffered tremendous national defeats. In effect, the uniqueness 
theorists become holocaust deniers themselves, or at least genocide deniers -  by refusing to 
accept the reality of Armenian, Ukrainian, or Romani genocides, despite a wealth of 
evidence. This denialism reduces the moral impact of Jewish suffering, and makes 
universalisation seem more just. It even makes Holocaust denial more legitimate. Why should 
deniers not attack the Jews, if Jewish historians like Katz are denying recognition to other 
worthy groups? Generalising Holocaust guilt also seems to be a self-defeating task. By seeing 
oppressors throughout the world, Functionalists deny themselves the ability to transcend the 
horrors of the Holocaust. Instead of acting as mentors to other groups seeking to document 
their own instances of oppression, Functionalism divides and condemns, making Jews 
complicit as genocide deniers, while alienating potential allies and fellow sufferers.
‘Acting’ like a victim: The Holocaust as Performative:
Contemporary debates over the Holocaust are at an impasse. Those disputing for and 
against the ‘uniqueness’ of it remain at loggerheads, each seeming to ‘hit below the belt’ to 
advance their own particular theories. One way out of this is to examine the uniqueness of 
Holocaust in a ‘performative’ sense, in the way that it has been made to be unique. This is not 
to say that it is not unique, but that its uniqueness has been defended and reinterpreted in
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order to maintain its ascendancy. This implies, as Cynthia Weber argues, that nothing 
constitutes a ‘pre-given subject’, but rather, ‘subjects are in process and that all subjects in 
process ... are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted.’ As she 
later writes, ‘Rather than understanding subjects as having natural identities, subjects and 
their various identities might be thought of instead as the effects of citational processes.’61 
Continuing on, Judith Butler writes, ‘performativity should be understood “as the reiterative
ff)and citational practice by which discourse produces the effect it names’” .
While Weber’s article concerns itself with the differences between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ 
and its applicability in unpacking theories of state sovereignty, the implications of 
‘performativity’ are of broader use. The concept of ‘performativity’ introduces the idea that 
maintaining the identity of a victim, or anything else for that matter, involves a continuous 
practice of creating ‘discourse’. In other words, the difference between ‘being’ a victim and 
portraying one self (or ‘acting’) as a victim is sometimes difficult to discern, for the simple 
reason that most people accept people, nations, and institutions according to how they present 
themselves.
A similar argument has been raised by David Campbell and William Connolly, who 
posit that in the formation of foreign policy, the state invents its own character by 
‘performing’ (generating policy) in a certain way, thereby enacting ‘the performative 
constitution of stable identities’.63 By adopting certain symbols and invoking certain types of 
imagery, a state ‘becomes’ what it wants to be. Its discourse shape its identity. While an 
activity in and of itself, such as the American-led bombing of Iraq in 1990, might be 
interpreted as an aggressive act, it might not appear so during and after the fact. If the nation 
‘acts’ as a moral superpower, defending ‘innocent’ Kuwaitis and punishing a Hitler-like 
Saddam Hussein, then the reality of a rich and powerful country attacking a relatively weak 
and poor country can seem to be morally justified, even humanitarian.
In describing how states manipulate reality, Campbell introduces the term 
‘narrativizing’ -  where a policy maker or nationalist leader writes a ‘story’, with an ‘ordered 
plot’, ‘cast of characters’, ‘attributable motivations’, and ‘lessons for the future’.64 Of course, 
the Holocaust is not a ‘story’, nor the suffering after it, merely a ‘performance’. Rather, these 
writers argue that events in history need to be examined in light of how they have been 
presented, as distinct from how and why they actually happened. In stressing a difference 
between the two, one is able to examine the instrumental aspect of using the Holocaust for 
political purposes.
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Applying this typology to the study of the uniqueness of the Holocaust, one is able to 
divide the debate between two groups. The first concludes that the Holocaust is unique
f V ibecause it ‘acts’ unique. It ‘acts’ like the most tragic event of the 20 century, and as such, it 
‘becomes’ what it purports to be. The clear gap between ‘acting’ and ‘being’ is where 
relativists (like Stannard, Dadrian, and Hancock) are wont to jump in, under the illusion that 
if their group ‘acts’ in a similar manner, they too can ‘be’ victims of genocide. Shifting the 
debate in this way helps us to understand how and why other nations and governments have 
so readily assimilated the metaphors of the Holocaust, and why Jews themselves, demoralised 
by the ‘exhaustion of meaning’, have in some cases adopted the term ‘Shoah’.
The Jewish example provides lessons on how to make a nation’s sufferings unique 
and unprecedented. By comparing themselves with the Jews in terms of the relative 
numerical or ontological natures of their own ‘genocides’, nations self-consciously ‘act’ out 
their own Holocausts, comparing themselves with the Jews in order to bolster their own 
position. The attempt to debate intent, compare facts, and ‘trade genocide stories’ is one of 
the unfortunate dilemmas in Steiner’s ‘post-culture’, one that Finkielkraut has rightly 
attacked.
On the other hand, the fact that many Zionists and Jewish Functionalist writers 
interpret the Holocaust as ‘the ultimate form of anti-Semitism’, the culmination of 2,000 
years of persecution, suggests that there is a measure of ‘acting’ on this side as well. This is 
not to dispute the historical facts of the Holocaust, but rather, to objectively discuss the 
manner in which events have been historically (and teleologically) situated. Peter Novick has 
rightly argued that while the horrors of the Final Solution and the numbers of dead are 
accurate, the Jewish tragedy, as we understand it today, was largely submerged under the 
general war crimes of the Nazis. It was not singled out, or made to be unique until the 1970s 
and 1980s. What mattered was the totality of Axis evil, not the specific victimisation of the 
Jews. As he has written in his book on the Holocaust and collective memory,
The murderous actions of the Nazi regime which killed between five and six million 
European Jews were all too real. But “the Holocaust”, as we speak of it today, was 
largely a retrospective construction, something which would not have been 
recognisable to most people at the time. To speak of “the Holocaust” as a distinct 
entity, which Americans responded to (or failed to respond to) in various ways, is to 
introduce an anachronism that stands in the way of understanding contemporary 
responses.65
While some writers find uniqueness in the facts of the Holocaust, attempts to 
mythologise it decades later demonstrate a certain level of performativity. While this is
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altogether normal and consistent for a national group seeking statehood, or seeking to justify 
the actions of its existing nation-state, it is also normal for other nations and countries to 
criticise others for double standards and a lack of respect for human rights. The 
performativity here consists in the way the Holocaust and the rebirth of Israel have ‘become* 
the culmination of Jewish history. Because of the use of the Holocaust to legitimate the State 
of Israel, the Holocaust is politicised (an argument justifiably raised by Finkielkraut), and in 
this sense, the charge of ‘acting’ somehow sticks. By ‘Zionising’ the Holocaust, (fitting it in 
the Zionist tradition) it became a tool of Zionism, and therefore part of a usable past of myths 
and symbols. Situated in a covenential cycle, and as a pivotal part of a messianic tradition, 
Zionists were the first to (ab)use the Holocaust to their advantage.
Certainly the arguments of Zionists who equate anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism must 
be seen, not only through the optic of the ‘Middle East conflict’, but also from a more 
instrumental perspective. A state which cannot be criticised because of the past suffering of 
its constituent nation is a case without precedent in the international arena. Similarly, Katz 
and Drescher are part of a conscious effort to deny the reality of other genocides, which can 
also be interpreted in a performative light. This aspect of Zionism, and indeed of Jewish 
intellectual history, has demonstrated the instrumentality of using one’s own genocide to 
one’s advantage. In this sense, the Jews are now victims of their own success, as other groups 
have readily assimilated symbols and images in their own nationalist movements. More 
importantly, the success of Jewish philosophers in creating a new ethical system from the 
ashes of the Holocaust gives other groups little option but to confront the Jewish example, 
and situate their own national struggles within it.
Performativity and Nationalism: The Nation as Invented and Constructed:
Of import to this thesis are the links between ‘performative’ practices of identity 
creation, and the invention of nationalism. Consider Rogers Brubaker’s description of 
nationalism as a ‘category of “practice”’, in, ‘the ways it can come to structure perceptions, to 
inform thought and experience, to organise discourse and political action’.66 Here, Brubaker’s 
description is one of nationalism as performativity -  the construction and organisation of 
political myths in a manner calculated to advance the legitimacy of a national project. By 
acting in a certain way, nations fit themselves into an ethical system, becoming good nations 
because they cloak their actions in the rhetoric of archetypal good nations.
Campbell has described this as a ‘process of inscription’, whereby a political 
community (or nation) is ‘imagined’ through numerous ‘disciplinary practices working to
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contain contingency, while distancing the “self’ from the “other”’, situating the state (or 
nation) within ‘the ethical borders of identity’.67 Much of Campbell’s work has centred on 
what this ‘inscription’ actually means. Broken down simply, states situate themselves 
positively within an ethical system, by painting conflicts in terms of black and white, self and 
other -  a process which absolves the state from feelings of guilt during wartime. This is little 
different from Kecmanovic’s concept of ‘counteridentification’. Understanding the 
Holocaust’s involvement in the creation of a new ethical system (or ‘post culture’), there 
seems nothing odd about another state or nation ‘inscripting’ its own experiences and present 
actions within these new ‘ethical borders’.
What Weber, Butler, Campbell, and Connelly describe is a simple process of creating 
identity, and of situating that identity within an ethical framework. This is a process which 
Serbs and Croats used to structure their own nationalist histories, in order to whitewash many 
of their less than salubrious actions. This process was instrumental, in that identities were 
consciously constructed or invented -  rather than being pre-existing or primordial.68 Both 
nations portrayed ethnicity as an objective given, somehow natural, possessing inherent 
features — such as territory, language, recognisable membership, and a common mentality.
Applying such a typology to Eastern Europe, Valery Tishkov has described a form of 
nationalism which he terms ‘instrumentalism’, a processes of identity formation where 
cultural elites work along side national leaders within the ‘power structures’ of states, 
‘producing “ethnic groups” by defining their boundaries.’ In this way, national leaders 
become, ‘professional producers of subjective visions of the social world’,69 while nations are 
‘constructs, created by people’ and find their base in the construction and manipulation of 
symbols.70 As he describes, the function of producing and explaining the ‘symbolic’ is 
assigned to literary writers, historians, and artists, as well as to the professionals, be they film
71makers, mass media barons, or indeed -  leaders of ethnic nationalist movements. While 
Tishkov applies this process to Eastern and Central Europe, this type of identity formation is 
often a standard part of nationalism. All nations by design -  whether civic or ethnic -  
deliberately exclude distasteful and embarrassing episodes from their own histories, as do 
most individuals.
Novick has also identified this process in his understanding of ‘collective memory’, 
arguing that present concerns, and not the ‘past working its will on the present’ determines
77what aspects of history will be used by historians and when. In other words, history 
responds to present needs -  there are no eternal immutable laws which govern how the 
process operates. While history is, as Smith describes -  a ‘usable past’ -  nationalists decide
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which aspects they will use, and when. Invariably, such a selective representation of the past 
involves simplification, and the elimination of ambiguity. Through collective memory, those 
who recreate the past become the protagonists, and a central theme, for Novick, is the
T Xexpression of ‘some eternal or essential truth about the group -  usually tragic’. For Novick, 
the Jews through the Holocaust, the Poles through ‘catastrophism’, and the Serbs through the 
myth of Kosovo, all share a similar form of collective memory, which both simplifies and 
tragedises the nation in history. This form of simplification is remarkably similar to that 
found in the Old Testament, as interpreted by Northrop Frye.
Drawing from the Jewish example, we see a highly developed and constructed 
nationalism, based on myths of divine election or Covenant, myths of persecution and Fall, as 
well as myths of Redemption. Wiesel’s claim that the Jews were hated as soon as they 
became a nation was a primordial assertion, going to the heart of Jewish otherness and 
persecution. Equally primordial was Buber’s myth of divine election -  that Israel was bom 
when the Covenant with God was struck. Uniqueness as a constructed phenomenon was used 
instrumentally by Zionists to show how the Holocaust was the culmination of several 
millennia of anti-Semitic oppression. In this sense, hatred of the Jews was as primordial as 
the Jews themselves, and it was this paradox of Jewish identity which legitimated the creation 
of Israel, and the work of Zionists.
Understanding the importance of the Jewish nationalist experience helps us to see 
why other nations, (Serbs and Croats for example) have fit their own experiences or 
‘collective memories’ into an ethical and teleological framework. For non-Jewish 
nationalists, creating myths of Covenant, Fall, and Redemption, allowed them to situate their 
nation’s history within a cyclical teleological understanding of history, while underwriting 
this framework with ethical arguments borrowed from the Jewish example. It is certainly for 
these reasons that many nationalism theorists, such as George Schbpflin and Dusan 
Kecmanovic, have created typologies of negative imagery in their respective studies of new 
nationalisms, as a means of bringing about ‘compensation for the powerless’ and ‘a special 
moral superiority for having suffered’.74
Conclusions:
Elias Canetti, in The Human Province (1945) was perhaps the first to lament the use 
of victimization to form a base of Jewish identity, ‘The suffering of the Jews had turned into
n  c
an institution, but it outlived itself. People don’t want to hear about it anymore.’ Forty years 
later, German Historikerstreit historian Ernst Nolte would lament its continued impact over
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the lives of Germans, the Nazi era, ‘seem[ing] to become more alive and powerful, not as a 
model but as spectre, as a past that is establishing itself as a present, as a sword of judgement 
hung over the present’.76 Clearly, Nolte’s ‘sword of judgement’ has continued well past his 
1980s movement, which attempted to normalise and rehabilitate German history by claiming 
that Germans were also the victims of Nazism. In Germany, there remains a fascination and a 
horror of Nazism, and a questioning of how and why its symbols continue to bedevil western 
consciousness.
The central theme of this chapter has been the primary role of Fall imagery in 
activating Jewish collective identity and nationalism. By placing myths of Fall and 
Redemption within a Biblical teleological tradition, Zionists argued that a universal negative 
historic force had been plaguing the Jews since the beginning of recorded history, 
contributing to a unique Jewish identity. The advent of the Holocaust proved to many Jewish 
writers that their old lives in the Diaspora were no longer possible. The Holocaust as ‘Hell 
made immanent’, and Hitler as the Devil for the modem world, created a new and secular evil 
which has continued to preoccupy philosophers and nationalists of all stripes. Living in a post 
cultural world, a new arsenal of symbols gives priority and legitimacy to victimised nations 
trying to assert themselves, over and above the legitimacy enjoyed by more powerful 
oppressors.
The Holocaust, as a new ‘frame of reference’, and the Jews as ‘the gold standard of 
oppression’, has created an interesting ethical system, where victims who articulate their 
suffering and make it meaningful within a historic and teleological context, may legitimate 
‘self help’, in whatever form that may take. A discussion of the presentation of the Holocaust 
as ‘performative’, and nationalism as an instrumental process of ‘inscripting narratives’ 
illustrates the importance of public perception in shaping nationalist writings. It also signals 
the importance of an elite caste of leaders and myth makers, what Tishkov rightly called ‘the
77professional producers of subjective visions’.
That the Holocaust has been used instrumentally by Zionists provides lessons to other 
burgeoning groups that if they too can ‘out-victim’ their rivals, they can claim moral 
ascendancy, and thereby legitimate territorial expansion and population transfers. Writers of 
nationalist theory generally acknowledge the importance of ‘myths of Covenant and 
redemption’, ‘primary myths of identification’, and ‘negative myths of identification’. I 
would argue that the last category has become the most important in the context of Serbia and 
Croatian nationalism, as each has adopted an aesthetic of persecution to legitimate national 
projects. Understanding Serbian and Croatian nationalism through its instrumental use of Fall
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mythology should demonstrate both the widespread misuse of such imagery, as well as the 
dangers involved for perceived enemies.
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Chapter Three: The Rise of Serbian Nationalism
‘The history of Serbian lands ... is full of instances of genocide against the Serbs and 
of exoduses to which they were exposed. Processes of annihilation of the Serbs in the 
most diverse and brutal ways have been continuous. Throughout their history they 
have faced the fiercest forms of genocide and exoduses that have jeopardised their 
existence, yet they have always been self-defenders of their own existence, 
spirituality, culture, and democratic convictions. ’
-SANU, “Declaration Against the Genocide of the Serbian People”1 -
Introduction:
This chapter will chart the rise of Serbian nationalism, while examining many of the 
important myths that evolved as a concomitant to it. The above citation, from a recent 
statement by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, encapsulates what became the 
Serbian view of history after 1986 -  a long suffering, but heroic nation, struggling for 
centuries against annihilation. I will begin by exploring elements of the Battle of Kosovo, a 
battle fought between Serbian and Turkish forces on 28 June, 1389. The Serbs lost this 
famous battle, and were thereafter subjugated to five centuries of Ottoman rule. In legend, the 
Battle was also a Serbian sacrifice, which elevated them to the status of a heavenly and 
chosen people. This chapter will begin by exploring the legacy of this famous myth, and how 
it has become a template for Serbian views of history. It is crucial to understand how this 
myth was generalised and fused with Jewish imagery, such that Kosovo became the ‘Serbian 
Jerusalem’. Myths highlighting the glorious but tragic aspects of Serbian history were of 
central importance in legitimating the dismantling of the Yugoslav Federation, and the 
expansionist ambitions of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his colleagues.
It is important to understand how Kosovo, and more general myths of Golden Age 
and Fall were instrumentalised, first in the case of the Kosovar Albanians, and secondly and 
more importantly, in the case of the Croats. Stemming from Kosovo and other myths has 
been the creation of a Serbian version of anti-Semitism -  ‘Serbophobia’ -  a genocidal and 
expansionist strategy, supposedly used throughout history by Serbia’s enemies. Using a 
nationalist teleology, Serbian writers specifically targeted the Croats as harbingers of 
Serbophobia, viewing them as a truly Biblical antagonist, which had been operating against
fVithe Serbs since the division of the Roman Empire. This chapter will review the 19 and early
iL
20 century manifestations of Croatian ‘Serbophobia’, laying the basis for an analysis of 
World War II, the SFRY, and the more contemporary conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia- 
Hercegovina.
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Contextualising Propaganda: The Rise of Serbian Nationalism:
It is accurate to suggest that for most of the lifetime of the SFRY, Serbian nationalism 
was subordinate to Communism, and did not become an important factor until 1980. The 
Serbian capital Belgrade became the capital of Yugoslavia, and Tito managed to repress most 
manifestations of Serbian nationalism during his lifetime. A high percentage of Serbs 
supported Tito’s Communist system, even if they were dissatisfied with particular aspects of 
it. The crucial break, however, when Tito died, after nearly four decades as a virtual dictator. 
The lack of any strong, articulate non-nationalistic leader with Tito’s charisma, capable of 
exercising the same level of control, created a power vacuum at the federal centre. This 
vacuum would soon be filled by nationalists throughout the Federation. From the onset, the 
most important power bases were to be found in Yugoslavia’s republics -  not at the federal 
centre. As such, without a Tito at the helm, power bases within the individual republics 
naturally became more important. This was not only true of Serbia -  but of all republics 
within the Federation.2
The rise of Serbian nationalism was largely a reaction to events in the former Serbian 
autonomous province of Kosovo, a region which was traditionally seen as the Serbian 
heartland, but was also home to an Albanian majority -  some 90% of the population. Kosovo 
was the seat of the early Serbian Orthodox Church, and was the site of some of the most 
important Orthodox monasteries in Yugoslavia, such as GraCanica -  where the remains of the 
famous Serbian King Milutin (1282-1321) were interred.3 The Plain of Gazimestan at 
Kosovo Polje (Field of the Blackbirds) was the scene of the Serbs’ battle against the Ottoman 
Empire. Kosovo was thus the home of their best-loved religious shrines, and the locus of their 
most famous defeat.
Albanians, not Serbs, were the first to articulate nationalist demands after 1980. 
Kosovar Albanian students demonstrated at Pristine University for Albanian autonomy and 
republic status, provoking riots which led to a large number of injured Kosovars and security 
forces, and nine deaths.4 The Serbian government clamped down the following year with a 
state of emergency, and over the next eight years, 584,373 Kosovars, over half of the adult 
population, would face either arrest, interrogation, or police harassment.5 In reaction to 
Albanian secessionism, amid fears of ‘Greater Albania’, the Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts drew up a Memorandum in 1986 -  a long list of Serbian grievances against their 
treatment within the Federation. Much of the document dealt with the ‘genocide’ of Serbs in 
Kosovo, and articulated the need for Serbs throughout Yugoslavia to assert themselves
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collectively. The 1974 Constitution, which decentralised power in Yugoslavia and stopped 
Serbia’s control over its former provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina), was blamed for the loss 
of Serbian power and prestige. The Memorandum's architects would eventually play a 
prominent role in spurring Serbian nationalism, and the dismemberment of the Federation.
Attempts by Serbian Party President Ivan Stambolic to deal with Kosovo’s civil 
unrest through constitutional revision and consensus proved to be ineffective, and the friction 
between Serbs and Albanians escalated.6 It was into this breach that an unlikely candidate 
asserted himself. Slobodan Milosevic, a former Belgrade banker and protege of Stambolic, 
was in all respects a colourless Communist bureaucrat and a most unlikely nationalist. It was 
he that Stambolic sent to Kosovo on 24 April, 1987, to hear grievances by Kosovar Serbs that 
they were being discriminated against by the police and the government. While his mission 
was to pacify the people, Milosevic did exactly the opposite, after hearing stories of Albanian 
police assaulting Serbian demonstrators. Milosevic’s simple phrase Niko ne sme da bije 
narod (No one has the right to beat the People) would make him an instant hero, for taking on 
the Albanian leadership, while making the antagonism between Albanian and Serb explicit.7
Milosevic was one of the first to sense Yugoslavia’s changing fortunes, and embraced 
nationalism with opportunistic fervour, correctly sensing that a ‘turning point’ was about to 
begin. While no nationalist himself, Milosevic opened the Pandora’s box that forever 
changed the nature of Serbian, and by extension Yugoslav politics. Former American 
ambassador Warren Zimmerman described Milosevic as having made a ‘Faustian pact with 
nationalism’, although his ‘extraordinary coldness’ and inability to care for anyone, even the
o
Serbs, made his choice surprising. Milosevic soon ousted his long time mentor, Stambolic, 
and, with the support of the media, took power in December, 1987. He appealed to an 
emerging sense of Serbian unity, and claimed to speak for Serbs throughout Yugoslavia -  a 
tacit warning to other republican leaders that their boundaries would provide little protection 
from Serbian intervention. Promising to end the persecution of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, and Kosovo, he advocated a strengthening of the Orthodox Church and a 
privileging of Serbian cultural and social institutions, which he argued had long been 
repressed under Communism.9
If we review Kenneth Minogue’s three stage process of nationalism, we can see that 
Milosevic clearly articulated the ‘stirrings’ stage of Serbian nationalism, through the 
acknowledgement that Serbs were suffering in Kosovo. Unfortunately, the ‘struggle’ stage 
was soon to follow.10 Milosevic convinced his people that a great turning point had arrived in 
Serbian history. He articulated what Dusan Kecmanovic has called a ‘watershed’, or the myth
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of ‘the right moment’11, or what George Schopflin described as a ‘myth of rebirth and 
renewal’.12 These types of myths basically advanced the same claim -  that it was time for 
Serbia to reassert itself under a powerful nationalist leader who could protect their interests -  
Milosevic was seemingly the man for the job. While alternate readings of Serbian nationalism 
existed at this time, and continued to hold sway over some segments of the population, the 
increasing power of the Kosovo myth, the decline of Communism, and the general sense of 
loss and marginalisation that had been stirred by the SANU and other organisations made it 
increasingly difficult for other voices to he heard.
Another important aspect of his nationalist platform was the re-Serbianisation of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina. Vojvodina, like Kosovo had been given a large measure of autonomy 
under the 1974 Constitution. The effects of this decentralising constitution were soon 
reversed. By the beginning of 1988, overt discrimination against the Kosovars began, as 
Milosevic stepped up his anti-Albanian rhetoric, to the delight of the increasingly nationalist 
oriented Serbian population. Milosevic’s nationalism was advanced in terms of an ‘Anti- 
Bureaucratic Revolution’, and ‘The Happening of the People’, two rather banal catch phrases, 
used to justify the re-emergence of nationalism and Milosevic’s cementing of political power.
By February, 1989, Milosevic pushed through a series of amendments to the Serbian 
constitution, eliminating the provinces’ authority to pass their own legislation. By organising 
mass rallies, he was able to force the leadership in Vojvodina to resign. By September 1990, 
a new constitution fully subordinated Vojvodina and Kosovo to central Serbian control.
These two coups provided Serbia with quadruple its allotted seats in federal institutions, 
granting the republic virtual control over the outcome of all votes at the federal level.13 Serb 
actions against the Albanians in Kosovo demonstrated definitively the collapse of the federal 
system. The lesson of Kosovo was obvious -  the system was no longer strong enough or was 
unwilling to restrain belligerent republics, and it was unable to protect basic human and 
constitutional rights.14
Milosevic’s intimidation of other republics in the SFRY soon led to secessionist 
movements around the country. The first overt move was made by Slovenian leader Milan 
Kucan, whose overtures for decentralisation were violently rejected by Milosevic -  who in 
turn threatened civil unrest and violence. The machinations of the JNA in Slovenia also set 
the stage for a showdown. Harassed by the JNA and threatened by Serbia, Slovenians pushed 
for separation from the Federation. In December, 1990, Slovenia declared its independence, 
later leading to a short war between Slovenian and JNA troops, which eventually resulted in 
Slovenian independence.15
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While Milosevic was often credited with breaking up Yugoslavia and installing 
nationalism as the ruling ideology in Serbia, it was certain that he had not acted alone. With 
him were many new nationalists who proved instrumental in the coming years. While 
Milosevic used nationalism as a tool to gain power, his leadership relied on the support of 
many ‘true believers’, who formed a crucial spiritual and intellectual base. Among these, 
novelist Dobrica Cosic was perhaps the most famous. Formerly a Communist novelist, Cosic 
wholeheartedly embraced nationalism with the decline of Yugoslavia, and became an early 
supporter of Milosevic and his government.
While the western press would later become obsessed with Milosevic as a nationalist 
demagogue, which became obvious after 1991, he should be seen more as a supporter of 
nationalism than its founder. Milosevic’s regime provided a climate for the unrestrained 
articulation of nationalist sentiments, and the wholesale revision of Serbian history. 
Milosevic’s overt support of the Serbian Orthodox Church was well known. The Church 
joined with individual journalists, politicians, novelists, academics and military leaders in 
contributing to the escalation of militant nationalism. However, their role was more 
important. By acting as the conscience of Serbian, they providing a greatly needed spiritual 
underpinning to Milosevic’s movement.
Milosevic’s regime was well known for its centralisation and control of much of the 
opposition media. While the media in the SFRY had operated relatively unfettered, new 
legislation limited the scope of independent reporting. New provisions under the Serbian 
Penal Code, specifically Article 98, made it an offence to criticise the government or cast 
doubt on the country’s leaders. Government ministries of Information and the Interior now 
had a mandate to censor, delete, or change any aspect of reporting found to be at odds with 
official government accounts.16 The government controlled Serbian Radio-Television (RTS), 
soon gained a broadcasting monopoly. The July 1991 Law on Radio and Television 
transferred parliamentary powers over radio and television directly to the government.17
The Milosevic regime also did its best to limit if not destroy independent print media, 
by imposing swinging taxes, while cutting supplies of newsprint and fuel. Independent papers 
such as Borba, Vreme and Republika were forced to pay four times more for newsprint than 
loyal government controlled papers, such as Vecemje novosti,18 Powerful conglomerates, 
such as the Politika Group, which owned twenty publications, a radio station and a television 
channel -  were reduced to government appendages by 1987, giving Milosevic full power to 
implement his nationalistic projects.19
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While control over the media allowed the regime to strictly determine what people 
understood about the government and its role in the wars which were to follow, Milosevic’s 
key role, once again, was as a catalyst for nationalism. The role of the media was axed 
primarily on maintaining support for Milosevic’s regime, not necessarily Serbian nationalism 
per se. Indeed, Milosevic’s role in persecuting nationalist opposition leaders was well known, 
such as his continuous harassment of nationalist author and politician Vuk Draskovic, which 
included severe beatings and several attempts on his life. Nevertheless, Milosevic’s legacy 
was to create a forum where such men were able to stand for election, and disseminate their 
nationalist views to an increasingly receptive audience. His later support of influential 
warlords (such as Vojislav Seselj and Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan) allowed Milosevic to 
indirectly carry out much of the dirty work in expanding the Serbian state, without relying on 
the official armed forces.
Milosevic’s support of numerous academic institutions and publishing houses 
dedicated to the promotion of nationalist views, proved to be of immense importance. Among 
the most important purveyors of Serbian propaganda were to be found: The Institute of 
Economic Sciences, The Institute for European Studies, Velauto International, IDEA, BMG, 
and of course SANU (Serbia), the Serbian Unity Congress, Dorset Press, Serbian Heritage 
Books (USA and Canada) Minerva Press, The Book Guild (Great Britain), and L’Age 
D’Homme20, L’Harmattan, and Terrain Vague (France and Switzerland). The international 
character of many of these gave the illusion that they were impartial publishing houses.
While some of these seemed to have been duped into advancing the Serbian position, others 
received direct funding from the Serbian government, and official support was crucial to the 
success of their endeavours.
The creation of the Serbian Ministry of Information also provided an important outlet
for nationalist views. Well and lesser known nationalists had access to a government
controlled forum for disseminating their nationalist opinions. This key ministry was
responsible for the co-ordination and consolidation of Serbian propaganda, and its influence
in unifying reinterpretations of Serbian history and current events should not be
underestimated. However, it was clear that even amongst opposition leaders, there is a
surprising consistency in Serbian revisionist views and propaganda, as will become apparent
throughout this thesis. Indeed, other than the non-nationalist opposition media, and curiously,
1Milosevic’s wife Mira Markovic, there were few dissenting voices.
The remainder of this chapter will explore how Serbian nationalist novelists, 
politicians, journalists, and military leaders firmly anchored Serbian nationalism in a cyclical
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teleological framework, which relied heavily on myths of a Golden Age or ‘Heavenly Serbia’ 
with Serbs as a chosen people or a nebeski narod. Another central theme woven throughout 
Serbian writing was the image of the Serbs as a long suffering, persecuted people, often 
likened to the Jews.
‘Kosovo’ and the Development of Serbian Consciousness:
Throughout the conflict, the myth of Kosovo was touted as a key moniker of Serbian 
identity. Kosovo figured as the locus of a historic defeat, but also symbolised the awakening 
of Serbian values and spirituality. The Kosovo Battle was fought in the year 1389 on St.
Vitus Day (28 June). The basic story surrounds Prince Lazar, an elected Serbian prince, who 
in legend was handed an ultimatum, where he was either to pay homage to the Turkish Sultan 
Murad I, and relinquish control of Serbian lands and taxation, or bring his forces onto 
Kosovo Polje to face the Sultan’s army. Lazar was approached in a dream by a grey hawk (or 
falcon) flying from Jerusalem, and was offered a choice: an earthly kingdom (implying 
victory for his forces against the Sultan), or a heavenly kingdom, (where the Serbs would be 
defeated in battle). As one Serbian source paraphrased Lazar’s decision,
“If I decide to choose the earthly kingdom, the earthly kingdom lasts only for a brief 
time, but the heavenly kingdom always and forever.” Thus the Serbian Tsar chose the 
heavenly kingdom rather than the kingdom of this world. Thus the holy Tsar Lazar 
... wisely led these reason-endowed lambs to lay down their lives courageously in 
Christ, and obtain the crown of suffering (martyrdom), so that they might all become 
partakers of the glory on high.23
The details of the battle are sketchy at best, including the actual winners and losers. 
Robert Kaplan and James Marriott both insist that the Serbs lost decisively. Tim Judah 
advances that the Serbs may have actually won the Battle -  based on a variety of 
contemporary dispatches. Reviewing a wealth of evidence, Noel Malcolm insists that the 
Battle was a draw -  neither side having clinched definitive victory.24 In the Serbian legend of 
the Battle, however, there is no ambiguity -  the Serbs lost, and there thereafter subjected to 
five centuries of Ottoman rule. What has emerged most prominently, however, was the 
heroism of the Serbs, dying so that their nation could be elevated to a spiritual entity. The 
Serbian Orthodox Church of North America painted the Battle as a moral and spiritual 
victory for the Serbs, the victory of the divine over the secular, the eternal over the temporal. 
Like the crucifixion, the martyrdom of Lazar and the Serbian nation raised the Serbian people 
and make them divine, holy, chosen, special. Their portrayal was typical,
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[T]he Battle of Kosovo was, in the eyes of the world, a disastrous defeat for the 
Serbs. But in the eyes of heaven and of those who understand the mystery and 
meaning of the Battle of Kosovo, it was a glorious victory. It marked the day when 
the Serbian people ceased to trust in the material things of the kingdom of this world, 
and began to set their hope on the spiritual values of the heavenly kingdom. It 
marked the day when the Serbs voluntarily had sacrificed their glorious earthly 
kingdom and even themselves for Christ their God, so that they might be partakers of 
the incomparably more glorious heavenly kingdom of Christ.25
The Kosovo defeat became nation-defining, allowing the Serbs to transcend mere 
mortality. As one contemporary historian wrote with disdain, the Kosovo myth seemed like a 
‘cheat’, since its ‘merges the contradictory satisfactions of being the winner and the loser’.26 
Nevertheless, Kosovo functioned as a typical covenential myth. There was also a Fall, and a 
promise of Redemption, embodying the ‘covenential culture’ described by Akenson.27 It also 
fulfilled the three aspects of Hebrew nationalism described by Kohn, as it elevated the Serbs 
to the status of a ‘chosen people’, gave them a ‘consciousness of national history’, and 
created a form of ‘national messianism’, while similarly democratising nationalism by means 
of a Covenant between God and all co-nationals. Like the Jews, the Serbs could regain their 
promised land, through constant contemplation and ‘wholehearted mourning’. This alone 
would allow ‘the seed of that distant defeat... to bloom into something more wonderful than 
victory’.29
The 19th century development of the myth through the writings of Serbian linguist 
Vuk Karadzic transformed Lazar into a Christ-like figure -  who led the Serbian nation to 
holy martyrdom so that it would achieve divine status. As well, Lazar’s enemies became 
Judas-like traitors. Serbian warrior Vuk Brankovic was later demonised for crossing over to 
the Turkish side on the eve of the battle. Brankovic came to symbolise betrayal from within, 
the ‘Christ killer’ who represented Serbian converts to Islam, who became enemies of their 
own people.30 This would lay the basis for an obvious example of Kecmanovic’s theory of 
‘counteridentification’ -  with the projection of a variety of negative characteristics onto the 
Moslems.31 This counteridentification would be strengthened through the well known Serbian 
epic poem, ‘The Mountain Wreath’, written by Petar Petrovic-Njegos, a price-bishop from 
Montenegro. This poem glorified the exploits of one Milos
Obilic, a legendary Serbian hero from the Battle of Kosovo who supposedly killed the 
Turkish Sultan.32 Obilic exemplified how courage and great deeds could overcome national 
defeat. In essence, he epitomised the promise of Redemption for the Serbs, if they held true to 
their faith in Orthodoxy and Serbdom.
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The Turks would be the main enemy of the Serbs for centuries, representing
tVieverything they were not. In the 19 century, geographer Jovan Cvijic activated the Kosovo 
myth, making it a central component of his ‘Dinaric man’ -  the traditional South Slav 
inhabitant,
The Dinaric is consumed with a burning desire to avenge Kosovo, where he lost his 
independence, and to revive the Serbian empire about which he has never ceased to 
dream even in the most desperate circumstances in which a man of pure reason 
would have despaired ... This tenacity, this absolute faith in the national ideal, is the 
essential fact of his history, he considers himself chosen by destiny to accomplish the 
national mission ...To kill lots of Turks is for him not only a way of avenging his 
ancestors but of assuaging their pain which he shares.
For Cvijic, as for later interpreters, the Battle contained both positive and negative 
components -  the valiant Serbs against the treacherous Turks. Thousands were rallied for war 
in the 19th and 20th centuries through the legend of Kosovo. It gave Serbs the will to fight, 
even in cases of certain defeat. The aesthetic of martyrdom, of dying for a noble cause, 
seemed truly embedded in the national psyche. No greater form of Golden Age could be 
imagined for the Serbs.
Milosevic’s genius in exploiting Kosovo to his advantage was readily apparent by
t li1989, when a huge rally was planned to commemorate the 600 anniversary of the Battle. As 
a precursor to the event, the relics of Prince Lazar were paraded around Serbia, with full 
media coverage, to be finally interred at Ravenica, Lazar’s original place of rest.34 On the 
plain of Gazimestan, a vast crowd of pilgrims estimated at between one and two million 
gathered for the 600th anniversary. This was to be Milosevic’s shining moment, as Serbs from 
around the world gathered to celebrate the renewal of Serbian culture, religion and 
nationalism. It was at this stage that Milosevic was able to transform himself into a nationalist 
demagogue, as he emerged triumphant from a helicopter amid cheering crowds. Orthodox 
priests held aloft icons of Milosevic □ and Lazar, while thousands of men and women crowded 
around the podium. Arguably, this was Milosevic’s finest hour.35 Secretly, however, 
Milosevic □ admitted that most of this was nothing more than ‘bullshit’.36 The spectacle was 
purely for the benefit of the Serbian people -  to cement his growing personal power.
Kosovo secured Milosevic’s position as both a political and spiritual leader of the 
Serbian nationalist movement. It was also a good example of George Schopflin’s 
‘myths of election’, since this was clearly an event where the nation was seemingly chosen by 
God, or History to perform a special mission -  uniting Yugoslavia’s disparate mass of
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Serbdom together.37 Such rallies were designed to quell any opposition to Milosevic’s rule, by 
co-opting even the most virulent nationalists. By 1989, Milosevic’s political control over 
Serbia and Kosovo was unquestioned, as was the emergence of Serbian nationalism. A sharp 
division between nationalists and Communists appeared, with Serbs as either loyal supporters 
of the regime, or potential traitors. Vuk Brankovic, the Serbian Judas, was seemingly lurking
-JQ
behind every comer.
Throughout Serbia, Kosovo fever gripped the population. Serbian bookstores filled 
their shelves with books on Kosovo, while musical artists dedicated their works to Kosovo. 
Even a new perfume ‘Miss 1389’, evoked images of the Battle. In some respects, Anthony 
Smith was correct when he noted the aesthetic aspects of Golden Age nationalism. Smith’s 
general description of the use of Golden Age myths easily applied to the Serbs during this 
time. Serbian leaders were most adept at ‘unfold[ing] a glorious past, a golden age of saints 
and heroes, to give meaning to its promise of restoration and dignity’.40 Indeed, there was 
much in Kosovo fever which reflected the ‘poetic spaces’ described by Smith.
Renewal of the Serbian Orthodox Church:
It should be noted at the onset that while Kosovo was one of the most important myths 
of Serbian greatness, it accompanied a general trend of glorifying past Serbian 
accomplishments, while tingeing them with tragedy. Much of the revision of history involved 
the glorification of Serbian Orthodoxy as a repository of nationalist expression. Orthodoxy for 
Serbs had a certain purity, being ‘purely spiritual’, while ‘turned towards Christ and the 
“Empire of Heaven’” , to quote one historian 41 The rise of Serbian nationalism and the 
instrumentalisation of Kosovo also brought to the fore a general feeling of Serbian greatness. 
Serbia as the ‘new Byzantium’, and the Serbs as a ‘heavenly people’ were to become 
increasingly popular motifs.42 Such imagery stressed the strong Covenant that Serbs 
supposedly maintained with God, and reinforced the image of the Serbs and a holy, chosen 
people.
Speaking of his fellow Serbs, Metropolitan Amfilohije Radovic of Montenegro 
preached, ‘Our destiny is to carry the cross on this blazing divide between different worlds ... 
therefore the Serbian people are also divine ... Our people preserves in its bosom, in its 
collective memory, Jerusalem’s holiness.’43 Nevertheless, he warned that ‘an insane wind 
tries ceaselessly to extinguish this sacred lamp’. These ‘insane winds’ were to be understood 
as Catholic and Protestant countries from the west, and Islamic countries from the east. Serbia 
was seemingly sandwitched in the middle of two expansionist forces, both trying to encroach
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on its territory.44 The Church promoted Kosovo as the spiritual and cultural heartland of the 
Serbian people. Kosovo also symbolised their unity and integrity 45 The 600th anniversary of 
the Kosovo Battle became a year of commemoration for the past 500 years of ‘suffering’ 
under which the Orthodox Church claimed the Serbs had suffered 46
Coupled with the emergence of this religious-nationalist amalgam were a spate of 
books and articles, propagating a patriotic view of Serbian superiority. One such book, by 
Olga Lukovic-Pejanovic, was suggestively titled The Serbs: The Oldest Nation, and claimed, 
among other things, that the Biblical Garden of Eden was located in Serbia, that the Cyrillic 
script was invented by Serbs, and that numerous ancient writers, such as Ovid, composed their 
works in Serbian. One curious text entitled ‘Serbs - Nations Most Numerous’, argued that 
Serbs were the most numerous (and therefore the most cosmopolitan) nation in history, 
having inhabited India, Mesopotamia, Siberia, and Africa. The author even claimed 
Alexander the Great as one of the great Serbian heroes of the past, even though he was 
Macedonian 47
Similarly, Serbia’s minister of culture, focusing on the Serb’s uniqueness, concluded 
that the Serbs are one of five imperial peoples, ‘It is an ancient people and one of the most 
Christian ones’. According to another minister of the Serbian government, ‘Today, many 
around the world dream about being Serb ... Be happy you belong to this people. You are 
eternal.’ Likewise, in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Velibor Ostojic, President of SDS proclaimed, 
‘every nook of Serbian land and the Serbs themselves are a heavenly wonder, and an
ARinspiration and example to all other peoples and countries.’
A tradition of religious tolerance and love was to prove extremely important in 
demonstrating that the Serbs were religiously and culturally unable to be aggressors in any 
conflict; they could only be the victims. Kosovo allowed for the creation of a coherent 
nationalist system, where political and religious leaders worked side by side with opposition 
politicians, academics, and journalists to promote the cause of Serbian renewal. At this stage, 
such myths were used to re-awaken the people, and could in some ways be described as 
Smith’s Golden Age of nationalism, with myths of origin, descent, and a heroic age.
Certainly, Serbian leaders were taking advantage of their ‘usable past’ to cement their power 
as the republic transformed itself49
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Generalising Kosovo: Serb and Jewish Connections:
We have to persevere or else we are lost. I t’s similar to the problem the Jews had.
Kosovo is our Jerusalem. We’d rather defend it as it is, rather than have just one 
wailing wall. Kosovo is a place of Serbian national identity that we cannot give away, 
just as Israel can’t give away Jerusalem. ’
-Serbian writer and musician Aleksander Pavlovic -
At the same time, however, Kosovo as a Golden Age was only a small part of its 
overall significance. The image of Serbs as a long persecuted people reflected Schopflin’s 
taxonomy of negative myths, namely the ideal of ‘myths of redemption and suffering’ and 
‘myths of unjust treatment’50, and conformed also to Kecmanovic’s ‘myth of victim and 
sacrifice’.51 Such myths were integral to the rise of Serbian nationalism, and explained, far 
more than Smith’s theories of a Golden Age, why Serbs so eagerly supported the idea of a 
national awakening. Certainly a key aspect of Serbian propaganda was the belief that the 
nation had reached a historic turning point -  that Serbian suffering was now over, and that 
Serbia could now relive its glory, while avenging the wrongs of the past. Nevertheless, while 
Kosovo resonated strongly with the Serbian people, the government also saw the need to 
generalise the lessons of Kosovo, to incorporate non-Serbian and contemporary symbolism 
into the myth, in order to justify the re-emergence of Serbia to the outside world. The lessons 
had to be universalised, and brought into the late 20th century. For this reason, a new form of 
Kosovo interpretation began, bringing Serbia into the comparative genocide debate.
In 1988, a group of eminent Serbian intellectuals formed the Serbian-Jewish 
Friendship Society, headed by Klara Mandic, in the hope of paralleling the plight of Serbs 
and Jews. The formation of the Society and its later work proved how important the Serbian 
notion of ‘performing’ their own victimisation had become. The primary goal of this society 
was to strengthen contact between Serbia and Israel, relations which had obviously soured 
with the strong anti-Zionist line advanced by Tito at the behest his Islamic Non-Aligned 
colleagues. Activities such as city twinning were popular, with 22 twin cities between Serbia 
and Israel, the most important being Belgrade-Tel Aviv, where mutual activities, from 
sporting events to commercial transactions, were encouraged. Mandic brought the mayors of 
fifteen Serbian cities to Israel during the Gulf War, when Serbia remained a staunch ally of 
Iraq. Even the Serbian Crown Prince in exile, Aleksander, visited Israel to stress the 
commonalities between these two cultures. A new museum was also formed, to show the
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historic ‘Jewishness’ of Serbia. North of Belgrade, in Zemun, the supposed ancestral home of 
Theodor Herzl was restored and also turned into a museum.53
The purpose of the Society was to equate Serbian suffering with that of the Jews, 
allowing Serbs to enter into the comparative genocide debate. The Society’s role was clearly 
not to represent Jewish interests, but rather, to court Israeli military support, which Serbia 
successfully maintained until 1999. In reality, the Jewish community in Serbia was relatively 
small, with only 3,500 Jews in nine local communities affiliated with the Federation of 
Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia, a non-nationalist representative of Jewish interests.54
American journalist Florence Levinsohn was one of the first American Jewish writers 
to compare the Kosovo Battle to the Jewish legend of Masada, where approximately 1,000 
Jewish warriors committed mass suicide, after a losing battle with the attacking Romans 
some 2,000 years ago.55 Echoing Jovan Cvijic, Milan Bulajic, Director of the Museum of 
Victims of Genocide in Belgrade, ascribed a willingness to fight to Serbian ‘genes’, which 
made them see themselves as ‘victims by destiny’. He also claimed that ‘they are the chosen 
people, like the Jews. They have chosen the heavenly kingdom symbolised by Kosovo.’56 For 
writers such as Bulajic, what it meant to be a Serb was immutable, and rooted in the ancient 
past. They seemingly shared much with the Jews, in terms of their willingness to fight 
heroically in the face of overwhelming odds.
Such views were also evident in clerical circles. As early as 1983, a petition was 
drawn up by Serbian Orthodox bishops to protest Serbian persecution in Kosovo. Once again, 
the links between Serbian and Jewish suffering were stressed,
The Jewish people, before the menace of their annihilation and by the miracle of the 
uninterrupted memory, returned to Jerusalem after 2,000 years of suffering, against 
all logic of history. In a similar manner, the Serbian people have been fighting their 
battle at Kosovo since 1389, in order to save the memory of its identity, to preserve 
the meaning of their existence against all odds.57
Zarko Korac of Belgrade University also made this link explicit, in his study of the 
Serbian national revival. Here, he posited that the myth, like a passion play, eventually 
became primordial, and could not be seen as mere metaphor. The myth became central to the 
will to fight for a homeland. Thus,
What [Kosovo] tells the Serbs is “we are going to make a state again”. Just as “Jesus 
is coming back” so is Lazar. It means that because we opted for the kingdom of 
heaven we cannot lose, and that is what people mean when they talk about Serbs as 
being a “heavenly people”. In this way the Serbs identify themselves with the Jews.
As victims yes, but also with the idea of “sacred soil”. The Jews say “Next year in
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Jerusalem” and after 2000 years they resurrected their state. The message is “We are
victims, but we are going to survive”.58
There can be little doubt that Serbian writers saw the merits of drawing overt 
comparisons between themselves and the Jews. Serbian claims to Kosovo were no different 
than Zionist claims to Israel, or so the argument went. Serbs were a persecuted nation, as 
were the Jews, and both deserved to have a national homeland. In this example of Serbian 
myth making at its finest, the process of inscription, or narrativising was obvious.
The First Targets: Myths of Persecution and the Kosovar Albanians:
The operationalisation of the Kosovo myth was first used against the Kosovar 
Albanians, as a means of legitimating the re-incorporation of this province into an expanded 
Serbia. Accusations of genocide levelled against the Albanians acted as a precursor to later 
accusations of genocide levelled against Croats and Bosnian Moslems. For this reason, it is 
worth reviewing several aspects of these Serbian claims, and how they constituted the first 
step in a Serbian merger of Kosovo and Jewish imagery in the service of nationalism. From 
the very beginning, it was clear that accusing the Albanians of genocide was the key to 
legitimating Serbian territorial claims. By 1986, 60,000 Serbs had signed a petition, along 
with Serbian Orthodox bishops from New Zealand, Europe, and North America, detailing a 
‘fascist genocide’ being inflicted on Serbs and Montenegrins.59
Echoing the Jewish case, anti-Albanian propaganda focussed on a long history of 
Albanian genocide in Kosovo. Numerous Serbian publications advanced that Albanians had 
been killing and forcibly expulsing Serbs from the region since the arrival of the Ottoman 
Turks. Albanians supposedly acted as the ‘strong arm of the Ottoman Empire’, keeping the 
weak but proud Serbs in submission from 1389 onward.60 Others described how in the 
‘intervening centuries’, Serbs were forced to flee from Kosovo, while the Turks settled the 
region with Islamicised Albanians, a process, ‘which today would be called genocide’.61 
Forced expulsions in the 19th century were similarly claimed to have been severe, 
approaching a total of 150,000.62 For these Serbian writers, the Albanians were a violent and 
treacherous people. Because they had collaborated with the occupying Ottoman armies, and 
had set themselves up in Kosovo in order to terrorise the Christian Serbs, they had no claim 
to be a constituent nation in the region -  they were ‘morally disqualified.’ It was clear that 
only a chosen nation, like the Serbs, deserved to be in control.
Tito’s Yugoslavia would be reinterpreted as a time when Albanian genocide 
continued with full fury. Dobrica Cosic was one of the first to reinterpret Kosovar actions
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during the lifespan of Yugoslavia as an attempt to create, ‘an ethnically pure Kosovo republic 
... an Albanian state in Yugoslav territory.’64 Kosovars, not Serbs, were blamed for inventing 
‘ethnic cleansing’. For other writers, the long history of ‘brutal persecution’ included such 
activities as, ‘rape and pillage ... the desecration of Serbian religious institutions and 
cemeteries, arson and exploitation’.65 Writers blamed the Albanians for instituting a 40-year 
policy of ethnic cleansing against the Serbs during the lifetime of Yugoslavia, in order to 
create a Republic of Kosovo on the ethnically pure area.66 Others would describe an ‘open 
and total war’, which was leading inexorably to, ‘the physical, political and cultural genocide
fnof the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohije’. In all cases, a long and continuous 
history of genocide was revealed, with the Serbs as the indigenous people of the region 
constantly under attack from the alien Albanians.
Such a portrayal of Serbian-Albanian relations made Serbian reactions against 
Kosovo appear as a welcome, although long delayed measure, designed to correct centuries 
of abuse. Such rhetoric bore similarities to Hugh Trevor-Roper’s definition of ‘normal 
nationalism’, with its ‘expression of wounded nationality’, its emphasis on national defeat, 
and its theme of insecurity and exposed national frontiers, surrounded by hostile foreign 
powers. The creation of a continuous history of violent persecution and genocide also 
reflected Schopflin’s ‘myths of powerlessness and compensation for the powerless’, where 
the Serbs deserved to regain their ancestral land -  primarily because they had lost it due to 
violence and treachery. In both theories, invoking persecution was central to making moral 
and territorial claims.69
There was little statistical information to support these Serbian claims of genocide, 
nor was rape as serious an issue as Serbian nationalists advanced. Except for several highly 
publicised cases of rape, the Kosovo average was far below that of the rest of Serbia before 
the war, nor were many of the cases of harassment ever proven. What could be proven, 
however was the large increase in Kosovar relative to Serbian births (27 per 1,000 for 1981- 
90 versus the Serb and Croat average of 2.2). This gave rise to another type of genocide 
accusation, the notion of a demographic conspiracy to out-birth Serbs and therefore gain 
control of the province. While this style of paranoid rhetoric was never used for the Croats 
nor the Bosnian Moslems, it demonstrates both the perseverance and versatility of Serbian 
writers, when faced with the reality that Serbs had not been victims of genocide in any 
conventional sense.
Cosic was one of the first to highlight the dangers of a ‘demographic explosion’ -  
designed to bring about the separation of Kosovo and its joining with Albania, ‘by sheer force
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of numbers’.70 Some, like political cartoonist Milenko Mihajlovic, blamed Tito’s government 
for encouraging a high birth rate. His works depicted throngs of Albanian babies with leering 
grins, swarming out from behind Marshal Tito -  the queen bee.71 Reactions of the academic 
community were difficult to take seriously. Zivorad Igic’s monograph on a ‘demographic 
time bomb’ denounced the Albanian birth rate as ‘unique to the world’, in that their, 
‘reproductive behaviour is quite unsuited to the time and space in which we live’.72 A high 
birth rate, he reasoned, constituted, ‘an objective threatening of the rights of the other 
nationalities’. It became part of a coherent strategy to ‘create an ethnically clean region’, a 
strategy supposedly pursued by Albanian leaders for national reasons. Poverty and a lack of 
education were dismissed as irrelevent, while ‘tribal leaders’ were blamed for forcing women 
to bear children, in order to take control of Kosovo. Such attitudes informed Igic’s theories, 
and those of the Serbian scientific establishment, and were indeed a reverse of the UN 
Genocide Convention.
The notion of a gynaecological conspiracy was also supported by the Serbian 
Association of Professors and Scientists, who exposed a plot to make Albanian women more 
fertile, so they could engender a, ‘demographic explosion never before seen, the most potent 
in the world’. Claiming that the Albanian population had risen by a factor of 50 (the number 
was actually 3.3 times from 1941-81) the Association was clear that a concerted strategy of 
high Albanian births constituted a form of genocide against the Serbs.74 This idea was again 
introduced in a 1995 scientific conference in Pristine, designed to deal with the ‘negative and 
unacceptable demographic movements’ in Kosovo. Their recommendations included the 
following: ‘a special population census’; ‘a selective approach to the population policy [to 
establish] a demographic equilibrium’; ‘a law concerning the permanent settlement of 
refugees from the regions of the former SFRY in Kosovo and Metohija (about 400,000 
persons)’; and the ‘adoption of a family planning law’.75
One wonders how a ‘demographic equilibrium’ was to be achieved, and what that 
might have implied in the context of a ‘negative and unacceptable’ demographic movement. 
Equally alarming was the idea that the population of the region contained 400,000 too many 
Albanians, while lacking 400,000 Serbs. That ethnic cleansing was eventually pursued should 
surprise no one. While the conference advocated ‘family planning’ as a possible method of 
reducing the Albanian population, the Serbian government made no efforts to help them with 
their birth control concerns.76 Family planning was advocated solely to reduce the percentage 
of Albanians relative to Serbs. Any coercive measures to this effect would have been 
considered genocide under the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948. Even if Serbian
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propaganda were true, Kosovar Albanians out-birthing Serbs would have been neither an 
instance of genocide, nor a crime against humanity.
While the scientific establishment used veiled threats and ‘scientific’ studies to 
advance anti-Albanian policies, several writers were more direct. SANU academic Veselin 
Djuretic, for example, rejected such complicated and long-term projects as family planning, 
proposing instead the ‘repatriation’ of Kosovar Albanians to Albania. The solution was to 
deport everyone who was not a Serb. Serbs would then be moved into Kosovo to fill the 
empty houses.77 Djuretic’s plan went to the heart of Serbian political and military objectives 
in Kosovo. Several convoluted, but by no means universally accepted definitions of 
‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ were used to justify the forced removal of Kosovar 
Albanians from the region, in order to replace them with Serbs.
There was little truth to the claim that a demographic plot was being hatched. An 
impartial Yugoslav study, conducted in 1988 to assess the situation, revealed that low 
education levels among females, and a high unemployment rate, were the crucial contributing 
factors to a high birth rate. There was no cynical policy on the part of the Albanian 
leadership.78 At the same time, there were only five inter-ethnic murders in Kosovo between 
1981 and 1987. This region had the lowest crime rate in Yugoslavia.79 Nevertheless, the 
illusion of danger, and the theme of the ‘universal culprit’, were common during this time.80 
Accusations of persecution soon became self-fulfilling prophesies, as the Kosova Liberation 
Army -  largely funded by expatriate Albanian groups -  launched a bitter struggle for 
independence. This only increased the level of Serbian terror in the province. By 1999, more 
than one million Kosovars had been forced to flee their homes, by a mixture of Serbian 
paramilitary violence and NATO destruction. Some Serb nationalists took their ‘self 
defensive’ activities quite seriously. Given the Albanians’ crime of genocide, Macedonian
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economist Vladimir Gligorov ironically remarked, ‘the punishment seemed appropriate’.
Contextualising Serbian Nationalism in Croatia:
For the Serbian government, the lessons of Kosovo were obvious. By activating the 
Kosovo myth, and by linking it with explicitly Jewish metaphors of ‘genocide’, the 
government was able to take over the province and rejoin it to Serbia. Few Serbs protested 
Milosevic’s heavy-handed approach to Kosovo, which he ran like a military police state. The 
fact that Serbs had suffered ‘genocide’ gave him carte blanche. The links between an 
aesthetic of persecution and state terror were not ignored by outside observers. Shkelsem
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Maliqi, in his study of Albanian nationalism, drew out the links between Serbs in Kosovo and 
the Palestinian problem, noting the militaristic capabilities and actions of each,
...Israel used all coercive means to “liberate” and “redeem” Palestine as a “sacred 
land” which had been “usurped” by the Palestinians. In the same way the dominant 
state machinery of the “unitary” republic of Serbia decided to apply all coercive 
means to the task of bringing Kosova back into the national possession of the Serbs, 
on the grounds that Kosovo had been historically “sacred Serbian soil”, which had 
been “usurped” by the Albanians a couple of centuries ago.82
Maliqi posited that Serbian nationalists and militant Zionists had much in common.
As he described, ‘the Serbs as a persecuted and historically tragic people, the notion of the 
historical right to gather all Serbs within one state, the idea of the crusade against (in this 
case) the Albanians as an alleged vanguard of Islamic fundamentalism, the right to recolonise 
“sacred soil”, the right to impose demographic control over the “usurpers”.’83 As an Albanian 
Moslem, Maliqi had clear sympathies with both Kosovars and Palestinians, and his 
denunciation of both groups in one stroke is an interesting indication of how far he felt such 
parallels extended. Clearly, Serbia had entered into the ‘comparative genocide debate’, and 
Milosevic had successfully managed the take over of Kosovo by playing on his people’s fear 
and misunderstanding.
But if Serbian nationalists cut their teeth in Kosovo, their main opponents as 
Yugoslavia disintegrated were the Croats. While there had been little if any Croatian- Serbian 
antagonism before 1918, history would be revised to reflect a new reality. By 1990, Croatian 
leader Franjo Tudjman, following the example of Slovenia, was trying to pull his newly 
formed ‘Republic of Croatia’ out of the Yugoslav Federation. Milosevic had not opposed 
Slovenian secession, on the grounds that there was no Serbian minority there in need of his 
‘protection’. While fighting had broken out between Slovenian secessionist forces and the 
JNA in June, 1991, Milosevic had secretly assured Slovenian leaders that he would not try to 
prevent their secession.84 What Silber and Little have dubbed ‘the phoney war’ ended quickly
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by July, after Milosevic vetoed the continued use of force by the JNA. Croatia, however, 
was different, since its territory contained a sizeable Serbian minority -  13% of Croatia’s 
total population of 4.7 million people. Moreover, certain regions of Croatia, Eastern 
Slavonia, and the eastern Krajina, were seen to be historically Serbian. Milosevic’s 
legitimacy as a national leader was based on uniting Serbian populations and historic lands, 
and this made a confrontation with Croatia inevitable. His attitude was made clear at a secret 
meeting to Serbian regional leaders in March, 1991. Expressing his conviction that borders 
were made by the strong at the expense of the weak, he argued,
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We simply consider it as a legitimate right and interest of the Serbian nation to live in 
one state. This is the beginning and the end ... And if we have to fight, by God we are 
going to fight. I hope that they [the Croats] will not be so crazy as to fight against us.
If we do not know how to work properly or run an economy, at least we know how to 
fight properly.87
Like the Kosovo case, myths proving that parts of Croatia were historically Serbian 
provided much needed ammunition against Croatian secession. Territorial claims would 
simultaneously be backed with moral claims to Croatian territory, again, a fusing of Kosovo 
and Jewish style myths. Such myths would advance that the Serbs had been the victims of a 
long and bloody Croatian expansionist programme, aimed at destroying the Serbian nation. In 
their analysis of this ‘anti-Serbian’ or ‘Serbophobic’ programme, the importance of Catholic 
expansionism was another important ingredient.
The remainder of this chapter will therefore focus on two different aspects of Serbian 
propaganda: first of all -  the establishment of territorial claims and the beginnings of Serbian 
nationalism within Croatia. Secondly, it will be important to review some of the primary 
Serbian myths of persecution, and how Serbs began to reinterpret their earlier historical 
associations with the Croats. These sections will lay the basis for a comparison between 
Serbian and Croatian reappraisals of their historical relationship, until the beginnings of 
World W arn.
Serbian Territorial Claims in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia:
Certainly, the Serbs had a number of highly compelling and ancient myths which 
were operationalised in Kosovo to legitimate control of the province. In the case of Croatia, 
the two regions claimed by Serbs had a far more ambiguous lineage, and while there were 
arguably towns and villages with a Serbian majority, these regions were deep inside historic 
Croatia. The Serbian plan for annexing these two regions was made clear almost from the 
beginning. Serbia desired to keep these areas within a smaller SFRY. An amputated ‘Croatia’ 
would be free to leave, once Milosevic has seized the lion’s share of the republic for himself. 
Had the Serbian plan been successful, Croatia would have been divided in two, somewhat 
like East and West Pakistan, making Croatia what Serbs jokingly called a ‘so-called split in 
half country’.88
By 1992, geographer Jovan Ilic had laid forth Serbian territorial ambitions. Serbs 
would participate in a referendum on their separation from Croatia. The Serbian Republika 
Srpska Krajina would eventually be annexed to Serbia, while those Serbs remaining in
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Croatia would be traded reciprocally with Croats in Serbia. Remaining Serbs would be 
obliged to move to Eastern Slavonia (namely Baranja, Vukovar and Vinkovci) which would 
also be annexed to Serbia. ‘At any rate,’ warned Ilic, ‘not many Serbs should remain in 
independent Croatia’.89 In historic Dubrovnik, at that time being ravaged by JNA shelling,
Ilic recognised that the population was predominantly Catholic and Croat. While he accepted 
that, ‘according to the ethnic principle this area should belong to Croatia’, he proposed the 
establishment of Dubrovnik and the surrounding area as a separate ‘political-territorial, 
autonomous unit’.90 Of course, this unit would continue to be a part of the new SFRY, most 
likely subject to a system of rule similar to that in Kosovo and Vojvodina. While these 
annexations would unite Serbians and their supposedly historic territory, the key issue for Ilic 
was punishing and humiliating the Croats for daring to oppose Serbian nationalism. ‘The new 
borders should primarily be a therapy for the treatment of ethno-psychic disorders’, 
prescribed Ilic, ‘primarily among the Croatian population.’91
The historical basis for Ilic’s claims were dubious at best. The Krajina, or 
‘borderland’ was historically a western outpost, controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
It was a border established to keep the Ottoman Empire at bay, and for this reason, large 
numbers of Serbs had been settled as soldiers during the 15th and 16th centuries.92 Ilic’s claim 
to the land was based on the fact that Serbs had fought for the ‘west’ and therefore deserved 
the region as their reward. He further cited a 1630 charter given to the inhabitants by 
Ferdinand II of Austria, guaranteeing their autonomy from Croatian control, a reality which 
supposedly persisted until 1881, after which time control was ceded to Croatian 
administration. Ilic’s primary argument was that the Military Border as a territorial and 
political unit had existed outside the boundaries of Croatia for centuries. It was never truly a 
part of Croatia, and was therefore entitled to exist independently.93
Claims on the Krajina included south-eastern Dalmatia, western Srem, Dubrovnik, 
and eastern Slavonia, even though there were few Serbs there during the conflict, as a result 
of, ‘conversion to Catholicism, Uniating, and Croatisation’, as well as ‘genocidal 
destruction’. There were even claims that Serbs formed the majority on some of the Adriatic 
islands, such as Vis -  although writers were forced to concede that these also had been 
‘Catholicized’.94 With regards to Eastern Slavonia, there was little historical evidence that the 
region had been anything but Croatian for many centuries. While there was one claim that 
Vukovar had been founded by the Serbs, most propaganda directed at this region relied 
primarily on its proximity to Serbia, and the fact that its people were predominantly 
Serbian.95
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Moral Claims: The Myth of ‘Serbophobia’:
While these historical claims were important as a starting point, it was clear that the 
Croats had far more claim to these lands than did the Serbs. These had been part of Croatia 
for many centuries, and while there were Serbian villages and towns, there were also 
considerable numbers of Croats in these regions as well. Ilic’s claim that, ‘One cannot be the 
occupying power of one’s own country! ’ was used throughout the conflict as an important 
justification for Serbian violence in Croatia.96 Nevertheless, while territorial arguments were 
useful, the Serbs in Croatia, as in Kosovo, chose to capitalise on myths of genocide and 
persecution, asserting a moral, as well as a territorial right to these historic lands. As in 
Kosovo, Schopflin’s ‘myths of powerlessness and compensation for the powerless’ were used 
to justify Serbian autonomy. The Serbs had supposedly fought for centuries against the 
Ottoman Empire on these lands, and therefore earned the right to be free from Croatian 
control.97
IlicD continually asserted such claims, advancing special moral rights for the Serbian 
nation, ‘because it was exposed to genocidal extermination many times’,98 His arguments
t V iwere designed to resemble those of Herzl and other 19 century Zionists, positing that there 
could be no existence for Serbs outside of Serbia. Of course, the Serbs never truly followed 
the Zionist approach. Rather than going to their homeland, they preferred to create ethnic 
pockets wherever they lived. A bizarre process developed, of creating Serbian autonomous 
pockets throughout the region, which would then be joined by land bridges (or corridors) to 
Serbia.
An essential precondition and follow-up to Serbian machinations in the Krajina and 
East Slavonia involved proving the existence of a historic nationalist project aimed against 
the Serbs. The myth of ‘Serbophobia’ (a historic fear, hatred and jealousy of Serbs which 
nationalists have likened to anti-Semitism) allowed nationalists to revise history -  tracing a 
continuous legacy of Serbian hatred and violence amongst the Croats. The actions of the JNA 
and Serbian irregular militias in Croatia could therefore be presented, both at home and to the 
outside world, as self-defensive and humanitarian -  saving the Krajina Serbs from 
annihilation. Coupled with a project of demonising Croats was the rehabilitation of Serbian 
history, to prove that Serbs had never harboured any ill feeling towards Croats, and had 
always behaved nobly in their dealings with them. This propaganda was designed to highlight 
the irrationality of the Croatian nationalist project, while casting the Serbs as victims 
throughout history.
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The idea that Serbs were forced into the war, and that Croatia had started the violence, 
were popular themes -  found regularly in the media and in scholarly publications. While 
great moral strength was to be gained from the myth of Kosovo and their parallel suffering 
with the Jews, an entire history of Croatian duplicity and evil had now to be constructed. 
Again, this was very much like Kecmanovic’s theme of the ‘universal culprit’, an evil force 
which had been trying to destroy the Serbs for centuries." Schopflin also spoke of his ‘myths 
of unjust treatment’, where Serbs had been singled out for negative treatment throughout 
history, and therefore had special moral rights to defend themselves from the threat of 
attack.100
Serbophobia became an anti-Semitism for Serbs, making them victims throughout 
history. Dobrica Cosic could claim before the war, ‘We Serbs feel today as the Jews did in 
Hitler’s day. We are a people who are [considered] guilty... Today, Serbophobia in Europe is 
a concept and an attitude with the same ideological motivation and fury as antisemitism had 
during the Nazi era.’101 Cosic’s text also highlighted Serbian and Jewish Diasporic 
conceptions of identity, viewing both nations as having been doomed throughout their history 
to suffer under persecution, because they lived outside their national borders. Thus Krajina 
Serbs were likened to Russian or Polish Jews.
Nationalist opposition leader and novelist Vuk Draskovic also saw the merits of such 
rhetoric, arguing, ‘Israel and the Serbs live in a hellish siege where the sworn goal is to seize 
and the cover with mosques or Vaticanize the lands of Moses and the people of St. Sava 
[Serbia’s patron saint].’102 Clearly, many of the most prominent writers and politicians were 
hying hard to push the connections between Jews and Serbs. Since Disapora Serbs had 
suffered in history, the only solution was an expanded state. While Cosic, perhaps to his 
credit, never operationalised a working definition of ‘Serbophobia’, its meaning was clearly 
implied. There were others, however, who did elaborate on the phenomenon. Historian Smilja 
Avramov, (who was also an advisor to Milosevic) overtly compared the persecution of Serbs 
with that of the Jews in history, ‘The departure point for the genocide of the Jews was anti-
i mSemitism, and of the Serbs, Serbophobia.’ Both movements were morally equal, according 
to Avramov, and each was to be found in a variety of different countries. By Avramov’s 
definition, Serbophobia was closely tied to the Catholic Church, and was operationalised 
historically through the Vatican and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Croatia was in many 
respects a pawn in a much larger Catholic expansionist plan.
Elie Wiesel’s claim that the Jews were hated as soon as they became a nation was a 
concept curiously reversed by the Serbs in their Serbophobia rhetoric. For Serbs, the moment
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that Croatians became Catholics, was the moment they began to hate the Serbian other and 
their Orthodox faith. The Catholic hatred of Orthodoxy was thus presented in history as a 
‘continuity of genocide’ against the Serbs, something, ‘which has been carried out throughout 
history and is being implemented today.’104 Like anti-Semitism, Serbophobia could not be 
taken seriously if it was not ancient and primordial. Therefore, as one writer asserted,
Catholic aggression and expansionism was part of Croatian nationalism from the onset,
For [a] thousand years Croats have been in full political dominance by foreign 
factors, and have tried through them to achieve their own state. Croatian Catholicism, 
often militant and opposed to the ecumenical spirit, gradually absorbed all other 
national compounds and subordinated them to the mighty state of Rome. Numerous 
Popes, in the last thousand years considered the Orthodox Church heretic, schismatic 
and cursed, so they brought up Croats as its border guardians towards the East. Rome 
has planted an idea in the Croatian soul, that their land is “Bulwark of Christianity” 
which turned them away from the Orthodox brothers, with the aim to exterminate 
Serbs on the religious basis.105
Seen as nothing more than historical slaves to the Vatican and their expansionist 
plans, the Croats were accused of being religious executioners, killing Serbs in order to 
destroy all vestiges of Orthodoxy in the Balkans. Serbian writers argued that for a thousand 
years, the Croats had been killing Serbs as a primary part of their nationalism. As one 
historian noted, Croatian nationalism and the killing of Serbs were inseparably tied together. 
Without Croatian hatred of Serbs, Croatian national identity was not possible. ‘Croatian 
national leaders’, he claimed, ‘had no clear idea of national self-determination, unless it was 
founded on the genocide over Serbs.’106 Like Wiesel’s claim about the links between anti- 
Semitism and anti-Zionism, the existence of Croatian nationalism and the Catholic Church 
implied ipso facto the existence of Serbophobia. The Croats were to be bearers of a 
nationalism that had no intrinsic worth -  except for its hatred of the Serbian other. It was a 
national identity purely founded on Serbophobic principles, and seemingly existed only 
because the Vatican wanted to destroy Orthodoxy.
As useful as an ahistorical genocidal project was for Serbian historians, ‘Serbophobia’ 
had also to be historicised, to be understood as a political phenomenon. Many traced a 
general form of Serbophobia from the Great Schism in 395, when the Roman Empire split 
into eastern and western halves. Others traced Serbophobia to much later contact with the 
Croats, when Serbs were brought in to defend the Krajina against Ottoman attacks. Croatian 
feudal lords and the Catholic clergy were blamed as the later instigators of Serbophobia.
These were supposedly frustrated by Serbian autonomy in the Krajina, and by the refusal of 
the Serbs to convert to Catholicism. Like early versions of anti-Semitism, early
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manifestations of Serbophobia were supposedly religious inspired, and could easily be 
corrected by conversion.
This type of religious-based Serbophobia had seemingly metamorphosed by the 19th 
century, into a more organised and systematised concept of hatred. Historian Dusan 
Batakovic wrote profusely on the 19th century development of Croatian and Serbian 
nationalism during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. A large number of his works were widely 
circulated on the Internet. Batakovic used comparisons of political and social systems in 
Serbian and Croatia to argue in favour of Serbian tolerance and Croatian xenophobia. He 
privileged Serbian eastern concepts of nationhood, and his writings contain numerous 
justifications for what would later be called ‘Greater Serbia’ -  the now famous Serbian 
strategy of empire building in the 19th century. Batakovic noted, and rightly, that Serbs
t hadvocated a strong unified state in the 19 century as a bulwark against Bulgarian, Russian, 
and Turkish expansion, and dreamed of uniting South Slavs into a common homeland.
Rather than condemning this process, he argued that ‘Greater Serbia’ was a positive 
form of fraternal unity between Serbs and Croats, who were seen be, ‘but two branches of the 
same nation, which had become forcibly divided by the foreign domination.’107 Thus outside 
interference and colonialism were blamed for keeping these two groups apart. ‘Greater 
Serbia’ would be the solution to their problems. It was, as Batakovic explained, a model for a
•  10R •unitary and democratic state according to the French model. Serbian nation-building was 
supposedly a constructive, positive phenomenon.
For Batakovic, privileging Serbian history as one of tolerance and democracy was of 
great importance, particularly in light of the continuous flow of anti-Serbian writings going 
from Croatia to the west. These often alluded to Serbia’s Ottoman roots and eastern practices 
of despotic rule and violence. Batakovic elevated the ‘millet tradition’ of self rule under the 
Ottoman empire as a great boon for Orthodox nations in the Balkans. He argued that it, 
‘proved itself to be a solid base for transition to the standard European type of national 
integration -  the nation-state model, based on the experience of the French Revolution.’109 
Thus the Serbian evolution to ‘democracy’ was based on European ideals, and was therefore 
consonant with enlightenment values. By contrast, he drew a sharp distinction between the 
desirable Serbian forms of nationalism, and the supposedly negative and destructive Croatian 
forms,
Contrary to the authentically European model of integration, in the neighbourhood of 
the former Ottoman provinces turned into newly established national states ... within 
the frontiers of another multinational empire, the Habsburg Monarchy, a Central-
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European model of national integration arose gradually -  a clerical nationalism, 
mixed with feudal traditions. That model of nationalism was especially apparent in 
regions where the Roman-Catholic and Orthodox Church coexisted, like Croatia, 
Dalmatia and Slavonia, and was coloured by an excessive religious intolerance.110
Batakovic contrasted this Serbian ‘European’ model with the Croatian system, with its 
emphasis on religious extremism and intolerance. He called it simply, ‘a contemporary 
variant of the Civitas Dei -  “God’s state’” , which continued to rely on anachronistic 
interpretations of ‘feudal “historical rights’” -  well into the 19th century.111 Contrary to 
Serbian nationalism, this religious-based nationalism was inimical to the ‘modem solutions’, 
favoured by the Serbs, from romantic nationalism to liberalism. Thus, Serbian and Croatian
t l ihad opposing views of state and nation-building in the 19 century. Serbian nationalism was 
European, democratic, tolerant, cosmopolitan, and enlightened, while Croats were medieval, 
hierarchical, xenophobic, and backwards. Batakovic’s theories are an excellent example of 
Kecmanovic’s ‘counteridentification’, where the enemy’s history was seen to be completely 
opposite to one’s own.112 The positive aspects of Croatian nationalism in the 19th century 
were completely ignored, as were the many negative aspects of Serbian history from this 
time. Batakovic’s selective narrativising of the past was sadly typical.
Within a general analysis of the period was a specific condemnation of Croatian 
nationalist politicians and activists who were at the vanguard of an anti-Serbian movement. 
Croatian linguist and nationalist Ante Starcevic was an obvious target of Serbian writings, as 
the co-founder of the nationalist ‘Croatian Party of Rights’ (with Eugen Kvatemik). Starcevic 
and Kvatemik were frequently condemned for inciting Croats to commit genocide against the
Serbs, being, as one writer recalled, ‘the founders of the idea of genocidal destruction upon
11^Serbs in Croatia...’ Starcevic’s politicking was also linked with the rise of right wing 
nationalist Josip Frank, whose Frankovci were later to start, ‘a systematic anti-Serbian and 
anti-Orthodox campaign’, which resulted in, ‘pogroms, exiles ... and the first attempt of 
genocide upon the Serbian people.’114 It was clear once again, that the rise of Croatian
f h  •nationalism in the 19 century equalled genocide.
Starcevic was a Croatian linguistic reformer, who standardised the Croatian language 
as distinct from the Serbian. Linguistic standardisation was an extremely important step in 
uniting disparate peoples and creating nations in the 19th century. Germans, Greeks, Italians, 
and many other nations (including the Serbs) followed a similar path of linguistic 
standardisation, as a means of creating a workable common culture within their new national 
states. Nevertheless, Starcevic’s project was denounced as inherently racist and xenophobic,
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on the assumption that his workable common culture was intolerant and destructive to 
Serbian culture. He was was accused of destroying South Slavic unity, of inventing, ‘an all- 
together non-existent Croatian language and orthography’ -  a language constructed only to 
erect artificial barriers between Serbs and Croats. For Serbian historians, Starcevic’s program 
consisted exclusively of, ‘denying and exterminating the Serbian people’, as a precondition to 
Croatian self determination.115 Again, the idea of denying South Slavic unity, and denying the 
existence of cultural, linguistic and historic ties between Serbs and Croats was presented as 
the first major step in Serbophobia, a step which led inexorably to genocide.
In Starcevic, Serbian writers also noted the emergence of racial theories similar to 
those of during the Nazi era. As Serbian politician Vasilije Krestic □ revealed, ‘The “Father of 
the Homeland” had developed such racial theory about the Serbs, that it can only be 
compared to Hitler’s theory about the Jews...’116 Krestic’s understanding of Croatian 
motivations was similar to those of his counterparts. His reading of Croatian history also 
included violent and xenophobic plans to destroy the Serbs, according to a Machiavellian 
desire to take over the Krajina. Paraphrasing the Croatian position, he added that, ‘all means 
are permitted for the reaching of this aim, including the genocidal extermination of the 
Serbs’.117
Krestic could not resist including the Starcevician vocabulary used for assimilating 
non-Croats, names such as “Alpine Croats” (for Slovenes), “Orthodox Croats” (for Serbs), 
“flower of the Croatian people” (for Moslems), followed by “Turkish Croatia” (for Bosnia), 
“Red Croatia” (for Montenegro), “White Croatia” (for Dalmatia) and “Carinthian Croatia”
(for Slovenia). As Krestic explained the rationale behind such identifications, ‘These names 
had been carefully nurtured for hundreds of years and rooted in the consciousness of the 
Croat with the idea of developing in him a conviction of the greatness of Croatia and of the 
numerical strength of the Croats.’118 Such vocabulary also performed an important role in 
convincing the Croats that other nations were artificial and therefore did not exist. Denying 
the existence of the Serbs was seen to be crucial to their extermination.
Contrary to Serbian claims, specifically those of Krestic, Starcevic was not a 
genocidal maniac. His original ideas were assimilationist, not exclusivist. For him everyone 
was a potential Croat, and the fact that Slovenians were ‘mountain Croats’, and Serbs 
‘Orthodox Croats’, reflected his assimilatory policies. While he did see ‘Serbdom’ as an 
artificial construct, it was not his desire to exterminate Serbs, but rather, to make them into 
good ‘Orthodox Croats’. Starcevic was in many ways reacting against the Illyrianism and 
pro-Serbianism of such liberal thinkers as Ljudevit Gaj and Juraj Strossmayer, who argued
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that the great differences between Orthodox and Catholic were artificial and manufactured. 
Starcevic argued that these Croats were giving too much away for the promise of eventual 
union with the Serbs, even though he still saw a communal state as the best alternative to the 
‘Balkanisation’ of Europe.119 Certainly, we can observe many parallels between Starcevic, 
and his Serbian contemporary Vuk Karadzic, who preached basically the same philosophy 
from the Serbian point of view. Nevertheless, a realistic appraisal of Serbian and Croatian 
history was not in the cards. Krestic □ cited the anti-Serbian riots of the 19th century, 
particularly from 1899-1902 (when Serbian homes and shops were destroyed in downtown 
Zagreb) as proof of Croatian Serbophobic sentiments. This violence, he argued was stirred up 
by the Catholic Church in Croatia, and the Vatican, who dreamed, along with the ‘Party of 
Rights’ of creating a ‘Greater Croatia’ at the expense of the Serbian populations.120
The combination of Serbophobic religious, linguistic and political programmes was to
culminate in the butchery of Serbs in World War I, according to many Serbian sources. This
period would be consonant with ‘elements of anti-Serb genocide’ -  claimed one writer.121
Croatian Peasant Party leader Stjepan Radic, (later shot by a Serbian parliamentary deputy)
was specifically accused of whipping up anti-Serb hatred, which led to Croatian massacres of
Serbs in World War I.122 Other writers described the ‘religious warmongering’ as well as the,
‘anti-Serbian demonstrations and pogroms’, and the, ‘plunder and destruction of Serbian
1property’, as proof of the ‘holy war’ levelled against the Serbs during the war.
Such 19th and early 20th century imagery was fascinating, because it described an 
altogether unending period of Croatian hatred, when in fact the reverse was true. Many 
Croatian academics and politicians in fact looked to Serbia and to the idea of Yugoslavism or 
Illyrianism as a positive phenomenon. Men like Ljudevit Gaj and Bishop Juraj Strossmejer, 
who created the Yugoslav Academy in Zagreb in 1875, were very much pro-Serbian. They 
argued that a cultural and spiritual union with the Serbs was the best way to secure a strong 
South Slavic state -  wherein some measure of freedom and equality could come about. 
Similarly, Ivan Mestrovic, the world famous Croatian sculptor and Yugoslav nationalist, 
pushed for Yugoslav unity, even creating a ‘Kosovo Temple’ which he exhibited at the 
Serbian, and not the Austro-Hungarian exhibit at the Rome International Exhibition in 1912. 
These and many more examples demonstrate the counter factual nature of many Serbian 
assertions. For many decades, Croatian intellectuals and writers were at the forefront of 
Illyrianism, even more eager for union than their Serbian counterparts.124
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Serbian Interpretations of the First Yugoslavia:
When the first Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created in 1918, it 
was clear at first that all parties found the union acceptable. The Serbs favoured it, as they 
saw their state expand dramatically westwards. The Croats also favoured the arrangement, as 
their lands were now protected against Italian predations after the war. Croatia had been part 
of the losing side as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, there were problems, 
and the Yugoslav state soon became what Batakovic had claimed -  an extension of the pre­
war Serbian kingdom. While it is clear from many accounts that Serbs dominated 
Yugoslavia, the official Serbian position advanced that the country was decentralised, federal, 
and equal. As Batakovic claimed, it was, ‘an expression of the modem European spirit, 
manifesting itself as an integrative idea of the liberal bourgeoisie which advocated the unity 
of Yugoslav views.’125 For Batakovic □ and his contemporaries, The Kingdom was as western 
as France or Germany, which meant that it conformed to the highest ideals possible.
Further, King Aleksander was credited with favouring the Roman Catholic Church 
over other religious denominations in Yugoslavia, handing out generous concession to the 
Croatian business community, while actively encouraging former Austro-Hungarian army
1 9Aofficers to integrate themselves into the Yugoslav army. That such information was clearly 
counterfactual did not matter a great deal. Serbian historians wanted to portray Serbian 
history as one of tolerance and largesse. From its promising beginnings, writers argued that 
the Serbian policy of ‘reconciliation and national tolerance’ was soon abused by the Croats, 
while the generosity of the Serbs, ‘soon made it possible for all opponents of the Yugoslav
1 97common state to work unhindered.’ In reality, there was little Serbian tolerance, and even 
less support for Croatian business leaders or military officers.
Moderate writers have described the Croat’s drive for increased autonomy as the 
‘Hungarian complex’, where they saw the new kingdom as another Austro-Hungarian style 
system, with Serbs and Croats in a potential power sharing arrangement. Others were not so 
open minded.128 Batakovic, continuing with his cultural critique of Croatia, blamed the 
Croats almost entirely for the breakdown of the first Yugoslavia. The Croats were backwards, 
as he saw them, and, ‘the Yugoslav idea could not be implemented in the undeveloped, 
predominantly agrarian society, impregnated by various feudal traditions, religious 
intolerance and often a xenophobic mentality.’129 Dobrica Cosic would similarly blame the 
Croat’s ‘hatred for diversity’, as a key reason for the Kingdom’s breakdown.130 Both men 
were clear that the cultural inadequacies of the Croats made the country unworkable, despite 
the best efforts of the Serbs. Furthermore, it soon became apparent that the Croats never
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accepted Yugoslavia as a permanent solution. Rather, union was seen as a ‘way-station’ on 
the road to the creation of a ‘ethnically pure and independent “greater Croatia’” . Once again,
the Serbs found themselves in the way of another nation’s expansionist plans, and became
•  1^1 victims at a time when ‘Serbophobia and hatred for the Serbs’ was high.
Such writings were designed to demonstrate the goodness and perhaps naivete of the 
Serbs, who in their kind and trusting manner established a state for all South Slavs, only to be 
stabbed in the back by Croatian ethnic hatred and chauvinism. No matter how good the Serbs 
were -  Serbian historians argued -  inter-ethnic harmony was impossible because of the 
Croatians and their genocidal characteristics. Even the development of King Aleksander’s 
royal dictatorship was justified along these lines. Croatian politicians, instead of recognising 
that the Yugoslav state provided, ‘a unique historical opportunity for their own national 
emancipation’, chose instead to, ‘abuse democratic rights and parliamentary life’, exercising 
an ‘extreme primitivism’ which led to the dissolution of Parliament and the imposition of a 
royal dictatorship, ‘as in some European countries’.132 Serbian historians had become so 
adept at manipulating truth, that even the excesses of a Serbian dictatorship were blamed on 
the Croats -  whose intolerance and violence made democracy impossible.
Royal dictatorship was often defended by the Serbs as the only solution to a full scale 
genocide of Serbs by Croats. Croatia was described as nothing less than the locus of 
‘darkness and insanity’, where, ‘there reigns hatred incomprehensible to the civilised 
world’.133 Such hatred, according to Serbian sources, was almost exclusively the product of 
the Roman Catholic faith, and its general desire to supplant the Orthodox Church. Even in the 
creation of a dictatorship, in a climate of almost total Serbian control over the population, the 
Serbs tried to prove that they were in fact the most European and enlightened, while the 
primitive Croats simply abused democracy and plotted genocide. Serbian writers, due to their 
undeniable skill in reinterpreting history, would even make an age of total Serbian control a 
time of Serbian victimisation.
Revising Serbian-Croatian antagonisms from the early 20th century also allowed 
conspiracy theories against the Vatican, which was often portrayed by the Serbs as the great 
architect of Balkanisation. By 1989, the well known Bosnian Serb academic Milorad 
Ekmecic blamed the Vatican almost exclusively for the destruction of the first Yugoslavia. 
Ekmecic denounced the ‘bureau of archbishops’ for destroying all Serbian attempts at Balkan 
unity, and saw ‘Catholic nationalism’ as the Serb’s worst enemy throughout history.134 He 
went so far as to blame the Catholic Church for encouraging the genocide of Serbs
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throughout much of the twentieth century, through its supposed desire to create a ‘Catholic
1 ^Central Europe’ with its frontier on the River Drina.
While he offered a selection of contentious anecdotes, Ekmecic could give little proof 
of his assertions. Rather than acknowledging that the Serbian centralised monarchy was 
corrupt and despotic, or that the Croats had very real grievances within Yugoslavia, it was 
much easier for Serbian writers to blame the Croats, or their Catholicism, for Yugoslavia’s 
fragmentation. Further, by implicating the Vatican, a much larger conspiracy could be drawn 
out. Not only the Serbs, but perhaps other Orthodox societies -  Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Macedonia etc, could similarly be threatened by a Catholic expansionist project. Such attacks 
on the Vatican constituted a tacit call for Balkan unity, or at least Orthodox unity. During the 
early 1990s, this was a top government priority. That the Vatican had been at the forefront of 
every Croatian separatist movement was taken for granted. It was common for Serbian 
writers to see the Vatican as an expansionary power, which saw Yugoslavia as an obstacle to 
the spread of Catholicism. If the Ottoman Empire had swept through Serbia in the middle 
ages on its way westward, the Vatican was seen as a western expansionist power, heading 
east. Sandwiched between the advancing Turks and Catholics were the seemingly helpless 
Serbs, with only their legends and their faith to sustain them.
Conclusions:
What emerges from an understanding of Serbian conceptions of Kosovar and early 
Croatian history was the centrality of persecution imagery. This involved the 
instrumentalisation of Kosovo and Jewish imagery to promote themes of Islamic and Catholic 
expansionist projects. Creating Serbophobia allowed Serbian writers to employ such 
metaphors as ‘liquidation’, ‘pogroms’, ‘purges’, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘genocide’, in order to 
prove that they were merely resisting expansionist plans that were centuries old. By casting 
Albanian and later Croatian nationalism in an exclusivist, xenophobic, and destructive light, 
certain historical patterns emerged, with clear and distinct themes. Serbs were, like the Jews, 
the victims of ahistorical, dangerous forces, seeking to enslave and destroy them.
Further, through the use of territorial arguments, Serbian writers claimed, that like the 
Jews, they were being denied their right to a homeland for all of their people. Their lands and 
their liberty were being taken away from them, and the roots of this were to be found well 
before the current conflict. As such, the early history of Serbian-Croatian relations proved 
crucial to the thesis that Serbs were merely protecting themselves from a well-established 
pattern of Croatian behaviour. Many of the ideas used against the Kosovar Albanians were
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later instrumentalised against the Croats as well -  the concepts of ethnic intolerance, and the 
use of violence and genocide historically as a means of ridding Serbian regions of their own 
people. Many of these themes either anticipated, or were in reaction to Croatian propaganda, 
which obviously advanced opposing contentions. Croats argued that the Serbs were in fact 
the most genocidal and bloodthirsty nation in the region. This will be the subject of the next 
chapter, which will allow for some useful comparisons.
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Chapter Four: The Rise of Croatian Nationalism
Christ’s remarkable principle: “Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do 
good to them that hate you, and pray for them that use and persecute you. ” That 
selfless sentiment has remained throughout history a cry of the weak, or an 
expression of those who have accepted their doom ...No matter how many examples 
can be found in life and history to support such renunciation, it has never overcome 
the passions of hatred and the desire to dominate or to take revenge. ’
-Franjo Tudjman, Horrors ofWar-
Introduction:
Serbia was certainly not alone in its revision of history, nor in its use of national 
mythology. The Croatian government also saw the merits of reinterpreting history to buttress 
its own political objectives. Many of Croatia’s most interesting national myths were created 
well before the collapse of Yugoslavia. As such, it will be useful to begin with a description 
of Croatian nationalism and its development during the Communist period. We will then look 
to the evolution of nationalism under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman and his nationalist 
party the Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ). Tudjman’s rise to power in 1990, and the 
eventual independence of Croatia, after almost five decades of Communist federalism, 
engendered a fertile climate for national myth creation. In many crucial ways, Tudjman’s 
Croatia would strongly resemble Milosevic’s Serbia, with the centralisation of political, 
military, and media power.
Croatia’s national propaganda evolved within an authoritarian context, and many of 
the central themes favoured by Croatian writers were similar to those advanced by their 
Serbian counterparts. The spectre of ‘Greater Serbia’ -  which became likened to an anti- 
Semitism for Croats -  was remarkably similar to Serbophobia. Many other myths appeared to 
be a reaction to a fear and hatred of the Serbs. Several myths, like the ‘state right’ tradition, 
the Antemurale Christianitatis, and Medjugoije, proved the existence of a civilised, peace 
loving and enlightened Croatia. Other myths advanced that the Serbs were religiously, 
culturally, and racially part of an eastern and therefore inferior civilisation, while the Croats 
were more western, more enlightened, better educated, and more democratic.
The Beginnings of Croatian Nationalism:
Contrary to the rise of nationalism in Serbia, Croatian nationalism was not a reactive 
phenomenon. There were no Albanians beating Croats in the ‘provinces’, and no minority 
within Croatia was agitating for statehood before the 1990s. Nevertheless, Croatian
97
nationalism, like its Serbian counterpart, was bom of a sense of cultural submergence and 
political domination within Yugoslavia, and a perceived threat to Croatian language, culture, 
and religion. Nationalism came to the forefront in Yugoslavia during a period of 
decentralisation and liberalisation in the 1960s, when Tito was forced to tone down his 
hardline policies on nationalism in return for Western loans. This opened a window of 
opportunity for a new generation of Croatian Communists, who began pushing for increased 
autonomy from the federal centre. In what became known as Maspok, activists demanded 
increased national rights within the federation. They sited the fact that Croats were 
underrepresented in their own republic, since Serbs, who comprised roughly 15% of the 
population held 40% of the Party posts, and a higher percentage of posts in the police, the 
secret police, and the army. The official figures for the number of Serbian war dead during 
World War II was openly questioned in the media, the alleged economic exploitation of 
Croatia was also explored, as was the status of Croatians in Bosnia. A key focus of Croatian 
greivances however, was the subordinate status of the Croatian language. A 1967 petition by 
the Croatian Writer’s Club called for the designation of Croatian as a distinct language -  
both for educational and publishing purposes.1
Afraid of having “1941 all over again”, Tito purged nationalist oriented Communists, 
removing reformers from the ranks between 1971 and 1972. Some 1,600 Croatian 
Communists were subject to “political measures”, including ejection from the party -  even 
arrest.2 While these purges momentarily suppressing domestic nationalism, nationalism 
continued in the Diaspora, among Croatian expatriate groups in Australia, New Zealand, the 
United States, Canada, and Europe. Well financed and closely co-ordinated, these groups 
were solidly anti-Communist, since they had left Yugoslavia due to their dissatisfaction with, 
and disapproval of the Titoist regime. Most of these people dreamed of one day returning 
home, and recreating an independent Croatia, separate from Communist control. With Tito’s 
death in 1980, new opportunities opened up for such people, and their contact with Croatia 
grew stronger.
The Croatian nationalist movement was eventually led by former Communist general 
and historian Franjo Tudjman. Tudjman, bom in 1922, was the youngest general in Yugoslav 
history; he also served as Tito’s Head Political Commissar. Tudjman was an extremely 
successful, high ranking Communist, and a true believer, before his conversion to nationalism 
in the 1960s. When he began to challenge the official accounts of Croatian history during 
World War II, Tudjman was sacked for his nationalist writings in 1967. He was jailed after 
the Croatian Spring in 1971 and later in the 1980s.
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Tudjman exploited his prison time, casting himself as a martyr for the Croatian cause. 
His most important works included An Endless Multitude o f Historical Truth (1977), Croatia 
on Trial (1981), and his most famous work, Wastelands o f Historical Reality (1987) which 
was substantially re-edited for the 1996 English edition, Horrors o f War. Tudjman’s writings 
laid the basis for a movement to discover the truth about Croatia’s history. Typical of his 
egocentrism, which at times assumed messianic proportions, he even coined a name for the 
movement which he claimed to have founded. ‘Tudjmanism’, as he defined it, was to be both 
a non-Communist nationalism and as a ‘reexamination of Croatian history’.4 Tudjman’s 
revisions dealt primarily with World War I I , and will be extensively discussed in the next 
two chapters dealing with that period of history.
On a practical level, Tudjman’s denunciation of Communism and his embrace of 
Croatian nationalism made him highly popular among Diaspora communities, and allowed 
him to raise millions of dollars for the re-emergence of nationalism. This impressive war 
chest would be essential during his rise to power in 1990. So too was the support of the 
emigres themselves, like former Canadian business owner Gojko Susak, who later became 
Defence Minister in the HDZ government. On February 28,1989, the HDZ held its first 
public meeting, bringing together Maspok intellectuals and nationalists, both of whom 
advocated the increasing autonomy and liberalisation of Croatia.5 By 1990, large numbers of 
emigres had been brought in for the February HDZ Congress, mixing with Croatian and 
Hercegovenian nationalists. It was only at this stage that the success of Tudjman’s movement 
was assured.6
Tudjman’s party, with its American designed posters and slogans, appeared western 
and progressive. He alluded to a referendum on Croatian independence, and promised to 
recreate the Croatian state in all its former glory. While the re-annexation of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina formed a central part of Milosevic’s election strategy, Tudjman focussed on the 
annexation of Bosnia Hercegovina, referring to the unnatural shape of Croatia, as, ‘an apple 
with a bite taken out of it’. All this would change -  he promised -  once the HDZ was in 
power.7
While viewed with suspicion outside Croatia, within, Tudjman enjoyed the same 
initial support as did Milosevic. His party gained victory in April 1990, ousting the weak
o
reformed Communists, who were largely taken by surprise. Tudjman’s electoral triumph was 
typical of what Tom Naim has termed an elite-manufactured ‘popular revolution’ or ‘national 
liberation struggle’.9 Whether it was Tudjman’s ‘Tudjmanism’ or Milosevic’s 
‘Antibureaucratic Revolution’, the myth of popular mobilisation against colonial (or in this
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case -  Communist) oppression was integral to the success of nationalism. Naim also rightly 
identified the issue of underdevelopment as a key argument in many nationalisms. Tudjman 
echoed the widely held belief that since the 1970s, most of Croatia’s tourist earnings were 
being siphoned off by Belgrade. A vote for the HDZ was seemingly a vote for the end of 
Communist mismanagement and economic plundering.10
Unlike Milosevic, who was very much an opportunist, Tudjman was a true believer in 
nationalism, and certainly contributed to many of the nationalist myths used before and 
during the wars. As a result, control over the spread of nationalist propaganda was centralised 
within the HDZ apparatus. While there were several nationalist opposition groups, these were 
not co-opted into government, and remained marginal players. The Communists had been 
largely discredited by Vladimir Bakaric’s slavish adherence to Tito during and after the 
Maspok period, when nationalistic Croatian Communist Party officials, journalists, and 
academics, were purged, arrested, and sometimes imprisoned. With Communist leaders 
discredited by Bakaric’s legacy, many Croats felt that they had little choice but to seek 
independence through Tudjman’s party. Other nationalist, non-Communist parties simply 
did not have the HDZ’s level of funding, or its long cultivated level of Diaspora support.
Tudjman shared much with Milosevid, in terms of his hunger for power, and his 
desire to create a national state that he alone could effectively control. As in Serbia, one of 
the first acts of government was to gain strict control of the media. Article 17 of the 1990 
Croatian Constitution granted Tudjman sweeping presidential prerogatives to restrict 
constitutional rights, ‘during a state of war or an immediate danger to the independence and 
unity of the republic’, while Article 101 allowed Tudjman to pass decrees without 
parliamentary approval.11 These articles allowed for the replacement of media editors and 
managers in wartime, for the punishment of journalists, and for the banning of media for 
violating very strict conditions on the reporting of military affairs or from war areas. Within 
two months of the 1990 elections, the Croatian Radio-Television Act was rushed through 
Parliament, changing the name of Radio-Televizija Zagreb to Hrvatska Radio-Televizija 
(HRT), while completely submitting it to government control.12 Thereafter, it became a 24- 
hour mouthpiece for the HDZ regime.
Print media was another favoured target. HDZ faithful replaced journalists and 
editorial staff at HINA, (formerly TanJug) the state news agency.13 Journalists of ‘mixed 
origin, one Croat parent, one Serb’ were denounced as enemies of Croatia, and were 
summarily dismissed from their posts. Independent papers, such as the Vjesnik Group, 
formerly 80% privately owned, were slowly taken over by the government.14 Vjesnik was
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one of the largest media groups in Croatia, and through it the government came to dominate 
the distribution and printing of newspaper and magazines. Magazines owned by this group 
were often scuttled if they ran stories contrary to government interests; Danas, for example, 
had its circulation cut by 70%.15 The satirical weekly Feral Tribune was also harshly treated, 
with a 50% sales tax in 1994, constant defamation in the government press, public paper 
burnings in the streets of Zagreb, as well as the theft of thousands of copies from newspaper 
kiosks. Its editors were also drafted into the army after criticising Tudjman.16
Centralisation of the media, like in Serbia, allowed HDZ leaders to control 
communication within the republic. At the same time, distinctly nationalist views could now 
be co-ordinated and spread throughout the country. As in Serbia, almost every aspect of life 
would become co-opted by Tudjman’s nationalism, from the Art History Department at the 
University of Zagreb, to the editors of the Croatian Medical Journal. As in Serbia, the media 
was seen as a means of supporting the HDZ regime, while disseminating a nationalist 
viewpoint favourable to the government. Government controlled publishing houses such as 
The Croatian Heritage Foundation / Matica Hrvatska Iseljenika, and the Croatian Information 
Center, proved of central importance in reinterpreting Croatian history in line with 
government priorities. Other publishing houses, such as OKC, VIGRAM i VIDEM (Croatia), 
Dorrance and Company, Northern Tribune, and Roy Publishers (USA & Canada), Fayard 
(France and Switzerland) were also affiliated with Croatian nationalists.
Such institutions would soon perform the same role as did their Serbian counterparts. 
They would become, ‘professional producers of subjective visions of the social world’, as 
described by Valery Tishkov. Their responsibility would be enormous. Croatian history 
would be revised and reinterpreted to highlight themes of Croatian goodness, chosenness, and 
victimisation -  while the Serbs would be thoroughly demonised.17 The editor-in-chief of 
HRT during the war clearly understood his place. HRT was to be the, ‘Cathedral of the 
Croatian spirit’, with a duty, not to accurately report of events as they happened, but rather,
‘to frankly support the defence of Croat ethnic and historical space.’18 For a supposedly 
democratic, post-Communist country, these were not auspicious beginnings.
While Milosevic preferred designer suits, Tudjman revelled in his love of decorative 
Titoesque uniforms, replete with gold braid, and large multicoloured sashes. He even 
invented the garish costumes worn by members of his newly minted presidential guard. 
Tudjman’s own role in history was the subject of a Croatian funded documentary film 
entitled ‘Tudjman -  Croatian George Washington’, starring highlights from his life, 
interviews, and the narration of actor Martin Sheen.19 This documentary, aired in Croatia in
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August, 1997, portrayed Tudjman as a champion of democracy and a martyr for the Croatian 
nation.20 Newspaper articles also praised him as the Croatian ‘Moses’ -  leading his nation 
away from the ‘golden calf of Titoism they had falsely worshipped before. Like the Serbs, 
Croats saw their country as the promised land, for which they had to struggle, since, ‘Every 
day is an exodus from Egypt.’21 By controlling the media and almost every aspect of 
communication within Croatia, the HDZ government under Tudjman was able to cement 
nationalist power virtually unopposed.
Contextualising the War in Croatia:
While Serbian nationalism was seen first as a reaction to Kosovar Albanian demands 
for autonomy, Croatian nationalism was very much reliant on the threat posed by Milosevic’s 
own expansionist strategies. While Tudjman consistently argued that the Croatian Serbs were 
unjustified in their actions against the Croatian state, it often seemed that he was deliberately 
trying to provoke Serbian anger and resentment. His 1990 Constitution, for example, 
conspicuously omitted Serbs as a constituent nation within the new country. While it was 
stated that, ‘the members of other nations and national minorities, who are her citizens, will 
be guaranteed equal status with citizens of Croatian nationality’, the Serbs were not 
mentioned by name -  an oversight which soon played into the hands of Serbian nationalists. 
On a practical level, it became obvious that jobs, property rights, and even residence status, 
depended on having Croatian citizenship. This was not an automatic right for non-Croats. A 
series of exams was required to obtain citizenship, requiring knowledge, but also approval, of
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This situation deteriorated further, as the police, universities, and most government 
bureaucracies, began purging Serbs from their ranks. The resurrection of the Sahovica, the 
chequer-board coat of arms from medieval Croatia, and the Kuna as the new currency also 
exacerbated tensions -  these symbols were starkly familiar to those used during World War 
II. Tudjman’s habit of renaming Croatian streets to conform with great nationalist heroes of 
the past, many of whom possessed dubious credentials, cast doubt on his own political views. 
Another problem was the influx of many former Ustasa collaborators and their families from 
the Diaspora. The rise of extreme nationalism became a worrying phenomenon.
These aspects of the new regime, led to the development of two Serbian nationalist 
parties within Croatia. Dobrica Cosic encouraged Jovan Raskovic and Jovan Opasic to found 
the Serbian Democratic Party in 1990, as a means of promoting Serbian national rights.23 A 
more militant nationalist party, the Democratic Union of Knin, was also founded in 1990, by
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dentist Milan Babic. Both groups soon merged at the behest of Cosic and Milosevic, but the 
differences between the two groups soon became obvious. The more moderate Raskovic 
supported Croatian sovereignty, but advocated negotiating for autonomy and national rights 
within an independent Croatia.24 By contrast, Babic demanded complete autonomy for the 
Serbs in Croatia, and was prepared to back up his demands through armed conflict. 
Raskovic’s negotiations with Tudjman only gave Babic the time he needed to increase his 
stockpile of weapons, while allowing him to create the ‘Association of Serb Municipalities’ -  
a nascent Serbian assembly which formed the nucleus of the eventual Republic of Serbska 
Krajina.25
By 1990, with Serbia’s backing, the Krajina Serbs became increasingly militant.26 
Babic’s list of demands included an autonomous police force, and the right not to fly the 
Croatian flag in the Krajina. Rebuffed by the Croats, a ‘state of war’ was soon declared over 
Radio Knin. Open fighting broke out in April, and a referendum on Serbian independence 
was called for April 17th. The so-called Tog revolution’ was one of the most memorable 
events at the start of the conflict. Armed Serbs blocked roads to prevent the Croatian police 
from intervening in the vote, a vote that of course resulted in a call for Serbian secession from 
Croatia.27
Between February and June, 1991 the rebellion escalated, as Croatian Serbs battled 
Croatian security forces with home-made weapons. Militia units from Serbia were soon 
brought in at the behest of Milosevic. Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan’s ‘Tigers’ and Vojislav 
Seselj’s ‘White Eagles’, were trained and funded by the Serbian Ministry of the Interior. The 
situation became more dramatic as JNA tanks intervened, under the pretext of protecting 
Serbian minority rights -  they claimed to be acting as ‘peace-keepers’.28 In the midst of this 
conflict, the Serbian government formally recognised the ‘Serbian Autonomous Province of 
Krajina’, a situation which was to have lasting political and military consequences.29
Croatian leaders also contributed to the volatility of the situation. Defence Minister 
Gojko Susak and a handful of paramilitaries fired several rockets into Borovo Selo, a Serbian 
suburb of Vukovar- seemingly to provoke conflict. Hostilities escalated, as Croatian 
policemen were killed by local Serbs, in retaliation for the rocket bombings. This rocket 
attack further justified the JNA’s ‘peace-keeping’ initiatives, and by September, 1991,
Serbian and JNA forces controlled almost one third of the Croatian territory. The role of the 
JNA had by this point switched from defence of the Yugoslav constitution to supporting the 
remaining republics in Yugoslavia, namely the Serbs and Montenegrins. Their shelling of
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Vukovar in October, 1991, (the last Croatian stronghold in eastern Slavonia) was dramatic 
proof of this. The JNA also began the wanton attack on Dubrovnik in the same month.31
It was very much within this climate of fear and mistrust that militant Croatian 
propaganda entered the mainstream. While Tudjman, like his counterpart in Serbia, had 
assumed almost complete control over political and media power within the state, he had yet 
to fully operationalise it. While the Serbs were the first to engage in full-scale attack, 
Tudjman was instrumental in provoking conflict. His narrow-minded exclusive 
interpretations of Croatian history denied Serbs the cultural and political rights they had 
enjoyed in the SFRY. Further, by rejecting many of Raskovic’s pacifist and arguably 
reasonably demands, he legitimated the rise of Babic and his more violent nationalist 
cohorts.32
It was also clear that Susak and his colleagues had deliberately provoked Serbian 
military aggression in Vukovar. Tudjman would also be blamed, first for ordering the 
shelling, then for refusing to send military aid to relieve the beleaguered Croatian defenders 
in Vukovar, who were being heavily bombarded. Tudjman used the siege of Vukovar to gain 
maximum political credibility. He was able to claim that Croats were the victims of Serbian 
terror, what Gow and Tisley have rightly termed a ‘victim strategy’. It is clear that Tudjman’s 
government, rather than sending arms and troops to end the 86 day siege, preferred to use the 
political capital to be gained by its destruction, thus leading to the charge that, ‘Tudjman 
manipulated its position, rather than defending it’.33
Throughout the conflict, the view, which stemmed from the fall of Vukovar, that the 
Croats were merely acting in self-defence, allowed them to move in Bosnia relatively 
unfettered by the international community. It was clear that nationalists were promoting a 
form of ‘counteridentification’ -  creating a sense of national cohesion and support for 
Tudjman though a fear of external attack.34 Certainly, Tudjman was able to capitalise on 
Vukovar, insuring Croatia’s position as a victim, rather than an aggressor during the conflict. 
This impression continued, even when it was clear that Croatia and Serbia were both 
committing crimes against humanity in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
It was in this context of war that a wholesale reappraisal of Croatian history came 
about, one which would involve many diverse sectors of the community. Like the Serbs, the 
Croats argued that they had been the victim of expansionist powers throughout their history. 
Further, a long and horrific history of Serbian imperialism and danger was created, so that the 
contemporary crop of Serbian nationalists would not be seen as a cabal of power hungry 
opportunists, but rather -  as representatives of a typical, age-old Serbian strategy of
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expansion and repression. Croatian-Serbian relations had to be uprooted and decontextualised 
from reality, then recontextualised, in light of new evidence and new historical revisionist 
arguments. This process was identical to that used by the Serbs, and was similar to Northrop 
Frye’s understanding of positive and negative agencies within Biblical teleology. With some 
careful manipulation, Milosevic □ could represent, to the Croats, what the Pharoah of Exodus 
or Nebuchadnezzar represented to the ancient Hebrews -  a symbol of evil and Fall.
By clearly presenting themselves to the outside world as victim of Serbian genocide, 
Croatians hoped to court western recognition and aid, both of which would prove vital for 
their self-defence. Such imagery would also play into their hands during Croatian 
machinations in Bosnia. Myths of persecution and victimisation set the basis for other forms 
of mythology -  myths proving that Croatia had every right to exist as a separate state, then 
myths dealing with the separateness of almost every aspect of national identity, from culture, 
religion and language, to racial, linguistic and psychological traits. Once the evils of Greater 
Serbia had been proven, the great differences between Croats and Serbs were repeatedly 
stressed.
Croatian Confronts ‘Greater Serbia’:
Croatian nationalism was far less triumphalist or self-exalting than the Serbian 
variety. The proliferation of books, articles, documentaries, and conference papers dealt 
mainly with the fear of Serbian aggression -  portraying Croatia as the helpless victim of 
Serbian expansionism. It is therefore appropriate to begin a discussion of Croatian myths with 
the concept of “Greater Serbia”, a Serbian nationalist project from the 19th century aimed 
primarily at empire building in the Balkans. Without understanding their perceptions of 
Greater Serbia, it is difficult to contextualise other forms of Croatian writing, which have 
largely justified the existence of the Croatian nation in its present borders. It is also difficult 
to understand how and why Croatian writers have devoted so much effort to myths of 
differentiation between Croats and Serbs, at cultural, sociological, geographical, 
psychological, racial and linguistic levels. Greater Serbia for Croats was tantamount to 
genocide -  Serbian expansion implied ipso facto a reduction of Croatian territory, ethnic 
cleansing, and the death of Croatian civilians.
As in the Serbian case, historical amnesia was important to many Croatian writers.
The differences between Serbs and Croats were not only to have been irreconcilable, but 
more importantly, had always been so. History was reinterpreted to prove that under no 
circumstances had Serbs and Croats ever chosen to co-operate. Serbs would figure as
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Kecmanovic’s ‘universal culprit’, or perhaps more accurately as a pseudospecies, completely 
different from the Croats in absolutely every respect.35 Their sole ambition throughout 
history, as understood by Croatian historians, was to expand their state, while destroying any 
nations that stood in their path.
The origins of Greater Serbia stemmed from before the Ottoman conquest of the 
Balkans, and were specifically tied to the ‘Great Medieval Serbian State’, under Tsar Dusan
thin the 14 century. This state was one of the largest in the Balkans, and its dismantling after 
1389, Croats contended, established a template for later Serbian territorial aspirations.36 The 
recreation of Dusan’s state was linked directly to the efforts of the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Serbian writers were always quick to denounce Catholicism, and the Croats were little 
different in their portrayals of Orthodoxy. For them, the Church was ‘religiously exclusivist’, 
with objectives said to include, ‘destruction of all members of other nations and faiths, the 
stealing of possessions and conquering of territories all resulting in religious, national, and 
political exclusivism and intolerance.’
While Serbian writers accused 19th century Croats of trying to expand their state 
under the Vatican’s wing, Croatian writers portrayed this century as the culmination of the 
‘Greater Serbian’ ideal, as the Serbs engaged in wars of conquest to recreate Dusan’s state.
As one academic graphically described,
The syndrome of Serbian warped notions of heroism, all-Serbian unity, racial 
domination and megalomaniacal claims of ownership of other people's territories is so 
powerful that Serbians themselves believe in this lie, let alone the insufficiently 
informed world public. This gave them sufficient time to commit a great number of 
crimes from their bloody palette in order to paint the picture of the conquering 
invasion of South-eastern Europe.38
t i lSerbs, from the beginning of the 19 century, would stand accused of bloodshed and 
hatred, based on their need to recreate their former kingdom. Croatian writers compiled
it.
anthologies of Serbian writings from the 19 century, citing a variety of documents to prove 
that Serbia had a long history of antagonising its neighbours. ‘Of all the parties in the war 
today’, three French Croatians concluded during the conflict in Bosnia, ‘Serbia is the one that 
has provided the oldest doctrinal arsenal, and hence the most elaborate and moral and 
intellectual justifications.’39 As well, it seemed that every strata of Serbian society was 
actively engaged in this national project. As they wrote of the history of Serbian ideas,
[Sjince the beginning of the 19th century, Serbian writers, clergy, military men and 
politicians have talked of a Greater Serbia, a “homogenous and pure Serbia” while
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exalting violence, as well as introducing the term “ethnic cleansing” (ciscenje). There 
more than anywhere, the origins of patriotism can be found in the fight against 
Ottoman occupation, which was twisted by nationalism; the unnatural “Yugoslav” 
idea was steeped in an imperialism tainted with racism...40
Largely a presentation and ‘analysis’ of Serbian national writings, this anthology 
began with documents from 1807, positing that the Serbian love of genocide had ancient 
roots, with Serbian writings being little more than, ‘reference texts for a school of hate’. In 
many respects, their approach differed very little from that of Serbian historians, who 
constantly linked Croatian nationalism with genocide. Echoing these types of Serbian 
argument, the authors stressed that, ‘the conceptualisation and applications of “ethnic 
cleansing” is an indispensable means of realising the Greater Serbian project’ -  again, linking 
Serbian nationalism and genocide together.41
Such anecdotal writings accompanied reviews of pivotal events in Serbian history, 
events that supposedly proved the genocidal nature of the Serbs. The first concerned a 
rebellion against Ottoman rule in 1807, when the Serbs supposedly ‘cleansed Belgrade’, 
‘slaughtering Turks’, raping children, and banishing the Jews. This was to be the first 
instance of what the authors termed ‘ethnocide and culturacide’, a concerted attempt to erase 
Turkish and Islamic influence in Serbia 42 Impartial historians have more accurately seen this 
as the beginning of Serbia’s rebellion against colonial rule. Serbs were similarly accused of
t h  t husing ethnic cleansing as part of a wartime strategy through the 19 and 20 centuries, during 
the 1878 struggle for independence, and during the 1912 and 1913 Balkan Wars.43 Again, it 
was stressed that Serbian nationalism equalled genocide, and that Serbian state-building was 
consonant with atrocities of the worst description.
t hAs an ideology, Greater Serbia came into its own in the mid-19 century, when a 
series of Greater Serbia political plans were hatched. The first and most famous was the 
‘Nacertanije’ or ‘Outline’, written in 1844 by Serbian government minister Ilija Garasanin. 
The ‘Outline’ was a basic plan for expanding the Serbian empire to include most of Dusan’s 
former kingdom. Very much the work of a utopian dreamer, it included claims to Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, parts of Bulgaria, and Croatia. Equally 
famous was Vuk Karadzic’s ‘Serbs All and Everywhere’ (1849), which used a linguistic 
definition of nationalism little different from that of Starcevic, to posit that Croats and 
Slovenians were in fact Serbs, who all spoke the same Serbian language. This, as well, was 
seen to be a justification for the assimilation of non-Serbian nations -  particularly the 
Croats.44
107
The mid-19th century was consistently presented as the time when the Croats first 
became a primary target of Serbian aggression. The first anti-Croatian demonstration took 
place in Belgrade in 1892, followed by riots in Knin, and in other regions. Supposedly, there 
was a concerted Serbian attempt to assimilate the Croats into some form of Serbian 
nationalism, laying the basis for the eventual annexation of Croatia itself.45 Other historians 
would advance the “Pasic Plan”, created by Serbian politician Nikola Pasic, as another 
example of Serbian expansionist goals. According to historian Branko Miletic, the “Pasic 
Plan” became the most important political document in Serbia. He described it as, ‘nothing 
short of a blueprint for a Serb-dominated empire stretching from Thessaloniki to Trieste.’46 It 
was also to be a tool by which, ‘genocide in the Balkans has been honed, fashioned, and
tVirecently perfected.’ Almost every aspect of 19 century Serbian nationalism was presented as 
part of a blueprint for Serbian genocide.47
Vuk Karadzic’s 19th century assimilationist nationalism was another obvious target of 
Croatian attacks. While his theories were little different from those of Ante Starcevic, 
Karadzic’s view that all South Slavs (including Croats and Slovenes) spoke the same 
‘Serbian’ language constituted proof that Croats had been denied their ‘right’ to exist as a 
separate race. One historian went to far as to suggest that Karadzic’s policies were no 
different from those of the Nazis, 50 years before Hitler’s birth since, ‘This is quite similar to 
what the Hitlerites did in Nazi Germany. To deny the actual existence of a certain race is a 
subliminal way of dehumanizing it — the first step in a planned and systematic genocide. This 
type of rhetoric was also evident with anti-Semitism, which is the paragon of a planned and 
systematic genocide.’48 This is an obvious example of the manichean morality which 
pervaded Croatian and Serbian nationalism. Both sides ignored the real similarities of 
Starcevic and Karadzic’s national programmes, which were bent on uniting South Slavs 
against colonial oppression.
The beginnings of Peter Karadordevic’s Serbian kingdom in 1903 became another 
period when Greater Serbia asserted itself. Serbian politicians, such as Nikola Stojanovic, 
were also accused of whipping up genocidal hysteria amongst the Serbs. His 1902 article, ‘To 
Extermination: Ours or Yours’, has long been cited as a blueprint for ethnic cleansing and 
genocide, applying a Social Darwinist model of the world (survival of the fittest race) to 
understand how Serbs should best approach various non-Serbian groups, including the 
Moslems and the Croats.49 Soon after the publication of Stojanovic’s article, Serbian 
nationalists, supposedly inspired by his document began, ‘an organised extermination of
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Croatians and other non-Serbian nations in 1903,’ the result being that, ‘Croatians were 
victims on their own land from 1903 to 1941.’50
For Croatian writers, the rise of Serbian secret societies also confirmed various 
conspiracy theories that the Serbs were constantly plotting against the Croats. Thus, groups 
like the ‘Cetniks’, the ‘Black Hand’, the ‘Slovenian South’, ‘Serbian Defense’, and ‘National 
Defense’, were all accused of undermining Croatian sovereignty, while continuing the 
genocidal policies of ‘Greater Serbia.’ King Peter, through the ‘Black Hand’, was blamed for 
the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, and by extension, for provoking the First
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World War. The beginning of the 20 century was presented as a time when the Serbs 
profited by the weakness of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to persecuted Croats in their own 
land. As one historian recalled,
From 1906 to 1909, Croatians were forced to endure fear in all villages which they 
resided together with Serbians. Their houses were burned and crops destroyed. There 
were numerous cases of beatings along with wounding both Croatians and Serbians 
who did not accept the aggressive Greater-Serbian politics. There were a number of 
Croatian political leaders who were murdered.52
Serbs were also blamed for genocidal acts against the Albanians, the Bosniacs and the 
Macedonians during the first Balkan war in 1912. Supposedly inspired by the Nacertanije, 
Serbs, ‘set entire villages on fire, killing civilians in the most barbaric fashion using knives, 
axes and dull wooden mallets.’ A coherant picture of the Serbs emerges from a reading of 
Croatian historical descriptions. The Serbs are brutal, bloody, treacherous, cold, calculating, 
ruthless, greedy, and expansionist. Additionally, Croats have been their chief victims, but not 
their only victims. In their zeal to expand the borders of their state, the Serbs put every 
Balkan nation at risk.
Summarising what lessons could be learned from a review of Serbian history, the 
director of the Croatian Information Center, Ante Beljo, in the introduction to one of many 
anthologies of Serbian nationalist documents, would note the following, ‘Trying to hide their 
true motives from the eyes of the world with a series of historic and demographic 
falsifications, today’s proponents of Greater Serbian ambitions are only continuing the 
promotion of an idea that has been smouldering with various degrees of intensity for over a 
century.’54 Such an attitude removed any sense of individual responsibility from the equation 
during the 1990s. The Serbs were merely acting according to an age old predetermined plan, 
as if they somehow had no choice, as if history had been leading up to that moment for over a 
century. Milosevic was therefore not operating from opportunism or self interest, but was
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simply continuing a traditional Serbian pattern of behaviour. It was then equally important to 
come to terms with Garasanin, as it was to understand Milosevic
Documents from this era of Serbian history were extremely popular with Croatian 
academics. Without much difficulty, various jingoistic writings from a wide variety of 
sources could be collated together according to their dates of publication. A noted Croatian 
glossator would then offer contemporary comments about what each document ‘meant* about 
the war in Croatia, well over a century after it was written. The whole purpose of such an 
exercise was to demonstrate the timeless quality of Serbian evil. Very much like a form of 
Biblical evil, Serbian expansionism and bloodlust was timeless had no sell-by date. Such 
imagery clearly evokes Kecmanovic’s theme of the ‘universal culprit’.55
The key to understanding the Serbian ‘genocidal’ mind lay in reading edited volumes 
such as Beljo’s Greater Serbia: From Ideology to Aggression, Separovic’s Documenta 
Croatica, or Grmek, Gjidara, and Simac’s influential, Le nettoyage ethnique: Documents 
historiques sur une ideologie serbe, all of which were meant to tell the ‘truth’ about Serbian 
contemporary events from a selective reading of history. One shudders to think what ‘truths’ 
could be gleaned about the British from selective readings of Francis Galton, Oswald Mosley, 
and Enoch Powell, with Winston Churchill’s views of the ‘Blackamoor’, thrown in for good 
measure. Such anthologies were meant to inform the reader about what the Croats were about 
to get themselves into, when they committed the tragic error of entering into political 
association with the Serbs for the first time in history. Readers, were seemingly meant to 
scratch their heads and exclaim, “The Croats should have known better!” Like some sort of 
Shakespearean tragedy, the outside world was meant to understand the Croats’ fatal flaw (that 
they did not know how evil the Serbs were), and then wince with pain every time something
t hwent wrong. Unfortunately, most of these 19 century documents did not actually describe a 
blue print for genocide at all.
For example, Nikola Stojanovic’s reprinted essay, ‘To Extermination: Ours or Yours’, 
said little about exterminating anyone. The fanciful glossating aside, a review of the selected 
passages of Stojanovic’s work, even when reprinted in a Croatian anthology, offered little to 
indicate that all Croats were at risk of being annihilated. While he argued that, ‘Croats have 
neither a separate language, nor unified customs, nor a fully unified lifestyle’, making it clear 
that ‘this cannot be a distinct or separate nation,’ Stojanovic was not advocating genocide, 
just assimilation, as others in Croatia and Serbia before him had done.56 While his writings 
were extremely patronising, Stojanovic advocated Croatia’s union with Serbia, to allow 
Croatia to secure ‘economic, political and cultural independence, and freedom from German
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encroachment.’57 Stojanovic, it seems, was trying to rally his perceived co-nationals together 
against an external threat, rather than advocating Croatian annihilation.
Croatian Perceptions of the First Yugoslavia:
For Croatian writers, the general public were supposed to view the situation in 
Yugoslavia during the early 1990s as some sort of tragedy -  the Serbs having no choice but 
to be genocidal tyrants, the Croats with no choice but to play the victim and try to defend 
themselves against attack. The problem, of course, was that the portrayal of 19th century 
Serbia as the nodal point of genocidal aggression in the Balkans was simply false. If Serbia 
was as horrifically evil as contemporary writers suggested, why then were there so many 
Croatian Illyrianists and Yugoslavs? Why were there not huge riots in the streets in 1918 
after the Kingdom was formed? By all accounts, the first year of the new Kingdom was 
relatively positive, and there was a reasonably high level of support for the state. It was, after 
all, preferable to annexation by Italy or continued colonial domination by Austria-Hungary.58 
If the Serbs were so horrible, then surely one of these options would have been preferred.
Nevertheless, as history was revised, the reality of Croatian motivations and reactions 
at that time was left by the wayside. The first Yugoslavia became the first time that Serbs and 
Croats were united politically and economically in a joint state. But it was also seen by 
Croats as the first real instance of Serbian dominance over Croats, the first time when Croats 
were truly confronted with Greater Serbia.59 In practice, this would mean a time when, 
‘Serbian chauvinism transformed itself into virulent anti-Croatianism, culminating in acts of 
terror and violence.’ One writer described this period as one of ‘symbiosis’, when, ‘the
tVitheories and ideas of 19 century pro-Greater Serbianism were welded with 20th-century 
fascist imperialism and Chetnik terrorism.’ Yugoslavia therefore gave ‘Greater Serbia’ not 
only a framework, but ‘limbs as well’, ‘limbs with which it struck at the hearts of all 
non-Serbs in royalist Yugoslavia.’60 Such imagery, consciously or not, evoked images of 
some sort of B-movie monster, a black and white Serbia festooned with claws and rubber 
arms, attacking Croatia -  an innocent young maid who could do nothing except scream for 
help.
Miroslav Krleza also promoted the view that the state was cruel, racist, and despotic. 
In Ten Bloody Years, Krleza argues that the state was founded on, ‘blood and violence’, and 
provoked instant rebellion by the Croats against the regime, resulting in brutal massacres in 
Zagreb. Police open fired on crowds demanding an independent Croatia, killing 100 people -  
these subsequently became immortalised as the ‘December victims’.61 Further, we hear that
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the Serbian army treated Croatia as ‘if it were enemy territory’, and actively suppressed 
Croatian nationalism, imprisoning political leaders while using the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to quell opposition.62 Such ideas clearly refuted Serbian claims that the Kingdom had 
been an egalitarian, peaceful and democratic country, constructed according to a European 
model.
The horrors of the Serbian kingdom were evident not only in Croatia -  according to 
Croatian accounts. The first genocide in Bosnia, Croatian sources argued, was not in 1992- 
93, but back in 1918 and 1919, when Serbian-controlled Yugoslavia instigated a series of 
agricultural reforms in Bosnia. One Bosnian Croat academic described these reforms as 
‘genocide against Bosniacs’, when some 1.2 million hectares of land were confiscated from 
wealthy Bosnian families, without adequate compensation. In this account, ‘homelessness’ 
and ‘genocide’ amounted to the same thing. This ‘genocide’ (or land redistribution) was 
designed to allow some 200,000 Serbian families to ‘colonise’ Bosnia, thereby destroying the 
demographic balance of the region. The Serbs were further accused of implementing a ‘death 
march’ in 1919, where 50,000 Bosnian peasants were forced to leave their homes, over 1,000 
of whom were killed by ‘Serbian terrorists’. During this time, the author reveals, ‘a long 
colony of victims walked to numerous camps in Kosovo and Sandzak, where they were 
transported to Turkey and settled in Anatolia.’64 The imagery created here bears a stark 
resemblance to the genocide of the Armenians by the Turks, when the Armenians were also 
forced to abandon their homes on a long ‘death march’.
Certainly there was land reform during this time, which led to the confiscation of 
Bosnian property. However, such policies were designed to help the general population, not 
commit genocide against the Moslems. While feudalism had been abandonned by the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire in 1848, the vestiges of the Ottoman sharecropping tradition nevertheless 
continued in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina. Some 7,000 Bosnian landlords, 
representing .5% of the population, controlled some 85,000 families of feudal serfs, both 
Moslem and Christian. These serfs were tied to the land, and in addition to labour service, 
were forced to pay excessive proportions of their produce, often 1/8 of the total. As Phyllis 
Auty describes, agricultural modernisation and the improvement of peasant life would have 
been impossible without land reform.65 While it is certainly true that Serbs received land in 
Bosnia Hercegovina, John Lampe argues that the majority of these feudal farmers were in 
fact Serbs, who had been farming the land for a very long time. He also fixes their number at 
113,000, not 200,000, and states that while Serbs received the bulk of the appropriated land 
in Bosnia, they did represent 42% of the population at that time. Certainly, Serbs did gain the
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majority of the land, but Jozo Tomasevich, the leading authority on the 1919 land reforms, is 
clear that this redistribution was “a political and socio-economic necessity”.66 There is 
nothing to suggest in any of these accounts that a policy of genocide was pursued.
In general, Croatian writers conveyed the impression that Yugoslavia was nothing 
more than Serbian dominated anarchy, where every non-Serbian group was stripped of its 
rights and lived in terror. According to one account, Serbian Cetniks ran wild throughout the 
kingdom, and, inspired by their desire to create a Greater Serbia, ‘killed people, beat them, 
threatened them, and burned their houses.’67 At the same time, the assassination of Croatian 
Peasant Party leader Stjepan Radic and four other deputies by a Serbian assassin was a 
further indication of Serbian malevolence and Croatian weakness.68 But if this situation was 
not bad enough, King Alexander’s royal dictatorship (1929) was seen as significantly worse, 
as a time when ‘the lives of non-Serbian people had no value’.69 The disbanding of political 
parties and the re-division of the country into Banovina would coincide with further political 
intrigue, mass arrests and bloodshed. This era is generally portrayed as one of torture, police 
repression, and the liquidation of non-Serbian opposition leaders -  the Communists in 
particular.70 In short, the Croatian decision to join Yugoslavia was a complete disaster, 
resulting in Serbian domination and persecution.
The republication of Henri Pozzi’s Black Hand Over Europe by the Croatian 
Information Center provided a link between this period and the more contemporary crisis. 
Ante Beljo was clear about the book’s purpose in the introduction, ‘The contemporeneity of 
Pozzi’s work derives from the concord of present and past historical manifestations and 
circumstances ... a grave warning to all those who still, like their predecessors underestimate 
the Balkan precedent.’71 He would further claim, ‘The methods and philosophy of the Black 
Hand [secret society] can be recognised in many of the present actions of Serbian politicians 
and generals.’72 Again, Beljo referred to the timeless, even ahistorical nature of Serbian 
nationalism. Serbs were the same, no matter who they were, or which century they lived in. A 
Serb could be nothing more than a blood-thirsty expansionist nationalist. This is why an 
understanding of the past was supposedly crucial in understanding later developments. As in 
the Bible, nothing changed.
Because of the timeless quality of Serbian nationalism, ‘Greater Serbia’ seemingly 
meant the same thing to Vuk Draskovic, as it would have meant to Jovan Cvijic, or Vuk 
Karadzic. Former Tudjman advisor Slaven Letica, expanding upon the timeless qualities of 
‘Greater Serbia’, would describe it as a ‘transhistorical phenomenon’, ‘frozen and suppressed 
into the subconscious’ -  an evil waiting to reappear at an opportune moment.73 Letica, either
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by training or aptitude, could not resist wording his descriptions in heavy-handed, plodding 
Communist j argon,
The moment these SUBSTITUTES (Yugoslavism etc.) begin to wear out, become 
routine or fail, the Greater-Serbian and All-Serbian assertions re-emerge. They 
experience renaissance, new political and intellectual articulations; again they draw 
large-scale political attention; they become the basis for new-old All-Serbian populist 
ideologies and movements ... this represents a dull easily predictable and unavoidable 
historical repetition ... its goal is to conquer and its means are to dominate and to 
exercise force.74
Letica’s statement was consonant with the general view of the Serbs as genocidal 
empire builders, bent not only on enslaving other nations, but liquidating them as well. 
Serbian nationalism was nothing more than ‘Greater Serbia’, which was nothing more than a 
blueprint for exterminating Croats and another Balkan peoples. The fear of Greater Serbia 
would thus become the most important Croatian myth of persecution, a myth of Serbia as an 
ahistorical negative force with a national project based solely on the hatred of other nations.
If the Hebrews needed the Philistines, the Egyptians, and the Romans to rally their people 
together, the Croats needed only one negative agency -  the Serbs, and only the Serbs would 
suffice.
After such portrayals of Serbian-Croatian relationships throughout history, there could 
be no doubt in the 1990s that Serbs were simply following their familiar pattern of genocide, 
while the Croats were following their familiar pattern of playing the victim. Such an appraisal 
of Serbian history allowed Croatian nationalists to obfuscate the many embarrassing decades 
of philoserbianism in Croatia. Early attempts at Yugoslavism and Illyrianism were therefore 
excised from the history books, while any arguments that Starcevic had advanced more or 
less the same view as Karadzic were summarily ignored.
That Serbs and Croats basically saw each other’s history as a mirror image of their 
own should come as no surprise. A great deal of debate occurred between these two nations 
during the war, in newspapers, magazines, and most importantly, on the Internet. The use of 
the World Wide Web as a medium of communication opened many new avenues for 
propagandists. While it is both expensive and difficult to print and circulate propaganda in 
large quantities, it was relatively cheap and easy to scan and paste Serbian and Croatian 
propaganda on a variety of websites. Those who agreed with the government position 
benefited from links on official government websites. This allowed for a continuous stream 
of new information and publications, designed to rebut arguments advanced by the other side.
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This new medium of expression allowed for the spread of a great deal of information within a 
very short time.
Croatian State Right and the Antemurale Christianitatis:
In reaction to the idea of ‘Greater Serbia’ and its expansionist and seemingly 
genocidal political project, the Croats were keen to stress their own myths of nationhood and 
uniqueness, myths that ran counter to the ‘genocidal’ ambitions of the Serbs. One of the 
primary myths of identification was that of the ‘state right’ tradition, the myth of continuous 
Croatian statehood for the past 1,000 years. This was designed to prove that Croats had a 
historic right to exist as an autonomous nation within their current borders. That the 1990 
Constitution described the new state as the realisation of ‘the thousand year dream of the 
Croatian People’ certainly attested to the centrality of this millennial myth.75
The myth of continuous Croatian statehood stemmed from two very early Croatian 
institutions: the Banus (the chief executive), and the Sabor (or people’s assembly), both of 
which emerged from the 7th century ruling traditions of the Croats. These institutions were 
ratified by a Pacta Coventa with Hungary in 1102, when Croats accepted the indirect rule of 
the Hungarian king. An elected Ban, or Duke, was to be the representative of the Hungarian 
empire — a man who was portrayed as a positive symbol of, ‘heroism, faithfulness, protection
n(L
for the common people and love of country.’ This tradition of ‘State Right’ was coupled 
with the advent of western European feudalism and the rise of a aristocratic hierarchy, both of 
which intimated that Croatian legislative traditions were heavily influenced by the west.
Numerous writers thus argued for such a continuous state, even during the Austro- 
Hungarian period, when Croatia was ruled directly from Vienna and Budapest. Even then, 
Croatian historians argued that the country had, ‘preserved the characteristics of its 
constitutional statehood.’77 Most Croatian historians posited that the Pacta, coupled with the 
later guarantee of free elections from the Habsburgs in 1527 gave clear proof of the
no
continuation of Croatian sovereignty. Such myths proved of central importance after 1990, 
as Croatia justified its right to existent as an independent nation on historic grounds.
This glorious millennium long period of Croatian history, the continuous state, was 
said to have been destroyed precisely with the rise of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, in 1918. As one early historian wrote, ‘The “Yugoslav” period of Croat history is 
definitely the darkest and most humiliating ... for the first time in 13 centuries the institutions 
of the BANUS and SABOR were completely abolished.’79 Thus this lengthy period of 
Croatian ‘state right’ was effectively ended in the 20th century, as the Serbs and their
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genocidal Greater Serbian project swept through the Balkans and destroyed indigenous 
cultures. Once again, the image of a peaceful democratic, and western state destroyed by the 
genocidal Serbs was presented as proof of the dramatic reversal of fortune the Croats had 
suffered after their contact with the Serbs.
This 1000 year myth very much resembled Anthony Smith’s view of the Golden Age. 
It was indeed designed to ‘unfold a glorious past’, while demonstrating to Croats that their 
traditions were ancient and noble.80 Nevertheless, they had more in common with George 
Schopflin’s ‘myths of election’, where the Croatian nation had somehow been ‘chosen’ by 
God or history because of its great and heroic qualities. While this was not a myth of 
Covenant in any sense, the fact that the Croatian nation still existed after 1,000 years and still 
retained a form of autonomy, implied that it was superior to its neighbours, and had 
withstood the test of time. It also qualified as a ‘myth of election’.81 There is no doubt that the 
myth of ‘state right’ gave Croats a sense of moral and cultural superiority, since their nation 
had outlasted most others in history -  supposedly without being conquered.
At the same time, the fact that the millennial dream died in 1918 contained the seeds 
of tragedy. Like the myth of Kosovo, the loss of Croatian statehood plunged the Croats into a 
terrible Fall. Unlike the myth of Kosovo, however, the nation was not elevated to holy or 
chosen status. It thus fell to Tudjman and his colleagues to resurrect the Croatian nation and 
bring about its independence. Such myths were therefore a reflection of a Smithean Golden 
Age in one respect, but this Golden Age was set up in order to present a historical tragedy, in 
order to introduce the Fall myth which was the inevitable concomitant of it. As such, we are 
confronted once more with the tragic nature of Croatian nationalism. Their proud state 
tradition was forever destroyed by the Serbs in the first Yugoslavia. At the same time, such 
myths are utter nonsense. While they favoured a much more decentralised arrangement, with 
more autonomy for themselves, the Croats could have taken advantage of Wilsonianism and 
gone it alone, of course, there was a serious risk that Italy would invade and occupy the 
country, particularly the Istrian Peninsula, which it had always claimed. Caught between 
Italian invasion and South Slavic unity, most Croats chose to see where decades of 
Illyrianism and Yugoslavism could take them. ,
The Civilisational Divide Between East and West:
Like the Serbs and the Kosovo myth, the Croats advanced their own myths of 
historical courage and power. Another aspect of ‘state right’ was the myth of the Antemurale 
Christianitatis, the notion that Croatia was the western most rampart of Christian Europe, and
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was the sole defender of the west against the east. While the Serbs had also used similar 
imagery, suggesting that Orthodoxy was the west’s defence against Islam, the Croatian 
interpretation saw all former Ottoman colonies as eastern, with Orthodoxy itself as an eastern 
religion. Clearly, this moved the eastern border to the Krajina region, within Croatian 
territory. Writers were quick to cite Croatia’s 1,200 year history of suffering, humiliation and 
aggression in defence of western Christendom.
The enormous sacrifices associated with defending this border were constantly 
reiterated. Very much like the Serbs, the Croats saw themselves as a peace-loving and 
spiritual people, who had never attacked others outside their borders. Croats were to be a 
noble and benevolent nation because of their Roman Catholic faith. As legend has it, the Pope 
sent priests to baptise the Croats in the 3rd century. After this time, the Croats supposedly 
made a ‘covenant’ with the Pope, and seemingly with God as well, that in return for living at 
peace with their neighbours, and never making wars with foreign countries, they would
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receive both God and ‘Peter the disciple of Christ” s protection against attack. This was very 
much a myth of Covenant and divine election. Croats has supposedly chosen to become a 
peace-loving nation, and because of this choice, they were protected from on high.
Croatian historians drew a sharp line between the Catholic world, and the Orthodox 
world further to the east. Croatian historians, reflecting on the ancient past, traced Serbian- 
Croatian antagonism to the Great Schism between Orthodoxy and Catholicism in the 4th 
century, also a significant date for the Serbs. Numerous historians would falsely trace the 
origins of Serbian and Croatian antagonism to this key event.84 For contemporary Croatian 
historians, the division of the Roman Empire created an unfathomable gulf between the two 
nations -  who stood at opposite ends of the great divide between east and west. Such divisions 
were projected into later periods of history, in particular, the 1054 division of the Christian 
Church into Greek-Orthodox and Catholicism. According to Croatian historians, this would 
further create a civilisational split between, ‘two different civilizations and cultures, that is 
eastern and western spheres.’ Divided by the River Drina, this river was seen to separate 
Serbs and Croats, and was, ‘figuratively called the border of the two worlds.’
Such imagery would later be expanded to include the period of Ottoman rule, seen 
also as the beginnings of ‘Greater Serbia’ and the rise of the Serbian Church. Within these 
five centuries of Ottoman rule, Serbs supposedly learnt their cruelty and despotism, while 
becoming further separated culturally from the Croats. That Serbs and Croats had been 
culturally distinct for centuries made Croatia’s decision to seek independence all the more 
reasonable. That the Serbs were eastern and therefore somehow civilisationally inferior to the
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Croats made it seem natural that they would gravitate towards western Europe, away from the 
‘eastern’ Serbs. Themes such as this were rife during the war in Croatia. Most academics 
referred to such division, and Tudjman truly believed that a dividing line existed. As he 
claimed in one speech, ‘Croats belong to a different culture a different civilisation from 
Serbs. Croats are part of western Europe, part of the Mediterranean tradition. Long before 
Shakespeare and Moliere, our writers were translated into European languages. The Serbs 
belong to the east. They are eastern peoples, like the Turks and the Albanians. They belong to
Q/r
the Byzantine culture’.
If Tudjman was not Serbophobic, then he was most certainly ‘Balkanophobic’. For 
him as for many Croats, the idea of Croatia as part of the Balkans was inimical to all of their 
past traditions and values. As he commented in one interview, ‘Based on its geopolitical 
position, its fourteen centuries long history, civilization and culture, Croatia belongs to the 
central European and Mediterranean circle in Europe. Our political links with the Balkans 
between 1918 and 1990 were just a short episode in the Croatian history and we are 
determined not to repeat that episode ever again!’87 He later argued that geographically, 
Croatia had always been a part of central Europe, and was culturally a part of this region, 
except for the ‘recent past’ when, ‘balkanism has constantly subordinated the Croatian State 
territory to an Asiatic form o f government.’88 In other words, Croatia’s history placed it 
within the western world, which Serbia was part of the eastern or ‘Asiatic’ world. Any 
associations between these two cultures was purely a historical anomaly.
Croatia’s reinterpretation of history also implied rejecting the Balkans itself, a project 
which found recent expression in a recent Croatian conference entitled ‘South-eastern Europe 
in the 20th Century’, whose organisers stressed categorically that Croatia was not a Balkan 
country, but rather, a part of ‘South-eastern Europe’. For the conference organisers, ‘being a
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part of the Balkans means being a part of the backward part of Europe. ’ Croats, despite the 
ravages of war, still had hope for the future, that once their independence was assured, they 
would somehow be able to become symbolically part of a different world. Certainly, no 
Croatians wanted to associated with the Serbs, who were seen as nothing better than 
‘Vandals’ and ‘Asian hordes.’90 The use of such Orientalism with reference to the Serbs 
shows clearly that culturally, or ‘civilisationally’, Serbs did not belong in Croatia, as 
members of a different ‘civilisation’. Further, their place was across the Drina, in Serbia. 
Through their religious and cultural separation after the Great Schism, Serbs seemingly 
became a pseudospecies. They came to represent all that was opposite to Croatian identity.
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This idea of east versus west proved to be of fundamental importance in defining 
Croatian self-identity. So too was the geography of the region, the liminal quality of Croatia’s 
landmass, the last rampart of the west in the east. Croatian geographer Zalijka Corak 
expanded upon the Antemurale myth, using a social geographer’s eye to understand Croatia’s 
history,
The very shape of Croatia, the way it looks now is a dramatic sign that its existence 
has been endangered. It represents a kind of visual unrest which should also be 
removed as an error ... A country the shape of which is not the product of a long and 
authentic historical process cannot assess the paradigm of historical space that 
Croatia represents. But Croatia’s shape is at the same time a shape of resistance. By 
standing for centuries on the military border of the western world, Croatia is now 
fighting for a world which can only survive if this historical space survives?1
Here, Corak conveyed the image of a Croatia protecting the west from a barbarous 
east, with the Serbs hying to invade Europe, in a manner reminiscent of Ottoman invasion, 
against which the Antemurale was first established. As she further described, ‘This is an 
attack by the last of the barbarians coming from their darkness to the lights of Mediterranean, 
to Rome. Those barbarians who would like to think or themselves as being the successors of 
Byzantium or what is more, as Byzantines themselves ... Their conduct is Eastern and 
different in the sense of different ethics.’92 Again, the issue of Croatia standing on the border 
between east and west was a powerful image. It portrayed a sense of heroic struggle, as well 
as an image of vulnerability, both of which would prove to be positive in Croatia’s bid for 
western support.
Such imagery reflected more traditional western views of the Ottoman Empire, 
reminiscent perhaps of James Marriot’s 1918 description of the Ottoman provinces as, ‘an 
alien substance, embedded in the living flesh of Europe, akin to the European family neither 
in creed, race, language, in social customs, nor in political aptitudes and traditions’. 93 It may 
also have reflected more recent views, such as Samuel Huntington’s Clash o f Civilisations 
argument (1993), where ‘Civilisations’ (his term for a religious-cultural amalgam) became 
the repository for an individual’s primary identification, and the nodal point of conflict. 94 
Huntington’s conclusion that, ‘[political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to 
coincide with cultural ones; ethnic, religious and civilisational’, certainly worked to the 
advantage of Croatian writers, who argued that Yugoslavia was an artificial joining of 
different civilisations, a project surely doomed to failure. In fact, the Croatian argument that 
the collapse of Yugoslavia was ‘natural’ became less controversial as the conflict evolved. 
Yugoslavia, described as a ‘cleft country’ by Huntington, contained, ‘major groups from two
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or more civilisations’, who posited, “We are different peoples and belong in different places”. 
This alone was sufficient cause for break-up, according to Huntington, ‘The force of 
repulsion drives them apart and they gravitate towards civilisational magnets in other 
societies.’95 Theories, both old and new of the naturalness of a civilisational divide, played 
well into the hands of Croatian secessionists, attempting to justify pulling Croatia out of a 
union with the Serbs that had been more or less peaceful since 1945. The instrumentalisation 
of such theories allowed nationalists to paint the conflict as an age old primordial battle 
between good and evil -  yet another aspect in a multifaceted arsenal of myths and legends.
The Myth of Medjugorje:
Another aspect of Croatian writing was to stress the chosen or holy elements of the 
Croatian nation. Catholicism had to be relevant not only historically; it now had to be used to 
demonstrate the inherent cultural superiority of the nation. While the Serbs had Kosovo, the 
Croats had no great symbolic defeats which could elevate them to divine status. While there 
was much currency to be gained from the ‘state right’ and Antemurale myths, Croatian 
writers added a religious aspect to their nationalism. They needed a myth able to compete 
with the Battle of Kosovo, a Battle which had so fired the imagination of Croatian artists and 
politicians such as Ivan Mestrovic, Juraj Strossmeijer, and Ljudevit Gaj.
It was precisely for this reason that the myth of Medjugoije was operationalised as 
part of the Croatian rhetorical arsenal. Describing the apparition of the Virgin Mary to a 
group of small children in Medjugoije, Bosnia, in 1981, the myth could not have been better 
timed. Medjugoije soon became an enduring symbol of the cultural divide between east and 
west, while creating a tourist haven and pilgrimage site for European Catholics, a new 
competitor for Assisi and Lourdes.96 Tudjman was perhaps the first to instrumentalise 
Medjugoije, at a peace conference there in May, 1993, when he invoked the miracle in 
support of the Bosnian Croats. ‘The Madonna’s appearance’, he maintained, heralded ‘the re­
awakening of the Croatian nation’, a statement which demonstrated his belief that the Croats
Q7had been granted the Virgin Mary’s favour. This statement was extremely controversial, 
considering that Tudjman was speaking in Bosnia, and not Croatia, a new country with 
internationally recognised borders.
Medjugoije would later become the subject of sociological reflection. Stjepan 
Mestrovic, Slaven Letica, and Miroslav Goreta successfully propagandised it in the service of 
the Croatian cause. For the authors, it was obviously no accident that, ‘the dividing line 
between East and west runs roughly along the present day border between Croatia and Serbia,
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which is known as the Krajina region.’98 The mythical aspect of it, at least for Mestrovic, lay 
in the fact that, ‘Medjugoije itself symbolises a growing rupture between Eastern and 
Western culture.’99 In other words, the region itself, situated on a border between east and 
west, began to carry its own special significance. Firstly, it offered Croats their own divinity, 
since Mary appeared to them, and not the Serbs. It also gave them a form of chosenness or 
divine status which was preferable to the Kosovo myth. As the authors wondered aloud, ‘it is 
intriguing that the central message at Medjugoije was “peace”, whereas Kosovo was revived 
by the Serbs as a shrine to their military glory...’100
Of course, the difference between shrines to ‘peace’ and ‘war’ was neither a 
coincidence, nor an accident of history. For the authors, the Virgin Mary’s appearance 
constituted lasting proof that right was on the side of the Croatians. Medjugoije became, ‘the 
Fatima of our times’, symbolising, ‘the yearnings of Slovenia and Croatia in the west for 
greater pluralism and democracy versus the Serbian leanings in the East for fascist-like 
nationalism and monolithic political systems’.101 This analogy was further drawn out. The
1 CiJCroats now became part of a ‘mother centred culture’ , with a passive character orientation, 
a caring, nurturing identity, in contrast to the ‘father dominated’ Serbs, who were generally 
more warlike and destructive.103 The central aspect of the myth was the goodness of 
Catholicism, which rendered the Croats more civilised, more peace loving, and more 
enlightened. As the authors explained,
[T]he moral message given by the Madonna from Medjugoije to Poland, seems to be 
softer: peace, compromise, pluralism. One has to explain Eastern European and 
former Soviet machismo, totalitarianism and terror in the context of a virgin based 
cultural system. Mary seems to represent the other side of the authoritarian, father 
dominated [Serbian] Slavic mindset uncovered by [sociologist Dinko] Tomasevic.
The female side [Croatian] represents the “higher” softer, more civilised aspects of 
Slavic culture.104
Thus Medjugoije would become a symbol for the geography, religion and cultural 
traditions of Croatia, while Catholicism would promote a ‘universalist cultural base’ which 
was ‘recognisably Western’.105 Such theories were directly opposed to those of Batakovic 
and his Serbian colleagues. Medjugoije became a useful way of creating a modem myth of 
chosenness, perhaps to counterbalance the strong influence of Kosovo on the Serbs. At the 
same time, the linkages were clear -  Serbs had to stay on their side of the civilisational divide 
-  they did not belong in Croatia. It seemed that Medjugoije had replaced the River Drina as a 
natural dividing line between east and west. Some writers went so far as to suggest that the 
Serbs were in league with Satan in their desire to destroy Medjugoije.106
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Medjugoije performed several crucial functions in Croatian nationalism. Firstly, it 
elevated Croatian Catholicism to a chosen and superior religion, and Croatians themselves to 
the rank of superior nation. While it was not Kosovo, it proved to Croats that they too could 
be part of the divine elect, as evidenced by the Virgin’s appearance. It also demonstrated that 
a Covenant existed between the Croats and the divine. We see here the use of Schopflin’s 
‘myth of election’, where the Croats were specially chosen by God, or in this case the Virgin 
Mary, because of their unique qualities as an ancient and peace loving people, and because 
they were the innocent victims of Serbian aggression.
Secondly, the myth became a symbol of peace and westemness, proving that the 
Croats belonged in western or (at least) Central Europe, and maintained traditions and ideals 
which differed significantly from those of the Serbs. Thus Schopflin’s ‘myths of unjust 
treatment’, and ‘myths of redemption and suffering’ are both of use here. Because they have 
suffered for so long in Yugoslavia under Serbian domination, the Virgin Mary appeared to 
give them hope in the midst of hardship. Thirdly, Medjugoije endorsed Tudjman’s nationalist 
regime. The Virgin’s appearance demonstrated that right was on the side of the Croats, while 
Serbia was clearly the satanic aggressor. Certainly, Medjugoije was useful in an instrumental 
sense. It gave the Croats a sense of religious pride, and restored to them a great deal of hope, 
first of all in 1981, when the Virgin Mary supposedly first appeared, then throughout the 
crisis.
The Different Racial Origins of the Serbs:
Even these aspects of differentiation were not enough to stress the opposing 
psychological, sociological, and civilisational differences between Serbs and Croats. Yet 
another theme was to be introduced -  that of different racial origins. That both groups were 
descended from South Slavic tribes was well established by most impartial historians. 
However, a number of Croatian writers attempted to debunk the myth of South Slavic unity, 
arguing that Serbs and Croats were racially distinct, and should never have entered into any 
political or social institutions together.
Yale University’s Ivo Banac reflected a typical Croatian view at this time, charting 
the origin of the Croats (and their name as well) to an ‘Iranian group’ that was somehow 
assimilated by Slavic populations, sometime before their settlement in the western portions of 
the Balkan Peninsula.107 By contrast, Banac posited that the origins of the Serbs were more 
dubious. He claimed that most of these were ‘Orthodox Balkan Vlachs’, who moved to 
Croatia and Bosnia during the Ottoman era.108 Thus Serbs and Croats were actually racially
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distinct. Unsurprisingly, he was unable to offer any convincing proof of these assertions. 
Banac’s theories were a typical representation of Croatian views. In 1995, a team of Croatian 
scholars also tried to prove that Croatia’s ancestors were Aryans who came from Persia. 
Ethnographers, positing that the word Hrvat derived from the ancient Persian word Hu-Urvat, 
undertook the largest archaeological project in Croatian history in search of the Croats’ 
ancient Iranian origins. The project received warm support from Tudjman.109 Another 
Tudjman sponsored project, featuring Nedjeljko Kujundzic, president of the Croatian 
Academy o f Educational Sciences at Zagreb University, traced the Croats to early Celtic 
tribes, while describing the Serbs as descendants of the numidian Samaritans.110
By contrast, another theory held that the Croats were the only true Slavs, having been 
in the Balkan region at least four hundred years before the Serbs. This formed the central 
thesis of Zagreb University historian, Trpimir Macan’s nationalist writings, who used as 
proof two Greek tablets from the 2nd century AD containing the words, Horathos and 
Horuathos, from whence derived the name Hrvat (Croat). Claiming that Serbs were 
descendants of a different set of tribes altogether, Macan posited that the Serbs were not 
Slavic, but (as Banac asserted) Vlachs, Gypsies, and Romanised shepherds.111 Another 
theory, advanced by a radical group based in Zagreb, was that Serbs were Arabs, as 
evidenced by their square fingers. The Croats, meanwhile were of another race, since their 
fingers were more rounded.112
Another aspect of this racial differentiation concerned Croatian territorial rights.
While generally, Croats and Serbs were presented as having different racial origins, Serbs 
within Croatia’s borders were further differentiated. The Krajina Serbs were to be separated 
ethnically from the rest of the Serbian population. Echoing Macan’s theories, several 
Croatian academics claimed that these were in fact, ‘non-Slavic Vlachs of Greek-orthodox 
religion’, who supposedly settled as farmers in Croatia in the 16th century.113 The theory 
holds that these Vlachs were converted to Serbian Orthodoxy and therefore ‘became’ Serbs in 
the 19 century, due to the machinations of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who,
‘transform[ed] the non-Slav, Orthodox Vlachs into aggressive, national, conscious Serbs’, a 
group which later formed “Little Vlaska”, in Pakrac in 1876, and began a conspiracy to 
‘liquidate all Croatian Catholics’.114 The fact that the Vlachs could be converted supposedly 
encouraged Serbian leaders to try a form of ethnic cleansing in the 19th century, by 
Serbianising non-Serbian lands near Serbia, the joining these lands with the expanded 
Serbian state. If such theories were to be believed, then most of the Krajina and Slavonian 
Serbs would have been ethnic Croats whose families were Serbianised only a century ago.
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What emerged from a review of racial differentiation were two key arguments. The 
first advanced that the Croats were racially distinct and somehow ethnically superior to the 
Serbs, due to their Iranian, Slavic, or Celtic origin, depending on which scholarly work you 
chose to believe. This acted to dismiss any Serbian claims that Serbs and Croats belonged 
together at any time in their history. At the same time, the fact that ‘Krajina’ Serbs and 
‘Serbian’ Serbs were of different racial origins proved, at least to the Croats, that they could 
not even claim the national rights which ‘real’ Serbs might have possessed. Thus a double 
onus was created for the Krajina Serbs. Not only did they have to prove that the land was in 
fact Serbian, they also had to prove that they were actually Serbs themselves.
In other cases, the medical profession concluded their own studies in support of the 
Croatian cause. In 1995, Ivica Kostovic, dean of the medical school in Zagreb, released the 
findings of the Croatian Institute for Brain Research, which stated conclusively that, while, ‘it 
can not seriously be claimed that there are differences between brains of Serbs and Croats ... 
differences in outward forms, skulls can be established’. As he further wrote, ‘These 
anthropological differences are evident especially at the racial level... but hardly any 
conclusions about differences at the level of brain functioning can be drawn from them.’115
The re-emergence of the pseudo-science of phrenology was one of the more unusual 
aspects of Croatian propaganda. Kostovic’s theories, as well as those of Croatian 
archaeologists, historians, and sociologists, were highly suspect and unrealistic. The notion 
that Serbs and Croats were somehow different races who had, by some miracle, lived side by 
side and avoided reproducing during their many centuries of association -  defied all logic.
The large number of so-called ‘mixed marriages’ and births in the present day invalidates any 
such arguments.
Much of this rhetoric about east and west was wishful thinking on the part of Croatian 
politicians. Perhaps they could not give their people democracy, imported consumer goods, 
or a decent standard of living. Perhaps they could not even give their people an entire country 
with stable borders. However, they did have the ability to make their people feel ‘western’, 
that they had somehow symbolically left Yugoslavia, Communism, and the east behind, 
simply by ‘otherising’ it, as people in ‘real’ western countries had done. In a sense, Croatian 
leaders were encouraging their people to ‘perform’ in a difference sense. They promised their 
people that if they began ‘acting’ western, then sooner or later they would ‘become’ western. 
The best way to be western, of course, was cut off all associations with the eastern Serbs.
It was a comforting thought that when Croatia did become part of the west, all of their 
troubles with Serbia would recede into the ancient past. However, Tudjman and his
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colleagues were never able to give the Croats more than the illusion of ‘westemness’, and 
they were not terribly successful at this either. Slavenka Drakulic rightly observed in Cafe 
Europa, that, ‘Europe is not a mother who owes something to her long-neglected children; 
neither is she a princess one has to court. She is not a knight sent to free us, nor an apple or a 
cake to be enjoyed; she is not a silk dress, nor the magic word ‘democracy.” 116 Croatians 
could continue to worship Europe to their hearts’ content -  but this did not mean that Croatia 
would ever be part of the club.
Conclusions:
In reinterpreting their history, the Croatian side shared much with the Serbs. Each was 
obsessed with self-perception. Each side wanted to see themselves as loveable and heroic 
victims of history. Each tried to elevate the nation to divine and chosen status, through a 
series of covenential myths, myths of election, and myths of Redemption and suffering. 
Historical claims to the land, myths of Croatian westemness, and myths of cultural and 
linguistic uniqueness were used to advance the thesis that Croats were more enlightened, 
peace-loving, and generally more civilised than the Serbs. Many of these themes mirrored 
similar ones in Serbian writing, particularly those of Batakovic.
Both Croats and Serbs tried to portray the other as more intolerant, racist, xenophobic, 
greedy, blood-thirsty, expansionist, and genocidal. The Croats projected every possible 
negative trait onto their Serbian straw man, or pseudospecies. Serbs were seen to represent 
the worst aspects of eastern civilisation, in a racial, psychological, and sociological sense -  
making it clear that the Serbs were responsible for the war in which Croatian found herself 
after 1991. The contrast between the warlike Kosovo myth and the peaceful Medjugoije myth 
provided just one example of the phenomenon. While there were much less comparisons 
between Croats and Jews compared with Serbs and Jews, it was clear that Croatian writers 
had prepared a coherent interpretation of history which ignored decades of co-operation 
between Serbs and Croats, and chose instead to highlight the negative aspects of their 
association.
Another characteristic shared by both Serbs and Croats was the frequent use of the 
Internet to disseminated nationalist propaganda. Vast networks connected literally thousands 
of different cites together, many with complete online books, journals, and magazines, which 
could be downloaded free of charge. Most nationalist publications available as hardcopies 
could similarly be found floating in ‘Cyber space’. Many books and journals that were 
available only as hardcopies in the first two years of the conflict were duly scanned and
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uploaded into various government websites, with all of the scanning mistakes intact. The use 
of this new medium made many of the historical debates between these two sides extremely 
vibrant and dynamic.
An interesting aspect of Croatian propaganda was how the focus of attack shifted after 
1991. Before Serbia became a threat to Croatian autonomy, Croatian nationalists had little 
interest in Serbian leaders or Serbian history. Their only true enemies were the Communists, 
who were solidly in control of the SFRY. It was only after Serbian machinations in eastern 
Slavonia and the Krajina that any coherant study of Serbian history took place. It was only at 
this time that a Serbian history of evil was created.
A long tradition of attacking Communism and Tito as the worst possible enemies of 
Croatia changed after 1991, when the Serbs, not the Communists generally, became the new 
source of evil. This issue of propaganda shifting will be explored in the next three chapters. 
What emerges from a detailed overview of Croatian myths of pre-World War II history is the 
historical evolution of Serbian hatred against the Croats. What begins as a general 
condemnation of eastern barbarity, due to the Great Schism, becomes more politicised in the 
19th century, with the creation of a coherent Serbian nationalist project. While this project is 
aimed at destroying various nations, of which the Croats are only one victim, their association 
with the Serbs in the first Yugoslavia transforms them into the prime target of Serbian 
aggression.
In each historical period, Croatia’s relationship with Serbia grows more intimate, and 
therefore more threatening. The concept of evolving hatred is extremely important in both the 
Serbian and Croatian cases, and will certainly become more obvious in the chapters dealing 
with the Second World War. For both sides, an understanding of early history established a 
pattern of behaviour for the enemy nation, a pattern of violence which would only escalate 
during the 20th century, seemingly culminating in the 1990s in the worst genocide that either 
side had seen in its history.
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Chapter Five: Revising World War II History
‘A very considerable part of the Croatian political elite, supported by the Catholic 
hierarchy and Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac himself -  supported this national and 
religious intolerance, and strongly supported policies of clericalism and racism, 
marked by mass killings, forced conversions and the deportation of the Serbian 
Orthodox population as well the slaughter of the Jews and Gypsies. '
- Dusan Batakovic, ‘The National Integration of the Serbs and Croats’-
‘An intriguing part of the propaganda campaign has been an attempt to equate the 
supposed victimization of present-day Serbs with that of the Holocaust Jews. In 
promoting the image of Serbian spiritual kinship with the Jews as fellow victims, 
Belgrade has concealed Serb willingness to collaborate with the Nazis in the 
extermination of Serbia’s Jews. ’
- Philip Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War -
Introduction:
Throughout the Serbian-Croatian conflict, the comparative genocide debate has been 
of particular importance. For both countries, the success of nationalist regimes has depended 
on their ability to present national history as one of righteous struggle against persecution.
For both Serbs and Croats, the revision of World War II history provided a wealth of myths 
of heroism and persecution. Continual portrayals of enemies as either Cetniks or Ustasa, as 
well as constant references to World War II atrocities as a precursor to events in the 1990s, 
demonstrated the centrality of German and Italian occupation to contemporary conceptions of 
nationalist identity. The previous two chapters examined how pre 20th century history was 
important for nationalists in both countries. Nevertheless, the national expansion and 
genocide, bloodshed and mayhem of these earlier times would pale in comparison to World 
War II. This was to be the apogee of the Serbian-Croatian conflict, four years when each side 
supposedly unleashed full-scale genocidal terror against the other.
Thus, descriptions of perpetrators and victims in World War II became incredibly 
important. Links would be drawn between atrocities during the 1940s, and those after 1990. 
David Campbell’s theory of ‘deconstruction of historical teleologies’ provides a useful 
method of understanding how certain narratives, or views of history have been created. 
Campbell’s ‘deconstruction’, in the context of Yugoslavia, allows us to analyse how hatred of 
the other has been the product of current generations of academics and politicians, working to 
create the illusion of an inevitable conflict, what Campbell terms ‘historical fatalism’. For 
Campbell, a ‘deconstructive reading’ allows for the proposition that, ‘the conflict is
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constituted in the present, and that “history” is a resource in the contemporary struggle’.1 In 
many ways, this is no different from Novick’s use of ‘collective memory’.2
Contrary to Anthony Smith’s position, however, history as a resource was not used as 
a means to relive a Golden Age, but rather -  to revise and exaggerate the horrors of the past, 
(in this case World War II). History could then be placed within a teleological framework, 
similar to that described by Frye, Tudor, and others. Every negative aspect of World War II 
was re-examined, revised and re-presented to the people, and a clear dichotomy was created 
between the righteous and suffering self, who resisted Nazism and saved Jews, and the 
genocidal Nazi-like enemy nation. Such a view of World War II made Tito’s SFRY appear as 
a historical anomaly, with the 1991 war figuring as the normal state of affairs between Serbs 
and Croats. Milica Bakic-Hayden, in her analysis o f ‘nesting orientalisms’, took issue with 
the idea that Serbian and Croatian antagonisms were primordial and deeply rooted in history. 
As she explained,
The explanatory slogan “ancient hatreds” of the South Slavic peoples... is but a 
rhetorical screen obscuring the modernity of conflict based on contested notions of 
state, nation, national identity, and sovereignty ... [A]ll Serbs are identified with 
Chetniks, all Croats with Ustashas and all Muslims with Islamic fundamentalists, or 
fascist collaborators. By evoking one of the lowest aspects of their historical 
association and ignoring the significance of their other interactions and integrations 
(most notably 45 years of post World War II experience), each group perpetuates not 
only disparaging rhetoric but destructive modes of association.3
Such a view was advanced by both sides, who argued that the contemporary conflict 
was merely the latest instalment in an ongoing story of genocide and terror, of which World 
War II was one of its most violent exponents. Michael Ignatieff s use of Sigmund Freud’s 
‘narcissism of minor differences’ is thus an accurate description of how each side magnified 
the evils of the other in an attempt to whitewash their own crimes. As he described, 
‘Nationalist politicians on both sides have used the narcissism of minor differences and 
turned it into a monstrous fable according to which their own side appears as blameless 
victims, the other side as genocidal killers. All Croats become Ustashe assassins, all Serbs 
become Chetnik beasts.’4
A Short Overview of World War II:
World War II was an era of devastation for both Serbs and Croats. The Germans 
invaded on 5 April, 1941, supported by Italian, Hungarian and Bulgarian forces.5 The 
Germans and Italians and took control of the country within a week, soon establishing puppet
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states in both Serbia and Croatia. In Serbia, former royalist minister Milan Nedic was 
installed as head of a Nazi occupied state. In Croatia, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) 
was formed under Ante Pavelic, the leader of a right wing insurgency group, the Ustasa (with 
Italian support). While the Serbs generally remained loyal to King Aleksander and the 
Yugoslav government in exile, Croats saw the NDH as their liberation from over two decades 
of Serbian control. This initial support soon dampened, as Croatia was forced to cede most of 
Dalmatia to Italy, and northern Slovenia to Germany under the Treaty of Rome. While 
Bosnia-Hercegovina was joined to the NDH in compensation, many nationalists felt betrayed 
by a reduction in their territory.6 The poorly trained Ustasa officers and soldiers, and 
Pavelic’s distinct lack of charisma and inability to hold mass rallies, reduced his exposure 
amongst the population. Nevertheless, the lack of credible resistance was also noticeable.
Both the Croatian Peasants Party and the Catholic Church remained largely passive.7
At the same time, some degree of support for the regime existed, and large numbers 
of Croats did join the Ustasa and the more popular Domobran (Croatian Home Guard). While 
Croat writers have downplayed Ustasa crimes, the scale of these atrocities was immense. 
Large numbers of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, Communists and Croatians were interned in 
concentration camps, while countless others were massacred in towns and villages. Unlike 
German camps in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia, the Usta§a were directly involved in 
the administration and in the orchestration of the killings. In addition, some 200,000 Serbs 
were forcibly converted to Catholicism.8
In Serbia, the Nedic regime enjoyed some support. By 1942, Nedic’s Serbian State 
Guard numbered 13,400 men, who worked closely with the 3,600 men in Dimitrije Ljotic’s 
fascist Zbor movement.9 More famous were the Cetniks -  Serbian royalist irregulars who 
pledged to restore the monarchy. While the Cetniks of General Draza Mihailovic were 
committed to ousting the Germans, the smaller Cetnik group of Kosta Pecanac broke early 
with Mihailovic, and openly collaborated with the Germans.10 While the Cetniks were 
officially supported by the Allies at the beginning of the war, their reluctance to engage the 
Germans, for fear of reprisals, and their violent conflicts with Communist forces eventually 
lost them Allied favour. Hampered by indiscipline and acts of cruelty, which included 
sporadic rapes and looting, they were eventually reviled by most non-Serbs. Alienating 
potential support amongst Croats and Moslems, they committed massacres in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina and Croatia, making them as hated as the Ustasa.11 Mihailovic’s anti- 
Communism, coupled with massacres carried out in his name, eventually led to his capture, 
show trial, and execution in 1946.
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In short, the wartime records of some groups of Serbs and Croats were dubious, which 
allowed contemporary historians to cast doubt on the conduct of each nation during World 
War II. Some groups had collaborated with the occupiers, some committed massacres of 
civilian populations. At the same time, each side did participate in the Communist Partisan 
resistance movement, which greatly increased in popularity, as German defeat became 
certain. Nevertheless, there were clear qualitative differences between the Allied-backed 
Cetniks monarchists and their small-scale massacres, and the Nazi-backed Ustasa with their 
Croatian-run concentration camps. The work of Serbian and Croatian propagandists involved 
rehabilitating the role of one’s own side, while demonising the wartime activities of the other. 
Thus, the other was described as an enthusiastic and active collaborator with the Nazis, an 
instigator of genocidal aggression against other nations, and a keen supporter of the 
Holocaust against the Jews. Constructing a negative role for the other and a positive role for 
one’s own nation allowed for the creation of a nationalist ethic. Here, active Nazi 
collaborators were seen to be as bad as the Nazis themselves, while being a victim of these 
two groups made one morally equal to the Jews.
Rehabilitating the NDH: Conflicting Perceptions Among the Croats:
One of the earliest aspects of Croatian nationalism revolved around rehabilitating the 
NDH. Croatian Diaspora accounts tended to be pro-Ustasa, while maintaining an ambiguous 
view of the German occupation. More official accounts in the 1990s, by contrast, downplayed 
the importance of the NDH and its crimes, and sought to reduce the importance of its support 
during the war. It was portrayed simply as a reaction against Serbian genocidal ambitions. 
Earlier writings, such as those of the Croatian Liberation Movement, in Argentina, 
exonerated the Ustasa regime, by stressing the resistance nature of the movement. Pavelic 
became merely, the ‘founder and representative of the revolutionary Liberation Movement of 
the Croatian people.’ 12 Such writings favourably compared the Ustasa to earlier French and 
American revolutionary movements. Their main goals were seemingly to defend Croatian 
against Serbian aggression and against international Communism. There was no doubt in the 
minds of early Croatian writers that the NDH represented the outcome of a long historical 
process, and was warmly welcomed warmly by Croats, ‘with unprecedented enthusiasm,
i<i
spontaneously and unanimously’, as one account described.
These early accounts also vindicated the persecution of Serbs and the Orthodox 
Church, claiming that its influence had to be curbed, since it was, ‘a centre of propaganda and 
activity of Serbian chauvinism, Serbian imperialism, and hostility against the Croatian
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people...’14 Thus Ustasa actions were, ‘self defensive’, protecting Croats and their property, 
even if massacres of Serbs were the inevitable result. Such writings were extremely important 
in Diaspora Croatian nationalism, as they vindicated Croatian history, while attacking 
Communist repression of their national identity.
It fell to other emigre writers, such as Ivo Omercanin, to highlight the differences 
between the Ustasa and the Nazis -  and there were supposedly many of these. Omercanin 
advanced that while Croats approved of their independent state, which gave them more 
autonomy and freed them from Serbian domination -  they still chafed under Nazi rule.15 Thus 
the author drew a sharp distinction between support for an independent state, and support for 
the Nazis, two concepts which were fundamentally different. In support of this statement, 
Omercanin traced the origins of a pro-Allied Croatian ‘putsch’, which was supposed to have 
began in early 1943, featuring such notable Ustasa officials as Interior Minister Mladen 
Lorkovic, and Minister for Home Defence -  Ante Vokic.16 The reason, it failed, Omercanin 
revealed, was because of American politicking, and the lack of will to land Allied troops in 
Dalmatia to support an indigenous Croatian rebellion. However, he noted that the putsch did 
succeed internally, since civil and military authorities were ready to depose the government 
and work with the Allies for a democratic independent Croatia.17 Omercanin was clearly 
trying to vindicate the Ustasi position, using anecdotal evidence to prove that leading Ustasi 
were also anti-fascist. For Omercanin, the former Ustasa charge d ’affairs in Berlin, this 
‘putsch’ became a useful means of legitimating his role and those of his friends in the 
government, forced into exile on charges of collaboration.
These accounts promoted the Ustasa as a genuine nationalist and revolutionary 
movement, one that was pro-independence and anti-Nazi. Such views became rife after 1990, 
when many of these emigres moved back to Croatia. The existence of emigre magazines such 
is NDH, edited by a former Ustase official, and the son-in-law of Ante Pavelic, was a direct 
lesult of Tudjman’s reliance on Diaspora Croats and their financial contributions.18 NDH was 
notable for its continuation of Croatian Liberation Movement themes -  the ‘truth’ about 
World War II, as well as poems and articles eulogising Ante Pavelic and the Ustasa. The 
Partisans were often the subject of attack, and were denounced as, ‘Yugoslav criminals’, and 
Serb and Croat scum’.19
Such magazines accompanied a spate of revisionist books, which sought to clear the 
Ustasa’s bad name, giving a human face to those who were integrally involved in the regime. 
Troubling was the publication of Ivo Rojnica’ memoirs, the former Ustase administrator for 
Dubrovnik who was decorated by Tudjman. Rojnica’s own skewed understanding of history
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was obvious. He argued that 250,000 Serbs were expelled to Serbia from Ustasa controlled 
Croatia, and were therefore not killed, while claiming that only 420 Serbs were forcibly
90converted to Catholicism. Another troubling memoir, by Eugen Dido Kvatemik, was 
reprinted in 1995 with financial support from the Croatian Ministry for Science and 
Technology. Kvatemik, the founder of the Croatian death camp system, produced a work 
notable only for its descriptions of ‘courtly life’ in Pavelic’s inner circle, while omitting any
91reference to the atrocities committed by the regime. The main thrust of these Diaspora 
accounts was that the NDH was both a revolutionary and popular nationalist movement, 
which was suppressed by the Communists. The atrocities committed by the regime were 
rarely discussed, while many of the worst war criminals were elevated to near cult status.
The political climate in Croatia clearly provided for the emergence of such militant 
and revisionist views. Tudjman did little to discourage them, nor could he. Most of his 
campaign contributions, and the money needed to finance the war, came from Diaspora 
Croats, among whom such views were not uncommon. Nevertheless, Tudjman also had 
western support to consider, and for this reason, government propaganda dealing with the 
NDH was markedly different from that of the CLM or NDH magazine. Officially, support for 
the NDH was seen to be largely a reaction to Serbian atrocities in royalist Yugoslavia, ‘the 
prison-house of nations’. As discussed in the previous chapter, the first Yugoslavia was 
condemned as an instrument of Serbian domination. Croatian support for the NDH was 
therefore anti-Serbian, rather than pro-German or Italian.22 Such writings supported the self­
defensive nature of the NDH, but denied that the Ustasa were either revolutionary or popular. 
Tudjman’s own writings, for example, advance Vladko Macek’s Croatian Peasants Party as 
the prime focus of Croatian loyalty. This ‘middle of the road’ party, Tudjman maintained, 
had the advantage of being, ‘[politically equidistant from both Pavelic’s Ustasism and Tito’s
9*3
revolutionary movement... ’
A similar view was taken by Philip Cohen, in his controversial pro-Croatian revision 
of Serbian history -  a book which earned him several medals from an appreciative Tudjman. 
Cohen described a level of support as low as 2% for the Ustasa regime, which he credited to a 
general dislike of their ‘notorious brutality’.24 He dismissed claims that the Croats were 
collaborators, positing that the 312,000 man strong Croatian Home Guard were, ‘notoriously 
unreliable as collaborators’, possessing ‘poor morale’ and an unwillingness to fight, which 
eventually led them to defect to the Partisans.25
In reviewing Croatian interpretations of the NDH, we find two conflicting forms of 
propaganda. One is overtly pro-Ustasa, the other is cautiously against it, but puts more efforts
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on minimising its importance than condemning it. This paradoxical strategy is best explained 
by the division of loyalties under which the Tudjman regime laboured. First, it had financial 
and moral obligations to the Diaspora Croats who supported the HDZ. Many of these had 
ties to the NDH. Thus, a vindication of wartime Croatia, and a denial of Ustasa atrocities 
were integral to external support for the war effort. At the same time, Tudjman faced heavy 
criticism from the international community for his revisionism. The solution lay in 
downplaying the Croats’ support for the NDH, while making a clear distinction between 
wanting independence, and being pro-Nazi. The NDH as a haven from Serbian genocide was 
another popular argument. To maintain power, Tudjman pursued a complicated balancing act 
-  trying to please both the Croatian people, and highly critical western governments.
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Serbian Views of the Ustasa and Cetniks:
Serbian historians were also preoccupied with World War II. While the demonisation 
of Croatians and Moslems was essential, so too was the vindication of Cetnik history. Any 
ambiguous alliances with the Germans or Italians were excised from history books, leaving a 
picture of the Cetniks as righteous freedom fighters -  engaged in a liberation struggle against 
the Nazis. Novels were often a favourite means of reinterpreting history. They could be 
emotive, convincing, and non-threatening at the same time. Momir Krsmanovic’s The Blood- 
Stained Hands o f Islam, was designed to promote a Serbian view of World War II to an 
English speaking audience. The author, an eastern Bosnian, was heralded as one of the new 
breed of Serbian writers, and his previous work, The Drina Runs Red with Blood, was a best­
seller. This book promised an insider’s account of the Cetniks and their national struggle, 
motivated by, ‘the desire to save the Serbian nation and wage an honourable struggle for 
justice, truth and the right of that nation to a place under the sun’.26 This was set against the, 
‘vengeful and blood-thirsty Turks and Catholics of Croatia and Bosnia’.27
Much of this book was set predictably in the Krajina, the scene of countless battles 
between Ustasa and Cetnik forces. Krsmanovic□ aimed to vindicate Serbia’s position in the 
1990s, by demonstrating how the Croatian Serbs had spent most of the 20th century defending 
themselves from the threat of genocide. Important also was nostalgia for Royalist Yugoslavia. 
Books such as this featured graphic descriptions of Ustasa ethnic cleansing operations, as 
well as torture, rape and other atrocities. One description of an Ustasa rape of two Serbian 
women, followed by the cutting off of their breasts and the slitting of their throats -  was 
typical.28 Curiously, the Ustasa commanders were given names such as Stipe and Franjo, 
obvious references to contemporary Croatian politicians. Others, presumably Moslem Ustasa,
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were called Alija and Ibrohim. Novels such as this advanced a series of pro-Serbian myths, 
similar to Schopflin’s ‘myths of redemption and suffering’, and ‘myths of powerlessness and 
compensation for the powerless’, where the Serbs were primarily the victims of World War 
II, and had thus earned their right to an autonomous republic in Bosnia.29
Novelists like Krsmanovic inflated the level of Croatian collaboration, describing how 
80% of the Croatian and Moslem male population joined the Ustasa against the Serbs -  a 
statistic which is historically untenable. This new generation of novelists also attempted to 
rehabilitate Milan Nedic, casting him as a martyr for Serbia, who collaborated with the Nazis 
in order to minimise German atrocities against the Serbs. Thus, his collaboration was 
dismissed as, ‘efforts to preserve his people during the harsh enemy occupation.’31
Similar views were to be found in Slobodan Selenic’s 1989 Timor mortis, dealing 
with the Ustasa massacres of Serbs during World War n. This author repeated a common 
pattern in Serbian writing -  that Croatian aggression stretched far back into the remote past. 
Like Krsmanovic, his descriptions of Croatian atrocities were extremely graphic.32 Similarly, 
Maijorie Radulovic’s Rage o f the Serbs, historically situated in World War II, attempted to 
vindicate Serbian history. She praised the heroism and righteousness of the Cetniks, their 
love of justice, their universal support by the Serbian people, and their single-minded 
devotion to freeing their country from Nazism. At the same time, Tito’s Partisans were 
condemned as Ustasa collaborators, while the Ustasa were dehumanised as genocidal 
beasts.33
Vuk Draskovic’s Noz also dwelt on similar themes, namely the genocide of Serbs by 
Ustasa, which he placed at well over one million people. His work described the legacy of the 
death camps in Croatia, how two-thirds of all Serbian families had lost relatives to the Ustasa, 
and how many more were sentenced to lengthy prison terms under the Communists for trying 
to keep the memory of their tragedy alive. World War II massacres become a ‘Calvary’ for 
the Serbian people. Draskovic also attacked the Croats for their revisionism, arguing 
generally, ‘those who hide a crime have the intention to commit it anew’.34
Of course, with this renewed interest in the Cetniks came a glorification and 
‘performance’ of their actions as well. Cetnik hats, uniforms, and flags became popular 
fashion accessories, especially amongst paramilitary units fighting in Croatia and Bosnia. 
Arkan caused a sensation when he attired himself in full Cetnik regalia during his 1995 
wedding. His wife, the well-known turbofolk singer Ceca, was dressed as the ‘Maid of 
Kosovo’ (Kosovka djevojka), the Mary Magdalene figure who nursed Serbian soldiers as they
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lay dying on the battle-field.35 As with Kosovo fever, Cetnik kitsch was to be found 
everywhere.
Various journals, including Duga, Pogledi, and Srpska Red, worked actively to 
rehabilitate the Cetniks. Nationalist warlords, like Vojislav Seselj, encouraged their followers 
to destroy anything bearing Tito’s name, while calling for the reestablishment of the 
monarchy.36 As in Croatia, wartime collaborators were rehabilitated. Dimitrije Ljotic□ was 
exonerated in series of articles published in Pogledi, while the Partisans and the Cetniks were 
condemned for inciting German wrath against the population.37 Such writings performed a 
similar function to those in Croatia -  they stressed the self-defensive nature of Serbian 
actions in the war, even presenting obvious collaborators as protectors of the Serbs against 
the Germans. World War II history and all of its Serbian participants were glorified as either 
great heroes, liberators, or defenders.
Croatian Views of the Cetniks:
For Croatian historians, the ambiguous nature of Cetnik history had been a worrying 
phenomenon. Presented equally in historical accounts as heroes or collaborators, the Cetniks 
still enjoyed a better reputation than the Ustasa. An important objective of Croatian 
propaganda was portraying the Cetniks as genocidal aggressors, who were every bit as evil, if 
not worse, than the Ustasa.38 The basic argument was as follows: the Cetniks had little 
interest in liberating the country from the Germans and Italians. Rather, World War II was 
merely a backdrop for the continuing expansion of Greater Serbia, which was to include 
almost 90% of NDH territory. For this reason, Cetnik goals were obvious, ‘the destruction of 
the NDH and cleansing of the Croatian and Muslim population from these territories in order 
to annex them to Greater Serbia.’39 That the Cetniks might be seeking revenge for anti- 
Serbian atrocities committed in the NDH was simply not discussed. Rather, the Cetniks were 
presented as genocidal fanatics, who were trying to exterminate the Croats in order to build 
their super-state. For them, the war and the occupation of their country did nothing to change 
their expansionist strategies, which were timeless, and seemingly existed in a vacuum.
The Cetniks were also accused of formulating a plan for genocide before the 
establishment of the Ustasa death camp system. Cetnik commander Stevan Moljevic’s 
‘Homogeneous Serbia’, yet another essay on Greater Serbia, was frequently cited to balance 
out atrocity accusations levelled at the Croats. Draza Mihailovic’s ‘Instructions’ of 
December, 1941, was also advanced as proof that the Cetniks were using the war as a means 
of creating an ‘ethnically cleansed’ Greater Serbia. For Croatian writers, Mihailovic was
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nothing more than a genocidal lunatic, and his sole ambition was to drive Croats, Moslems, 
and other non-Serbians from Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Cetnik claim to be staging an uprising 
against the occupying powers was cited as the ‘formal reason’ for fighting. Of course, the 
true reason was bringing about an ethnically cleansed Greater Serbia, through ‘Chetnik terror 
and genocidal crimes’.40 The descriptions of Cetnik crimes were often extremely graphic, 
mirroring the Serbs’ use of such imagery,
Physical destruction took the form of massacres, hangings, decapitation, burning, 
throwing victims into pits and killing them with various objects. Victims were in 
most cases tortured before being killed ... rape of Muslim and Croatian women and 
girls so as to nationally and religiously degrade them. There were two especially 
significant forms of indirect Chetnik crimes. These were robbery and forced 
conversion of Catholics and Muslims into the Serbian Orthodox faith ... The forced 
conversion to the Serbian Orthodox faith aimed at further degrading the victims and 
destroying that deepest of ties to the Croatian or Muslim nationality!11
Croatian writers also stressed the enormous size of the Cetnik movement. A large 
Cetnik membership was often contrasted with a small Ustasa membership -  the implication 
being that Serbs were more genocidal than Croats. One Croatian historian claimed that some 
300 Cetnik organisations existed in Bosnia, with another 200 in Croatia by 1941. These 
organisations were supposedly famous for their terror and barbarity, as well as their penchant 
for murdering large numbers of Croats and Muslims.42 While it was clear that the Cetniks 
were neither well funded nor well organised, Croat historians presented Mihailovic as a 
dangerous manipulator with direct communication with all of his units in the field. This was a 
highly contested assumption, since most Cetnik groups operated in isolation with a great deal 
of decentralisation of authority. Many were not even in radio communication with each other. 
What was important in the context of war was to prove that the Cetniks were a unified 
cohesive force, all bent on the genocide of the Croats and the Moslems. Loosely co-ordinated 
bands of mercenaries did not present the same level of threat. At worst, such people could be 
likened to the Turks slaughtering the Armenians, but not the Nazis, and their well-oiled 
apparatus.
Another popular argument held that the Cetniks had openly collaborated with the 
Italians and Germans, in order to exterminate Croats on NDH territory. Supposedly, Italian 
and German forces supplied the Cetniks with weapons, food, clothing, and even local 
currency when they agreed to exterminate Croatian and Moslems on behalf of the 
occupiers.43 Such claims were exagerated by Croatian historians, who paradoxically argued 
that Cetnik unofficial collaboration was somehow worse than official highly publicised
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Ustasa collaboration. Tim Judah has argued that by 1943, both the Cetniks and the Partisans 
had commenced dialogue with the Germans, each seeking an alliance against the other. As 
was clear from wartime accounts, the Cetniks were willing to side with the Germans if it 
could mean the destruction of the Partisans. While these negotiations ultimately failed, due to 
a lack of German interest, the Cetniks were willing to collaborate, to increase their strength 
against Partisan forces. It is also clear that in Montenegro, they did accept help from the 
Italians, during the Italian surrender in 1943. However, it is highly misleading to suggest that 
Cetniks throughout the war collaborated with the Germans and Italians in order to carry out 
the genocide of Croats and Moslems.44
For Croatian writers, the attempted genocide of Croats and Moslems justified their 
presence in Ustasa and Domobran units. These two groups were forced to defend themselves 
against ‘Cetnik-Communist units’, which were formed in the forests in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
In this way, they were not guilty of collaboration since they were merely reacting to the 
Serbs, who, ‘following the example of their Vlach ancestors, began to exterminate the Croat 
and Muslim population of the Bihac region in horrible and [sic.] mercyless massacres.’45 
Further, Pavelic’s crimes were excused on the basis that he was merely countering ‘Cetnik 
terrorists with terror of their own’, which in any case was not as ruthless as that of the Serbs 
in Serbia, where, ‘the persecution of Jews was even more thorough’.46
In sum, what emerges from a reading of Croatian perceptions of World War II is the 
reactive nature of Croatian activities. For some unexplained reason, the Serbian Cetniks 
seemingly had the upper hand throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina, and were busy instigating a 
genocide of Croats and Moslems. The problem, of course, was that the Ustasa were in control 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina, not the Cetniks. It was the Ustasa which had the power of the state 
behind them, as well as Italian and German support. Nevertheless, this view of the Cetniks as 
unrestrained genocidal killers seemingly rang true for the Croatian public.
Tudjman himself used the concept of a genocidal Cetnik movement to generalise 
Serbian guilt. He suggested that, ‘Macek’s middle-of-the-road Croatian Peasant party was to 
remain the chief political force opposed to the revolutionary NOP on Croatian soil, just as 
Mihailovic’s Cetnik movement was in Serbia’.47 While these two movements were likened, 
in terms of support, morally, they were far apart, according to Tudjman, who placed the 
Cetniks on par morally and philosophically with the Ustasa, not the CPP. Tudjman’s later 
development of this argument made his position more obvious,
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Both the Ustasa and Cetnik movements were equally the expression of mutually 
opposing ideas concerning nation and state and of the programs for their 
implementation, both stemming from the judgement that coexistence in a common 
state was impossible. This means that Dr. A. Pavelic and General D. Mihailovic, in 
the circumstances of the Second World War, found themselves as the forefront of 
nationally exclusive and irreconcilable movements, which sought equally to exploit 
those circumstances for the realization of their respective national programs!18
Thus, Cetnik and Ustasa were paralleled, in terms of their level of atrocities, in terms 
of their ideology, their modus operandi, and their aims during the war. Croatian writers 
ignored that one was a Nazi-backed, Italian-trained terrorist group, and the other, a Royalist, 
Allied backed, anti-German and anti-Communist resistance movement. Because most Serbs 
supported a genocidal movement with an expansionist political project, Tudjman implied that 
all Serbs were tarred with the Cetnik legacy, and by implication -  a legacy of genocide. At 
the same time, since Croats were mainly CCP supporters, their culpability was significantly 
reduced.
Anti-Semitism in Croatia: Stepinac and the People:
How Jews were treated in Yugoslavia during World War II became another subject of 
heated debate. If each side was to legitimately claim to be the victims of genocide, of the type 
experienced by the Jews, then their own relationship with the Jews was crucial. For both 
Serbs and Croats, Jewish history during the war needed to be carefully revised, to highlight 
only the positive aspects of their historical relationship. Similarly, the other had to be 
presented as an anti-Semitic collaborator who participated actively in the Final Solution. Both 
sides actively participated in this exercise, and were not ashamed to manipulate Jewish 
leaders in the process.
Croatian writers pursued a dual strategy of touting their own love of Jews, while 
condemning the Serbs for their complicity in the Holocaust. One aspect of Croatian 
revisionism was the wholesale rehabilitation of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, head of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Croatia. Croats devoted a great deal of energy to proving that 
Stepinac was a great friend of the Jews, and inspired most Croats to help them during the 
war. Of course, Stepinac, like most of the cast of characters in the region, had some rather 
dubious credentials. As Archbishop of Zagreb, Stepinac officiated at the Te Deum, which 
gave thanks for the foundation of the Ustasa state.49 At first, Stepinac appeared to have been 
no different than many Croats with great expectations from the regime. However, his 
enthusiasm soured greatly as the war dragged on, and the atrocities of the Ustasa came to
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light. He is generally painted as a naive and idealistic man, who, while hating the horrors of 
war, saw Pavelic as a hero and saviour of his people.50
While he refused to denounce the regime officially, there is evidence that Stepinac did 
help some Jews -  aiding children to escape to Palestine, while donating food and money to 
Jews in hiding.51 What emerged was the portrait of a man sitting on the fence, symbolically 
supporting the NDH, condemning Ustasa crimes as far as he could without incurring danger 
to his person, while secretly easing his conscience with private acts of piety and kindness. 
Nevertheless, while he seemingly helped some of the Jews, he expressed no remorse over the 
forced conversions of an estimated 200,000 Serbs, often at gunpoint.52 Accused of 
collaboration by the Partisans, Stepinac stood trial in September, 1946.53 He was 
subsequently sentenced to 16 years imprisonment, served five years, then returned to his 
native village where he died in I960.54
Stepinac, despite his wartime record, was completely rehabilitated by Croatian 
historians. His supposed love of the Jews was cited as proof of Croatian philosemitism during 
World War II. One writer noted how 70 Croats received ‘The Certificate of Honour’, and 
‘The Medal of the Righteous’, from Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, as proof of Croatian goodwill 
during the war.55 Another described how, as early as 1936, Stepinac supported Austrian and 
German Jews by founding ‘Action to help refugees’ and ‘Croatian Caritas’ (1938).56 Stepinac 
was also credited with saving 60 inmates of the Jewish Old People’s Home in Zagreb, 
preserving the private library of Zagreb Chief Rabbi Miroslav Shalom Freiberger at his 
request, and publicly condemning the destruction of Zagreb’s main synagogue in 1941.57
Stepinac’s usefulness as a symbol of Croatian tolerance was not lost on Franjo 
Tudjman. In one lengthy defence of Stepinac, Tudjman dismissed the accusations against 
Stepinac as having, ‘even less of a foundation than does the Jasenovac distortion’.58 He later 
emphasised that Pope John Paul II’s visit to Croatia, and Stepinac’s beatification by the 
Vatican, completely exonerated Croatia of any wrongdoing during World War II. Stepinac, it 
seemed, had become a symbol of Croatia’s wartime relationship with the Jews. As he 
explained,
With the beatification, the Holy Father and the Vatican sided with this Croatia and 
Croatian people against attempts to accuse the whole Croatian people of genocide and 
fascism. The Holy Father, the Vatican, and the Catholicism, all said that Stepinac was 
not a criminal, as was not the Croatian people. That is a contribution to the truth 
about the Croatian people in WWII and the truth about the contemporary Croatia...59
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The Vatican’s support for Stepinac was extremely important, further proving that he 
was a friend of the Jews, as well as a Croatian martyr against both Nazism and Communism. 
Tudjman cleverly manipulated Stepinac’s rehabilitation to clean the Croatian wartime record. 
His own portrayal of Stepinac’s beatification was highly controversial. Stepinac was 
appointed Cardinal for his resistance to Communism, and for his condemnation of Partisan 
attacks on Catholic clergy after the war. By the end of 1945, an estimated 273 priests were 
killed by the Partisans. Countless more were arrested, or had gone ‘missing’. Stepinac was 
targeted by the Communist authorities only after his condemnation, and he stood trial a year 
later for collaboration with the NDH regime.60 Tudjman falsely claimed that Stepinac became 
a Cardinal because of his ‘innocence’ during the war, when it fact it had much more to do 
with his resistance to Communism and his defence of Catholicism in Croatia after 1945.
Generally, Croats described Stepinac as an outspoken critic of the Nazis and a “friend 
of the Jews”, because of his wartime efforts to save them. The tarring of Stepinac, one writer 
posited, was done solely to deflect attention from the dishonourable conduct of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church.61 Stepinac became useful as a leader who constantly stood up to the 
Ustasa, offering passive spiritual resistance. Such resistance was often contrasted to the role 
of the Serbian Orthodox Chinch, which was described as bent on persecuting Jews and 
promoting Greater Serbia, which was condemned as a ‘racist ideology’.
The theme of a racist and anti-Semitic Orthodox Church was common in Croatia. 
Ljubica Stefan’s From Fairy Tale to Holocaust was a typical example of this type of 
thinking, tracing the ancient roots of Serbian anti-Semitism. A large section of her work was 
devoted to reviewing various anti-Semitic folk tales, assembled by Vuk Karadzic in 1853.
One featured work is the ‘The Yids’ (Civuti), the story of Hansel and Gretel, with the wicked 
witch as a Jew. As Stefan described, these folk tales encouraged Serbs to see the Jewish 
people as those who, ‘chased after the gentile children with knives and forks to eat them, 
which presents the Jews as cannibals...’.63 She thus traced Serbian anti-Semitism from 19th
tficentury fairy tales, to the political traditions of Greater Serbia, and then into the 20 century, 
where Serbia was, ‘the most trustworthy ally of the Third Reich’.64
While the Serbs were under direct military occupation, with strict curfews and a 
particularly brutal police force, Stefan argued that the Serbs had a completely independent, 
autonomous state, complete with, ‘a government, organised ministries, independent 
governments in cities and villages, its own army equipped by the Germans ...’ 65 The Serbs 
were able to gain such autonomy, asserted Stefan, because of their long tradition of anti- 
Semitism, and their eagerness to participate in the Final Solution. She also argued that
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Orthodox Church was instrumental in the genocide of the Jews, since they functioned as, ‘a 
sort of a political party and even racist’, while they, ‘totally neglected pastoral and spiritual 
work.’66
This form of ‘counteridentification’ was crucial during the 1990s, as it showed the 
continuation, once again, of an age-old Serbian hatred of all things non-Serb, and a desire to 
expand the Serbian state -  while destroying everything in its path. Thus, for Stefan, and for 
many others, the Jews and the Croats were fellow victims of Serbian aggression during 
World War II. Generally, Croatian claims of Serbian anti-Semitism were false. While it was 
clear that certain Orthodox officials, and the Serbian puppet government, maintained anti- 
Semitic views, there is little to support the idea that the Serbs actively and enthusiastically 
aided in the Holocaust. Serbs had little autonomy within Serbia during the war. This was a 
country entirely occupied by German troops. Even Philip Cohen, after his lengthy attack on 
the Serbs, was forced to admit that, ‘it is indisputable that the executioners of Serbia’s Jews 
were German army personnel or regular police. However, the role of the Serbs as active 
collaborators in the destruction of the Jews has remained under-explored in Holocaust 
literature.’67 While perhaps under-explored, Cohen was unable to argue convincingly that 
anti-Semitism was an important aspect of Serbian nationalism.
That a large number of Serbs joined the Partisans and the Cetniks does indicate that 
there was little support for the Nedic regime. As well, it seems that there was little love lost 
between Germans and Serbs. Germans considered the Serbs to be treacherous and dangerous, 
remembering the events of 1914, when Germans were defeated in large numbers during the 
First World War.68 Christopher Browning’s analysis of the German occupation of Serbia 
suggests that support for the Nedic regime was much lower than that alleged by the Croats.69 
While the Serbian Orthodox Church promoted anti-Semitism to some extent, this did not 
translate into overt support for the genocide of Yugoslavia’s Jews.
Serbian Views of Collaboration and Anti-Semitism:
For the Serbs, connections between the suffering of Serbs and Jews during World War 
II were extremely important -  anti-Semitism and Serbophobia were continually compared, as 
proof that the Serbs were also the victims of genocide. For many Serbs, World War II was a 
time when Serbia was close to being wiped out, as Germans, ‘committed wide scale murders,
70burning of entire villages, raided and bombed cities.’ Jews and Serbs would be symbolically 
linked, as one writer revealed, for espousing the same values, ‘The Jewish-Serbian-Capitalist- 
Democratic front had to disappear forever from the world ... Jews and Serbs were struck with
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the same dagger.’71 Dobrica Cosic went so far as to assert that the genocide of Serbs was 
worse than that of the Jews, in terms of its methods and bestiality.72 Exaggeration aside, the 
Serbs did indeed suffer heavy losses during World War II, although it was never on the level 
suggested by contemporary historians. There were few similarities between Serbian and 
Jewish experiences during the war.
As with the Croats, the myth of philosemitism was extremely important for the Serbs, 
who saw themselves, along with the Jews, as fellow victims of Nazi aggression. Laza 
Kostic’s The Serbs and the Jews (1988) advanced that Serbia was one of the few countries 
that was free of anti-Semitism during the war. Describing himself as, ‘a fanatical friend of the 
Jews in general and of the Serbian ones in particular’, Kostic advanced that Serbs were 
always the best friends of the Jews throughout history,
The Serbs are one of the rare peoples in the world who have lived with the Jews in 
peace and love throughout the whole history of their settlement in our lands ... The 
Serbs never persecuted the Jews, never carried out any demonstrations against them.
Not one anti-Semitic text has ever appeared in the press, and hatred against them was 
not spread orally either ... There was no more tolerant country towards the Jews. 
Considerably later, many other countries copied the so-called “emancipation of the 
Jews” from the Serbs.73
This general view was important in vindicating the Serbian role in World War II. Kostic even 
made the suggestion that Nedic had in no way collaborated with the Nazis in the Holocaust of 
Jews. While they worked under the Nazis, they refused to, ‘contemplate participation in 
aspect of the extermination of the Jews by the Germans...’ -  so Kostic claimed. 74d
Of course, with daily accusations from the Croatian side that the Serbs were the worst 
anti-Semites the world had ever seen, the Serbs countered with invective of their own. 
Mirroring Croatian arguments, Serbian writers alleged that Croatia was neck deep in anti- 
Semitism. In Serbian eyes, one of the worst offenders was Alozije Stepinac, who was 
presented as an active collaborator and a figurehead for Catholic complicity in the genocide 
of the Serbs and the Jews. Certainly the most vocal critic of Stepinac’s rehabilitation was 
Milan Bulajic, who denounced Stepinac as an enthusiastic NDH supporter.75 His voluntary 
loyalty oath to Ante Pavelic and his position as Ustasa army chaplain made him, ‘the spiritual 
father of the Ustasi Independent State of Croatia’ -  he therefore provided crucial spiritual
I f k  *justification for their activities. His support of the NDH and denouncing of Yugoslavia also 
proved that he was a ‘fanatical opponent’ of the ‘Masonic-Jewish state’ -  which for some 
reason was Serbia.77
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Much of Bulajic’s efforts were directed to debunking the myth of Stepinac’s 
philosemitism. He argued that while Stepinac saved individual Jews, these were Jews in 
mixed marriages with Catholics, or had converted to Catholicism to escape death. He argued 
that Stepinac was only against the racialisation of anti-Semitism. Jews could continue to be 
persecuted as Jews because of their religion and race, but if they converted to Catholicism,
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then they could not be persecuted because of their race. The claim that Stepinac saved 200 
Jewish orphans was rebutted by the fact that as soon as Stepinac petitioned the Vatican to 
save them, the Ustasa rounded them up and sent them to Jasenovac. ‘This’, Bulajic argued, 
was ‘the historical truth of this “humanitarian action’” .79
The case of Miroslav Salom Freiberger was also refuted, since Freiberger was later 
captured by the Ustasa secret police and sent to a German death camp. Bulajic also 
denounced Stepinac for exercising a double standard, since the many Gypsies who converted 
to Catholicism were not saved. ‘The Catholic Church in Croatia didn’t care too much about 
them’ -  was his conclusion.80 Bulajic argued generally that while Stepinac made a show of 
his philosemitism after the war, his wartime actions came to nothing, since most of the people 
he supposedly tried to save were eventually killed. This is meant to cast doubt on Stepinac’s 
motives, implying that these demonstrations of philosemitism were merely for show, 
concealing the ugly truth of his own anti-Semitism.
The Catholic Church was often portrayed as a genocidal collaborator with the Nazis. 
Historians, such as Dusan Batakovic, derided the Catholic Church for, ‘their own brand of 
religious exclusionism, intolerance, and a militant proselytizing’, which formed part of a
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Church driven policy to bring about a religiously and racially pure Croatia. ‘A very 
considerable part of the Croatian political elite,’ Batakovic concluded, ‘supported by the 
Catholic hierarchy and Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac himself -  supported this national and 
religious intolerance, and strongly supported policies of clericalism and racism, marked by 
mass killings, forced conversions and the deportation of the Serbian Orthodox population as 
well the slaughter of the Jews and Gypsies.’ For Batakovic, Church leaders were queuing 
up to commit genocide against the Serbian and Jewish populations in Croatia.
Other historians would use similar imagery, describing how the Ustasa state was, 
‘soundly and joyously received by the majority of the Croatian people’, and how the Catholic 
Church, and Stepinac in particular, were ‘the most loyal [of] Hitler’s collaborator^]’.83 Other 
writers were in no doubt that the Vatican had been a keen advocate of genocide, with Church 
officials inciting Croats from their pulpits to wage, ‘“holy” war for the cause of a pure and 
independent Croatia.’84 Serbs commonly portrayed Stepinac as the spiritual leader of an
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enthusiastic gang of genocidal clergy, only too eager to swear allegiance to Pavelic’s regime, 
in order to begin killing Serbs, Jews, and Communists. If Stepinac’s goodness allowed 
Tudjman to portray the Croatian nation as righteous and good, Stepinac’s collaboration tarred 
all Croats as genocidal killers. Nevertheless, while there was evidence that some priests had 
participated in atrocities, Stepinac’s record seems clear, insofar as he never sanctioned 
violence or racial hatred. Those Catholic priests who actually helped the Serbs were never 
mentioned, nor were the many Serbian Orthodox priests who lent their support to the Cetnik 
massacres during World War II.
Serbian sources maintained that over 80% of Croatia’s Jews were killed during the 
Ustasa period, only a few surviving by ‘sheer accident’. The killing of Jews was ascribed to a 
uniquely Ustasi approach, spear-headed by Andrija Artukovic, the NDH Minister of the 
Interior, who decimated the 14,000 strong Jewish community in Bosnia-Hercegovina, leaving 
only 2,000 survivors. Serbian propagandists linked Artukovic’s hatred of the Jews with a fear 
of International Communism and capitalism, both of which threatened to swamp Croatia, and 
the Croatian nation.85 According to other Serbian sources, the Ustasa regime killed 30,000 of 
Croatia’s Jews during the war, as well as a majority of the Gypsy community, estimated at 
between 40-100,000 people.86 The conflict between 14,000 Jews and 30,000 Jews is striking. 
It seems that no one was certain exactly how many Jews were in Croatia -  either before the 
war, or after.
Throughout the 1990s, the use of graphic, lugubrious imagery was an important 
prerequisite of Serbian propaganda. The more graphic the details, the more horrific the 
crimes of the Croats would appear to be, and by extension, the more important it would be to 
stop another Croatian genocide. Among the favoured themes was the slaughter of innocent 
children, proof that the Croats were truly depraved. This description was typical, ‘Infants 
were shot in their cribs, babies were foisted on bayonettes, slaughtered with knives, razors 
and axes, burned in their homes, in brickyards and in the Jasenovac crematorium, boiled in 
soap melting cauldrons, bound together and thrown into rivers and wells, thrown alive into 
caves and grottoes, asphyxiated in cyanide and poisoned with caustic soda, killed through 
hunger, thirst and exposure... ,87
This typical account conveyed the savagery of the Ustasa, trying to destroy the future 
of the Serbian nation. ‘The foundations of the Ustasi state,’ the authors of this work
o o
concluded, ‘were laid on the slaughter of children’. Graphic portrayals of a war on children 
highlighted the depravity of the Ustasa, but also demonstrated the extreme suffering of the 
Serbs, who had been robbed of the future of their nation. Similar works published by the
144
Serbian National Defense Council of America presented a mixture of graphic language and 
gruesome photographs, to prove that the Ustasa atrocities were too horrible to forget.89 
Constantly mentioned in Serbian literature was the famous encounter between journalist 
Curzio Malaparte and Ante Pavelic, where Malaparte was proudly shown a basket containing 
forty pounds of Serbian eyeballs -  a gift from ‘loyal Ustasas’. This account, described in 
Malaparte’s Kaputt (1946), was one of the favourite pieces of imagism used by the Serbs to 
describe the irrationality and brutality of the NDH. The only intrinsic value possessed by a 
Serb was his eyes.90
Such descriptions of Ustasa terror aimed at completely dehumanising the Croats, 
imparting the idea that they were nothing more than sadistic, bloodthirsty killers. While a 
certain percentage of Serbs and Croats did run wild during four years of war, these few 
psychopaths did not reflect the motivations and actions of the vast majority of the population. 
At the same time, it was curious that the Serbs sought to invent a variety of anti-Vatican, anti- 
Stepinac anti-Ustasa stories, when there were many documented facts about World War II 
which were far more damning.
Take for example Mark Aarons and John Loftus’ Ratlines, which factually analysed 
the role of the Vatican in helping escaping Nazi war criminals. Through the Intermarium, The 
Vatican controlled the largest Nazi smuggling organisation of its kind in Europe after the 
war.91 Intermarium even helped Pavelic to escape to Italy, where the Vatican allowed him to
09live in of the Pope’s summer homes, safe from the British and the Yugoslavs. While this in 
no way validates the Serbian position, it is curious that Serbs chose to invent and distort 
history, when many of the true facts of history were worse than much of what they claimed.
The Myth of Partisan Participation:
Another important aspect of World War II revisionism was the myth of Partisan 
membership. Each side tried to prove that their nation initiated anti-fascist resistance, and 
was therefore on the winning side. This was of central importance, because it proved that no 
one actually collaborated with the Nazis and their puppet states. Each side now became 
innocent victims of fascism, instead of collaborators with it. Each side could also claim to 
have created and founded Tito’s Yugoslavia, only to be later betrayed for their national 
sacrifices -  each side now became martyrs when they were ‘discriminated’ against in the 
SFRY.
The Serbs certainly took Partisan membership seriously. Historian Velimir Ivetic’s 
lengthy monograph examined the annual ratio of Serbs and Croats in each Partisan
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detachment in Croatia, arguing that the Serbs were the most important resistance force in 
Croatia. A summary of his findings included the following: ‘that the participation of the 
Serbs from Croatia in the common struggle against the occupier and his lackeys was 
enormous’; ‘ that the Serbs had the “role of initiator” of the uprising’; and, ‘that the Serbs 
helped the rising up of the Croatian people against the occupier’.93 The Croats only 
constituted a majority, Ivetic claimed, when defeat was certain. Of course, while the Croats 
were represented as cynical opportunists, Serbs were credited with extending a hand of 
brotherly friendship to their erstwhile enemies. Ever able to forgive and forget, the Serbs 
supposedly helped their killers join the Partisans.94
Similar arguments have been raised by other Serbian writers, who argued that, 
‘persecuted Serbs swelled the ranks of Draza Mihailovic’s Cetniks but even more so of Tito’s 
Partisans’.95 Others concluded, ‘The Serbian and Montenegrin people are today among those 
freedom-loving peoples which share the feeling of pride with the world because of their 
undeniable contribution to the defeat of the greatest evil of this century.’96 The Ministry of 
Information similarly concluded, that the Serbs were ‘freedom loving, democratic and 
antifascist’, by their struggles, ‘against the Croatian genocidal government and the Nazi
Q7disintegration of Yugoslavia’. Others described how Tito was forced to move his 
headquarters to Belgrade from Zagreb, after the, ‘enthusiasm with which the German 
occupiers were greeted in Zagreb in 1941’. Here, the ‘rebellious energies’ of the Serbs in 
Serbia, Montenegro and in other Serbian areas was not only, ‘a primary source of the anti-
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Fascist struggle, but also a condition for CPY survival’.
It was obviously important that Serbs appeared to be the liberators of Yugoslavia, and 
the greatest opponent of Fascism. While Partisan participation in World War II increased 
Serbian claims to be anti-genocidal in the contemporary conflict, a high Partisan membership 
also tied in with the Serbian theme of sacrifice. Serbs had supposedly given their all to create 
Yugoslavia, and had a legitimate claim to be the inheritors of what remained of the country -  
rump- Yugoslavia -  as it was unfortunately called. Such claims also countered Tudjman’s 
assertions that every Serb had been a Cetnik. While few Serbs were willing to admit that the 
Cetniks had committed any atrocities during the war, it was a much better strategy to focus 
on Partisan membership -  a much less morally ambiguous movement.
The Croats advanced similar arguments, positing that they were both the first and 
largest ethnic group in the Partisan resistance. While this ran counter to Tudjman’s thesis that 
all Croats supported the CPP, it accomplished the same objective -  proving that Croats were 
not wholesale collaborators. Croatian writers argued that the majority of the Croatian
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population both ‘supported and actively participated’ in Tito’s Partisan movement." Others 
described how the ‘the first rebellion in Europe against the [N]azi and fascist occupation’ was 
led by the Croats, who formed the first Partisan unit near Sisak in June, 1941. Included in one 
account was a list of Croatian notables such as poet Vladimir Nazor and ‘the democratically 
oriented’ Communist leader Andrija Hebrang, as well as descriptions of how the Croatian 
based Partisans (ZAVNOH) held more liberated territory than Tito’s pan-Yugoslav council 
(AVNOJ).100
Others, while admitting that Serbs at some points formed the majority of Partisans, 
dismissed their commitment to the cause, since, ‘the Serbs were primarily escaping from 
persecution, while the Croats chose the antifascist side because of their personal beliefs and 
with the idea of preserving the identity of their state through a war of liberation.’101 
Curiously, this writer failed to realise that these Serbs converted because of Ustasa 
persecution. While some Serbs were opportunistic, they were certainly morally superior to 
those Croats who were killing them. Cohen similarly posited that the Serbs were the main 
collaborators in World War n, advancing that 70% of Croats but only 11% of Serbs were 
antifascist. Further, any Cetniks who converted to the Partisan cause supposedly did so only 
to make the Communists a, ‘new tool for “Greater Serbia’” .102
Impartial historians have described the predominance of Serbs in the NDH who joined 
the Partisans, largely in reaction to the Ustasa atrocities, thus there may be some truth to the 
Serbian claim.103 This does not however, negate the strong participation of Croats in the 
Partisans, nor does it detract from the massacres committed by Serbian Cetniks during this 
time. For both sides, it became clear that high Partisan numbers were but one more aspect of 
a growing revisionist conflict, with each side arguing the opposite of the other. Each side 
claimed to have been the key to the anti-fascist liberation of the country. This allowed each 
side to similarly claim that their people had been against the Cetniks and Ustasa all along.
Conclusions:
In general, Serbs and Croats arguments vis-a-vis World War II were almost identical, 
proving once again that the narcissism of minor differences was alive and well. Each argued 
in favour of their philosemitism, victimisation, and heroism, while denouncing the other for 
their treachery, anti-Semitism, collaboration, and genocide. The recent revisions of history 
from both sides suggest uneasiness about the legacies of the past. They also suggest a need to 
vindicate one’s own history, excising any negative historical patterns that one might find,
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while at the same time continuing to identify a coherent pattern of genocidal hatred and 
destruction on the part of one’s perceived enemy.
What has indeed emerged is a blurring of the lines between acting and being, as well 
as a blurring of the concepts of self and other. In both cases, each side can rightly claim 
victims who were killed in the style of the Cetniks or Ustasa. Each side is also guilty of 
having adopted the symbols and trappings of this earlier period. Resurrected Cetnik and 
Ustasa units battled each other once again, proving for many that the war was very much cast 
as a continuation of an earlier conflict. Why Arkan wore full Cetnik regalia to marry his 
‘maid of Kosovo’ was as difficult to understand as why Dobroslav Paraga’s renewed Party of 
Rights and the HOS regiments in Bosnia-Hercegovina sported Ustasa insignia and used the 
old Nazi salute.
However, the complexity of events can be broken down fairly simply -  each side 
attempted to revise and excuse the atrocities their side had committed, and part of that 
process involved donning their former nationalist dress, and adopting old symbols to prove 
that they were not ashamed of their past history. Demonisation of the other required the 
inflation of the other side’s atrocities, and a denunciation of their parallel process of 
rehabilitating their own past. Thus, the work of neither side should be studied in isolation, as 
both Serbs and Croats have done, but rather, seen as a series of related actions in an 
escalating crisis.
The concept of ‘performativity’ is thus extremely important here. What began as 
groups ‘playing’ Ustasa and Cetnik soon evolved into neo-Ustasa and neo-Cetnik units, 
complete with traditional weaponry, uniforms, salutes, and styles of killing. What began as a 
vindication of one’s own national past became a blurring, then a desecration of it. 
Paradoxically, each side, in the name of historical revisionism, set out to bum, loot, shell, and 
commit the same barbarous acts, acts which they refused to admit their predecessors had 
done. By re-enacting the past crimes of which their grandfathers stood accused, they 
ironically tarnished their own national past. Curiously, while each side blamed the other, 
there is no doubt that the escalation could not have begun if only one side chose to adopt a 
historic role. As discussed above, Ignatieff s narcissism of minor differences is obvious in the 
debate over World War II. Each side advanced almost identical arguments, countering each 
other, fact by fact, point by point. Without the participation of historians, politicians and 
journalists from both sides, no debate would have been possible.
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Chapter Six: ‘Numbers Games’ and the Myths of Jasenovac
and Bleiburg
‘What will our children say about us when they read about the Balkan Holocaust in
their history books? '
- Stjepan Mestrovic et al., The Road from Paradise -
Introduction:
The previous chapter outlined some of the principal myths of victimisation and 
persecution stemming from the wartime activities of the Serbs and Croats. By invoking 
images of historic genocide and persecution, both sides portrayed their actions in the 1990s as 
defensive only -  a reaction to either ‘Serbophobia’ or ‘Greater Serbia’. This chapter will 
review two of the most important persecution myths emerging from World War II. Revising 
the history of the Ustasa run death camp at Jasenovac was a useful means of casting Serbs as 
the victims of a ‘Holocaust’ by Croats. On the Croatian side, the massacre at Bleiburg 
(Austria) by Communist forces (or Serb led Communists) in 1945, was also likened to the 
Holocaust. In both cases, the other was accused of committing genocide, using either the 
mask of Nazi or Communist domination to justify their atrocities.
Of central importance was a ‘game of numbers’, what Ronnie Landau has referred to 
as a ‘grotesque competition in suffering.’1 Like the works of Stannard, Dadrian, Hancock, 
and others reviewed in the comparative genocide debate, Serbs and Croats used the Jews as 
the litmus test for historical suffering, while also trading genocide stories with each other. By 
inflating their own numbers of dead, and reducing the numbers of enemy dead, they 
conducted their own comparative genocide debate within Yugoslavia. Both Jasenovac and 
Bleiburg became emblematic of national suffering, and Fall during World War II. Following 
a victim centred strategy, both sides advanced negative myths of identification, arguing that 
they alone had suffered a ‘Holocaust’ during the war, which was repeating itself in the 1990s.
The ‘Numbers Game’ at Jasenovac:
During the Communist era and afterwards, the Ustasa death camp at Jasenovac
fL
became the most potent 20 century symbol of Serbian victimisation. It figured as the scene 
of their attempted genocide -  some would even refer to it as a Serbian Holocaust. Certainly 
this former brick factory was the locus of many horrible massacres, and many thousands lost
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their lives at the hands of the Ustasa. The controversial issue was not the existence of the 
camp, but rather, how many Serbs actually died there.
The major problem of Jasenovac history lies in fixing the number of dead. This 
continues to be politically charged. Claiming that 50,000 died puts one on the Croatian side, 
while claiming a larger number (one million or more) is more in line with Serbian thinking. 
Sadly, there is little consensus on the total number of dead, or indeed, what percentage of the 
victims were Serbs. Impartial historians, using a variety of statistics, often arrived at startling 
different figures: Denitch (less than 100,000); Vulliamy, (around 600,000); Stitkovac 
(‘hundreds of thousands’); Dragnich (total in NDH: 500-700,000); Hall (750,000); Glenny 
(200,000); Ridley (330,000); and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (300- 
400,000).2 This extreme range of estimates may have resulted from the sloppiness of some 
researchers, who have seemingly confused the number of dead at Jasenovac with the total 
number of Serbs killed in Yugoslavia as a whole. Dragnich, Hall, and Vulliamy’s numbers, 
for example, could either be interpretations of Serb-based totals of Jasenovac, or Croat-based 
totals of all Serbs killed in the NDH.
Serbian and Croatian writers provoked much of this confusion. However, the original 
confusion stems from the Yugoslav Communists’ own manipulation of war casualty figures. 
The figure of 1,706,000 was presented at the International Reparations Commission in 1946 
without any documentation to prove its veracity. In 1947, a second year mathematics student 
named Vledeta Vuckovic was ordered to, ‘compute “a significant number” of war victims’, 
and duly arrived at a figure of 1.7 million victims. This included not only war-related deaths, 
but also projected future demographic losses as a result of the war -  including unborn 
children.3 The motives behind such a strategy were clear -  the Yugoslav Communists wanted 
to gain the maximum amount of war reparations from Germany after their long and bloody 
conflict. This financial motive was significant. However, a symbolic motive was also 
important. Communist Yugoslavia would rely on a series of myths of ‘anti-Fascist liberation’ 
to buttress its legitimacy. A high number of deaths allowed the Partisans to cast themselves as 
martyrs to Fascism, while creating an axiomatic link between nationalism and genocide. 
Nationalism would be an evil associated with racism, extermination, and death camps, while 
the future would lie in a multiethnic, peaceful Communist society.
Early attempts to impartially assess the number of dead after the first post-war census 
in 1951 yielded new statistical results. Americans Paul Myers and Arthur Campbell fixed the 
total numbers of dead in Yugoslavia (for all nations), at 1.067 million people, a number 
significantly lower than the official estimate.4 Later analyses in the 1980s by Montenegrin
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Serb Bogoljub Kocovic, and Croat Vladimir Zeijevic arrived at similar totals -  1.014 million 
and 1.027 million respectively. Within this number, Kocovic posited a Serbian total of
487.000 deaths, while Zerjevic published a slightly higher number (530,000).5 With regards 
to the numbers of Serbs killed at Jasenovac, both Kocovic and Zeijevic arrived at a figure of
83.000 deaths -  each using different statistical methods.
While Zerjevic was later drawn into the Croatian propaganda war against the Serbs, 
his numbers appeared to be reasonably impartial. Further, his analysis was incredibly 
detailed, with descriptions of the number of ‘skeletons per square meter’ calculated over the 
total surface area of mass graves.6 The figure of 83,000 can, of course, never be proven 
conclusively, and a belief in any estimate requires a great deal of trust in the researcher, and 
in his or her motives. This explains the huge variance in estimates between impartial 
historians, who simply do not know who to believe, and have no means of verifying any 
conclusions. As the wars in Croatia, and then in Bosnia-Hercegovina escalated, more and 
more statistical surveys from each side made the Jasenovac total even more difficult to 
determine.
Jasenovac and the Serbian ‘Holocaust’:
For the Serbs, maintaining a high number of Jasenovac deaths was absolutely central 
to their national self-identity. A high number proved that they had suffered from a Croat 
inspired genocide during World War II. Jasenovac attested to the genocidal possibilities of 
the Croatian nation, proving their willingness to annihilate the Serbs in the past, and in the 
present. A high number also made the Serbs one of the primary victims of World War II, 
rather than an aggressor. The Serbian Unity Congress, for example, claimed Jasenovac as, 
‘the third largest concentration camp of the WWII occupied Europe’, a common theme in
n
Serbian writing, which advanced a clear case for a Serbian ‘Holocaust’. The Serbian 
Ministry of Information also saw Jasenovac as a Serbian ‘holocaust’ -  a holocaust which
o
acted as a precursor to Croatian and Bosnian Moslem aggression 50 years later.
The Serbian Orthodox Church also took a leading role in propagating the myth, 
denouncing the Croats for their part in the genocide of the Serbs. As Patriarch Paul asserted 
at the beginning of the war,
Nothing can be worse than Jasenovac, where during four years of war, 700,000 
people were killed ... Jasenovac is the scene of the most important horrors committed 
against the Serbs, the place of their aneantissement their annihilation, their 
extermination, their execution, their torture, where they suffered under a blood lust,
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the like of which could not be paralleled by the antichrist himself... This is the new 
crucifixion of Christ. This is the sin of sins.
Such imagery of a violent, annihilatory Croatian other proved central in motivating
the Serbs to ‘defend’ the Serbian minorities who were seen to be victims of a renewed
Croatian aggression in 1991. It was not only Jasenovac, but also the covering up of the
genocide after 1945 that captured the imagination of Serbian writers. Slobodan Kljakic’s
Conspiracy o f Silence, for example, traced a Communist conspiracy to lower the number of
Serbian dead in World War II, a project propelled by the Vatican and the Croats. He blamed
Croatian authorities for bulldozing Jasenovac to the ground in the 1950s, supposedly, ‘on
orders from authorities in Zagreb’.10 Croatian Communist leaders, such as Stevo Krajacic and
Andrija Hebrang, received the lion’s share of the blamd, for trying to resurrect Croatian
nationalism by suppressing negative aspects of their history.11
Certainly the most well known and prolific Serbian writer on the Jasenovac camps
was Milan Bulajic, who became famous during the 1990s for his Goldhagen-esque theorising.
He blamed everyone in Croatia for the genocide, from the, ‘paramilitary formations of the
Croat Peasant Party’ -  the so-called ‘Guardians’, to the Catholic Church -  which supposedly
wanted to establish a Catholic state in the Balkans. For Bulajic, the motivations of the Croats
and the Vatican never changed. As in the 19th century, these two groups still wanted to
destroy the Orthodox Church, in order to expand Roman Catholicism in the Balkans.12
On the basis of different reports, Bulajic drew up his own estimates of Serbian war
related deaths: 1,467,000 (through direct war losses), and a further 390 - 440,000 deaths
(300-350,000 in refugee camps; 50,000 quislings; 40,000 Jews). In total, he charted the
deaths of 1,850,000 Serbs, a figure surpassing even the Communist estimate, which had
11referred to all national groups, not just the Serbs. He also famously accused the Croats of 
shelling the Jasenovac memorial, ‘the largest Serbian underground town’ -  in an effort to 
erase the legacy of the past. (That the shelling was later proven by the Croats to be false was 
not discussed).14 Bulajic also attacked Franjo Tudjman’s very low estimate of the numbers of 
dead, as expressed in his most recent work, Horrors o f War,
All that this book says leaves no room for surprise because it is a deplorable 
confirmation that the Ustasha clerico-nationalism has not been fully uprooted and the 
result of the failure to de-nazify the Independent State of Croatia which committed 
the crime of genocide against the Orthodox Serbs, Jews and Gypsies, and the 
pro-Yugoslav Croats.15
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Bulajic was certainly Tudjman’s greatest critic in the Jasenovac debate.16 He was 
quick to condemn ‘Tudjmanism’ as, ‘a mixture of radical Croatian chauvinism and 
clericalism, which is a certain form of clerical Nazism’. His opinion of Tudjman himself was 
no less virulent. Bulajic also focussed on the specifically ‘Catholic’ nature of Jasenovac, 
questioning why so many Church officials seemed to be in charge. The camp’s commandant 
was the sinister ‘Friar Satan’, and Bulajic also attacked other priests, such as Friar Zvoniko 
Brekalo, who was also attached to the Jasenovac camp and was affiliated with the Vatican 
representative in Croatia. His penchant for torturing and liquidating prisoners, while engaging 
in ‘orgies and immoral life’, with his fellow priests, was graphically described, as well as the 
sadism, mass murder, and ‘whoring’ of Friars Anzelmo Culina, and Zvonko Lipovac.18 
Bulajic’s view that Jasenovac was a specifically ‘Catholic’ death camp, articulated the strong 
links between Catholicism and genocide. By extension, Jasenovac was not simply the product 
of Croatian nationalism, or a generalised hatred of Serbs. It was a religiously inspired 
exercise.
While the issue of genocidal priests was not a common theme in Serbian writing, the 
numbers of Serbs killed at Jasenovac was a frequent subject of scholarly debate. As with 
impartial writers, no Serb seemed exactly sure how many people had died at Jasenovac.
Jovan Ilic’s total was 700,000, with the Serbs, ‘the most numerous victims by far’.19 Svetozar
onBurdevic’s number was the same. Bozidar Zefievic put the numbers killed at, over one
million.21 Radoje Kontic added, ‘We are proud to note that with 1,706,000 killed citizens,
00Yugoslavia ranks third by the number of victims in the Second World War.’ Paul Pavlovich 
echoed the traditional figure of 1.7 million, describing how, ‘mostly Serb lives’ were brutally 
ended, ‘and by the Croat hand for the most part’. 23 Petar Damjanov also put the number at 1 
700 000 victims, claiming that every ninth Yugoslav was killed.24 Vojislav Stojanovic, 
president of the Serbian Association of University Teachers and Scientists, placed the number 
of Serbs killed during their ‘genocide’ at over 2 million, which he posited was, ‘in terms of 
suffering’, no less important that the fate of the Jews in occupied Europe. Similarly, Serbian 
General Velimir Terzic arrived at a total of ‘over one million’, while Vuk Draskovic 
advanced a figure of 1.5 million Serbs for the whole of Croatia during the war.26 While these 
Serbian numbers differed by more than 500,000 people, the totals were certainly much higher 
than those advanced by impartial observers.
Revisionist novels and scholarly works were also designed to maintain or increase the 
Communist estimate of Serbian deaths. Some of these include Strahinja Kurdulija’s Serbs on 
Their Own Land (1993)27 and Lazo Kostich’s The Holocaust in the Independent State o f
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Croatia (1981), recently reprinted by the Serbian government.28 Such books, as well as 
shorter surveys by Serbian academics, perpetuated a high number of deaths, continuing the 
theme that Serbs were victims of the worst genocide in World War II, with only the Jews and 
the Russians ahead of them. These high numbers were advanced to prove Ustasa evil during 
the war. They were also designed to reduce the level of Serbian guilt and complicity. Dusan 
Batakovic gave perhaps the most honest reason why promoting a figure of 700,000 was 
central to the Serbian cause, writing,
[Tjhe number of Serbian victims has, over numerous decades become the object of 
political manipulation, because in reducing the dimensions of the Serbian Holocaust, 
it will either be discounted completed or minimised and placed in the ranks of 
vengeance done to Moslems in Oriental Bosnia and the mass shooting of those 
Ustasha who were captured at the end of the war.29
Batakovic was quite right. If Serbs could not maintain the high number of deaths, then 
they too could be accused of being genocidal killers. His oblique references to the ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ of Moslems by the Cetniks and the massacre of Ustasa at Bleiburg demonstrated 
an awareness that each group had a symbolic ‘Holocaust’ of its own. It was therefore the 
responsibility of the Serbian historian to insure that his own nation’s genocide received top 
billing. Jovan Ilic, for similar reasons, described the Serbs’, ‘additional right to self- 
determination and uniting’, because of their exposure to ‘genocidal extermination many 
times’.30 For both Batakovic□ and Ilic, it was crucial that Serbian historians did their utmost 
to advance Serbian claims, since historians on the other side would be doing precisely the 
same thing.
Because so much of the conflict was rooted in perceptions of past victimisations and 
the need for ‘self defence’, such writing proved essential in maintaining a high level of 
morale within Serbia. As the hardest hit victims of World War H , they had an obligation to 
‘defend’ their brothers in the Krajina, in Eastern Slavonia, and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The 
myth of Jasenovac was similar to Schopflin’s ‘myths of redemption and suffering’, where
Serbs had a moral right to create an expanded Serbian state after 1990, in order to prevent
11
another genocide from occurring. It was also similar to Kecmanovic’s myth of the 
‘universal culprit’.32 The Croats, and their cynical master -  the Vatican, had been 
continuously trying to push the Serbs out of the Balkans. Jasenovac would be yet another 
eiample of this phenomenon.
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Jasenovac, the Croatians, and the ‘Black Legend’:
Long preoccupied with the high official numbers of Serbian dead in the SFRY, 
Croatian nationalists had been hying for decades to reduce the significance of Jasenovac. As 
discussed in ‘Chapter One’, Tudjman had been writing on the issue since the mid-1960s. For 
him, as for many other Croatians, Jasenovac was an obsession. A watershed occurred in 
1990, when at last, with the creation of an independent Croatian state, the government was 
now able to publicly open the debate, to ask that long awaited question: “How many Serbs 
actually died at Jasenovac?” The estimates, while frequently different, were almost always 
extremely low.
For the Croatian side, it was vital to downplay the importance of Jasenovac, to prove 
that the death camp was insignificant by the standards of World War II. This performed 
several important functions. The first was to minimise the historic guilt of Croatia in the war, 
by denouncing Serbian accusations as part of an insidious propaganda campaign. This was 
meant to restore the prestige of the Croatian wartime record, while exonerating the NDH. 
Secondly, low numbers allowed Croatian writers to counter their Serbian ‘victims’ with their 
own ‘Holocaust’ at Bleiburg, thus balancing or neutralising atrocities in the comparative 
genocide debate. Thirdly, reducing the numbers of Jasenovac dead made liars and schemers 
of the Serbs. They were merely trying to cover up their own sinister wartime record by 
accusing innocents of exaggerated crimes.
Tudjman played a starring role in this debate. He had aroused much controversy over 
his World War II revisionist writings and his founding of ‘Tudjmanism’ as a means of re­
examining and interpreting Croatian history. One of his primary aims was to resurrect 
Croatian national pride, after it had suffered from what he termed the ‘black legend of the 
historical guilt of the entire Croatian nation’.33 This guilt was clearly attributed to the high 
statistical number of Jasenovac deaths, which Tudjman interpreted as a Serbian plot to 
suppress Croatian nationalism. It is worth quoting his definition in full,
There is also the systematic creation of the black legend of historical guilt of the 
entire Croatian nation. For if the dimensions of the Ustasha crime are stretched to 
hundreds of thousands and even millions of victims, and if, by contrast, there are no 
commensurate crimes on the opposite side, then the responsibility for the crimes does 
not fall upon a mere handful of Pavelic’s fanatical followers, blinded by vengeful 
impulses, but on the entire Croatian nation. From this point, it follows logically that 
... Croatianness can be equated with Ustashism which is branded as worse than 
Fascism or Nazism.34
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The purpose of this ‘black legend’ was to maintain Serbian domination in Yugoslavia. 
For Tudjman, there was a direct correlation between the existence of the ‘Jasenovac 
distortion’ and Serbian control. This ‘distortion’, he claimed, kept ‘Croatianness in shackles’, 
while, ‘instigating] Serbdom against Croatianness’.35 This contributed to his larger thesis -  
that the Serbs had been oppressing and persecuting the Croats since 1945. They had 
manipulated a false sense of Croatian guilt to humble and humiliate them. This was to be a 
time of ‘watershed’, as described by Kecmanovic, a time had at last arrived when Croatia 
could break free of its shackles -  the TRUTH could now be revealed.
Tudjman’s theories were controversial. Using various statistics, he arrived at a total of
50,000 killed overall, not just Serbs, and not just at Jasenovac -  but for all of the Ustasa 
camps in Croatia.36 He estimated that between 30,000 and 40,000 inmates had died at 
Jasenovac, and he listed them as, ‘Gypsies, Jews and Serbs, and even Croatians’ -  reversing 
the conventional order of deaths to imply that more Gypsies and Jews were killed than 
Serbs.37 Satiated with his own statistics, Tudjman concluded, ‘the fabled numbers of 
hundreds of thousands of slayings at Jasenovac are utter nonsense.’38 While BulajicD argued 
that the Jasenovac numbers were too low, and blamed the Vatican for this, Tudjman lashed 
out at the Serbian Orthodox Church. He accused them of inflating the numbers in order to 
divide Serbs and Croats, while rehabilitating the Nedic regime. Why the Serbian Church 
would have wished to do this was never explained.39
While a statistical analysis of Jasenovac deaths was important, ‘Tudjmanism’ also 
consisted of more general historical revisionism. Somewhat conspiratorial and melodramatic, 
Tudjman’s Jasenovac numbers were not overly controversial when compared to other 
revisionist numbers. More problematic was his application of ‘Tudjmanism’ to other periods 
of history, as part of a larger project to relativise the Ustasa genocide. A section of his book 
was devoted to violence, traced back to as long as humanity, ‘has been aware of its own 
existence’. Genocide also had an ancient pedigree, having existed ‘since the dawn of our 
primitive prehistory.’40 According to Tudjman, history was a never-ending series of violent 
acts and wars, beginning with Old Testament history, when, ‘violence, hatred, crime, and 
revenge are inseparable components in the life of man...’41
While almost unbelievable for a head of state, Tudjman launched a series of poorly 
aimed attacks on the Jews. He argued that the Jews had invented ethnic cleansing, as part of 
their Covenant with God. ‘Israel’, he claimed, ‘in both aggressive and defensive wars, acted 
as the executor of the will of God in history, which induced religious fervour and military 
heroism, but also mercilessness.’42 The Hebrew God was one who ‘demands utter
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annihilation; that is, complete destruction of the enemy, both of living beings and material 
goods.’43 Of the Holocaust, he famously wrote that, ‘The estimated loss of up to 6 million 
dead is founded too much on emotional, biased testimony and on exaggerated data in the 
post-war reckonings of war crimes and squaring of accounts with the defeated.’44 He also 
accused the Jews of committing genocide against the Palestinians in 1947, remarking, ‘After 
everything that it had suffered in history, particularly because of the monstrous suffering in 
the Second World War, the Jewish people would in a very short time initiate such a brutal 
and genocidal policy towards the Palestinians people that it has rightly been named as 
“Judeo-Nazism”.,45
The 1996 edition of Horrors o f War was a substantially revised edition from 
Tudjman’s original Wilderness o f Historical Reality, published in 1987. While his new 
edition had undergone much editing to make it palatable to a western market, it was still 
extremely shocking and controversial. If these revisionist arguments were not enough to 
question Tudjman’s motivations, he also sought to reduce the culpability of Ustasa death 
camps administrators. He claimed that the inmates’ administration at Jasenovac was entirely 
composed of Jewish capos, who were blamed for stealing gold and other valuables from the 
Gypsies. Theft, he claimed, and not racism, was the reason why the Jews were executed by 
the Ustasa.46 What emerged from Tudjman’s extreme moral relativism was the intrinsic 
unimportance of Jasenovac and indeed the Holocaust in world history.
While almost universally condemned for his revisionism, Tudjman pressed ahead 
with his plans to rehabilitate Croatian history. Because both the Holocaust and Jasenovac 
were reduced in importance and significance, Tudjman advocated converting Jasenovac into 
a memorial park, to commemorate ‘All Croatian war victims’.47 This plan was unveiled 
during his ‘State of the Croatian State and Nation Address’ in 1995. Tudjman planned to have 
both the ‘victims of Communism’ and the ‘victims of fascism’ buried at Jasenovac side by 
side. There were even plans to reinter Ante Pavelic at Jasenovac, before Tudjman met with a 
storm of criticism. He later credited his idea to General Franco, and his plan for a chapel in 
Toledo to commemorate both sides who had died in the Spanish civil war. Tudjman stated 
glowingly on one occasion, ‘In the figure of Franco, Spain found someone who had the 
courage and wisdom to say that Spanish Communists and Spanish Falangists equally fought
Aftfor Spain, but under separate flags. The same was happening in Croatia.’
Tudjman’s writings might have been influenced by the Historikerstreit, and the debate 
over the normalisation of German history. Nevertheless, Ernst Nolte and his colleagues did 
not excuse or minimise Nazi crimes, nor did they endeavour to rehabilitate Adolf Hitler.
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Tudjman’s agenda was qualitatively different. But while his views on Jasenovac were highly 
publicised, he was neither the first nor the last word on the subject. The literature is 
extensive, and was devised largely to counter the huge estimates advanced by Belgrade 
academics and the Orthodox Church. Croatian writers blamed the Serbian Orthodox Church 
and Tito’s government for inflating the number of war dead, the latter, in order to promote 
Serbian interests, and the former, in order to subdue the Croats while gaining larger war 
reparations from Germany.
For some Croatian historians, Zeijevic’s statistics formed the basis of analysis, while 
Kocovic’s were ignored. Josip Pecaric, for example, supported Zeijevic’s arguments, but 
blamed the Serbs in particular for manipulating the figures. The Orthodox Church and the 
Serbian intelligencia, he argued, were guilty of raising the number of dead, in order to 
obscure Serbian collaboration with the Germans, since they, ‘believed that it was possible to 
achieve Great Serbian ambitions within the Hitler’s system.’49 He also posited that such high 
numbers were designed to incite the Serbs of Croatia to revolt against the government.
Other more high profile writers simply ignored Zeijevic’s statistics, and proposed 
others in their stead, following Tudjman’s lead. Ante Beljo, in Genocide in Yugoslavia 
(1985), greatly contributed to the revisionist movement, claiming, ‘The very fact that the 
killings which are attributed to the Croats range from one hundred thousand to one million 
seven hundred thousand are a fabrication'50 Through a wealth of statistical evidence, he 
managed to ‘prove’ that there were more Serbs in Croatia after World War H than before it. 
Beljo, like many of his colleagues saw the Ustasa state only as an attempt to quell the, 
‘hegemonic tyranny over the Croatian people in Yugoslavia under the monarchy.’51
Echoing Tudjman’s earlier numbers, Beljo arrived at a total of 50,000 people killed at 
Jasenovac, and of these, ‘leftist Croats, followed by some Serbs, Gypsies and Jews, but 
mainly Communists.’52 The figure of 50,000 was also echoed by Grmek, Gjidara, and Simac, 
in their anti-Serbian anthology. As with Beljo, their numbers included 18,000 Jews, as well 
as some Gypsies and Croatians, leaving little space for Serbian deaths. Other writers put the 
total number of dead from concentration camps in 215,000, with only 79,000 Serbian 
casualties for all camps.54 Like Tudjman, Croatian academics substantially reduced the 
number of Serbian deaths, arguing that the Serbs had falsified their own victimisation in 
order to humble and humiliate Croatia.
Clearly, both sides manipulated the number of Jasenovac deaths to achieve specific 
nationalist goals. For the Croats, a low number exonerated the nation from its ‘black legend’, 
proving that the Croats were persecuted and mistreated during the Titoist period by the Serbs,
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who manipulated Jasenovac to falsely portray themselves as martyrs. By reducing the number 
of dead, Croatian writers debunked the myth of a genocidal Croatian nation. From the 
obverse perspective, a continued high number of deaths strengthened Serbian claims that they 
were the victims of a Holocaust during World War II. While one will never know the true 
number of deaths at Jasenovac, the politics and manipulations involved in such a cynical 
‘numbers game’ give valuable insight once again into the narcissism of minor differences 
which so characterised Serbian and Croatian academe. While relatively impartial surveys did 
exist, both sides chose to ignore these, instead arguing that their unrealistic high or low 
numbers were accurate. In such a case, the performative aspect of these revisions was clear -  
each side tried to play the victim, to cast themselves as martyrs, having suffered not only 
from genocide, but also a concerted effort by the enemy to cover up the TRUTH.
Bleiburg: The Croatian ‘Holocaust’:
For Croats, the massacre of Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian collaborators by Tito’s 
Partisans was rich in imagery. It symbolised Croatian repression in World War II, and later, 
during the Communist period. The facts of the story can be substantiated, although the 
number of deaths is again, difficult to establish with certainly. Towards the end of World War 
n, large numbers of Croatian Ustasa officials and soldiers, together with Croatian 
Domobrani, Slovenian White Guards, and Serbian Zbor, along with their families, retreated 
north, making their way to the Austrian border, where they hoped to escape Partisan reprisals. 
On 16 May, they encountered 150 British troops. On condition that they be interned outside 
Yugoslavia, a large number soldiers, administrators and civilians surrendered to the British. 
Bluffed by the British commander, they were packed into trains and rolled back into 
Yugoslavia, where they were massacred by Partisan forces.55 Bleiburg became the scene of 
British treachery, and the symbol for the mass murder of wartime collaborators namely 
Croats) by the Partisans.
Like Jasenovac, establishing number of dead was central to the debate over whether 
or not Bleiburg constituted a Croatian ‘Holocaust’. Unlike Jasenovac, however, most 
impartial historians converged on much lower numbers of dead, suggesting that Bleiburg was 
by no means as significant as the largest death camp in Yugoslavia. For example, Judah put 
the numbers killed at between 20,000 and 40,00056, Anzulovic at 50,000,57 Jelavich at 
between 40,000 and 100,000, ‘including civilians’58, and Tanner, at somewhere between the
200,000 suggested by ‘Croatian nationalists’, and the 30,000 suggested by ‘others’.59
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Jasper Ridley’s figures were perhaps the most accurate. He described how 200,000 
members of anti-Partisan forces, Slovenian White Guards, Croatian Ustasas and Domobrani 
and Serbian Zbor succeeded in reaching Austria after the war. 60 Of these, he noted that the 
Allies agreed to surrender 23,000 to the Partisans between the 24th and 29th of May -  
Slovenians, Serbians, and Croatians. Reports from the time, according to Ridley, indicate that 
not all of 23,000 were killed. Supposedly, most of the young boys were saved, since Colonel 
Penezic, the chief of Tito’s political police in Serbia, felt that the youth could still be, 
‘cherished and re-educated to be good and useful Communists’.61
Ridley gives a reasonably accurate number of between 20-23,000 killed, a high 
number of deaths which demonstrates a horrific massacre. This also squares well with the 
early references to the massacre in Milovan Djilas’ Wartime (1977), wherein he confirmed 
that the British handed over the escaping collaborators to the Partisans, who then 
subsequently massacred them. Djilas confirmed the numbers killed, mentioning between 20-
30,000 people, ‘Chetniks, the Ustashi, [and] the Slovenian Home guards’. There is no 
denying the severity of the massacre either, which Djilas described as, ‘senseless acts of 
wrathful retribution’, and ‘sheer frenzy’.62 Obviously there was little mention of the massacre 
officially, and Djilas’ dissident account was one of few descriptions, although he failed to 
mention it by name. One could argue that there was a conspiracy to suppress information 
about Bleiburg during the life-time of the SFRY -  this would be in keeping with much of 
Titoist policy surrounding the Partisans’s actions during wartime. Nevertheless, Bleiburg has 
fared as well as the history of any other World War II massacre. The main problem for 
Croats, however, was not simply that Bleiburg had not been adequately discussed, but that 
relative to the horrors of Jasenovac, it was non existent.
Inflating the numbers of dead at Bleiburg had several layers of significance. Firstly, it 
gave the Croats their own massacre, their own genocide at the hands of Serbs and/or 
Communists, which allowed them to counter the Serbs’ Jasenovac genocide with one of their 
own. Secondly, it allowed Croats to distance themselves from the Serbs and the Communist 
regime which had carried out the massacre. They could portray Croatia as an unwilling 
participant in the SFRY, more a prisoner than a constituent nation. Thirdly, by suffering such 
a massacre, the Croats underwent their own ‘way of the Cross’, as it was frequently dubbed 
in Croatian writings. The sins of the Ustasa could be cleansed by their martyrdom at 
Bleiburg, vindicating both the Croatian nation and the NDH.
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Croats and the Numbers Game:
There is little convergence among Croatian writers on the actual numbers of dead. 
Some, like Vladimir Zeijavic, cited a low number of between 54,500 - 65,000 (45,000 -
55.000 Croatian and Moslems, 1,500 - 2,000 Serbian and Montenegrin Cetniks, and about
8.000 Slovenian Belogardists), one which balanced out his low figure for Jasenovac.63 
University of Zagreb historian Josip Sentija described one massacre of between 30-40,000 
Croats, then argued that ‘several times that number’ were killed at Bleiburg, ‘and also along 
the roads in north-west Slovenia’.64 Another article contended that ‘more than 100,000 
Croatian civilians and soldiers were executed’.65 While high, these numbers suggest a 
conscientious effort to advance realistic numbers.
More radical writers, however, would follow the Serbian example, and inflate their 
numbers beyond recognition. Croatian propagandist C. Michael McAdams, for example, 
established a range from 100,000 to 250,000.66 Ivo Omrcanin arrived at a figure of ‘500,000 
Catholic and Muslim Croats’.67 Stjepan Hefer’s numbers were roughly the same: 150,000 
soldiers and 300,000 civilians.68 Putting the total killed at 400,000, Mislav Jezic described 
how soldiers and civilians fled to Austria, ‘out of fear of the greater-Serbian and communist 
terror.’69
Ante Beljo’s theories were equally contentious. In his description of Bleiburg, which
he called the ‘Croatian Holocaust’, he described an ‘exodus’ of 300,000 people. These
people, he claimed, were killed at a rate of 15,000 per day, a figure which he argued made
Bleiburg ‘worse than Auschwitz’, where only 6,000 were killed daily. 70 Beljo famously
argued, ‘The Yugoslav determination to liquidate the retreating Croatians was so
predetermined that they would clash even with the allies if these would take the Croatian
71refugees under their protection.’ But even Beljo managed to achieve balance by citing more 
extreme views than his own, such as George Prpic’s 1973 research, which described Bleiburg 
as, ‘the bloodiest orgy in Balkan history’, which, ‘resulted in the death and exodus of over 
one million men, women, and children’.72 While his numbers were more realistic than one 
million, Beljo’s assertion that Bleiburg was qualitatively worse than Auschwitz because of 
the frequency of killing constitutes a fine example of how Croatian writers tried to maximise 
the benefits of Bleiburg in the comparative genocide debate.
The only high ranking detractor of the Bleiburg myth was Franjo Tudjman, who 
placed the number of dead at, ‘some 35,000 to 40,000 people’. He even criticised Beljo’s
I'Xfigures, as well as those of other noted revisionists. Tudjman’s motives behind this are 
unclear, particularly since much of Beljo’s work was based on Tudjman’s earlier writing.
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Clearly, Tudjman was trying to distance himself from the whole debate, and seemed anxious 
during the war to have the number of Jasenovac and Bleiburg deaths be the same -  his figure 
of 50,000 was used for both.
Motives and Participants in Bleiburg:
In general, the high numbers of dead and the rate of killings insured that Bleiburg was 
seen as no ordinary massacre, but one which could be compared numerically with the 
Holocaust. This was of course only part of the story, for, as important as the high numbers 
were the identities of the participants and their motivations. Some, like McAdams, accused 
the British and Americans of initiating the massacre. He described a ‘march of death’ where 
Croatian soldiers and government officials were supposedly marched out of Zagreb at 
gunpoint by the Allied Expeditionary Forces. An exodus supposedly began in May of 1945, 
with 200,000 civilians and 200,000 soldiers, all of whom were apparently led to Bleiburg by 
the Allies, then handed over to the Communists for execution. As McAdams wrote, ‘Some 
were shot at the border, while others joined the infamous death march which took them 
deeper into the new People’s Republic for liquidation...’74 Why the British would have 
marched the Croats out of Zagreb to Austria, then back across the border into Yugoslavia 
again for the waiting Partisans, is not explained. Indeed, the large number of Croats that 
McAdams indicates suggests that a huge Allied force would have been needed to force the 
Croats anywhere, a force that simply did not exist in Yugoslavia at that time.
While the Allies were blamed, revisionist historians manipulated the story of Bleiburg 
to transform it into a massacre of Croats by Serbs. One of Philip Cohen’s more controversial 
arguments was that Serbian Communists, not just Communists, had carried out the Bleiburg 
massacres. Beginning with a dismissal of Serbian Partisans as opportunists, former 
collaborators and fascist killers, he went on to articulate his main argument,
It was only after the withdrawal of the Germans and the overthrow of the Nedic 
regime by advancing Soviet forces and their Partisan allies in October, 1944, that the 
Serbs in Serbia began to join the Partisans in large numbers. These new Partisans 
included tens of thousands of former Nazi collaborators responding to Tito’s promise 
of amnesty, as well as to the call of the Serbian king-in-exile -  reluctantly and under 
British pressure -  for Serbian Chetniks to join British forces.75
Here, the Croats were presented as indigenous resisters, while the Serbs joined merely 
to save themselves. Cohen used this idea of the opportunist Serbs to explain the Bleiburg 
massacre ‘of repatriated Croats and Slovenes, and even a number of Chetniks’.76 While
162
Cohen noted Tito’s strategy of, ‘instituting state terror to ensure the Communist’s post-war 
monopoly of power’, he also cited the more important reason why Bleiburg took place. This 
to allow for, ‘a Serb-driven blood letting’ -  to help cement Serbia’s loyalty to Tito’s
77movement. In Cohen’s analysis, the massacres had little to do with Tito exacting revenge, 
and much more to do with Serb driven malice, which even membership in the Partisans could
78not erase.
There were thus several layers to the Bleiburg story. At one level, the massacre was 
likened to the Holocaust, in terms of the numbers of people killed, and the rate of killings. 
This allowed for a general myth of victimisation -  that the Croats had suffered like the Jews 
because of Bleiburg. At another level, not only were the Partisans to blame, but rather, the 
Serbian-led Partisans, who were in fact genocidal Cetniks, using Communism as a screen for 
Greater Serbian aggression. Thus the Croats were likened to the Jews who suffered a 
Holocaust at the hands of genocidal Serbs. In this way, a conflict between fascist 
collaborators and vengeful Communists became a battle between victimised Croats and 
genocidal Serbs.
Cohen was clear that the Bleiburg massacre was Serbian led. Because of Bleiburg, 
they succeeded in dominating the SFRY and controlling it until its collapse. Further, Cohen 
accused Tito of allowing high-ranking Serbian collaborators to continue to oppress Croats 
and Slovenes in the SFRY. It is worth quoting his conclusion in full,
These events [the Bleiburg massacre] led to Serb numerical domination of 
Yugoslavia’s Communist Party and provided the window of opportunity for a 
substantial core of Serbian Nazi collaborators to attain influential positions in the 
postwar Yugoslav government. Although some of the most prominent Serbia pro- 
Axis collaborators were condemned and punished after the war, Tito nevertheless 
allowed a significant degree of historical revisionism by Serbian apologists rather 
than risk offending this much needed constituency.79
Here too the Serbs were seen at the core of a Yugoslavia which figured merely as 
another instrument of Serbian domination. Needless to say, most of Cohen’s conclusions 
were virtually impossible to prove. In the case of Bleiburg, he is unable to identify the actual 
soldiers who carried out the massacres, nor is he able to present any real proof that these 
Partisans were in fact Serbian.
Bleiburg as an Ustasa ‘Sacrifice9:
Croatian arguments supported the belief that the Croats were victims of a Serb 
inspired Holocaust, one which Serbs used instrumentally to gain control of the second
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Yugoslavia. But Bleiburg also performed another important role -  that of vindication. Terms 
such as ‘Holocaust’, ‘march of death’, ‘exodus’ and ‘genocide’ were used with the specific 
intent of rehabilitating the Ustasa. Ustasa war criminals were ‘magically’ transformed into 
innocent victims of Serbian aggression. They were not killed as collaborators, but as Croatian 
patriots who wanted an independent homeland. This rehabilitation proved central to the 
Bleiburg project, particularly for those like Beljo, who fundamentally believed that Croatians 
had never done anything in their history that they should be ashamed of, since he argued, 
‘[tjhroughout history we have never conquered, plundered or exploited other nations’.80
Academics, such as Josip Sentija elaborated on this the rehabilitation. Using such 
metaphors as ‘march of death’ and ‘way of the cross’, Sentija argued that the Croats 
redeemed themselves for the Ustasa period by dying in mass numbers at the hands of the 
Communists. They may have been misled, but their sacrifice somehow purified the entire 
Croatian nation of its sins.81 Such imagery was indeed fascinating, as it reflected many of the 
themes raised in the Serbian myth of Kosovo, primarily the aestheticisation of the victim, and 
the ideal of being morally victorious in defeat. Rather than being massacred by the Partisans, 
these soldiers seemingly gave their lives in defence of Croatia. Bleiburg thus became a ‘myth 
of election’ in its own right, in that it transformed Nazi collaborators into patriots, making 
Croats victims in World War II, rather than aggressors.
The official perpetuation of this form of amnesia regarding Ustasa crimes took shape 
most recently on 15 May, 1997, when the Croatian government organised a holy mass at 
Bleiburg, to commemorate the 52nd anniversary of the tragedy. The mass brought 1,000 
pilgrims to Austria, at which time, Dubravko Jelcic, the Croatian Parliament president 
representative described Bleiburg as, ‘one of the greatest tragedies in history of the Croatian 
people’, marking, ‘a new kind of slavery await[ing] Croatia’ (clearly a reference to a ‘Serb 
dominated’ Yugoslavia). Continuing the process of rehabilitating the Ustasas, he painted 
them are patriots rather than fascists, ‘[T]he issue is about Croats who fanatically believed in 
a Croatian state, not about an ideology -- red or black — that was not even apparent.’ This 
type of revisionism glossed over the very real atrocities committed by Croats during the war. 
It is also a way of discrediting Yugoslavia, for as Jelcic was keen to add, ‘All that is founded 
on evil collapses, and that is why Yugoslavia is forevermore our past and Croatia our 
awakened future..’82
Croatian parliamentary president Vlatko Pavletic took Bleiburg a step further, and 
universalised the massacre, arguing that it had become nothing less than, ‘the generic term for 
the suffering of Croats’. Further, he maintained that the struggle against fascism and Nazism,
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had been supported by the entire Croatian population, again, a form of extremely revisionism 
which ran counter to historical fact. Other controversial theories included the contention that, 
‘Croats were the first antifascists in Europe and the world’ and that, ‘the majority of NDH 
military units, fought against fascism’. These statements were revisionist in the extreme.83 By 
this time, a form of collective amnesia had taken hold of many HDZ officials. By acting out 
or performing their role as martyred victims, Croatian nationalist leaders convinced 
themselves, and their fellow Croats, that Croatia had nothing to be ashamed of. The slate had 
now been wiped clean.
Pavletic’s attempts to universalise the lessons of Bleiburg is another fascinating 
aspect of this particular myth. Like the universalisation of the Holocaust, Bleiburg was 
supposedly significant enough that it could become a symbol for Croatia. Bleiburg made 
victims of the Croatian fascists, while once again demonising the Serbs for their age old plans 
to construct a ‘Greater Serbia’ in the Balkans. Whether they were Cetniks or Communists, the 
lesson was clear -  a Serb was always a Serb, and would continue to hate Croatians, no matter 
what ideology he or she followed. At the same time Bleiburg encapsulated the antagonism 
between the Croatian self and the Serbian dominated Communist others in the SFRY.
Because Bleiburg was covered up, and the Serbs supposedly dominated Yugoslavia, the 
Croatian ‘Holocaust’ continued for another 45 years after World War II. This made Croatian 
involvement in the SFRY seem unnatural, which again buttressed their decision to leave the 
Federation.
Ubiquitous throughout the conflict has been nationalist kitsch; Bleiburg has fared no 
differently. New Zealand artist Suzanne Brooks-Pincevic recently produced a series of 
paintings on the ‘Bleiburg Tragedy’, which she dedicated to ‘the Croatian cause’. The 
paintings and her consequent book gave an overview of ‘Croatia’s violent rebirth’. Typically, 
the book covered the links between World War II ‘genocide’ against the Croats by the Serbs 
and Communists, and the ‘complicity’ of Britain in mass murder. It further promised to,
‘slash open the fabric of silence that has shrouded the truth of Croatia's past’. In the end the 
reader was confronted with the ‘a century of genocide’ committed by the Serbs against the 
Croats.84
While Croatian writers had been obsessed with Bleiburg for many decades, the new 
innovation after 1990 was the targeting of Serbs as the prime culprit in the massacre. Croatian 
expatriate writer Krunoslav Draginovic wrote an expose of the massacre in 1955, citing a 
figure of between 100-140,000 soldiers and civilians killed. He even used Biblical imagery 
sich as ‘Calvary’ and ‘way of the cross’ to describe the forced marches and the positioning of
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mass graves. The difference between old and new lay in Bleiburg’s executioners. In 
Draginovic’s account, Tito and the Communists were clearly the instigators of the genocide. 
The Serbs are not even mentioned. Until Milosevic, there was simply no need to highlight 
any form of Serbian aggression. Bleiburg, like most other aspects of Serbian and Croatian 
history, was highly subject to manipulation. One wonders if Montenegrin or Slovenian 
Communists would have committed genocide against the Croats, if they, and not the Serbs 
had destroyed the federation.
There is an obvious problem with the high numbers at Bleiburg -  it conflicted with 
the equally common claims of Croatian historians that few Croats supported the NDH, that 
defection was high, and that most Croats were part of the Partisan movement. Two clear 
contradictions emerge here. First of all, if it was indeed so easy for the Cetniks to join up with 
the Partisans during Tito’s quest for volunteers, why did the Ustasa and Domobran not do the 
same? As well, if the Croats were the vanguard of Partisan resistance, why were they not able 
to stop the massacres? Indeed, if they claim to have been the majority, it is almost certain that 
the massacre, no matter how large -  must have involved many Croatian Partisans, which 
makes perfect sense, since they too would have an axe to grind against their fellow nationals 
who had collaborated. This logical conundrum can be explained simply by the fact that 
Croatian historians were attempting to cover all bases. They want to be victims of a 
Holocaust, the leaders in anti-Fascist resistance, the founders of the SFRY, and conscientious 
objectors to the NDH regime.
Conclusions:
As this chapter indicates, the legacy of World War II continued to be of paramount 
importance during the contemporary war in Croatia, and the later war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Chief among Serbian and Croatian concerns was the extent to which they were victims of 
World War II. By proving their own victimisation at the hands of Croatian enemy, Serbs 
portrayed their machinations in Croatia as self-defensive, preventing a ‘repeated genocide’ of 
Serbs. Similarly, for Croats, the massacre at Bleiburg demonstrated a pattern of Serbian 
genocidal aggression, followed by scheming, cover ups and political dominance. Clearly, 
being a victim of a Holocaust carried tremendous moral and political weight, and each side 
was anxious to use such imagery to its fullest extent. As Finkielkraut, Landau and others have 
noted, the universalisation of the Holocaust has allowed for the borrowing of its symbols in 
the service of social and political movements.
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The issue of performativity was of central importance in understanding Jasenovac and 
Bleiburg revisions. By casting themselves as victims of genocide in World War II, both sides 
were able to play the victim in the 1990s, arguing that contemporary events were a repeat of 
the past. Kecmanovic’s negative myths, those o f ‘damage’, ‘plot’, ‘universal culprit’, and 
‘counteridentification’, were commonly used by both sides to highlight the strong differences 
between each side and their role in World War II. The reinterpretation of Serbian and 
Croatian history was extremely important. The mere fact that a public questioning of 
Communist official history was possible signalled that a ‘turning point’ or ‘watershed’ had 
come. The fact that history was open to reinterpretation seemingly implied that intellectual 
freedom had been restored, and that a definitive break with the Communist system had taken 
place. Unfortunately, this was not the case.
Both sides, in acting like the suffering victims of either Jasenovac or Bleiburg 
aestheticised their victimisation, legitimating their attempts to expand or defend their own 
state borders. If actions in the 1990s were to be extensions of those in the 1940s it was 
imperative to prove that these earlier actions were horrific and genocidal. Each side, by 
proving its own ‘Holocaust’ was able to convince their own people that they needed to 
defend themselves against the renewed horrors of genocide. At the same time, recalling the 
Second World War allowed both sides to deny the reality of Serbian-Croatian co-operation 
during the SFRY, leading to the view that its break-up was both inevitable and natural.
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Chapter Seven: Communism, Post-Communism, 
and the War in Croatia
‘Not only is the Yugoslav reality as twisted as the tunnels that held the Minotaur, but 
the observer keeps coming face to face with himself seeing his own image spring out 
from what he thinks are the events of history, unable to separate projection from 
observation, fact from reflection, selffrom other. ’
-E. A. Hammel in: The Yugoslav Labyrinth -
Introduction:
After World War II, and the devastation caused by German and Italian invasion, the 
Yugoslav peoples had the task of rebuilding their society, after it had been tom apart by 
occupation and fratricidal warfare. The legends surrounding Tito’s Communist Partisans and 
their war of liberation are well known, immortalised in such works as Milovan Djilas’ 
Wartime, Fitzroy Maclean’s The Heretic, and Frank Lindsay’s Beacons in the Night.
However, as discussed in the previous two chapters, contemporary Serbian and Croatian 
reinterpretations of this period were often negative. The Croatian myth of Bleiburg advanced 
that the foundations of Tito’s Yugoslavia were constructed on the genocide of Croatian 
soldiers. For the Serbs, Tito was little more than an ethnic Croat with a grudge against 
Yugoslavia’s largest and most powerful nation. Both sides presented the lifetime of the 
SFRY as an era when national identity was suppressed under a barrage of Communist 
propaganda. National symbols were replaced with ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, and Tito’s own 
cult of personality. In Tito’s Yugoslavia, ethnic hatreds seemingly smouldered below the 
surface, manifesting themselves in bizarre and often contradictory ways.
The first part of this chapter will explore Serbian and Croatian nationalist 
interpretations of the Yugoslav period, during its rise, its decline, and finally, its Fall. The 
second will examine how propagandists succeeded in making direct connections between 
past eras of persecution, and the contemporary wars of the 1990s. For both sides, the past was 
nothing more than a template for the present and the future. Past patterns of behaviour, 
values, morals, paradigms, and ideologies, directly determined national goals and priorities in 
the 1990s. National leaders were seen as little more than the latest exponent of age-old 
ideologies and national strategies. The theme of the ‘universal culprit’ was advanced 
throughout the conflict.
t l iMilosevic was seen as a 19 century Greater Serbian politician, with a bit of Adolf 
Hitler thrown in for good measure. Tudjman was seen to be nothing less than the
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reincarnation of Ante Pavelic. World War II was being re-enacted in Serbia and Croatia, and 
all decisions would be calculated on an analysis of the past, not on a realistic assessment of 
contemporary events. Propagandists seemingly lived in the past, but this was a past that was 
cleverly manufactured. Milosevic’s huge rallies and religious processions, and Tudjman’s 
elaborate uniforms and ubiquitous memorials, turned parts of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia- 
Hercegovina into giant surreal nationalist theme parks.
Seen as a conflict of Biblical proportions, participants in the contemporary conflict 
were presented as actors in a drama, performing according to well-rehearsed nationalist 
patterns of behaviour. The enemy recreated a xenophobic nationalist regime, bent on 
genocide. One’s own nation could do little except battle heroically against the forces of evil, 
hoping that the nation would be redeemed from its Fall. The uniqueness and originality 
behind this historical revisionism was the fatalism attached to events as they transpired. 
Everyone saw their actions as responses, rather than as individual initiatives. Leaders claimed 
that they were responding to historic injustices, rather than actively creating something new. 
They also portrayed nationalism as a movement to correct the injustices of the past, rather 
than advancing a utopian project or a grand vision of the future.
The Communist Era: 1945 -1990:
In coming to terms with the Communist period, there was certainly much to criticise. 
Tito’s dictatorial rule relied on a corrupt base of power, and a personality cult of messianic 
proportions. The country was burdened by overcentralisation, massive foreign debt, and a 
powerful secret police force -  which cracked down on any internal dissent. Many saw 
Communism as an artificially imposed Russian system, forced on the people by Tito and 
Stalin -  an attempt to destroy indigenous nationalisms. One might even add that in the 
Partisans’ expulsion of Yugoslavia’s German minorities after 1945, they were promoting the 
ideals of ethnic cleansing which would become a key facet of nationalism in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina five decades later. Banac argues that there were more than 513,000 Germans in 
the 1921 census, most of whom were descendants of German colonists brought in by the
tViHabsburgs in the 18 century. Most of these people were forced out after the Partisans gained 
control of the country.1
Despite these detractions, Yugoslavia was the freest country in Eastern Europe, the 
most open to the west, and certainly one of the richest and most cosmopolitan countries in the 
Balkans. While most of the wealth was concentrated in Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia’s 
economy did come close to rivalling that of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic
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Republic. Additionally, Tito was genuinely popular with his people. In many ways, he held 
the country together, and was more successful as a leader than his other Balkan counterparts 
-  Nicholai Ceausescu, Todor Zhivkov, or Enver Hoxha.
The positive aspects of Communism in Yugoslavia were obvious -  a high standard of 
living, the freedom to travel and work abroad, and a strong sense of patriotism. Yugoslavia 
was a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, and played an important geopolitical role as a 
symbolic bridge between east and west, Capitalism and Communism. When nationalism rose 
to the forefront in the 1980s, there was little attempt to actually bring about a post- 
Communist society, as was marginally achieved in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. The Yugoslav successor states, like their Balkan neighbours, did not 
dismantle Communism as system of government. Little attempt was made to criticise the 
legacy of Communism itself, or to attack the rampant corruption, the rising foreign debts, or 
any of the other stark realities of the system. Both Tudjman and Milosevic □ appreciated the 
level of power a Communist dictator could enjoy, and they were not about to relinquish the 
many advantages that leadership afforded in the old system.
When Serbian and Croatian nationalists criticised the Titoist era, the national question 
loomed large, out of proportion with more important issues. Yugoslavia was condemned 
because it inhibited nationalism, because it allowed ‘enemy’ national groups to gain power 
and control events. Tito was not condemned for being dictatorial or corrupt, but rather, for 
being controlled by either the Serbs or the Croats -  for giving away too much of one’s 
nation’s historic possessions to another national group. Communism was seen as a catalyst 
for the enemy nation to gain power and influence. It was not condemned as a failed system, 
but as an instrument -  infinitely subject to manipulation. Thus, there was never any real 
attempt to purge Communism from the country as such, only to correct the national 
imbalances of the system.
While Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia saw Communism as a crime committed 
against all citizens, Serbian and Croatian nationalists painted federal Communism as the root 
of their problems, an evil which was selectively deployed against specific national groups, 
not against the country as a whole. Milosevic’s solution was to recentralise the SFRY; 
Tudjman’s was to pull Croatia out of it. By separating Communism and Federalism, Serb and 
Croat leaders managed to retain most aspects of the Communist system intact. While purged 
of non-nationals, most of the key ministries remained the same. Rigid control over state 
enterprises, the media and other aspects of life remained. Both Tudjman and Milosevic were
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keen to carve out their own Tito-esque cults of personality, Milosevic as a reincarnation of 
Prince Lazar, Tudjman with his gold braided uniforms as a ready-made Tito-for-Croats.
This separation of Communism and Federalism was all-important, as it allowed 
nationalists to demonise certain aspects of Titoist Yugoslavia, while preserving others. There 
was no doubt that Tito’s Communism had improved the state considerably, and very much 
brought Yugoslavia, technologically and industrially, into the 20th century. It was not the 
generation of wealth or industry that was attacked, but the balance between the different 
national groups -  who got what, and how much. Even when the Communist government was 
attacked for persecuting the people, (the use of police harassment, or imprisonment on the 
prison island Goli Otok), persecution was not seen as part of the system, but was blamed on 
nationalists manipulating the system against members of other nations. Persecution was based 
on nationality, not on ideology. When Communism was attacked, the variant of Communism 
was condemned. Serbs were constantly blamed for trying to over-centralise or Stalinise the 
system. Croats were blamed for wanting decentralisation, while hoarding all the profits of 
tourism for themselves. Such issues demonstrated the system’s failure to restrain nationalism, 
not the system’s failure itself.
Serbian Views of Tito’s Yugoslavia:
Arguably, Serbian writers had generally supported the Communist regime in 
Yugoslavia. Certainly the execution of Draza Mihailovic, the purges of Cetnik sympathisers, 
the decentralising 1974 constitution, and other anti-Serbian aspects of the regime raised 
troubling questions about Serbia’s place in the SFRY. Nevertheless, while Tito was alive, 
there seemed to be a high level of support for the regime and its policies. An obvious 
example of this was during the 1969 elections, when Serbs were offered the choice between 
reformers and hard-line candidates. While the rest of the country chose reform oriented 
candidates, Serbs overwhelmingly supported the old guard.
Nevertheless, by 1986, Serbian writers had turned on the system, as Yugoslavia began 
to fall apart. Dobrica Cosic was one of the first to condemn Tito’s Yugoslavia for reducing 
Serbia to a mere Communist province without history, culture, or national identity. He had 
fallen from grace in 1968 for criticising Tito’s positive policies towards the Kosovar 
Albanians. His writings in the late 1980s reflected his rejection of Yugoslav Communism. In 
The Sinner and The Outcast, Cosic, derided the federal system for suppressing Serbian 
identity and nationalism. Moscow and the Comintern, he posited, had installed an 
“anti-Serbian” Communist regime in Yugoslavia.3 He would later add,
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In the course of the four decades of Titoist tyranny, the Serbian people suffered from 
a veritable de-historification. Serbian identity and historical, spiritual, economic and 
political integrity were systematically demolished. The symbols and the fruits of the 
war of liberation belonging to the Serbian people were denigrated and falsified, while 
confiscating our magnificent Middle Age, shortening our history ... the entire history 
of the Serbian people was reduced to the history of the socialist movement, while the 
history of the communist party itself was reduced to the era of Tito.4
Themes of an anti-Serbian Communism would eventually find their way into the 1986 
SANU Memorandum. Among the Communists’s damnable offences was their explicit 
support of anti-Yugoslav secessionist movements in 1925. The fact that there was no Serbian 
Communist Party organisation until 1945 was also seen to indicate a consistent anti-Serbian 
bias.5 While one cannot deny the veracity of the events in question, it is clear that Tito’s early 
movement was aimed at destroying a repressive, nationalist monarchy, based on his own 
Communist beliefs, rather than any Croatian or Slovenian national convictions.
Other Serbian views included the theory that the Serbs had been continuously 
exploited economically. The Memorandum advanced that the Communists had reduced the 
economic potential of Serbia, in favour of Slovenia and Croatia. Serbia was forced to support 
undeveloped regions, while selling its natural resources at subsidised prices to the developed 
republics. For the Memorandum's authors, this came as no surprise, given that the ‘Croat’
Tito and the ‘Slovene’ Kardelj were the key officials behind such economic policies.6 A 
common theory was that Serbia was economically exploited by the richer republics of Croatia 
and Slovenia, and at the same time by poorer republics, such as Kosovo and Macedonia. 
Rather than attack the massive foreign debts, the corruption and the wholesale neglect of the 
economy by Tito and his Partisan clique, known affectionately at the ‘Club of 1941 ’, Serbian 
writers chose to focus on what they perceived to be the deliberate and conscious 
impoverishment of Serbia. In reality, Serbia’s poverty was an indirect result of much larger 
problems.
Administrative Versus Natural Borders:
As discussed in previous chapters, a key issue during the war in Croatia was the 
legitimacy of borders. Because the borders of all federal republics were put in place by Tito 
and the Djilas Commission, Serbian writers argued that these borders were purely artificial, 
the result of Croatian machinations to reduce the size of historic Serbia. For some of the more 
powerful Serbian institutions, like the Serbian Association of University Teachers, Tito’s 
Croatian background was blamed for the supposed increase in Croatia’s size after 1945, and
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Serbia’s shrinking. For such professional associations, Tito had created nothing less than a 
‘Greater Croatia’, during the lifetime of the SFRY. Others similarly denounced the borders 
as a ‘political improvisation’, while denying that they had any historic basis.8
For Serbian writers, the implications were very clear. The Serbs alone were targeted 
by ‘Croat Josip Broz Tito’.9 While the other nations, such as the Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian 
Moslems, and Macedonians were granted their own national republics, one third of Serbs 
were forced to live outside Serbia. It was Tito’s ethnic identity which was all-important for 
the Serbs. He had purposely weakened them, the largest and most important nation in 
Yugoslavia, with some 40% of the population. Because of his ethnicity, and the fact that the 
borders had been created to favour Croatia, Serbian writers argued that there was a serious 
divergence between the borders of nations and the border of republics. The result was a clear 
denial of Croatia’s right to leave Yugoslavia with its borders intact. Any secession without 
negotiations on new borders was considered to be illegal, hence the need for the JNA.
The most common view of the conflict was promoted by various Serbian 
‘constitutional’ and ‘federalism’ experts, who claimed to be analysing the break-up of 
Yugoslavia according to the prescriptions of international law. Milosevic’s contribution to the 
breakdown of the Federation was always avoided. Rather, a highly legalistic interpretation of 
developments would conveniently gloss over Serbian politicking. Serbian writers often 
blamed the war in Croatia on what was termed ‘the unilateral and illegal secession’ of 
Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia. They further blamed the international community, 
primarily Germany and the Vatican, for recognising Slovenia, Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, turning their ‘administrative’ borders into international borders when 
minority rights were still hanging in the balance. The problem for such writers was that 
‘almost 3 million Serbs’ lived in these newly independent republics, and were now cut off 
from their fellow Serbs.10
Croatia was therefore accused of several things -  of leaving Yugoslavia without 
consulting the other republics, and of deliberately endangering the lives of the Serbian 
minority living there. The supposed ‘illegality’ of Croatian actions was hypocritical at best, 
when compared with Milosevic’s own manipulation of borders and boundaries. Nevertheless, 
such accusations followed logically from accusations that Tito had deliberately conspired 
with Croatian and Slovenian Communists to reduce the power of his ‘enemy’ -  Serbia. 
Because of this situation, the Serbs were now justified, from a purely legalistic viewpoint, in 
having their own referendum on the independence of the Krajina, ‘since their ancestors 
settled these territories more than 500 years ago’.11 While the Croats were denounced for not
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upholding the democratic will of the Serbs, they were also condemned as hypocrites, for 
expecting the Yugoslav government to honour their own referendum on sovereignty.
As Slobodan Samardzic argued, the ‘illegal’ secession of Croatia and Slovenia 
destroyed the basic ‘constitutional corpus of “acquired rights’” that had been present in the 
Federation. Within the SFRY, Croatian Serbs had special rights as a constitutive people, a 
status which disappeared once Croatia became independent. From a purely legalistic and 
constitutional standpoint, Samardzic justified the war in Croatia. Serbs, he posited, had to 
protect themselves against the ‘ethnic homogenization’ of the country, which was making 
Croatian Serbs, ‘minorities against their will’.12 This view that Croatian Serbs were being 
forced to leave Yugoslavia was a key argument in promoting the Krajina referendum. Using a 
variety of persuasive technical and legal arguments, Samardzic tried to gloss over the reality 
of what was happening in Croatia at that time. Paramilitary forces and the JNA, both 
encouraged by Milosevic, were in control of one third of Croatian territory in 1994 when his 
article was written. Clearly, there was much more at stake than Serbs worried about a change 
in their ‘constitutional status’.
The difference between the borders of federal units and the borders of states was a
theme constantly reiterated by Serbian academics. Serbs were quick to argue, ‘only nations
1 ^can seceded from Yugoslavia, and not territories of republics’. One Ministry of Information 
spokesperson thus described Croatia’s manipulation of international law, in order to ‘seize 
another nation and another territory and to lend legal force to such an act’, clearly something 
the Serbs disputed.14 The main argument was simple -  Tito had never intended to allow 
individual republics to secede. He saw republican borders as administrative only.
Croatian nationalists obvious had a contrary view of the situation. They commonly 
argued that Croatia’s borders were not administrative, but ethnic and cultural. Serbian 
arguments were refuted by Croatian geographers, who described their borders as, ‘among the 
oldest in Europe’. A survey by two geographers, Crkvencic and Klemencic, revealed that 
there had been only a 10% change in Croatia’s borders in the 20th century, and these had 
resulted in a loss of Croatian territory after 1918, due to the success of Greater Serbia.15 Thus, 
Croatian territory had become smaller during the SFRY, not bigger, as the Serbs alleged. 
Other writers traced the historic origin of Croatia’s borders, which were defined during war 
against the Ottomans in the 17th and 18th centuries, and had remained more or less unchanged 
since that time.16
Croatian writers also managed to defend the minority issue, since Croatia, with 80% 
of its people being ‘Croat’, had the same degree of homogeneity as Spain or Great Britain,
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allowing these writers to posit, ‘Croatia presents a common European phenomenon’.17 Still 
other Croatian writers argued that while 24% of Serbs lived outside of Serbia, some 22% of 
Croats lived outside Croatia. Since Croatia, ‘had never demanded the annexation of those 
areas of other republics’, the Serbs were obliged to follow this example and accept the 
situation.18 Croatian Serbs would have to accept their minority status and not challenge the 
new state of affairs. The problem, of course, was that neither Spain nor Great Britain saw 
themselves as a homeland for one people only. There were no ethnic nationalist dictators in 
these countries, preaching intolerance against its minority groups. At the time these books 
were written, Croatia had not yet attacked Bosnia-Hercegovina, but this too would soon 
change, as Croatia pledged itself to defending its own people in Bosnia. It would then do 
exactly what it accused the Serbs of doing -  demand the annexation of other territory.
The 1974 Constitution and Genocide:
In 1974, an ailing Tito decided to reform the constitution of Yugoslavia. He wanted to 
ensure that the Federation continued in some form after his death. However, the 1974 
Constitution was a highly contentious development. It greatly decentralised the SFRY, 
granting autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina, while decentralising many of the 
administrative and financial functions controlled by the federal government. The Constitution 
also established an unwieldy rotating presidency, with a seven-member presidium. One 
presidium representative from each republic would take a turn at running the country. 
Croatian nationalist writers, in reviewing the Constitution, had little to complain about. The 
Constitution, as they presented it, gave each republic the status of a separate state, including 
such attributes as the inviolability of borders. Thus Croats used Tito’s decentralising 
Constitution to argue that their separation from Yugoslavia was perfectly justified and legal.19
The Serbs, by contrast, saw the Constitution as the root of many of their problems. It 
reduced their control over Kosovo and Vojvodina, while significantly hampering the power 
of the federal centre to make decisions for the Federation. It also reduced the power of the 
federal government to guarantee Serbian minority rights in other republics. Without 
centralised power, Serbs worried that they would suffer discrimination outside of Serbia. 
Kosovo was a particularly important thorn in Serbia’s side. Their loss of control here seemed 
to reflect the age-old Serbian catastrophist maxim: ‘Winners in war, losers in peace’. 
Journalists blamed the Constitution for creating Serbian minorities in Croatia, Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, and Kosovo. For many Serbs, the creation minorities in autonomous republics 
was the first stage in a campaign of genocide.
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With its many lurid photos and graphic descriptions, The Uprooting, by historian 
Bozidar Zecevic was one of many publications which denounced Tito’s manipulation of 
Kosovo to humiliate the Serbs. Rather than contributing to Serbian greatness, Kosovo was 
used as an instrument to reduce Serbian power. Zecevic□ attacked the ‘treacherous’ Yugoslav
Communists, for working with Kosovar Albanian separatists to create a ‘Greater Albania’ in
01Kosovo. Encouraging Albanian nationalism was presumably a way of weakening the Serbs 
— supposedly a central goal of the Communist regime.
Tito was also accused of ethnically cleansing Serbs during his four decades of rule. 
Examples of this line of argumentation were analysed in ‘Chapter Three’. What began as a 
fear of persecution in Kosovo spread to Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. As the Serbian 
Unity Congress described, ‘Tito’s favorite method of punishing the Serbs, whom he hated 
personally and discriminated against officially, was to allow the Croats and Muslims to rid 
their territories of Serbs by depriving them of their political, cultural, religious, and human 
rights.’ Included here was a list of the number of Serbs ‘ethnically cleansed’ during Tito’s 
rule: 121,376 from Croatia, and 205,542 from Bosnia-Herzegovina, making a grand total of 
326,918.22 The SUC neglected to explain how these numbers were calculated.
The 1974 Constitution was, for Serbs, the root of Yugoslavia’s many ills. Samardzic 
noted how the Constitution weakened the federal state, by taking centralised control from the 
federal party and Tito, and devolving it down to the individual republics, who became more 
powerful and more authoritarian. Decentralisation, and not Milosevic’s attempts to over­
centralise the country, was blamed for the ‘internal disintegration’ of Yugoslavia in the 
1980s. If anything, Milosevic □ was credited with trying to re-establish, ‘the integrational link 
between the federal units’, to prevent the ‘anarchoid form’ that it had taken after 1974.23 
Again, blaming Tito’s legacy for the breakdown of Yugoslavia deflected criticism away from 
Milosevic’s obvious attempts to hijack the federal system.
Genocidal Croats: Croatian Nationalism in the SFRY:
Structurally, the SFRY seemingly went against Serbian interests. However, Tito was 
not the only one responsible for Serbia’s weakened status. Two Croatian Communist officials 
were often cited in Serbian literature as enemies of the Serbian nation -  Ivan ‘Stevo’ Krajacic 
and Andrija Hebrang. Hebrang was often condemned as a Croatian nationalist with 
influential connections, who tried to manipulate Tito into reducing Serbian power. In reality, 
Hebrang was one of Tito’s most bitter rivals. As one of the most powerful Partisan leaders in 
Croatia, he tried unsuccessfully to advance Croatian interests at the Federal level, arguing
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that Croatia’s borders had been clipped by the Djilas Commission. He also argued against the 
unfair exchange rates imposed on Croatia after 1945, while similarly condemning the many 
show trials set up to punish supposed collaborators. Hebrang was never a serious threat to 
Serbian interests, since he was demoted several times after 1945, and was eventually placed 
under house arrest in 1948.24
Krajacic was seemingly a more dangerous figure. Krajacic was not a typical Croatian 
Communist; he was also the main resident representative of the Fourth Soviet Intelligence 
Service, and was cast as a sinister puppet master, with powerful contacts in Moscow. He was 
supposedly so powerful that even Tito was afraid of him. For Serbian historians, Krajacic was 
a useful scapegoat for why the system went wrong, for why the Serbs were victims in 
Yugoslavia. He, and not Tito, was blamed for persecuting Serbs during the bloody 
Communist purges after World War II. He was even blamed for founding the infamous 
prison camp at Goli Otok, as a means of punishing Serbs and Montenegrins, who constituted, 
‘the overwhelming majority of those detained and carefully watched over.’
Krajacic was presented as a cynical Croatian nationalist with incredible personal 
power. The fall of Serbian Communist leader Aleksander Rankovic was blamed on him, who 
supposedly brought about his downfall in order to carry out increased decentralisation, a plan 
of benefit only to Croatia, since ‘the virus of Croatian nationalism kept smouldering in 
him*.26 His nickname -  ‘The Conducator of Separatism’ was derived from his advocacy of 
Croatian separatism, as well as his dictatorial qualities, which made him similar to Romania’s 
own ‘Conducator’ -  Nikolai Ceausescu. Krajacic was also accused of being a supporter of the 
Ustasa, and a keen advocate of genocide as a means of dealing with the Serbs. He supposedly 
commented at the opening of the Jasenovac memorial in 1966, ‘Here we killed too few of 
you!’.27 Purportedly, Krajacic was forced to resign as President of the Croatian Parliament for 
this indiscretion.
The Krajacic conspiracy had some rather obvious motives. By the mid-1980s, Serbian 
historians had begun the process of rehabilitating Rankovic, who had been stripped of his 
powers in 1966. Rankovic founded Yugoslavia’s secret police, and served as Minister of the 
Interior during Yugoslavia’s most oppressive period after World War II. He was often 
portrayed in Croatian writing as a die-hard Serbian nationalist who abused his powers to 
advance Serbian interests. It was clear that Rankovic was a keen advocate of centralisation, 
and was seen to be the natural successor to Tito once he died or retired. His fall from grace 
was therefore a serious blow to Serbian prestige, and those who cherished the idea that a Serb 
could have ruled Yugoslavia -  if it were not for Croatian backroom dealings.
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A primary reason why Rankovic □ was stripped of his position was his persecution of 
the Kosovar Albanian population. Police repression in the province, and several staged show 
trials of supposed ‘Albanian spies’ at Prizren in 1956, greatly increased the friction between 
Serbs and Croats. While Rankovic □ was seen as a man who could keep the Kosovars in their 
place, he also provoked Kosovar anger and desires for separatism. While some Serbs saw him 
as a hero, whose demise opened the Pandora’s box of Albanian nationalism, the reverse was 
probably true. It was also certain that Rankovic, and not Krajacic, had established Goli 
Otok, where Tito sent some 7,000 people. The quest for a suitable scapegoat to hide 
Rankovic’s activities was never very successful. For one thing, everyone knew who Rankovic 
was, whereas no one had ever heard of Krajacic. Whether he was as all-powerful as Serbs 
suggest, or simply another mid level Communist official, is still open to dispute.
Croatian Perceptions of the SFRY:
Like their Serbian counterparts, the Croats presented Yugoslavia as an era of 
persecution and repression. Their national spirit was choked under the rigours of Titoist 
Communism, their nationalist leaders were driven into exile, and Croatia’s most acclaimed 
writers and scholars were imprisoned. While earlier Croatian Diaspora accounts often 
focussed on the horrors of Tito’s regime, later accounts during the 1990s blamed the Serbs, 
and not Tito, for destroying the system. Attacks on Communist tyranny were soon replaced 
with even more vitriolic attacks on Serbian treachery and greed. In an attempt to justify their 
separation from the SFRY, Croatian nationalists insisted that Serbian dominance remained 
the central focus in Tito’s political project. They argued that since Belgrade was the political, 
financial, military, judicial, and administrative capital of the SFRY, the Serbs had naturally 
been privileged. Any form of centralisation -  even Slovenian ideologue Edvard Kardelj’s 
‘Yugoslav consciousness’ -  was therefore dismissed as an attempt at greater Serbianisation.
Croatian writers often argued that the federal system in the SFRY was identical to that 
imposed on the Croats in the first Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Communism was described as a 
‘disguised Greater Serbia’.30 More graphically and colourfully, Communist Yugoslavia 
metamorphosed into, ‘a resurrected ghost of the expansionist, hegemonistic, unitaristic and 
centralist state of the old Yugoslavia type, this time in a more horrible form enabled by the
i
centralised, monolithic political power of the Communist Party... ’ For this writer, as with 
many others, the SFRY was simply, ‘a new artificial Greater Serbian nation concealed under 
the name of Yugoslavia’, entrenched ‘behind the facade of pretended socialism’. Others 
argued that the entire government bureaucracy, federal government officials, the army, and
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the diplomatic corps were completely dominated by Serbs.33 Thus, Yugoslavia never truly 
existed. It was a pseudo Communist state controlled by Serbian nationalists, who 
manipulated Tito into reducing Croatian power. In this process of revision, aspects of 
Communist life which were present in all Communist countries, such as a one-party state and 
a powerful police force, were blamed on Serbian domination. Rather than being seen as 
typically Communist, they were characteristics of Greater Serbia.
For Croatian historians, Serbs were presented as a highly privileged national group in 
Yugoslav society. Their language, culture, and political customs became the cornerstone of 
the state. At the same time, Serbs supposedly maintained numerical dominance in most of the 
key ministries, the police forces, and the military as well. Other aspects of control, such as 
economic exploitation were often described in terms of a core-periphery relationship.
Echoing Naim’s theories, Croatian writers saw nationalism as a solution to their problems of 
underdevelopment. Kecmanovic’s ‘theme of damage’, with its emphasis on economic, 
cultural, and social decline -  due to decades of Serbian domination -  was a theme constantly 
invoked.34 At every level, Croats argued that the Serbs were in full control of the SFRY. This 
became a useful justification for why it was time for them to leave, and why the Serbs were 
clearly the aggressors.
Serbian Economic Domination:
Another key aspect of Croatian attacks was the question of money. While Tito’s 
government had channelled hundreds of millions of dollars into a world class tourist industry 
in Croatia, a portion of this tourist revenue had to be paid to the federal centre. While the 
tourist industry had been established in order to increase Yugoslavia’s foreign currency 
reserves, a strategy aimed to help the entire Federation, not just Croatia, Croatian writers 
painted this as an example of economic exploitation. A typical argument was that for 70 
years, ‘Croatia was exploited and drained’, and had no control over where their money was 
going, and why. Croats argued that Croatia and Slovenia funded some 50% of the Yugoslav 
federal budget. The loss of this income was what had prompted Serbia to invade and occupy 
the country after 1991.35 Nationalism was simply a smoke screen for economic motives. 
Unfortunately, the figure 50% was completely false. Croatia brought in some 50% of foreign 
exchange earnings during the 1960s and 70s, but did not fund 50% of the federal budget. 
While Croatia did contribute considerably to the Yugoslav economy, they were never 
exploited to the extent historians claimed.36
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A far less scholarly analysis was presented in Miroslav Brandt’s Antimemorandum, 
written five years after the SANU Memorandum was leaked to the press. Brandt’s whinging 
style perfectly mirrored the intent of the SANU original. Brandt echoed several common 
themes -  that the Serbs controlled the military, the political system, and the economy. For too 
long, Croats had suffered from ‘Greater Serbian centralisation’. Independence was the 
solution to all of Croatia’s economic difficulties. Brandt reinterpreted many of the ideas 
found in Milo van Djilas’ New Class, wherein Djilas had attacked the massive power of the 
Communist bureaucracy during the 1950s. He argued that Yugoslavia had become more 
inegalitarian since the Partisan revolution. As he described it, a ‘new class’ had been formed, 
which administered and controlled the economy, distributed everything, and consequently 
enjoyed the fruits of production.38
Predictably, Brandt reasoned that Djilas’ ‘new class’ was dominated by the Serbs -  
who had milked the system for all it was worth. He argued that the great majority of 
Yugoslav millionaires were Serbia, ‘rich profiteers’, who benefited from other nations in 
Yugoslavia by supposedly confiscating other people’s property, and then exploited it for their
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own gain. As far as he was concerned, the Serbs were the only true ‘plutocrats’. By 
contrast, the Croats constituted an exploited class and nation -  rolled into one. ‘Croatia is,’ 
Brandt asserted, ‘a thoroughly oppressed country enslaved, plundered, pauperized, brought 
down to the verge of existence, forced to massive emigration of its population seeking a way 
to survive, exposed to national liquidation under a military and police regime or 
occupation’.40 Serbs were described simultaneously as bourgeois overlords, colonial 
oppressors, Bolshevik dictators, and Fascists.
For the Croats, Communism had been an utter failure -  Tito’s ‘pretended socialism’ 
had done nothing to eliminate the economic exploitation by the Serbian/Bourgeois/ 
Class/Nation over the Croatian/Proletariat/Peasant Class/Nation. Concocting a form of 
pseudo Communist dialectic, Brandt managed to merge class and nation to demonstrate how 
Greater Serbia continued to dominate Croatia in every respect during the Communist era. 
Brandt represented a typical view of Croatia’s exploitation within Yugoslavia. The view that 
the Serbs controlled everything from Belgrade was common, as was the argument that the 
Serbian occupation of Croatia was an attempt to regain control of Croatia’s economy.
Perhaps it attests to the ‘reasonableness’ of certain Croatian economists that they were 
willing to see only an economic motive for Serbian aggression, while dismissing the 
‘irrationality’ of nationalism.
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The Serbian Character Explained:
Serbian domination in the SFRY was a favourite theme of Croatian propagandists. 
Perhaps the most thorough, and at the same time the most insidious examination of the 
conflict between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia was the product of three Croatian 
sociologists. As with their analysis of Medjugoije, Stjepan Mestrovic, Slaven Letica, and 
Miroslav Goreta used a sociological model to come to terms with the ‘social character’ of the 
Serbs, something similar to primordial characteristics or as a ‘substitute for biological 
instinct’.41 For the authors, being ‘Dinaric’ in the Cvijic-ian sense implied being both 
‘predatory’ and ‘barbaric’ -  containing the seeds of ‘totalitarianism’ 42 Much of their work 
was a rhetorical window dressing for a fairly simple thesis: Serbs were war-like and 
aggressive by nature, lazy and eastern, while Croats were democratic, peace loving, and 
western. As such, their forced union within Yugoslavia led to Serbian dominance and 
violence, while the Croats were exploited and victimised. Most of their sociological 
metaphors and historical studies, while interesting, had little or no bearing on the reality of 
events in Yugoslavia.
One such example was an examination of Alexis de Tocqueville’s study of the 
American civil war. The United States became an analogy for Communist Yugoslavia, 
described as, ‘the sometimes unhappy union of two distinct and opposing cultures’, 
composed of the ‘Southern aristocrat’ and the Northerner. The Southerner was described as a, 
‘domestic dictator from infancy ... a haughty and hasty man, irascible, violent, ardent in his 
desires, impatient of obstacles ... fond of grandeur, luxury and renown, of gaiety, pleasure, 
and above all, of idleness.’43 This was in marked contrast to Northerners, who were, 
‘educated, talented, and family-oriented citizens ... the best elements of order and morality’.44 
It was not difficult to see where this analogy was going: two opposing cultures, one 
backwards lazy and despotic, the other, hardworking, educated, and moral. The combination 
of these two groups in a single state created a sociological ‘clash of civilisation’. For the three 
authors, the American analogy played out well in Yugoslavia, since the Balkans, ‘exhibits] 
more extremely the opposition between barbaric and peaceable traits that is found all over the 
world’.45
The disintegration of Yugoslavia was clearly blamed on the Serbs, who, living on a 
lower level of civilisation, could not help but dominate and abuse the helpless Croats. For 
example,
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[I]t is well known in Yugoslavia that Serbs and Montenegrins adhere to a sort of cult 
of the warrior. They have continually dominated the police and armed forces. They 
habitually own guns and engage in hunting as part of a machismo set of values.
Within Yugoslavia, they are known for being stubborn, irascible, and emotionally 
unstable. It is interesting that many of these same traits can still be found ascribed to 
male residents of the southern United States, in comparison with males in the North?6
Mestrovic’s dubious sociology supported the contention that Serbian actions were a 
result of a primordial and unchanging social character. The only solution was separation. 
There was an evident paradox in using this particular study of de Tocqueville. In the case of 
the US civil war, the Southerners declared independence and separated, with the support of 
various outside powers. The North refused to allow the South to leave, waging war rather 
than having the country split apart. Ironically, the Serbs has more in common with the North 
than the South, since they too are supposedly fighting a war against separatism, with a federal 
army to keep their ‘union’ intact. While Mestrovic’s attempt at analogy was confused and 
inaccurate, his suggestion that the Serbs were somehow more war-like, lazy, exploitative and 
generally inferior, struck a chord with many readers.47 Such dubious sociology advanced that 
Communist Yugoslavia was an untenable construction, completely controlled by Serbs, who 
dominated every aspect of life. Both the break up of the federation and the war which 
followed were natural outcomes of a Serbian psychology, which was seemingly fundamental 
different to that of the Croats.
Linguistic Repression in Yugoslavia:
The status of the Croatian language during the lifetime of the SFRY was an extremely 
important consideration. Since the time of Ljudevit Gaj and Ante Starcevic, a separate 
Croatian language was one of the key hallmarks of national identity. Tito was roundly 
condemned for outlawing the use of the ‘Croatian’ language, imposing instead the Serbo- 
Croatian language, with Occidental (Croatian) and Oriental (Serbian) variants. A joint 
language was seen as an important aspect of Tito’s ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, and was central 
to repressing manifestations of Croatian nationalism. Linguistic reform was a key demand of 
nationalist politicians during the Maspok movement in the 1970s. The demand for a separate 
Croatian language was largely responsible for the 1971 ‘Croat Spring’, during which famed 
Croatian novelist Miroslav Krleza led a group of 130 leading Croatian academics on a 
crusade to designate ‘Croatian’ as a separate language for education and literature. The 
Serbian Communist Party followed suit with a demand for reciprocal rights to a Serbian 
language for their people living within Croatia.
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For Croats, the Serbo-Croatian language was little more than a ‘political tool’, which 
had been used throughout the history of Yugoslavia to homogenise different peoples into a 
single nation. Even when Tito had been alive, Croats rejected the Novi Sad Agreement and 
pushed for their own language. With Tito’s death, and the rise of nationalism, the Croatian 
language once more became a crucial issue in Croatian identity. Moreover, the Serbo- 
Croatian language became symbolic of Serbian cultural dominance and Croatian weakness. 
As one historian argued, ‘The only reason that “Serbo-Croatian” existed and the only reason 
it has been forced upon unwilling populations were the politics of an artificial Yugoslavia 
united by force against the will of the majority of its population.’49
After independence, Croatian writers and linguists were able to reclaim ‘Croatian’, as 
their own distinct and unique national language. This was an extremely important ‘turning 
point’, or ‘watershed’, in Croatian history, when Croats at last had the freedom recreate a 
national language. For many Croats, there had once been a linguistic Golden Age in need of 
rediscovery. At some stage, there was a pure, authentic and unadulterated Croatian language 
waiting to be dusted off, polished, and shined, after decades of being covered with Serbian 
and Communist dirt and tarnish. Well know Croatian writer Slobodan Novak, commented on 
the new ‘purity’ of Croatia by proclaiming triumphantly,
Croatia is cleansing itself of Yugo-unitarist and Great-Serb rubbish which had been 
spread all over it for a whole century. Croatia is simply restored to its original form 
and returning to its true self. If today it has to make painful incisions in its language, 
history, scholarship and even the names of its towns and streets, that only shows the 
extent to which it was contaminated and how polluted were all facets of its life and all 
segments of its corpus.50
For Novak, as for many others, one of the most painful legacies of Communism was 
the loss of the national language. Once they had their language back, the Croatian soul could 
once more be found. But what exactly was the language to look like? Various dictionaries 
soon appeared on the scene. Stjepan Brodnjak’s Razlkovni Rjecnik (Separate Dictionary) 
featured 35,000 entries, composed mainly of technical term and archaisms. Equally 
convoluted was Hrvoje Sosic’s 1993 Croatian Political Dictionary, whose 1200 pages failed 
to elaborate on such terms as ‘fascism’, ‘antifascism’, ‘Ustashe movement’, ‘Ante Pavelic’ or 
‘Croatian Party of Rights’. While purporting to be political, this dictionary avoided all 
controversial issues in Croatian history.51
The zeal to ‘de-Serbianise’ the language led to revisions of distinctly ‘Croatian’ texts. 
Jasna Baresic’s 1994 Croatian language reader Dobro Dosli had to be cleansed of the 
‘Serbianisms’ by other Croatian linguists on a daily basis, since new ‘impurities’ were being
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constantly identified. Even Krleza, the ‘martyr’ for the Croatian language, had his works 
translated from ‘Serbo-Croat’ for new school textbooks. Voracious advocates of a pure 
‘Croatian’ introduced a bill before the Croatian Sabor, proposing fines and prison terms for 
those who used words of ‘foreign’ origin.52
In many cases, an entirely new language was being created. While some sort of 
linguistic Golden Age was the aim of the policy, most of the new words had no historical 
origin. What seemed to matter more was differentiating ‘Croatian’ from ‘Serbian’. More 
extreme voices, such as the writers at NDH magazine proposed going even further than 
Starcevic to create a completely different national language. Advocating the ‘Croatian 
“korienski” orthography’, one journalist argued that the adoption of a new dialect would be 
the only way to create an authentic Croatian language. Nevertheless it was clear that such a 
language would be neither historically ‘pure’ nor accurate. This, apparently, was not 
particularly important. As the author explained, ‘Only the renewal and rebirth of the unique 
character of the Croatian language and “korienski” orthography (because that way Croatian 
and Serb languages would become mutually unintelligible) can destroy Serb appetite for 
Croatian lands and free us from fear of violent “unification” of parts of Croatia with 
Serbia.’53 Creating their own Babel would allow Croats to be safe from Serbian attacks,
... the loss of mutual intelligibility of Croatian and Serb languages is the best 
guarantee that Croatia will never again join some Yugo-associations which could lead 
to the renewal of the common state with the Serbs, because our languages, cultures, 
and religions would be different. Since [Serbs and Croats belong to] two different 
civilizations there can be no coexistence for us. Let us work hard, with love, and learn 
the Croatian language cleansed of all non-Croatian traces which had been imposed by 
force on it, and renew its Croatian character.54
That the ‘Croatian character’ to which the author referred would be unintelligible to 
the vast majority of Croats themselves seemed to matter little. What mattered was not how 
useful the new language might be as a tool for communication, but its separate status. In 
general, the differences between ‘Serbian’, ‘Croatian’, and ‘Bosnian’ were dialectical, and 
were matters of regionalism, not nationality. Within Croatia itself, Istrians, Dalmatians, and 
those living around Zagreb all spoke with different dialects, which could, with little effort, be 
transformed into other ‘national’ languages. Linguist Celia Hawksworth, in her language 
training guide to the now defunct “Serbo-Croat” taught both the Serbian and Croatian 
variants of what she certainly saw as a common language. As she wrote somewhat ironically, 
“This book introduces the version of the language known to its speakers as ‘Croatian’, but if 
you learn this version you will be understood by all the other peoples listed above, who call
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their version of the language ‘Bosnian’ or ‘Serbian’ respectively. One way of looking at this 
complex situation is that it is extraordinarily cost-effective: if you learn one language you 
will find that you automatically know three or four!”55
While this process of linguistic revisionism appeared to be revolutionary during the 
early 1990s, it was clear by 1995 how farcical it truly was. During the Dayton Accord 
negotiations between the Serbs, the Croats, and the Bosnian Moslems, participants had the 
choice of simultaneous translation into ‘Serbian’, ‘Croatian’, and ‘Bosnian’. However, while 
there were three separate channels from which to select, there was only one translator for all 
three. In short, the language was identical, and none of the three parties seemed to care. For 
them it was the principle, not the language, that mattered.56
Now -  certainly many nations have produced their own standardised language, based 
on one specific variant, and of course not everyone could speak it. In France, on the eve of its 
Revolution, 50% of the population did not speak French at all, and only 12-13% spoke the 
Parisian variant that would eventually become the standard form. When Italy began its 
unification process in 1861, scarcely 2.5% of the population used Italian for everyday 
communication.57 Thus, even the korienski orthography might be historically defensible. 
What needs to be addressed in the Croatian case is not simply a nation’s right to recreate its 
language, but their motivations behind it. Linguistic recreation in Croatia was a means of 
creating artificial divisions between Serbs and Croats in the state. It was specifically designed 
to exclude non-Croats from the national ethos during a time of warfare and violence. Like all 
examples of linguistic standardisation, the reformulation of Croatian was by necessity 
exclusivist, a process designed suppressed regional variations and denied people the right to 
communicate on their own terms with one another.
The Rise of Serbian and Croatian Nationalism: Interpretations:
The demonisation of the Communist period was extremely important for both sides, 
seeking to justify why Yugoslavia had to be abandoned in its former shape and structure. 
Serbs and Croats used history as a resource, as a tool for explaining events during and after 
the war in Croatia, while inscripting narratives of victimisation and persecution. While 
benign theories of economic exploitation and Tito’s border machinations were cited by 
academics, the majority of wartime propaganda focussed on the fear of genocide. Ronnie 
Landau’s ‘grotesque competition in suffering’ had begun. Historical patterns of hatred and 
genocidal aggression had been identified for almost every historical period. All that remained 
was to apply the horrors of the past to understand war in the 1990s.
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For Serbian writers, the fear of renewed genocide, comparable to the Ustasa genocide 
in World War II was a central feature of their propaganda. This became the key justification 
for the rise of Serbian nationalism in Croatia and the JNA’s later invasion of what was 
recognised as a sovereign country. From the first day of Tudjman’s presidency, Croatian 
Serbs argued that the HDZ was trying to remove all Serbian power in the republic. The HDZ 
government was purging Serbs from almost every aspect of Croatian life, using what was 
described as an ‘ethnical broom’, to remove Serbs from the government bureaucracies, the 
police, the judiciary, the mass media, and the school system. Even blue-collar workers were 
supposedly purged.58 Serbian historians presented Tudjman’s regime as nothing more than 
the rehabilitation and restoration of the NDH.59 The first Croatian Constitution was often 
cited as proof that the HDZ was trying to assimilate Croatian Serbs, by denying them their 
national rights. This seemingly indicated that a new genocide was beginning.60
A common theme amongst Serbian historians and politicians was that the Serbs had 
merely reacted to the Croatian threat. Serbs had not started the violence -  they had only 
defended themselves. The assassination of Osijek’s moderate police chief, Josip Reichl-Kir in 
July 1991, by Croatian nationalists, was constantly cited as the first act of aggression in the 
Croatian conflict. Riechl-Kir had been negotiating with Serbian irregulars at the time, and 
was seemingly killed for trying to promote peace instead of war.61 The death of Reihl-Kir 
certainly demonstrated the duplicity of the Croatian government, but it was not the first act of 
violence. By this point, the Tog revolution’ was well under way. Croatian Serbs had already 
begun blocking off roads, and assaulting Croatian police forces. Nevertheless, Reihl-Kir 
came to symbolise how the HDZ regime was willing to kill off its own people, should they 
try to negotiate with Serbs. Serbian Krajina politician Mile Dakic soon denounced the HDZ 
for their, ‘fascist state policy and kalashnikov democracy.’ Common was the view that an 
independent Croatia was forced on the Serbs through the barrel of a gun.
A constant level of Croatian aggression against Serbs was a necessary theme in their 
representation as victims of genocide. Dismissing claims that the HDZ administration was 
democratically elected, Serbian sources argued that a multi-party system did not guarantee 
democracy. ‘Hitler,’ according to one historian, was a good example of another populist who 
manipulated democracy, since he, ‘came to power in Germany within the framework of a
( \ kmulti-party mechanism but subsequently became a great dictator, aggressor and criminal’. 
While the writer was clearly referring to Tudjman, the irony was, of course, that Milosevic 
had rise to power in an identical fashion, and was little different from his Croatian 
counterpart. Nevertheless, Serbian writers worked tirelessly to debunk the myth of Croatian
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democracy, specifically the western belief at that time that Croatia had become an open, 
westernised, post-Communist country.
By the time JNA tanks rolled into Eastern Slavonia in July, 1991, it was clear that the 
Army no longer represented the interests of Yugoslavia, but had become an instrument of 
Serbian power.64 While the JNA was simply trying to enlarge the Serbian state, the Serbs 
claimed that they were coming as ‘peace keepers’, to prevent a genocide of Serbs. 
Humanitarian arguments would be used throughout the conflict to legitimate the invasion and 
occupation of Croatia. In justifying military intervention, Serbs often compared Croatian 
leaders to Nazis and fascist aggressors, hoisting World War II era flags, while instigating 
continuous ‘pogroms’ of the Serbian population. Clearly, the new Croatia was nothing more 
than the resurrection of the NDH.65
The Serbian Ministry of Information also portrayed the Tudjman regime as neo- 
fascistic, making vague allusions to Aaron and Loftus’ book Ratlines, with its description of 
the Vatican smuggling networks for Nazi war criminals. This time, however, the ‘rat 
channels’ were reversed, and instead of smuggling war criminals out of Europe, war 
criminals were now being smuggled back in -  to Croatia. The strategy of welcoming back 
these former Ustasa was to be the precursor to a renewed Serbian genocide -  a genocide 
which was to be identical to that some 50 years before.66 Dobrica Cosic also saw Tudjman’s 
regime as an emerging Nazi dictatorship. He had this to say in a 1994 published collection of 
his wartime essays,
We see in Croatia, many aspects of a Nazi resurrection. This state is governed by a 
totalitarian and chauvinistic regime, which has abolished the elementary civil and 
national rights of the Serbs by simply erasing them from its Constitution. This 
provoked a Serbian insurrection in Croatia, those who justly fear a new program of 
extermination, the same as the one during the Second World War to which they fell 
victim.67
Because of their historical victimisation, Cosic had no difficulty in believing that a 
second genocide was on the way, necessitating a ‘defensive war’ against Croatian attacks.68 
Other Serbian writers urged Croatian Serbs not to surrender any weapons to the Croatian 
police, since politics there had blossomed into, ‘mass chauvinist hysteria.’69 In justifying the 
Tog revolution’, and other memorable moments in Krajina Serb history, links were drawn 
between the surprise night inspections for weapons carried out by the Ustasa in 1941, and a 
similar strategy of disarming mixed Serbian and Croatian units, supposedly instigated by the 
new Ministry of the Interior in 1991. This time, however, the Serbs had learned from their
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mistakes. Since the Ustasa had slaughtered large numbers of unarmed Serbs during World 
War II, Serbs had learned this lesson of the past, and had refused to surrender their weapons.
70Again, Serbs were seen to be defending themselves -  nothing more.
These Serbian warnings were sometimes supported by graphic evidence. Ever 
interested in theatrics, the Krajina Serbs organised the exhumation of a Serbian World War II 
era mass grave. Serbian journalists were invited to photograph the bones of those who had 
been massacred by the Ustasa, which provided a strong imagistic appeal to the Serbian nation 
to defend their ‘brothers’ against the threat of repeated genocide.71 Dragutin Brcin’s picture 
book of mutilated bodies, supposedly at the hands of the Croats in 1991, was another 
example of a picture saying a thousand words. Brcin’s views of the Croats echoed 
Kecmanovic’s theory of pseudospeciation. Because the Serbs were seen as a Tower species’, 
they were being targeted with biological and physical extermination, ‘for the third time this 
century -  for the second time from the Ustashas in the last 50 years’. Brcin also spread the 
story of one ‘Ustashi war criminal’ who wore a necklace made of the fingers of Serbian 
children.72 While this was originally an ancient Hindu story, it seemed to have travelled far 
by the 1990s.
There is little doubt that many Serbs thought the threat of annihilation was real. Serbs 
in Croatia, by 1991, began to complain of an ‘ethnic tax’ which they alone had to pay to the 
government.73 The use of Holocaust imagery appeared early in the conflict, with Serbs 
comparing themselves to the Jews in Nazi Germany. The Croatian Serb authorities 
complained of a ‘formal brand’ devised by the Croatian government to separate the Serbs 
from the rest of the population. As one writer reported, each Serb in Croatia was given the 
number 3 on the 8th figure of his uniform personal identity number. This, as Serbian Krajina 
President Goran Hadzic remarked, ‘is nothing else for us than the David’s star, our race 
label’.74
Included in the general theme of Croatian genocide of Serbs were testimonials of 
those who had suffered in Croatian ‘concentration camps’ during the early part of the war. 
Journalist Nikola Marinovic, searching for the Croatian version of the 1942 Wansee 
Conference, traced the Croatian ‘Final Solution’ to a small cabal of HDZ leaders and 
representatives from Slavonija. These men supposedly met in early 1991 to form an 
organisation, bent on, ‘the extermination of Serbs from western Srem and Eastern Slavonija’. 
According to Marinovic, this group of HDZ officials ‘started “everything” in all Croatia’. 
They deliberately planned and executed the genocide of Serbs, through a three pronged
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strategy -  replacing prominent Serbs, harassing the entire Serbian population, then 
liquidating them.75
Marinovic □ included a number of quotations from the initial meeting, unfortunately 
without indicating how he managed to get them. Either this was some form of dramatic 
licence, or Marinovic □ was perched below the window through which the end of Serbdom 
was being contemplated. How and why he would have acquired such information is not 
explained. The purpose of this book was obvious; it is meant to act as a justification for the 
Serbian military actions which followed. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the primary 
objects of Serbian attacks were the places where the Serbs were supposedly tortured and 
murdered by the Croats, as a result of this key meeting. Thus, Poljane and Marino, villages 
near Pakrac, were noted as sites of mass atrocities, as was Kip, near Daruvar, and Moscenica 
and Cesko, near Sisak.76 Similar atrocities were recounted for Vukovar, one of the first cities 
which fell to the Serbs. Here, Marinovic described the ‘hair raising savagery’ of the manager 
of the Vukovar Hospital, Vesna Bosanac, who earned the title ‘Vukovar Mengele’, after 
supposedly threatening one Serbian patient by putting a gun to his head, then threatening to 
slit his throat, then placing a bomb in his bed. Other instances such a torture, euthanasia, and 
the general denial of medical treatment to Serbian soldiers were also described here.77
Another patient described being beaten and then urinated on at a hospital near Pakrac. 
Each region was seen as the venue for terrible atrocities committed by the Croatian National 
Guard, proving that Serbian had had no choice but to shell the towns where these atrocities 
were supposedly taking place. Such descriptions instilled the notion that the new Croatian 
institutions, such as the police and even the medical services, were Serbophobic and therefore 
part of a genocidal conspiracy. Certainly some of the testimonials were true. Serbs were 
beaten and mistreated. But what was significant was why certain regions were selected for 
this book, and what they signified. According to the Serbs’ own accounts, a form of defensive 
ethnic cleansing had to take place to avoid a repetition of World War II.
The Orthodox Church also contributed to the increasing paranoia about genocide in 
Croatia. Spiritual Genocide (1994) outlined a continuous desecration of Serbian churches, 
claiming that more than 400 had been destroyed since 1941, leading the author to describe a 
‘total spiritual genocide’, which continued from the time of the NDH, through the
no
Communist era, to the conflict in the 1990s. This work featured detailed descriptions of 
every destroyed church, as well as photos of the destruction, drawing a link between the 
World War II destruction of churches, and their destruction in the 1990s. To stress the 
similarities between events in 1994 and 1941, World War II photos were mixed with more
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recent ones, all in grainy black and white -  blurring the distinction between historic and 
contemporary atrocities.
The purpose behind this onslaught of subjective and emotive propaganda was clear -  
it buttressed Serbian arguments that the war was forced on the Serbian people. The Serbian 
Orthodox Church and its parishioners had been brought to the, ‘verge of annihilation’.79 That 
this work appeared in 1994, after countless attacks on the Serbs in the international press for 
their destruction of Catholic churches and Mosques was no coincidence. Obviously Serbian 
churches were destroyed, but such one sided portrayals were mirror images of Croatian 
publications. This even extended to a contest on a city by city basis between Serbian and 
Croatian propagandists, to see which national group had been the most victimised. Thus, 
Croats published photos and descriptions of the destruction of Catholic churches in Vukovar 
and Mostar, and the Serbs responded in kind with Orthodox ruins in the same cities.80
‘Operation Storm’
One of the most tragic aspects of the war in Croatia was Milosevic’s cynical handling 
of the Croatian Serbs, after they were no longer useful to him. Seemingly abandoning his 
dream of creating a Greater Serbia, Milosevic repackaged himself as a peace-maker in 1995. 
He brought the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table in that year. It was also the year that he 
abandoned the Croatian Serbs in Eastern Slavonia and Knin, and left the playing field open 
for a Croatian offensive. With the way clear, American negotiator Richard Holbrooke 
encouraged Tudjman to take control of the Serbian Krajina, and Serbian controlled north 
western Bosnia.81 In late April, 1995, the Croats launched an attack on western Slavonia, and 
within 36 hours managed to take back the region, which had been violently taken by Serbian
o*y
forces at the beginning of the conflict. By the summer, much of the Serbian population in 
the former Srpska Krajina had fled, leaving towns and villages deserted.
By July, Tudjman had amassed an army of over 200,000 troops, ready to sweep into 
the Krajina. After calling for the surrender of the Serbian Krajina government and hand-over 
of weapons, Tudjman launched ‘Operation Storm’ on August 4. While the Serbs had 40,000 
troops and 400 tanks, they were no match for Croatian forces, who managed to seize Knin 
after only two days of fighting. The whole region fell in just 84 hours, as Serbs fled for their 
lives.83 While it was clear that MilosevicDhad left the Croatian Serbs to their fate, Serbian 
propagandists continued to advance the dangers of a Croatian genocide of Serbs. At this 
stage, the same arguments as before were used to highlight the consequences of Tudjman’s
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conquest. While Milosevic □ had little interest in reoccupying Croatia, the propaganda 
machine continued to advance the same arguments.
The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts reacted immediately to the Croatian 
offensive, issuing a Memorandum to alert the public to the renewed dangers of genocide that 
lay ahead. SANU urged the Serbian government to mobilise without delay, since the Serbs 
were facing, ‘extinction and the obliteration of all traces of their existence in these lands’.84 
Once again, the spectre of Croatian fascist terror was reiterated. SANU was at this stage 
trying to push the Serbian government to act. They claimed that some 300,000 Serbs had 
already been ‘forcibly expelled’ from Croatia, even before ‘Operation Storm’ had begun, and 
they urged the Serbian government to act against a ‘repeated genocide’.85 However, the fact 
that 300,000 Serbs had left the region implied that there was no genocide of any kind. The 
qualitative differences between ethnic cleansing and genocide were often lost on Serbian and 
Croatian propagandists. The purpose of genocide was to exterminate an entire nation, and 
remove it from the earth -  not to create hundreds of thousands of refugees.
Tudjman himself was similarly accused of being a genocidal fascist. Historian 
Svetozar Burdevic cited the, ‘speed at which the inhuman and uncivilized method of 
Croatization of the Krajina has been carried out’, as proof of the ‘vandal destruction and 
annihilation of all the traces and symbols of Serbian life, culture and spirituality in the 
region’. Franjo Tudjman, he argued, was only pursuing the same fascist policies that the 
NDH regime had followed some 50 years earlier. Serbs had to be killed, since they continued
or
to be the main obstacle to Croatian expansionism in the Balkans.
The Serbian Ministry of Information also joined the fray, describing the offensive as 
‘the final solution to the Serbian question’, while stressing the links between Croatian actions 
in 1941 and 1995. They too condemned Tudjman for wanting to create ‘a pure Croatian 
state’, through ‘pure Croatism’ in the Balkans. The Americans were also drawn into this 
‘Blitzkreig’. Having perfected their killing skills in Desert Storm they were looking for a 
small ‘Balkan Storm’.87 The Serbian Unity Congress also played their part, describing how,
The current civil and religious war in the former Yugoslavia is but the resumption of 
the 1941-1945 civil war in which the Croatian Fascists, collaborators of the Nazi 
regime, and Muslim religious extremists murdered between 600,000 and 1,200,000 
Serbs. The issues are the same, the battlefields are the same, even the flags and army 
insignia are the same.88
191
By 1995-96, this type of imagery was increasingly common. It was almost impossible 
to find descriptions of the war in Croatia which did not refer explicitly to the links between 
the 1940s and the 1990s. Serbs were once again fighting against annihilation. It did not occur 
to them that this was not a repeat of the past. It was as if they had actually gone back in time, 
and were reliving the struggles of their parents and grandparents. The motto ‘Never Again’ 
was constantly invoked by the Krajina Serbs, as proof that they were like the Jews during the
O Q
Holocaust, ready to defend themselves against annihilation. Sadly, however, it was not 
Tudjman, but Milosevic □ who had sold them out. This time, the Croats were only taking 
advantage of an opportunity that had been given to them by the Serbian president.
Contemporary Fears of the Catholic Church:
Accusations of Vatican and Croatian Catholic complicity in genocide were popular in 
Serbian historical revisions. Their involvement in genocide was traced from the 19th century 
through to the first Yugoslavia, World War n, and into the Communist era. Such a pattern of 
Catholic ‘Serbophobia’ was also applied to an understanding of the war in Croatia during the 
1990s. As in the past, Vatican involvement was presented as a catalyst in Yugoslavia’s 
collapse. The Vatican’s race to be the first to recognise Croatia and Slovenia was a fact not 
lost on the Serbs.
A popular fear among propagandists was that Serbs were being forcibly converted to 
Catholicism, as they had been during the 1940s. In 1995, the Serbian Ministry of Information 
claimed that the Croats had converted 11,000 Serbian children to Catholicism in just two and 
a half years. Another 14,000 Serbian children, some 90% of the total in Croatia, were 
supposedly forced to enrol in Catholic schools -  by implication they too were in the initial 
stages of assimilation. This ‘plot’ was revealed by Orthodox Church sources, who posited 
that the true intent behind this policy was not simply educational. Rather, ‘Once they convert 
to Catholicism, the former Orthodox people will automatically become members of the 
Croatian nation, because Catholicism and Croatian nationality are equated in Croatia.’90
The overall Croatian plan, as a government official from Novi Sad maintained, aimed 
at converting 700,000 Serbs in Croatia to Catholicism, making them first ‘Croatian Serbs’, 
then ‘Orthodox Croats’, then finally ‘pure Croats’, after their language, alphabet, church and 
other symbols of their ‘authentic and centuries old Serbian identity’ had been destroyed.91 
Such writing demonstrated how fragile many officials thought Serbian identity truly was, and 
how easily it would be for the Catholic Church to destroy the Serbian nation, now that 
Croatia was independent. Needless to say, such theories were mere conjecture, and no
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schools were actually named, nor was there any type of documentation cited to support such 
accusation.
There were of course other more direct attacks on the Vatican itself, dealing with 
specific aspects of the war in Croatia and later in Bosnia. During the 1995 NATO air-strikes 
on Bosnian Serb military positions, the Vatican, and not the Germans or the Americans, was 
accused of genocide. One University of Belgrade sociologist was clear that the prime culprits 
behind the attack were the Pope and his followers,
... encouragement came from Vatican clericalists pursuing the centuries-old goal of 
establishing the world Catholic multinational empire ... Pope John Paul II developed 
the doctrines of “limited sovereignty”, of “humanitarian military intervention” and of 
“disarming the aggressor”. The head of the Catholic Christian Church supported the 
idea of “bombs for peace”. The peace that can be brought by bombs is the peace of 
extermination of Serbs in Croatia and B&H. For those who survive there is 
conversion to Catholicism or expulsion to the “Belgrade Pashaluk”, the territory that
will remain to Serbia after Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina are again taken out of its
92jurisdiction.
The imagery was curious. The Pope himself was charged with trying to exterminate 
the Bosnian Serbs, as part of an imperial project which could only be compared to the
tfi tVimachinations of the old Holy Roman Empire during the 16 and 17 centuries. The idea that 
Serbs would be left with a small territory around Belgrade (‘Pashaluk* referring to the old 
Ottoman regional divisions of Serbia) certainly exaggerated the extent of the bombing 
campaign, a campaign which never entered Serbia proper. Accusing the Pope of genocide was 
not overly controversial in Serbian circles, where Vatican plots to destroy the nation 
seemingly existed since the Great Schism.
In general, Serbian propaganda disguised the reality of Serbian aggression in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Hercegovina. While the Serbs claimed only to be defending Serbs against 
annihilation, the Croatian government never advanced any deliberate policies to round up or 
systematically kill its Serbian population. While the Serbian community was clearly 
demarcated and singled out in the new state, and while discrimination was rampant, 
xenophobia did not lead to genocide. In the case of Croatia, there was never any proof that 
Croats intended to commit genocide, or even ethnic cleansing, before the Serbs invaded. By 
invoking both the age-old conspiracies of the Vatican and Catholic expansionism, mixing 
these with the fears of a new Ustasa genocide, Serbs successfully propagandised much of their 
history.
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Croatian Views of the War in Croatia:
In many ways, Croatian propaganda mirrored that of the Serbs. The war in Croatia 
was traced to the age-old project of Greater Serbia, and numerous links between past and 
present were joined together. In understanding Serbian aggression, Croatian writers divided 
up their understanding of events into three separate categories. The first dealt with the Serbs 
as Nazis, seeking territorial expansion, or Lebensraum. Like the Czechs or the Poles, Croatia 
was doomed to be colonised, then enslaved. A second argument compared Greater Serbia 
style empire building to the Holocaust. In the second argument, the Serbs had no real 
economic motivations for invading Croatia. Rather, their general hatred of the Croats drove 
them to round up and kill as many people as possible. The third argument relied on the work 
of Croatian psychiatrists. Serbs were analysed as a group, and their pathology was blamed for 
the war in Croatia. Serbs were both mentally and civilisationally inferior to the Croats. Their 
hatred and envy of the superior Croats, and their resentment against them for having 
abandoned Yugoslavia were responsible for their decision to invade.
During the lifetime of the SFRY, Serbs were accused of dominating and exploiting 
Croatia. Such a line of reasoning evolved into predictions of what would happen if the Serbs 
managed to successfully invade and occupy Croatia. Miroslav Brandt was perhaps the most 
vocal on what a reassertion of Serbian control would mean. ‘Non-Serbian peoples,’ he 
predicted, ‘would be slaves, a subjugated mob, expected and doomed to extinction as separate 
national entities in the future, their land, area for colonisation and a target to exploit, brought 
to the level of provinces working for the benefit of a new giant, super-wealthy and carefree 
state centre of Belgrade’.93 Brandt was therefore particularly clear on what the Croats were 
fighting against by defending the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia from Serbian predations,
These regions are simply resisting the annihilation of their particular national 
cultures, the persistent proven widely organised and continuous decades long 
activities of the Greater-Serbian plutocratic oligarchy to primarily deprive the 
Croatian people of their own language, to impose upon them the Serbian language, to 
suppress Croatian literature and other forms of Croatian culture, to wipe out the 
Croatian national awareness, to destroy and prevent Croats from learning their own 
history and to crush their dignity, to annihilate their faith, to impoverish them, and by 
a discriminatory economic policy to drive the Croats away from their own 
millennium long ethnic homeland and then systematically colonise these regions with 
Serbian nationals.94
Brandt’s theme of economic exploitation was common. Historian Boze Covic □ also 
blamed Serbia’s economic motives for the conflict. The Serbs were trying to compensate for 
their underdevelopment by exploiting the riches of Croatia, he described the inefficient
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Serbian economy is inefficient, burdened by losses and debts. Since it was unable to
‘stimulate its own creative potential’, it could not improve the standard of living, and thus
needed Croatia as a colony to dominate and exploit.95 Like Brandt, Covic similarly argued
that both Serbia and Montenegro, starved of resources, were keen to exploit Croatia, to
enable the flow of riches from the periphery to the core.96 Covic evidently, was no
dependency theorist, and this aspect of his analysis soon gave way to analogies between
Serbian economic exploitation and Nazi expansionist plans during the 1930s,
Serbia needs new lebensraum and new economic resources (on the ethnically 
cleansed i.e. completely Serbian, territory) given that “Greater Serbia” with only 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and the amputated parts of Croatia 
would find itself in the company of complete undeveloped areas ... It is a question of 
lebensraum and the concept of “blood and soil” which ensure the new nation-building 
ambitions of “Greater Serbia”. The problem of ethnic cleansing should be stressed 
here, i.e. firstly forcing Croats and all other ethnic groups to flee, so that only the 
Serbs remain, and secondly settling Serbian colonists in the emptied areas.97
There was little evidence to support the claim that Serbs were trying to colonise 
Croatia. Nevertheless, the fears of economic exploitation were justifiable, given the fact that 
when these documents were written, Serbian irregulars had been continually looting Croatian 
and Bosnian homes. At the same time, the use of the term Lebensraum served as a rebuttal to 
Serbian accusations that Tudjman and his government were composed of neo-Ustasa 
criminals. Accusing the Serbs of trying to exploit and dominate Croatia also covered up the 
very real machinations of the Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina. While they accused the Serbs of 
expanding their territory and colonising a region which was not theirs’, the Croats were doing 
the same thing. These themes were extremely common.
The Long Awaited Evil -  Greater Serbia:
The second key argument delved much deeper into the past, exposing many long term 
Serbian plans for the invasion of Croatia, plans which were purportedly hatched well before 
Hitler and the Third Reich. In Covic’s view, the war in Croatia was ‘the bloody finale of the 
long-prepared Greater Serbian plan of conquest’, supposedly the culmination of two hundred 
years of planning.98 Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag in 1939 was often invoked -  one which 
famously justified the invasion of Poland as a defensive measure to protect Poland’s German 
minority.99 The Serbian conspiracy, according to Covic, consisted of claiming victim-hood as 
a means of justifying territorial expansion,
The notion of victim and victimization is extended to the evaluation of conditions in 
which the Serbs live in non-Serbian regions and used for political action whenever a
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privilege is at stake. In recent years this myth has served to justify and promulgate the 
political thesis that all Serbs must live in one state. It is a screen for military 
aggression against Croatia and the realization of the Greater Serbia scheme.100
Ironically, Covic did exactly what he accused the Serbs of doing themselves -  
invoking myths of persecution and Holocaust in order to legitimate ‘self defensive’ measures 
against the ‘enemy’. Covic had no doubt that his own side was completely innocent and 
trustworthy, while the Serbs were evil and expansionist. This was an extreme example of 
‘counteridentification’, with its emphasis on the other being the mirror image of the self. 
While the regimes in Serbia and Croatia were surprisingly similar, writers like 
Covic □ continued to argue that Serbian violence in the 1990s far surpassed anything that had 
happened during World War II.101
For many Croatian historians, the myth of Greater Serbia was all-consuming. The 
basis of Serbian national identity was territorial expansionism. Like some form of plague, the 
bloodlust to create a Greater Serbia could lie dormant for decades, before being unleashed on 
unsuspecting neighbours. Branko Miletic therefore asked somewhat conspiratorially, ‘What 
drives the docile Serb peasant to rape, butcher and incinerate his peaceful Muslim or Croat 
neighbor?’. The answer was of course, ‘The double-edged theory of Greater Serbianism’. 
Greater Serbianism was supposedly ‘double edged’ -  because it was worse than either 
fascism or Communism, since it made co-nationals feel politically and culturally threatened’, 
and ‘emboldened’ at the same time.102 Like Covic, he saw how Serbian leaders had used the 
rhetoric of victimisation to mobilise their people for war. In his tally of the costs of this 
ideology, Miletic concluded,
Greater Serbianism has cost the lives of some 600,000 Croatians, 400,000 Muslims, 
100,000 Albanians, and countless others this century, not to mention non-conformist 
Serbs, and even people not from the Balkans. It has ethnically cleansed some five 
million inhabitants since 1900, wounded, maimed and imprisoned over two million,
103and caused hundreds of billions of dollars worth of material damage.
tViWhat Miletic offered was a complete picture of Serbian violence in the 20 century. 
Each period of history was seen to be tragically the same; Serbs promoting Greater Serbia 
while killing hundreds of thousands of people. How exactly the author tallied these figures is 
not explained. What was curious about these analyses of Serbian nationalism was how the 
role of the victim was discussed. This was seen to be a purely Serbian strategy, not something 
that the Croats would ever have thought to employ.
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Serbian Nazis and Collective Psychosis:
It was certainly clear that Croatia was under serious threat by the beginning of 1991. 
As discussed previously, one third of Croatia was occupied by this time, and the future of the 
country remained uncertain. It was in this climate of fear that mountains of seemingly 
spontaneous anti-Serbian propaganda began pouring out of Croatia. Certainly much of this 
was genuine, and there is no reason to doubt that most of these people truly believed, for 
good reason, that their country was in serious trouble. However, while Croatia was seemingly 
unable to defend herself against the Serbs, Tudjman and Milosevic were already making 
plans together to carve up Bosnia-Hercegovina. That Croatia had enough soldiers, equipment 
and weapons to maintain a defence war and an offensive war indicates that they were doing 
much better than they publicly admitted.
As the war progressed, it became clear that Croatia’s position was far stronger than 
people realised. As such, while a climate of fear was created and certainly existed, it is 
doubtful that the Serbs could ever have taken all of Croatia. It is also doubtful that they 
wanted to. Nevertheless, the emphasis during this time was on rallying the people together, to 
project to the outside world an image of unity in the face of hardship. For this reason, much 
of what emerged from Croatia used images of World War II to make sense of the tragedy. 
Rather than being the victims of an aggressive war, while similarly waging a war in Bosnia, 
Croatian writers, architects, historians, and other academics strove to portray themselves as 
victims of genocide.
In the war effort, it seemed that all facets of academic life in Croatia became 
subordinated to the war effort. The Art History Department at Zagreb University was one of 
many institutions contributing to the advancement of a victim position. In a picture book on 
the destruction of Croatia’s ancient buildings and monuments, the editor described the 
‘culturocide’ of the Croatian people, where Serbs were deliberately destroying ancient 
symbols of the past in order to, ‘annihilate ... the consciousness of our existence in time and 
space’.104 Much of this project aimed to demonstrate that Croatia was part of Europe. This 
‘European’ identity was crucial throughout the war. Croats used it to court western aid, but 
more importantly, to give some form of hope to the people who were suffering through the 
war. What was important was that a ‘European’ country was being destroyed by an eastern 
power.
Croatian scientists at the Ruder Boskovic Institute also got involved in the conflict, 
after they realised that ‘total destruction’ was immanent. Most of this work involved 
contacting outside scientific agencies through a variety of connections in order to sway world
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opinion in favour of Croatia. These scientists sent more than 9,000 letters and petitions 
abroad, and many met with favourable responses.105 Most scientists expressed a typical 
Croatian view of the war as a conflict between, ‘two different types of people’, concluding 
that, ‘Western catholics and Byzantine orthodoxes simply do not belong together.’
Everything was reduced to an ‘ethnic clash’ between the, ‘democratically oriented W est... 
and the bolshevik East.’106
This was coupled with accusations of Serbian genocidal ambition. American 
institutions from the Fulbright Commission to the White House were subjected to intense 
public relations efforts. A vigorous e-mail campaign was also launched, to counter the, 
‘Goebbelsian campaign of lies’ which had ‘enslaved the Albanians in Kosovo’. The stock e- 
mail also contained numerous references to ‘Great Serbian totalitarianism’ and their attempts 
to impose themselves as a ‘master race’ over other nations in the Balkans.107 That much of 
the scientific community was involved in this massive public relations effort demonstrated 
the extent to which Croats were convinced of the genocidal threat of the Serbs. The whole 
nation, it seemed, was mobilised for war.
Other groups, such as the Association of Architects of Mostar, contributed their 
photographs of the ‘urban genocide against Mostar’.108 For the authors, Mostar constituted a 
bridge between east and west, one which was destroyed by the Serbs, forever sealing the fate 
of their relations with the Croats. Serbs here were accused of trying to ‘exterminate the Croat 
and Moslem being’, by laying waste to a town which figured as a religious and cultural cross­
roads.109 There is no doubt that the Serbs destroyed at least half of the major buildings in the 
town. Certainly there was much barbarity in the attack on Mostar -  the Serbs shelled nine out 
of ten of Mostar’s bridges. Nevertheless, the Croats (not the Serbs) destroyed the famous 
Stari Most, or Old Bridge, which still lies in pieces. Still others combined a variety of formats 
to develop an image of Serbian aggression. Borde Obrado vic’s Suffering o f Dubrovnik was a 
strange mixture of historical novel, (set during the siege) glossy before-and-after pictures, and 
childrens’ drawings of the war.110
A still more interesting aspect of the war was the co-option of the psychiatric 
profession. Several psychiatrists quickly abandoned their professionalism, along with many 
of the well-established rules of psychiatry, to defend their country against Serbian genocide. 
Wartime writing was intended to prove that Serbs had actually internalised their civilisational 
differences in many psychologically nuanced ways. Trained medical professionals were 
encouraged to buttress the work of Croatian propagandists with psychiatric jargon. That such
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theories were published in the prestigious Croatian Medical Journal ensured maximum 
credibility.
Breaking perhaps the first and most important rule of psychiatry, trying to understand 
the individual before making a diagnosis, Edvard Klein, in his article, ‘Yugoslavia as a 
Group’, isolated certain Serbian group traits, in order come to terms with the war in Croatia. 
Through the use of psychiatric language, he concluded,
The Serbs are burdened with an inferiority complex compared to the peoples of the 
western part of Yugoslavia, for they are conscious that they are on a lower level of 
civilisation. They try to get rid of that feeling by means of various defence 
mechanisms, such as negation, projections, denial and destruction. The Serbs are 
inclined to regress to a schizoparanoid position and exhibit an archaic type of 
aggression which can explain the torturing of the wounded and massacring dead 
bodies.111
How all Serbs could exhibit the same traits was not explained, nor was it clear why 
and how the Serbs were civilisationally inferior. While Klein’s theories may well have been 
useful for analysing many of the more sadistic Serbian war criminals, he proposed his 
analysis for all Serbs, not a select group.
Psychiatrist Viktor Gruden similarly used the vocabulary of his profession. The Serbs 
were identified as being in a, ‘vicious circle of frustration aggression’ compounded with a 
‘collective paranoia’. The Serbian ‘disintegrated self was blamed for their ‘their tendency to 
massacre the Croats’, over which they seemingly had no choice. Much of this aggression had 
to do with the eastemness, and therefore the inferiority of the Serbs. There was no doubt in 
Gruden’s mind that, ‘the Serbs envy them [the Croats] and because they [the Serbs] are 
inferior... The Croats are not only a biological being (like the Serbs) but a psychological one 
as well. The Serbs also feel guilty, therefore their only reaction is a tendency to destroy the 
source of frustration, hence the source of destruction and the impulse to demolish everything 
that is related to the Croats.’112 In other words, the Croats were more western, more 
enlightened, more open, and more democratic -  the Serbs were merely trying to destroy what 
they could never hope to be.
The Serbs were similarly diagnosed (collectively) as suffering from a, ‘paranoiac 
collective unconsciousness’, and a ‘malignant ethnocentrism’. The war in Croatia was thus 
broken down into a conflict between a ‘paranoic political culture’ and a ‘narcissistic political 
culture’, the former (Serbian) seemingly the result of a demented political mind. The latter 
(Croatian) was denoted as peaceful and, ‘on a higher level of civilisation’. Further 
conclusions that, ‘Serbs are militant and primitive, a nation of death and necrophilia, wild
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barbarians, the greatest vultures of political victories, descendants of Turkish bastardism 
[and] a disturbing factors in Croatia’, were rounded off with the lamentation, ‘unhappy is the 
nation that has Serbs as its neighbours.’113 Such theories reflected Kecmanovic’s theme of 
‘victim and sacrifice’, where the self became the victim of envy, and foreign expansionism.114
Generally, the first rule of psychiatry is to approach each subject as an individual, not 
as part of a collective. Under standard medical definitions, it is simply impossible to diagnose 
a ‘group’ as one would an individual. Only individuals can be defined as having psychiatric 
disorders under the DSM-III classification system -  the standard system for understanding 
and classifying mental illnesses. While individuals may be influenced by membership in a 
collective, no two individuals possess an identical psychology. One is only able to 
comprehend the psychology of an individual after many hours of patient study and interview 
sessions. To lump a group of diverse individuals into a racial category, treat them as a 
individual and study them accordingly was truly an entirely pointless endeavour. From a 
psychiatric perspective it was the sloppiest, most unprofessional use of the profession. From a 
political standpoint, however, it made perfect sense. Psychiatrists, like artists, academics, and 
politicians were all seemingly under attack from genocidal Serbs, and therefore had to use all 
means at their disposal to counter the threat.
Conclusions:
Representations of the past proved to be absolutely crucial to understanding and 
justifying Serbian and Croatian nationalism during the war in Croatia. Each side claimed to 
be a victim of the other, both during the Communist period, and after, as the Federation 
disintegrated. While references to earlier periods of history were important, World War II 
provided the most important stock of metaphors and ideas. Of central importance throughout 
the conflict was the idea that actions during the war were merely a continuation of the past. 
Both sides were accused of acting or performing as their parents and grandparents did earlier 
in the 20th century. Serbian actions were merely a continuation of a desire to create Greater 
Serbia. Croats were simply trying to resurrect the NDH. In both cases, genocide was 
inevitably presented as the result.
In reviewing the main arguments of both sides, a strong performative aspect was 
evident. Each side portrayed themselves as victims, and eventually, by manipulating public 
opinion within their own countries, succeeded in creating a aura of victimhood by constantly 
reiterating this perceived reality, a process which Weber and Butler both identified.115 
Campbell’s definition of ‘narrativizing’ could also be found here. Serbian and Croatian
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writers both tried to create the types of ‘stories’ Campbell identified, with an, ‘ordered plot’, 
‘cast of characters’, ‘attributable motivations’, and ‘lessons for the future’.116 In both cases, a 
past history of victimisation and genocide was purposefully manufactured and presented to a 
receptive audience. In both cases, these ‘stories’ proved to be absolutely essential in creating 
and supporting war.
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Chapter Nine: ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Greater Croatia’: The
Moslem Question in Bosnia-Hercegovina
‘ We live in the borderland between two worlds, on the border between nations, within 
everybody’s reach, always someone’s scapegoat. Against us the waves of history 
break, as if against a cliff. ’
Mesa Selimovic: Dervish and Death1
7 can see that the situation is far more complicated and more difficult than other problems I  
have seen, even Cambodia. It is the peculiar three-sided nature of the struggle here that 
makes it so difficult. Everyone says that most people do not want this to happen. Yet it does. 
Everybody says it must stop. Yet it doesn’t. ’
- Richard Holbrooke: To End a War* -
Introduction:
While this thesis has focused on the continuous and vitriolic debate over history and 
current events pursued by Serbian and Croatian politicians, historians, and journalists, 
another aspect of the war of words and images deserves special consideration. The debate 
over Bosnia-Hercegovina was of immense importance throughout the crisis. Both Milosevic 
and Tudjman, together with their nationalist supporters, dreamed of creating their respective 
‘Greater Serbias’ and ‘Greater Croatias’. In the Bosnian crisis, Serbs and Croats often worked 
together, and as early as 1991, Milosevic and Tudjman had carved up Bosnia on paper, well 
before the ground war began. Tudjman boasted to western leaders of his plans well in 
advance, famously drawing a detailed map on a napkin at a reception in London.3 In Bosnia, 
the Moslems were seen as the primary threat to the creating of larger national states. Serbian 
and Croatian machinations, including the production of propaganda, thus followed very 
similar strategies.
Incorporating chunks of Bosnia-Hercegovina into Croatia and Serbia became central 
to the legitimacy of both governments, who had pledged to unite Diaspora nationals 
throughout the region. In line with a cyclical view of history, Serbian and Croatian leaders 
argued that many of the Fall suffered by their people in history could be rectified once the 
size and power of the nation-state had been expanded. Then, and only then, could all co­
nationals be safe from the threat of genocide. Such political ends were buttressed by 
distinctly military objectives. For Croatia, the addition of Bosnian and Hercegovinian lands 
would have substantially reduced its eastern border with Serbia, creating an important buffer 
zone between Dalmatia and Serbia proper. The Serbs likewise saw the merits of incorporating 
this geo-strategic region into their smaller rump-Yugoslavia, giving them a much larger
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common border with Croatia. Each regime thus had political and military objectives in mind, 
which made the annexation of Bosnian territory paramount.
Primordial and Constructed Nations: The Case of the Bosnian Moslems:
Myths of victimisation and persecution were of central importance in legitimating the 
war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, a war which today provokes images of mass rape, torture, 
indiscriminate killing, and ‘collection centres’ -  purportedly the first functional 
concentrations camps in Europe since World War II. In delineating the use of such 
propaganda, it will be useful to focus on several specific themes:
1. First of all, the idea of Moslems as either ethnic Croats or Serbs; and Moslem nationalism 
as invented or constructed;
2. secondly, the notion that Bosnia-Hercegovina had historically been either Serbian or 
Croatian;
3. thirdly, that claims to Moslem national identity and autonomy concealed an Islamic 
conspiracy to take over Europe. These three themes were found within the majority of 
Serbian and Croatian literature Bosnia.
While the third theme will be discussed later, it is useful to understand the first one 
clearly. To summarise this argument: while the Moslems of Bosnia had been forced to 
convert to Islam, certain linguistic and cultural attributes still marked them as either Serb or 
Croat. Bosnian Moslems were seen to be members of one religious community, while being 
members of an altogether different ethnic group. Because of these highly contested ethnic and 
historical ‘facts’, Serbian and Croatian leaders both argued that Moslems were Fallen 
members of their nation, who had been forced to abandon their true identity after Ottoman 
invasion. Military leaders therefore argued that they were simply ‘liberating’ parts of their 
ethnic homeland that had long been submerged under foreign rule, while ‘freeing’ Moslems 
from their artificial attachments.
Such arguments were possible only because Moslem identity was not taken seriously 
by either side. While both Serbs and Croats shared a view of their nations as having precise 
racial and national origins, complete with national myths and legends, Bosnian Moslem 
nationalism de-emphasised ethnicity, preferring to focus on shared cultural practices, social 
traditions, common experiences, and religious faith. Such forms of collective identity were 
condemned as weaker and therefore illegitimate, when compared with more ‘concrete’ 
nationalist assertions. While Serbs and Croats saw themselves as primordial nations, the
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Moslem nation was denounced as constructed, an artificial creation fabricated by the 
Moslems and Josip Broz Tito.
One major debate over the status of the Moslems, carried out in the summer of 1990 
in the Sarajevo daily Oslobodenje, concluded that while the Serbs and Croats were ‘natural’ 
nations, based on ‘unambiguous and common ethnic origin’, Moslem identity was based on 
‘psychological identification’, subject to self observation. Moslems were therefore seen as an 
‘invented nation’ -  not to be considered relevant in the more important dispute between 
‘natural’ Serbs and Croats.4 For Serbian and Croatian policy makers, invented nations had no 
real histories, and could not claim to have ever been chosen, divine, or even to have suffered 
a Fall. Fortunately, outside powers did not see the importance of such distinctions.5
The ‘naturalness’ of Serbian and Croatian claims to territory was privileged over the 
artificial and constructed nature of Moslem identity. Gone was the narcissism of minor 
differences, and the myths o f ‘counteridentification’, as Serbs and Croats worked towards a 
common goal. Since the Moslems were not an ethnic nation, they logically belonged to 
another ethnic group. Serbs would thus claim the Moslems as their own, and Croats would do 
the same. The idealised presentation of a multicultural, tolerant Bosnia-Hercegovina, long 
favoured in Titoist Yugoslavia, was summarily rejected. While Serbs comprised some 31.1% 
of the population and the Croats some 17.3%, the Moslems (43.7%), could now be 
operationalised as a group of ethnic ‘undecideds’. Their population would provide an ethnic 
‘swing vote’ -  badly needed by both sides in their attempts to expand national boundaries.6
Serbian and Croatian reactions to the Bosnian Moslems presented clear examples of 
how a cyclical view of time was represented. Moslems had abandoned their ‘true’ identity; 
they represented the historic Fall of both the Serb and Croat nations. Now, with the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, both groups had a golden opportunity to right the wrongs of 
history, to join former national lands and people to an enlarged national state. Kecmanovic’s 
themes of ‘watershed’ and ‘turning point’ are useful here.7 Both of these types of myth 
suggest a change in the historical destiny of the nation, when the nation is at last able to 
correct the injustices of the past. In this case, the historic injustice was the conversion of 
Serbs, or Croats, to Islam, and the loss of these people to the ethnic nation.
Denouncing Constructed Nationalism and Islam:
While their nationalism was publicly denounced, Bosnian Moslems did consider 
themselves to be a defined national group. While they were willing to share power with Serbs 
and Croats within the country, they had no intention of being incorporated into an expanded
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Serbian or Croatian state. When Alija Izetbegovic formed his Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA) in May, 1990, it became clear to Serbian and Croatian leaders that the Moslems would 
not be so easily assimilated, or relinquish their desire to preserve a multinational, 
multiconfessional republic. While appealing to Moslems with its green banners and crescents, 
the official policy of the SDA was the preservation of a tolerant and unitary Bosnia, with
o
national and religious rights for all. Most of the SDA’s actions, as well as the 
uncontroversial Bosnian flag (with its Kotromanic fleur-de-lis from the medieval period) 
seemed to support this claim.9
Nevertheless, the presence of a Moslem ruling party, even one committed to 
multiculturalism, was anathema to Serbian and Croatian interests, who in turn, formed their 
own nationalist parties. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) was founded two months after 
the SDA. Radovan Karadzic, long a favourite of Dobrica Cosic, was seen as the best man to 
represent the Serbian cause. Similarly, a Bosnian branch of the Croatian HDZ was formed 
under Stjepan Kljuic. This party would initially support the Bosnian government, then later 
seek to undermine it. 10 Events in 1991 were to prove crucial to later developments. By April, 
autonomous Serbs established a regional Bosanska Krajina parliament at Banja Luka. By 
July, the SDS announced their boycott of the Bosnian Parliament, amid denunciations of 
Izetbegovic’s rule. They reacted particularly harshly to Izetbegovic’s call for a referendum on 
the future status of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Soon after the referendum in August, four 
autonomous Serbian units had sprung up in the republic. Walking out of the Bosnian 
Parliament in October, the Bosnian Serbs held their own referendum in November, which 
resulted in near unanimous support for union with the SFRY.11
At the same time, the Croatian side was also working towards their autonomy. Only 
one day after the results of the Bosnian Serb referendum, the Croats established a Posavina 
community of eight units, forming an autonomous area in northern Bosnia. This was 
followed scarcely a week later by the formation of Herceg-Bosna (with 18 units) in western 
Hercegovina. In retaliation, the SDS in December announced the creation of the Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the same month, the Croats founded the Republic of 
Herceg-Bosna.12 It was clear that both Serbs and Croats were preparing for the eventual 
dismemberment of the Bosnian republic. Nationalist myths were operationalised within this 
context of ethnic polarisation. Myths which spoke of ancient national territory and peoples 
legitimated the creation of ethnic enclaves. Myths were also necessary to justify the presence 
of the JNA, and a wide range of paramilitary groups, such as the Tigers and White Eagles 
(Serbian), and Autumn Rain and the Croatian Defence Forces-HOS (Croatian). The violent
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seizing of territory necessitated a barrage of propaganda, to prove that the Bosnian Moslems 
had somehow brought the horrors of ethnic cleansing on themselves.
The Moslems as ‘Fallen’ Serbs: Ethnic and Territorial Dimensions:
Of extreme importance in the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina was the legitimisation of 
land grabbing activities, as well as some of the more insalubrious acts of Serbian state-craft: 
rape, ethnic cleansing, looting, and physical destruction. Two of the key arguments of 
Serbian propagandists were that Bosnian Moslems were ethnically Serbian, and, that Bosnian 
territory was part of ancient Serbia. Thus, the outside observer was to believe that Serbian 
leaders were merely practising an extreme form of collective masochism. One, after all, could 
not commit genocide against one’s own people.
Serbian territorial ambitions were certainly at the root of such writing. Serbian 
geographer Jovan Ilic’s geopolitical plans for Bosnia-Hercegovina had, by 1992, taken into 
account the agreements reached between Milosevic and Tudjman. His strategy for the 
dismemberment of the republic thus exuded a tinge of ‘impartiality’, where both nationalist 
regimes would receive their proper reward. Western Hercegovina and part of Posavina were 
to be annexed to Croatia, with Eastern Hercegovina joined with Montenegro. Serbia would 
then take all of Bosnia, as well as the Neretva Valley and Mostar, which would be joined 
with it. In this early stage of the conflict, Ilic remained convinced that the Moslems would be 
quite happy under Serbian rule, since, ‘As regards psychic construction, Muslims and Serbs 
are much closer to each other than Muslims and Croats’. This tune changed when Izetbegovic
• ITdecided to take Bosnia-Hercegovina in its entirety out of the Federation.
Generally, most official Serbian propaganda focussed on Serbia’s historic claim to the 
republic in its entirety, deriving many of its claims from the ethnic identity of the people. Due 
either to persecution or opportunism, Serbs held that their own people had converted to Islam 
in mass numbers during the Ottoman occupation. The Serbian Ministry of Information, for 
example, concluded that, ‘most of today’s Bosnian Moslems are descended from Serbs,’ 
declaring Bosnian Moslems to be ‘Serbs of Moslem faith’14 The Serbian government blamed 
Communism for the spread of an ‘artificial’ Moslem identity. Further, since Communism was 
itself a major suppresser of authentic forms of nationalism, it was clear that Moslem 
‘nationality’ was simply a political tool, nothing more.15
Other writers traced the rule of historic Serbian kings to prove the case. For Serbian 
nationalist ethnographers, Bosnia-Hercegovina had always been a part of Serbia, from the 
mle of Serbian king Chaslav in 927, until 1918.16 Most Serbian historians pointed to the long
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history of a Serbian majority in the region, positing that Serbian values and culture had 
influenced the region’s character and traditions. In reviewing the history of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, Dusan Batakovic described how, large portions of the republic were populated 
by Serbs.17 The basis for Batakovic’s claim, as it was for many others, was that Serbian 
nationality could be ascertained by a variety of features, including linguistic criteria, which 
betrayed an unconscious or primordial Serbian identity. Such views were common. One 
historian concluded, ‘The Moslem power brokers and the oppressed common people spoke 
the same Serbian language’, while another writer claimed hopefully, ‘There were Serbs as 
polytheists as Serbian, Orthodox, as Bogomils, therefore they remained Serbs even as 
Moslems, their ethnic character is also their language’.18 Serbian archaeologists employed 
other forms of historical evidence. The use of the Cyrillic script on tombstones, rather than 
the ‘Croatian’ Glagolytic script, also proved that Bosnia’s ancient inhabitants had been 
Serbs.19
Moslems were denied the luxury of a separate ethnic, national, and religious identity. 
Further, Serbian writers advanced dubious linguistic and historical ‘proof that the Serbs had a 
right to most of the land in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In practice, Bosnian Serb General Radko 
Mladic used such ideas to legitimate his army’s conduct, explaining in one interview, ‘I have 
not conquered anything in this war. I only liberated that which was always Serbian, although I 
am far from liberating all that really is Serbian...’.20 Militia leaders, like warlord Vojislav 
Seselj, advanced similar theories, claiming that Bosnian Moslems were ‘Islamisized Serbs’, 
while many ‘so-called Croats’ were in fact ‘Catholic Serbs.’21 Again, the theme of the 
‘watershed’ was important here. While for centuries, Moslem ‘Serbs’ had been submerged 
under a variety of despotic empires and false identities, the Serbs were now coming back to 
free their own ethnic brothers from centuries of misguided loyalty. This was seen to be a great 
era in Serbian history.
Converting ethnic Serbs from Islam to Orthodoxy became a top priority for the 
Bosnian Serb political leadership. Moslems would also have the ‘opportunity’ to abandon 
their constructed identity, embracing their ‘natural’ ethnicity -  that of Serbdom. In one 
domestic radio broadcast, Radovan Karadzic urged Bosnian Moslems to abandon Islam, 
claiming hopefully that, ‘many Moslems who are well educated and sensible are being 
baptized and are becoming Christian in Europe as a way of reacting against fundamentalism 
and the introduction of militant Islam into Bosnia... it is clear that we must cross the Rubicon 
since we are dealing with exceptional people in whom the memory of their Serbian origin is 
alive.’22 Karadzic concluded, ‘...the Croats and Moslems, in falsifying history, in using our
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literature and our culture have created the bases for their future states, on lands which are 
ethnically and historically Serb.’ The implications were clear. The Serbs were going to 
liberate the Moslems whether they liked it or not.
Of central importance was the argument that Serbs were improving the lives of the 
Bosnian Moslems. Their nationalism was somehow positive, because it was freeing Moslem 
‘Serbs’ from a false identity and religion, while allowing them to become more western and 
more civilised. Images of a return to historic soil and national liberation justified the 
irredentist ambitions of Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia. The need to convert the Moslems was 
based on the dangerous assumption that Moslem national identity was irrelevant in a blood 
based ethnic conflict. While a fraternal discourse was promoted officially, Serbian forces 
were busy shelling villages and committing ethnic cleansing against their former ‘brothers’.
Bosnian Moslems and their Croatian Heritage:
Many of the primordial themes found in Serbian writings were, not surprisingly, 
echoed in the Croatian media. Croats also had historic claims to Bosnia-Hercegovina, and, 
like the Serbs, saw the Moslems as part of their nation. In some respects, the Croatian claim 
seemed to be stronger, as evidenced by the willingness of Moslems and Croats to enter into 
coalitions and military alliances. Nevertheless, while alliances existed, demographic balance 
was often the primary consideration. After all, there were more than twice as many Serbs as 
there were Croats in the region. This explains why the Croats were so keen to forge strategic 
alliances with the Moslems. During key periods, demographics also informed Moslem 
decisions.
The idea that Croats and Bosnian Moslems were of the same ethnic stock was 
certainly not new, nor was the portrayal of Moslems as fallen Croats. Such ideas were 
common during the 19th century, and were exploited during World War II, when Ustasa 
propaganda described Catholicism and Islam as the two founding religions of the NDH. Such 
imagery allowed Croatian forces, to justify the take-over of Bosnian Moslem lands in the 
1900s. Like the Serbs, Croatian propagandists held that one could not commit ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ against one’s own nation. The first post-World War II stirring of this idea came 
from Nobel laureate Ivo Andric, perhaps the first in the Tito’s Yugoslavia to describe the 
Bosnian Moslems as part of the Croatian nation. ‘Having fallen to Islam,’ he claimed,
Croatian Bosnia, Tost the possibility of fulfilling its natural role of participating in the cultural 
development of Christian Europe. Instead, Bosnia became a mighty fortress against the
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Christian West.’24 This theme of the fallen Croat nation was to re-emerge with Tudjman’s 
regime in Croatia.
Later writers, such as historian Abdulaf Dizdarevic, also asserted this claim, 
employing a mixture of racial and linguistic criteria to dismiss Moslem nationalism, ‘The 
uniformity of the physical features of our Croatian nation which, along with its language is 
one of the dominant characteristics of the same racial group ... They preserved [the Croatian] 
language in its purest form and as a dialect of clear and undeniable Croatian origin.’25 The 
presence of these national traits constituted proof, as it did for the Serbs that the Moslems 
were co-nationals. Dizdarevic’s dramatic description of the Fall of the Croats to Islam is 
worth reviewing,
The religious wars that broke out when foreign religions mixed in with our common 
ancestral Slavic paganism, raged in the midst of our nation for centuries, destroying 
its most powerful forces, erased that unique national image which reflected the 
uniformity of national traditions ... The historical moment of converting to Islam was 
without a doubt the most decisive moment in the history of the Croatian nation ...
Thus began the long era in the history of Bosnia, cut off from its mother country ...
Never in history was there such a case of injustice as this one. It oppressed a handful 
of people who it seems, were condemned by God himself to bathe in the blood of 
their own children.26
Such views were common amongst Croats, as they were amongst Serbs. Moslems 
were long suffering Croats, desperately in need of ‘rediscovering’ their true ethnicity. 
Historian Paul Tvrtkovic, a linear descendant of the medieval King Tvrtko, similarly saw 
Bosnian Moslems as ‘Islamicised Croats’. Like Andric and Dizdarevic, he asserted that the 
Moslems had no choice in the matter. They were, ‘by ethnic origin, predominantly Croatian, 
whether one likes it or not.’27 Tvrtkovic□ also argued that ‘Croat Catholics and Moslems’ 
were ethnically identical, and thus of the same nation, while the Serbs were ethnically 
different.28
Mirroring his Serbian counterparts, Tvrtkovic charted the renewal of Croatian 
consciousness among the Moslems after the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the 
Austro-Hungarians in 1878. It was during this time, he claimed, that Moslems once again 
became proud of their Croatian origin. It was also during ‘apocalyptic moments’, presumably 
times when both nations feared the onslaught of ‘Greater Serbia’, that a common ‘Croat- 
Moslem consciousness’ was expressed.29 In this way, a seemingly natural and lengthy history 
of Croatian-Moslem alliances was drawn out. Paradoxically, this argument did not imply that 
the Bosnian Moslems should be treated with respect. Rather, it proved that since Moslems
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had historically sided with Croats, they had an obligation to do so during the 1990s, whether 
or not it was in their best interest.
Using a mixture of historical facts, Croatian writers used history in very much the 
same way as their Serbian counterparts, drawing out racial and linguistic similarities between 
Moslems and Croats. Because of their conversion to Islam, Moslems were forced to fight 
against their ethnic brothers, a situation which could now be reversed once Croatia was able 
to ‘liberate’ Bosnia-Hercegovina. Again, the same theme of ‘watershed’ was reiterated. In 
what could almost be a paraphrase of Karadzic’s views, Tudjman claimed with pride, after 
his troops took control of the Hercegovina in September, 1995, ‘Croatia accepts the task of 
Europeanisation of Bosnian Moslems at the behest of the Western European powers.’30 The 
Croats were coming home.
Bosnia-Hercegovina as a Croatian Land:
Like the Serbs, Croatian politicians and intellectuals employed historic arguments 
buttress their claims to Bosnian territory. Since Moslems were ethnic Croats, it was 
uncontroversial to suggest that Bosnia-Hercegovina was Croatian. Tudjman included the 
Moslems in his 1991 affirmation of Croatian sovereignty, hinting that ‘territorial adjustments’ 
to existing borders might eventually be required, since, ‘Croatia and Bosnia constitute a 
geographical and political unity and have always formed a joint state in history’.31 Croatian 
Defence Minister Gojko Susak was similarly lucid on the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 
one 1996 interview, ‘[F]or me Bosnia-Hercegovina is also the state of Croatian people and 
for me it is Croatia. For a Bosniak it can be Bosnia, and for a Serb whatever, but according to 
its constitution it is also the state of Croatian people and as such I consider it to be my 
homeland.’ Father Batakovic, vice president of the Bosnian HDZ also described Bosnia as 
‘an old Croat land’, as opposed to ‘an old Serb land’. Unsurprisingly, none of these political 
leaders saw Bosnia as an autonomous region which deserved be left on its own.
Annexing Bosnia was also a popular theme in academic circles. During the war in 
Bosnia, Ante Beljo described Bosnia-Hercegovina as an integral part of ‘Croatian ethnic 
territory’, with both republics comprising ‘an entity historically, culturally, linguistically, and 
economically.’34 That Bosnia-Hercegovina was an internationally recognised country, 
separate from Croatia, made no difference whatsoever to this type of thinking. Tvrtkovic also 
contrasted the ‘artificial’ borders between the two countries, with the ‘natural’ linkages
• • • “1Cbetween Hercegovina and Dalmatia and south western Bosma with Croatia. Other 
academics contributed to the war effort by inventing spurious statistics to buttress these
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irridentist claims. Sime Dodan’s unambiguously titled book, Bosnia and Hercegovina: a 
Croatian Land, claimed that 95% of Moslems and 30% of Serbians were ethnically Croat, 
using the putative theory that all surnames ending in ‘an’ were of Iranian origin, and were 
therefore Croatian.36
Even glossy Croatian travel books printed by the government included photographs of
V
Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities. Ante Cuvalo’s Croatia and the Croatians, described 
Croatia’s eastern border as being Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro. As stated in the 
introduction, ‘further reference to the Croatians and Croatia in this book encompasses the 
territory of today’s Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina’. To this 
end, the territory of this ‘joint’ state was added together, as was the population. Such tourist 
books aimed at attracting foreign visitors were meant to familiarise travellers with the idea of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia being the same state, and expressed clear designs on the 
region, well before the war had even begun. Before a single shot had been fired, libraries 
throughout the world received free copies of Cuvalo’s book.
Analysing Serbian and Croatian Arguments:
Conflicting national claims are often difficult to deconstruct. Historical revisionism is 
always a mixture of fact and interpretation, relying on a highly bias interpretation of 
historical reality. At various times in history, parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina’s territory were 
under Serbian and Croatian rule, thus making it impossible to assert that Bosnia was either 
Croatian or Serbian. Bosnia proper was under Serbian rule from the mid-10th century to the 
end of the 11th, although while the ‘Serbs’ ruled Bosnia, they controlled very little of what 
today is considered Serbia. However, their control over Hercegovina, today a Croatian 
stronghold, was more extensive. Bosnia proper was more closely linked to Croatia for much 
of its history, notably during the medieval period.38
The first time the region was united was under King Kotromanic in 1326, but while he 
was Catholic, his ‘Croatian’ identity is not mentioned.39 King Tvrtko, (crowned in 1367) 
while also a Catholic, was descended from the Serbian Nemanjic dynasty, and was thus 
claimed as both a historic Serbian and Croatian leader.40 There was a similar confusion over 
later figures. The ethnic identity of one 16th century vizier in the Sultan’s court, Mehmed 
Pasa Sokolovic, was hotly contested. Paul Tvrtkovic claimed him for the Croats, while 
Radovan Simardzic asserted his Serbian origin 41 These are but three of many examples of 
how different aspects of history -  religious affiliation versus lineage -  were used to assert 
competing claims.
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While true that much of Bosnia-Hercegovina had once been ruled by ‘Serbian’ rulers 
and ‘Croatian’ rulers, these rulers had little sense of nationalism or ethnic identity. Thus 
claiming Tvrtko or Sokolovic for one’s own side was historically misleading. Even if a 
ruler’s ‘ethnicity’ could be established without doubt, the constant change o f ‘ethnic’ rule 
through different historical periods made Serbian and Croatian claims irrelevant. Bosnia- 
Hercegovina had been subject to Turkish, French, German, Austrian, Italian and Hungarian 
administration. Historic rule, even if provable, in no way constituted a justification for
fHinvasion in the late 20 century.
Another aspect of Bosnian history which Serbs, Croats, and Moslems co-opted was 
the rise and fall of the ‘Bosnian Church’, a distinct religious organisation, which existed until
ththe 14 century. Moslems were the first to identify themselves as the descendants of Bosnian 
Church members, claiming that they converted en masse to Islam, and had therefore never 
been Orthodox or Catholic (and by extension, neither Serb nor Croat).42 Predictably, both 
Serbs and Croats proclaimed the Bosnian Church as merely an off shoot of their own faith. 
Croatian writers, such a Leo Petrovic and Jaroslav §idak, argued that the Bosnian Church was 
a heretical Catholic monastic order. Serbian writers, such as Bozidar Petranovic, argued that 
the Bosnian Church was an offshoot of the Orthodox Church.43
Problematically for nationalists, there was simply no standardised ‘national’
tficonsciousness before the 19 century, and therefore no means of accurately identifying an 
authentic Serbian or Croatian ‘ethnic’ consciousness. In many ways, Tito’s Moslem 
nationality was no more artificial than the arbitrary division of the Slavs into Serb and Croat. 
John Fine has suggested that due to the weakness of Church authority, there were many cases 
of multiple conversions, to Islam from either Orthodoxy or Catholicism, Catholicism to 
Orthodoxy, and Orthodoxy to Catholicism 44 Tone Bringa has described numerous families 
who tried to ‘cover all bases’ -  where one brother would be Orthodox or Catholic, the other 
Moslem.45
It is clear from historical accounts that the Islamic faith espoused in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina was rather liberal, what historian Peter Sugar has described as a ‘variety of 
European or rather Balkan folk-Islam’, which included baptism, icons to prevent mental 
illness and other non-Moslem characteristics. As he explained, ‘There were mountaineers 
who called themselves Constantin in front of Christians and Sulayman in front of Moslems. 
The dead would be given a service by the Orthodox Church and a subsequent burial in a 
Moslem cemetery. The religious boundaries were easily and frequently transgressed’.46 That 
one third of the contemporary Sarajevo population were in ‘mixed’ marriages cements the
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fact that even in the 20th century, religion was not seen as an exclusive category.47 Clearly, 
the notion that Bosnian Moslems were simply ethnic Croats or ethnic Serbs was untenable. 
The issue was largely a matter of opinion. There was no proof that any of Bosnia’s three 
national groups had any strong sense of national identity before the 19 century, or more 
importantly, that these groups were static and unchanging.
The Moslems as ‘Traitors’: The Islamic Conspiracy Theory:
Contrary to Serbian and Croatian desires, Bosnian Moslems had their own sense of 
identity, their own political parties, and their own military forces to back up their autonomy. 
It became apparent throughout the conflict that another form of propaganda was needed to 
legitimate military intervention in the region. Another soon emerged. If the Moslems rejected 
their ‘true’ ethnicity, and continued to promote their own form of identity, it followed 
logically that they had betrayed their Croatian or Serbian brothers. They had betrayed the 
nation because of their adherence to Islam -  the fact that they had adopted a foreign and 
expansionary religion. The theme of the Bosnian Moslems as traitors became influential in 
nationalist circles early in the conflict. ‘Islam’ was caricatured as a fundamentalist, 
exclusivist and thoroughly dangerous religion, bent on the destruction of ethnic nations in the 
Balkans.
Serbs and Croats would portray themselves as victims of an Islamic conspiracy. 
Rather than attacking a relatively defenceless minority group, they were defending Europe 
against the onslaught of an Islamic invasion, comparable only to the Ottoman invasion some 
five centuries before. Here, Kecmanovic’s ‘plot’ theme was often cited, as Serbs and Croats 
argued that outside powers were going to use the Bosnian Moslems as an ‘Islamic
AQ
Springboard’, to penetrate into the heart of Europe. Serbs and Croats were saving their own 
nation from assimilation and potential genocide, while reliving their historic role -  defending 
the Antemurale Christianitatis against a renewed Ottoman invasion.
Serbs and the ‘Moslem Traitors’ in Bosnia-Hercegovina:
The theory of Moslems as ‘fallen Serbs’ was often mixed with a view of the Moslems 
as traitors to the Serbian nation. Kosovo, as discussed previously, had elevated the Serbs to 
the status of a divine and chosen nation, while reducing the Moslems or ‘Turks’ to the status 
of ‘Christ killers’. Serbs who converted to Islam were seen to have renounced their chosen 
status, embracing the religion and culture of the invader. Converts were likened to Vuk
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Brankovic, and they were seen to constitute the worst of Serbia’s enemies. While certain 
propaganda focussed on the need to ‘save’ the Moslems, another more virulent strain called 
for the Serbs to ‘save’ themselves and the western world from Islamic invasion. Of course, 
anti-Moslem rhetoric had been popular in Serbia for many centuries. Karadzic’s 
popularisation of the Kosovo myth, Cvijic’s ‘Dinaric Man’, and Njegos’ ‘Mountain Wreath’ 
were but three early examples of anti-Moslem, anti-Turkish writings that were popular in 19th 
century Serbia.
Anti-Moslem rhetoric was extensively used in Serbian literature during the 1990s. 
Miroljub Jevtic, an Islamic specialist at Belgrade University, argued unequivocally that, 
‘Those who accepted Islam accepted the conquerors de facto as their brothers, and the crimes 
of the latter are their own. That means that their own hands are also covered with the blood of 
their own ancestors, the former Bosnian non-Muslim population. By converting to Islam, 
they destroyed Christian Bosnia and caused the Ottomans to rule over Christian Bosnia for a 
long time.’49 Jevtic □ was in many ways typical of the Serbian establishment. For him, as for 
many of his colleagues, the antipathy between Serbs and Moslems was centuries old. As far 
as he was concerned, ‘Serbophobia [was] highly developed among fundamentalist 
Muslims.’50 Thus, while Serbs may have been the aggressors in Bosnia, they were simply 
responding to centuries of Moslem aggression.
Novelists also picked up on similar themes. Draskovic’s Noz, (discussed in ‘Chapter 
Five’) featured a number of Moslem characters, who appeared primarily as treacherous, cold­
blooded murderers -  ethnic Serbs who had abandoned the ‘lessons of Kosovo’.51 This novel 
revolves around a massacre of Orthodox Serbs by Moslems, on Christmas Day, 1942. The 
only survivor, a Serbian baby, is raised by Moslems, and taught to hate the Serbs. By some 
twist of fate, he later discovers his own Serbian identity, and further discovers that his 
‘Moslem’ family is also ethnically Serbian. With its depictions of Moslem violence and 
wanton acts of cruelty, Moslems are presented as misguided traitors, who need to be carefully 
controlled.
Another novel of this stripe was Vojislav Lubarda’s The Ascension (1990) with its 
negative descriptions of Serbian-Moslem relations in Bosnia. Set after the assassination of the 
Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, the central action in the story once again 
consists of a massacre of Serbs by Moslems. Lubarda’s work was a typical expression of 
Serbian ‘counteridentification’. The Serbs were presented as noble and heroic, always willing 
to fight for others, and always willing to forgive and forget. These positive qualities were 
contrasted with those of the Moslems, who continuously hated the Serbs and massacred them
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whenever possible. Lubarda thus drew out stereotypical characterisations of the Moslems -  
their supposedly treacherous and warlike dispositions, making them little different from their 
mythical ancestor, Vuk Brankovic.
Novelists reinforced this anti-Moslem paranoia. So did politicians. In one collection 
of essays, Dobrica Cosic warned of a ‘pan-Islamic internationalization of war in Bosnia’, 
seeing this as ‘the greatest danger looming over both the Balkans and south east Europe’.54 
While Croatian writers almost always spoke of Serbs as part of the east, Cosic placed the 
Serbs solidly in the west, with the Moslems as little better than the Asian hordes and vandals 
to which the Croats alluded. Serbs had to continue their historic role, to defend the west 
against the evils of Islam. According to Cosic, ‘[It was] the Serbian people who consented, 
from the 14th century, to the greatest sacrifices for the defense of Europe and its 
civilization.’55
Other Serbian politicians, including Slobodan Milosevic, continued to hammer out the 
theme of Serbia standing alone against the forces of Islam, Serbia as the plucky ‘David’ 
against an Islamic ‘Goliath’. While he did not fear Islam, he saw the necessity of controlling 
it. This ‘plot’ was extremely popular among Serbian leaders, who enjoyed the symbolism of 
fighting against a powerful Islamic menace.56 Radovan Karadzic □ also saw his role in world 
historic proportions. He claimed that his mission as leader of the Bosnian Serbs was to insure 
that Islamic fundamentalism did not, ‘infect Europe from the south’. For Karadzic and many 
of his colleagues, Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey were
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trying to use Bosnia as a, ‘springboard for Islamic penetration of Europe.’ Serbian leaders 
enjoyed portraying themselves as self-sacrificing warriors, waging war in Bosnia in order to 
defend the west against a new Ottoman invasion.
Imagining the Islamic State: Serbian Perspectives:
While general ideas of Moslem treachery and cruelty were important, many Serbian 
academics amused themselves by imagining how horrible an Islamic state could be, what it 
would look like, how it would operate, and what features would distinguish it from other state 
forms. Certainly, a great deal of creative licence was allowed, as long as this distopian state 
was sufficiently horrific to deter the Serbian public from siding with the Moslems in Bosnia. 
Serbian views on what the Moslems were trying to create would have been laughable, had the 
authors not been serious.
For Serbian writers, the key to understanding Moslem objectives in Bosnia was Alija 
Izetbegovic’s now infamous tract, Islamic Declaration (1972). This publication, which earned
215
him a prison sentence under the Communist regime, was touted by Serbs and Croats alike as a 
blueprint for an expansionist Islamic empire. One quote in particular always caught the eye of 
Serbian propagandists. Izetbegovic supposed affirmed in his Declaration that “there can be no 
coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Muslim social and political institutions” in 
countries where Muslims represent the majority of the population.’58 Izetbegovic’s writing 
was often portrayed as a blueprint for an ‘Islamic renaissance’, followed by a ‘holy war 
(jihad)’ against non-Moslems. Serbs also feared that Izetbegovic was trying to create an 
expanded state, just as they were. Bosnia, one writer posited, was in danger of becoming part 
of a, ‘great Islamic federation from Morocco to Indonesia in which the Koran would be the 
supreme law.’59
This passage became an obvious favourite of both Serb and Croat writers, being one 
of the few that alluded to Izetbegovic’s plans for a utopian Islamic state. Contrary to Serbian 
and Croatian claims, Izetbegovic had never called for an Islamic state in Bosnia. In fact, he 
had concluded that such a state was impossible, due to the multi-confessional nature of 
republic. Nevertheless, interpretations of the Declaration gave a clear indication of Serbian 
paranoia about a resurgent Islam in the Balkans. Conjuring up a fear of jihad was a crucial 
aspect of Serbian propaganda. There had to be a serious Moslem threat to legitimate Serbian 
atrocities in the region.
One 1993 Serbian Ministry of Information pamphlet, intended for English audiences 
abroad, used a strong form of Orientalism laced with Islamic conspiracy theories. One of the 
contributors, an Orthodox priest and member of the Bosnian Serb Parliament, stressed the 
immorality and perfidy of the Moslems and their religion, predicting that,
They want for the second time to create a Turkish Bosnia or a Bosnia in Turkey ... 
with the Shariatic law and other life norms unacceptable in the twenty-first century.
Behind this century old dream of dream of a primitive man to live off the backs of a 
subjugated people, to have his own harem, dreaming of Istanbul, where according to 
him there was a paradise of earth, where “fairies are bathing in sherbet” ... They [the 
Moslems] invited to this bloody feast all other worldy bums, murderers and dogs of 
war, Mujahadins and jihad fanatics from the Islamic countries came to fulfill their 
sacred duty and to exterminate us. This unscrupulousness completely fits their 
religion and tradition and culture.60
For this particular writer, the Moslem utopia would be a reversion to some species of 
oriental despotism, where loose morals and low standards of behaviour would prevail.
Themes of sexual depravity and the subjugation of women were also common themes, as if to 
arouse in Serbian males the fear that their wives, mothers, or sisters, could be defiled by a
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Moslem. Thus Serbs objected to the possibility of an alternate society, where ‘eastern’ 
customs and manners would prevail. For them, the fear of another Ottoman empire was too 
horrible to contemplate.
Another article of a similar vein, entitled ‘Lying Hands on The Serbian Women’, was 
written by a Bosnian Serb official, again, defining the conflict in terms of a Moslem holy war 
against the Serbs. This document described a sort of ‘race crime’ being committed against 
Serbs leaving in and around Sarajevo. Here the image of rape as a weapon of war was 
stressed, ‘By order of the Islamic fundamentalists from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women 
from 17 to 40 years of age are being separated out and subjected to special treatment. 
According to their sick plans going back many years, these women have to be impregnated 
by orthodox Islamic seed in order to raise a generation of janissaries on the territories they 
surely consider to be theirs, the Islamic republic.’61
Again, the threat of Serbian women being raped was articulated. While some Serbian 
women were being raped, and perhaps not only by non-Serbs, rape was not described as an 
individual act, but as a weapon of war. This document was first brought to light by Roy 
Gutman in 1993, during his journalistic forays in Bosnia. It was at this time that the world 
first became exposed to the so-called ‘Serbian rape camps’, and the Bosnian Serbs were 
accused of systematically raping some 20,000 Moslem women. While such statistics were 
later proven to be unrealistically high, Serbian propagandists had a vested interest in 
deflecting criticism of any Serbian inspired rape policy. Thus, it made perfect sense to accuse 
the Bosnian Moslems of religiously inspired mass rape. The image of impregnating women in 
order to raise janissaries was also typical. Serbian women were not only being sexually 
violated; the Serbian nation was also suffering, since even more Serbian babies would be 
bom as Moslems.
While anecdotal evidence was extremely interesting, so too were the many 
compilations put out by the Serbian government. These featured testimony from Serbian 
women who claimed to have been raped by Bosnian Moslems. No doubt some of the stories 
were true, although they were nearly impossible to verify. Nikola Marinovic’s evocatively 
titled Stories from Hell, continued the popular Serbian theme of stereotyping Moslems as 
sexually depraved Ottomans,
The greatest humiliation suffered by Serbian women happens whenever a Moslem 
commander proclaims himself “bey”, “agha” or “vizier” (a frequent occurrence) and 
decides to have a harem. The “right to sleep” with the “master” is then brutally 
applied. Young Serbian women are thus brought to the bottom of human dignity.
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Such atrocities have particularly been registered in central Bosnia, in the towns of 
Zenica, Gomji Vakuf, Travnik, Jajce ... In these same zones, Serbian boys have 
undergone circumcision (the “sunnett”), and have been forcibly Islamicised.62
Once again, the fear of Serbian women being forced into harems was promoted, as 
well as the fear that Serbian boys would be forcibly converted to Islam, if the Serbs did not 
act quickly to take over strategic areas. After more than four decades of living side by side 
with Bosnia’s largely secularised Moslem populations, Bosnian Serbs surely knew that such 
distopian visions were pure nonsense. The most interesting aspect of this quotation was 
Marinovic’s listing of the towns and cities where these harems and forced conversions 
supposedly took place. Most of these places were those where a form of defensive ethnic 
cleansing had either taken place, or would take place shortly.
The Moslems as Genocidal Killers:
The Serbian aesthetic of victimisation was of central importance throughout the 
Bosnian conflict. Another general theme was to compare an exaggerated view of an Islamic 
conspiracy with the horrors of Nazi Germany. As with the Croats, Serbs could confidently 
claim to be defending themselves against a Moslem inspired genocide. Such a view was 
clearly stated by Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Ekmecic’s oft quoted speech to the last 
Congress of Serbian Intellectuals, in Sarajevo,
In the history of the world only the Jews have paid a higher price for their freedom 
than the Serbs. Because of their losses in the war, and because of massacres, the most 
numerous people in Yugoslavia, the Serbs, have, in Bosnia Hercegovina, fallen to 
second place, and today our policy and our general behaviour carry within 
themselves the invisible stamp of a struggle for biological survival f3
Ekmecic’s writings and public statements generally focussed on Bosnia-Hercegovina 
as the target of eastern and western expansionism. Sandwiched between two opposing and 
equally dangerous forces, Serbs were portrayed as Jew-like victims of an attempted genocide. 
This link figured prominently in many Serbian accounts.
Similarly, the fear of a Moslem inspired genocide was linked to the Bosnian youth 
magazine, Novi Vox, which supposedly encouraged its readers to participate in an anti- 
Serbian game -  to collect as many Serbian heads as possible.64 Another recent Bosnian Serb 
publication drew out similar themes. Here, the authors claimed to have uncovered a Moslem 
plan to kill 100 Serbs for every Moslem killed, and between 10-15 for every wounded. These 
figures echoed the ratio of Serbs to German deaths during the Nazi occupation of Serbia
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during World War II. Mixed with this imagery were reports of Moslem plans to establish a 
Moslem Islamic state, in which all women would be forced to wear veils, while all men 
would be forced to attend the mosque.65 Clearly, such imagism was important to create the 
impression that Serbs were merely reacting in self defence to a planned genocide on the part 
of the Moslems.
Another aspect of this self defensive posture was the theory that the Moslems had 
shelled their own people, to court sympathy from the west. The most publicised examples 
were two instances of shelling in Sarajevo, the first in February, 1994, where a marketplace 
was shelled on its busiest day. The second shelling occurred in August, 1995 when another 
marketplace was bombed, killing 37 civilians and wounding another 85.66 For Serbian 
writers, Izetbegovic, the skilful ‘dictator-impostor’, was guilty of having staged the shellings 
himself, in order to falsely portray the Moslems as victims of Serbian aggression.67
The prevailing opinion in Serbian quarters was that the Moslems were shelling their 
own people in order to deflect western attention from their extermination campaign against 
the Serb civilians. Historian Risto Tubic dismissed the marketplace bombings as a cover for a 
Moslem ‘Holocaust’ against the Serbs in the 1990s. Turning the truth completely upside 
down, Tubic compared the Bosnian Moslems to Nazis, victimising themselves in order to 
exterminate Serbs. Thus by denying that the Serbs had shelled Sarajevo, he was able to make 
overt parallels between Serbs and Jews,
Ever since Hitler organised the Crystal Night, this most cynical and filthiest weapon 
also became an instrument of modem warfare. Among many, suffice it to mention the 
massacres in Vasa Miskin Street and at the Markdale market-place. The aim was 
twofold: first to publicise reports on atrocities in order to arouse the desire for 
revenge among the public and draw world public support for one side against the 
other, and secondly, to alarm the world with such reports that would force 
governments to take action, to intervene militarily.69
References such as these were all the more ludicrous in light of the fact that Serbs had 
been continually shelling Sarajevo from their mountain positions during this time. The 
Sarajevo Olympic Stadium became a huge cemetery for Moslem casualties, while most 
Sarajevans were terrified to stray from their homes, lest they be gunned down by Serbian 
snipers. Even in such an atmosphere, when Moslems were dodging bullets down ‘sniper 
alley’ in Sarajevo, the Serbs maintained that Bosnian Moslems were playing the victim to 
cover up their own genocide against Serbs.
From a practical standpoint, it was clear that the image of warlike, fanatical Moslems 
was a key ingredient in activating Serbian violence in many regions of Bosnia. Images of
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Moslems as traitors and ‘Christ killers’ were repeated time and time again in the Serbian 
media, in an attempt to encourage and justify Serbian aggression. Constantly repeated in the 
Serbian press, such imagery was often used as a pretext for ethnic cleansing.70 Serbian writers 
often used reports of atrocities as a precursor to attacks on strategically important towns and 
cities. Thus Serbs were reported tortured and killed in Livno, Jajce, Slavonski Brod, Konjic, 
Travnik, Vitez, Mostar, even Sarajevo.71 Such patterns occurred throughout the conflict, 
suggesting that anti-Moslem propaganda had very practical and negative consequences.
*
Croatian Views of the Bosnian Moslems:
While there were many historical instances of co-operation between Croats and 
Bosnian Moslems, Croatian attitudes were strikingly to those of the Serbs. Persecution 
imagery performed an important role, as well as the argument that Moslems were fallen 
nationals who had to be brought back to the fold. Again like the Serbs, Croatian politicians 
and academics saw the merits in casting themselves as the victims of a Moslem onslaught, as 
part of their mission to liberate former Croatian territory. An emphasis on victimhood 
prevented domestic criticism of Croatian actions, in particular by the opposition media. Both 
Serbian and Croatian government media were issued strict instructions not to report on the 
negative activities of their own side in the conflict, thus rendering a skewed representation of 
Moslems as aggressors only. The Serbian media was keen to portray the conflict as a ‘civil 
war’, and media references to the Moslems described them constantly as ‘attackers’.72
Similar views were propelled on the Croatian side, even during periods of Croatian- 
Moslem alliances. This was due to the fact that such alliances were brokered by the Croatian 
government, with little regard for the views of Bosnian Croats (Mate Boban was removed by 
Tudjman during one such alliance). Thus, it was common for the Croatian media to promote 
messages of goodwill and friendship with the Moslems, while newsrooms in Herceg-Bosna 
were condemning Moslems as ‘enemies’ and genocidal killers.73 As with the Serbs, Croatian 
propagandists accused the Moslems of trying to take over the Balkans and Europe. Such 
imagery began in the official media by late 1992. At this stage, it focussed primarily on 
Moslem collaboration with KOS, the Yugoslav military intelligence, and by extension, the 
Serbs. This soon changed to specific attacks on Islam, with regular news reports decrying the 
dangers of fundamentalist extremism. By early November, 1992, Gojko Susak, in a bid for 
Israeli military support, tried to drum up fears of an Islamic conspiracy, alleging that there 
were 11,000 Bosnian Muslims studying in Cairo alone. He appealed to one Israeli audience 
by asking, ‘can you imagine a fundamentalist state in the heart of Europe?’74
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Tudjman likewise referred often to a threat of Islamic Fundamentalism and to an 
Islamic holy war. He justified intervention in Bosnia by maintaining that Izetbegovic’s 
government aimed to, ‘set up an Islamic state in Europe, which was part of a conflict between 
the Islamic and Catholic worlds, and of a confrontation between the Islamic world and the 
West.’75 For Tudjman, the Islamic threat was real. In a 1992 meeting with former American 
ambassador Warren Zimmermann, he outlined the dimensions of the Islamic conspiracy,
The Muslims want to establish an Islamic fundamentalist state. They plan to do this 
by flooding Bosnia with 500,000 Turks. Izetbegovic has also launched a demographic 
threat. He has a secret policy to reward large families so that in a few years the 
Muslims will be a majority in Bosnia (at the time they were 44 percent). The 
influence of an Islamic Bosnia will then spread through the Sandzak and Kosovo to 
Turkey and to Libya. Izetbegovic is just a fundamentalist frontman for Turkey; 
together they’re conspiring to create a Greater Bosnia. Catholics and Orthodox alike 
will be eradicated ...7<s
Tudjman’s unsubstantiated theories typified official Croatian views: the Moslems 
could not be trusted, and were plotting an Islamic expansion. Croatian writers used such fears 
to legitimise the establishment of Bosnian Croatian autonomous units, such Herzeg-Bosna.
As with the Serbian side, Izetbegovic’s Islamic Declaration was frequently cited as proof of 
the Moslem’s plan to overrun the region. Croatian journalists, like their Serbian counterparts, 
often quoted Izetbegovic’s line about, ‘no peace and coexistence between the Islamic faith
77and non-Islamic social and political institutions.’ The Declaration was also linked to 
specific genocidal crimes perpetrated by Moslems against Croats. Like the Serbs, Croatian 
writers portrayed Izetbegovic’s work as a blueprint for genocide.
One journalist described how the Bosnian Moslems in 1993, through a certain 
Operation “Tito”, had begun attacking Croatian settlements in central Bosnia, laying the 
foundations for a Moslem instigated genocide against Bosnia’s Croatian population. 
Izetbegovic□ supposedly had plans to make Sarajevo a European Islamic capital, were some 
15 million European Moslems would be housed. As for the Bosnian Croats, they were nothing 
more than an obstacle for Izetbegovic, who wanted to construct and Islamic empire from 
‘Teheran to Slavonski Brod.’78 Presumably this would have somehow fit inside the Islamic 
empire that the Serbs envisaged for Izetbegovic, destined to stretch from Indonesia to 
Morocco. Needless to say, there was no documentary evidence of an ‘Operation Tito’. The 
theory that Sarajevo was to become a world Islamic capital was also pure conjecture. More 
important were the overt accusations of genocide levelled against the Moslems. As in the
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Serbian case, such writings were useful in obscuring the reality of Croatian ethnic cleansing 
operations, which were ongoing in Bosnia at that time.
Even when Croats and Moslems formed Tudjman brokered alliances, the local press 
continued to condemn the Moslems, for trying to destroy their national distinctiveness with 
multinational federalism. One recent article, written well after the Dayton Accords, accused 
the Bosnian Moslems of trying to turn the Croats into ‘Bosnian Croats’, which they 
interpreted as an attempt to, ‘eradicate from their life and consciousness national symbols, 
tradition and language, to destroy their identity.. .’79 For many Croatian nationalists, even the 
prefix ‘Bosnian’ implied a Moslem identity rather than the former regional appellation it used 
to signify. When forced into an alliance with the Moslems in 1995, the Bosnian Croats had an 
extremely difficult time abandoning their hopes for an internationally recognised Greater 
Croatia.
Assigning Blame in Bosnia-Hercegovina:
Both Serbian and Croatian academics, journalists, military leaders and politicians 
consistently used the fear of Islamic expansion and violence to legitimate their own 
nationalist expansion and violence. Both Serbs and Croats ran ‘detention centres’ and 
‘collection camps’ where prisoners were housed, fed little to no food, frequently beaten and 
terrorised, sometimes sexually violated, and often killed. While one should note clearly that 
the majority of camps were Serb controlled (13 major camps), the Croats maintained 4 main 
camps as well. These, however, were only the largest. The International Red Cross, by 
August, 1994, had documented a total of 51, many small and impromptu -  located in camp 
grounds, schools, even movie theatres. Serbian camps were exposed during 1992, and 
figured prominently in the famous ITN-Channel 4 series on Bosnia. Roy Gutman’s prize 
winning dispatches also exposed Serbian crimes, while notably omitting references to
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Croatian violence. Tudjman publicly admitted to the existence of Croatian ‘collection 
centres’, which housed, by 1993, an estimated 20,000 inmates in the territory of Herceg- 
Bosna. That ‘others had them too’ was enough of an excuse for Tudjman, who did not seem 
to deny, nor regret that such camps existed.81
While organised militia groups instigated much of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, the Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholic Churches also proved their 
complicity in many of the violent activities of their supporters. Serbian warlord Vojislav 
Seselj and his militia were blessed by an Orthodox priest after having cleansed several 
Moslem towns near Sarajevo. In Trebinje, one Orthodox priest led a group of Serbs in
222
expelling several Moslem families from their homes. The town’s 500 year old mosque was 
later destroyed during celebrations for the feast day of St. Sava. Various influential Church 
officials spoke out against the Bosnian Moslems as well. Metropolitan Christopher in the 
United States described Bosnia’s Moslems as slavish followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini, 
while the Orthodox bishop of Zvomik described how Moslems killed ‘unbelievers’ as a way 
of getting closer to heaven.82 The Church’s involvement lent crucial moral and spiritual 
support to Serbian nationalists. Rather than speaking out against war, the Church became a 
willing collaborator.
The Croatian Catholic Church, to a lesser extent, proved instrumental in encouraging 
many of the more violent aspects of Croatian nationalism. While the Cardinal of Zagreb and 
the Archbishop of Sarajevo bravely condemned the escalation of violence, local branches of 
the Church were often supporters, particularly in Hercegovina. In Mostar, the local clergy and 
250 Franciscan friars lent their support to the HVO, arguing that, ‘Islamic states don’t have 
free speech, democracy or freedom of religion’. Priests often compared the Bosnian 
government to ‘Turkish occupiers’, while portraits of Ustasa leaders such Ante Pavelic and 
Ranko Boban were frequent adornments on the walls of Hercegovenian priests.83
In the Serbian and Croatian cases, both sides used the myths of assimilation and 
Islamic conspiracy to sanction the ethnic cleansing and mass destruction that so characterised 
the Bosnian war. Myths were employed as part of a political agenda, in order to legitimate 
violence, and in some cases, to instigate it. While the Churches could have prevented the 
escalation of violence, they did little to discourage it. Unfortunately, their complicity in mass 
murder and the forced expulsion of populations will remain one of the most enduring and 
disheartening aspects of the conflict.
The Bosnian Moslem Perspective:
Serbian and Croatian designs and overall strategies for Bosnia-Hercegovina were 
incredibly similar. So too were the themes and attitudes expressed in their national writings, 
another good example of how the narcissism of minor differences played out in practice. 
Unsurprisingly, the Moslem leadership also used images of victimisation and persecution.
The fact that the Moslems were the chief victims has much to do with this. Gow and Tisley 
put it well when they rightly noted, ‘if Croatia was weak, but played the victim to emphasise 
its position, Bosnia was generally a victim’.84
The Bosnian Moslems, like the Serbs and Croats, found victim centred imagery useful 
in articulating their case. The Bosnian conflict was perhaps the only one which saw Moslem
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leaders comparing themselves to Jews, in order to court western European support against a 
Christian instigated genocide. Clerics such as Mustafa Spahlic were quick to claim that 
Bosnian Moslems were ‘the new Jews of Europe’.85 Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Siladzic, 
amid fears that violence would escalate if the arms embargo was lifted by the United States, 
used World War II imagery to advance his case, compared lifting the arms embargo to 
bombing the rail lines leading to Auschwitz. As far as he was concerned, the lifting of the 
arms embargo would save tens of thousands of lives. During the Geneva negotiations, 
Izetbegovic used the same imagery, likening the agreements to those reached between 
Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1938, except, ‘Instead of Munich this is Geneva. Instead of 
little Czechoslovakia, this is little Bosnia. Instead of Benes, it is me.’86
The purpose of this imagery for the Moslems was similar, yet different to that used by 
the Serbs and Croats. The Moslem side was largely fighting a war of self defence; theirs was 
clearly the weakest position, and the use of such imagery was not meant to mask their own 
atrocities, but figured as a public relations tactic, to encourage western support for a united 
Bosnia. In the Moslem case, imagery of persecution and genocide was used in the same 
manner as that of the Armenians, the Romani, the Ukrainians, and other groups seeking 
national rights and international recognition in the face of overwhelming oppression.
Nevertheless, this does not imply that the Bosnian Moslems were entirely blameless. 
True to Serbian and Croatian accounts, the Bosnian Moslems had received military support 
from the Middle East -  although as a last resort -  long after war had broken out. Furthermore, 
the token support offered by Middle Eastern countries was more symbolic and political than 
practical. Algerian and Saudi veterans of the Afghan wars came to participate in ‘Jihad’ 
against the Serbs and Croats, but were alarmed by the ‘liberal’ or folk Islam practices in 
Bosnia, particularly the fact that men and women were fighting side by side. Bosnian 
Moslems, by contrast, were often angered by the hard line stance of their erstwhile allies.87 
There was little financial support from the oil rich countries of the Middle East, except for 
some government funding from Saudi Arabia and a variety of private contributions.88 What 
was given, and primarily from Iran, were offers of fuel, arms, and at one stage 10,000 ‘peace 
keepers’ (these were refused by the UN).
Rather than hying to help the Bosnian Moslems, Iran seemed to have been motivated 
by a desire to provoke the United States, while antagonising their Saudi rivals. Shiite Iranian 
relief aid was primarily targeted at areas which were being helped by similar Sunni Saudi 
agencies, suggesting that Middle Eastern politics was being played out in Bosnia, at the 
expense of the local population.89 Saudi and Iranian aid was simply too little too late, and had
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little effect on the outcome of the war. Contrary to Serbian and Croatian claims, Bosnia was 
never a springboard for Islamic penetration into Europe. Islamic countries hardly seemed to 
care at all what happened in Bosnia. While author Salman Rushdie was hiding for his life 
from an Iranian Fatwah, after the publication of his Satanic Verses, no Islamic regime incited 
aggression against Serbian or Croatian leaders.90
By 1994, some 80% of non-Serbs had been expelled from Serbian controlled territory. 
After most of thfe brutal ethnic cleansing took place, there were signs that the Bosnian 
government, feeling it now had nothing to lose, began imposing a distinctly Islamic morality 
on the territory it still controlled. Several officials in the Bosnian government spoke out 
against mixed marriages, arguing that they were doomed to failure and should be opposed. 
Mustafa Ceric, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia, opined that while the policy of systematic rape 
was ‘horrible and incomprehensible’, it was, ‘less painful and easier to accept than all those 
mixed marriages and all those children bom of mixed marriages.’91 Culture and Education 
minister Enes Karic, initiated new reforms to make what remained of Moslem Bosnia more 
Islamic, throwing away ‘European trash’ -  such as drugs, alcohol, and prostitution, banned 
Croatian and Serbian music from radio stations in favour of more Arab sounding music, as 
well as encouraging changes in the ‘Bosnian’ language to reflect as Islamic heritage.92
Curiously, there was a backlash against these reforms, largely from Moslems 
themselves, including members of the SDA government. Events came to a head in early 
1995, when Izetbegovic met with members of the 7th Muslim Brigade, whose banner bore 
Arabic writings. His official endorsement of Islamic over multi-confessional forces was 
highly criticised. His reference to one dead Moslem soldier as a shehid (martyr), brought 
open criticism from the boy’s family, angered by the fact that their son was described using 
Arabic words, while being the focus of Arabic prayers. This was a language which neither he 
nor his family understood. What was obvious among Bosnian Moslems was their continued 
support for a multiconfessional Bosnia, even amongst those Moslems who were the obvious 
victims of Serbian and Croatian aggression. For some reason, a strong sense of nationalism, 
or even religious conviction failed to take hold amongst the population, even during the 
bloodiest periods of the war.94
Conclusions:
Serbian and Croatian nationalists advanced startlingly similar ideas and images in 
their understanding of the Bosnian Moslems. Both claimed Bosnian Moslems as their ethnic 
kin, while similarly claiming the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina as historically part of their
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country. At the same time, negative myths were used to attack the Moslems as an 
expansionist and dangerous religious group -  with different cultural practices and sexual 
mores. Negative myths of identification, such as ‘counteridentification’, themes o f ‘plot’, 
‘threat’, ‘damage’, and ‘universal culprit’, were common, as well as themes o f ‘redemption 
and suffering’, and ‘unjust treatment’. Both sides portrayed the Moslems as the vanguard of a 
dangerous Islamic conspiracy, resorting to crude stereotypes and rabid orientalist discourse to 
assert their false claims. By examining Serbian and Croatian reactions to a common 
perceived enemy, we can truly see how prescient Ignatieff s use of the narcissism of minor 
differences really was. These similarities are best explained by the fact that both Serbs and 
Croats had similar objectives -  to legitimate the force necessary to create autonomous regions 
of their own, even when this included ethnic cleansing against the Moslem population.
While there were assertions of Moslem nationalism by the Bosnian government, these 
were certainly mild, and largely in reaction to the atrocities Moslems were forced to endure. 
The same held for foreign support, which seemed to have been motivated by Iranian-Saudi 
rivalry more than anything else. The Moslem population at large, even by the end of the 
conflict, still favoured a multiconfessional society. It remains unclear what the future will 
bring, even though the Dayton Accords (1995) seem to have brought about a type of peaceful 
co-existence. The legacies of ethnic cleansing, however, still remain. 60% of Bosnia’s 
inhabitants were forced from their homes, and more than 1.3 million people (some 30% of 
the population) were dispersed in 63 countries.95 There could be no doubt that Serbs and 
Croats had been the aggressors throughout the conflict. Their use of victim centred 
propaganda proved to be the most effective means of legitimating their conduct, which while 
not necessarily genocidal, was extremely brutal.
While there was never any proof that the Moslems wanted to spread Islam throughout 
Yugoslavia, or even to make Bosnia an Islamic state, Serbian and Croatian propagandists 
worked tirelessly to promote the Moslems as genocidal mujahadeen. In both the Serbian and 
Croatian cases, the threat of genocide, from each other or the Bosnian Moslems was the key 
to Redemption in an expanded nation state. Greater Serbian and Greater Croatian ambitions 
were premised on the need to protect one’s fellow co-nationals throughout the region, when 
Yugoslavia was in the final stages of life.
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Conclusions
‘The New Aristocracy will consist exclusively of hermits, bums and permanent 
invalids. The Rough Diamond, the Consumptive Whore, the bandit who is good 
to his mother, the epileptic girl who has a way with animals will be the heroes 
and heroines of the New Tragedy, when the general, the statesman, and the 
philosopher have become the butt of every farce andjoke'
-W.H. Auden-
When Auden penned this cynical projection early in the last century, he reflected 
on a new state of affairs that was coming to pass, a cultural transformation privileging the 
victim over the aggressor, the loser over the winner. This extract from one of his poems 
adequately encapsulates the importance of the Yugoslav conflict, as yet another era when 
the privileging and aestheticisation of the victim was paramount, along with the 
demonisation of the powerful and the proud. In Yugoslavia, Serbs and Croats cast 
themselves as the natural heirs to much of Yugoslavia’s land mass -  through the 
argument that their historic persecution gave them to right to expand their nation states to 
include all co-nationals.
This concluding section will highlight some of the main themes in this thesis, 
drawing together many of the theoretical and empirical strands which was been discussed 
in the previous eight chapters. As I described throughout this thesis, a teleological 
understanding of history proved to be of central importance for both Serbian and Croatian 
nationalist writers during the 1990s. Myths of Covenant, Fall, and Redemption were of 
particular importance, as was the general theme of good against evil. Serbs and Croats 
were particularly susceptible to these types of myths because of the religious nature of 
their national identification. Religion seemingly imbued each side with primordial 
national characteristics -  making the self appear more enlightened, democratic, noble, 
peace-loving, generous, and sacrificial. Religious faith was presented as the most basic 
form of national differentiation, influencing culture, traditions, language, and openness to 
the outside world. The clash between positive and progressive religions, versus backward 
and racist religions, was seen to be at the root of conflict.
In trying to analyse the successes and failures of Serbian and Croatian 
propaganda, we need to clearly understand whether or not any actual genocides took 
place in the Balkans, either in history, or during the more contemporary period. This
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includes the general question of whether the manipulation of Holocaust imagery is a 
useful means for nations to advance their political agendas. I have argued that general 
Fall imagery and imagery of the Holocaust have played an extremely important role in 
rallying co-nationals for the defence of the nation. As an instrumental means of gaining 
power and holding on to it, negative imagery has been very useful. Nevertheless, neither 
Serbs nor Croats have ever truly been the victims of genocide, nor even attempted 
genocide. As well, Holocaust imagery never succeeded in accomplishing its primary 
objective -  courting massive western sympathy and support. The comparative genocide 
debate in Serbia and Croatia was very much akin to the tragedy of the commons -  as 
soon as the Serbs invoked it, Croats, Kosovar Albanians, and Bosnian Moslems all joined 
in, and picked this stock of metaphors and symbols clean.
Religious Nationalism and ‘Ethnic9 Nations:
An obvious aspect of Serbian and Croatian revisionism was the theme of evil. 
Northrope Frye identified the importance of a continuous negative agency, bringing about 
Falls and driving history forward. For the early Hebrews, enemies came from a variety of 
cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. They all worshipped ‘false gods’, but they 
were not unified by any similar belief system. What unified them was their role as 
different aspects of a negative agency, acting to destroy the Hebrew nation.1 While the 
Egyptians, Philistines, Romans, and others were metaphorically linked, this was the 
extent of their connection.
Serbian and Croatian history was boiled down to a series of monumental 
encounters between these two groups, whereas the Hebrews faced a wide variety of 
enemies over many centuries. Through the bogeymen of Serbophobia or Greater Serbia, 
contemporary politicians and military leaders were linked to their counterparts a century 
before. This form of metaphorical linking was important. In these two case studies, true 
historical enemies were excised from history. In Croatia, the Hungarians, and not the 
Serbs, were the objects of Croatian hatred in the 19th century. The sword on the famous 
bronze statue of Ban Jelacic was, after all, pointing at Budapest, not at Belgrade. His 
rebellion in 1848 was staged against the growing power of Hungary, not Greater Serbia. 
As well, Croats were not forced into the first Yugoslavia in 1918. Rather, joining with
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other South Slavs was infinitely preferable to annexation by Italy, which had coveted the 
Istrian Peninsula for many decades.
Serbia’s greatest enemy -  Turkey -  seemed largely irrelevant in reinterpretations 
of Serbian history. While there was a great deal of anti-Moslem, anti-Islamic rhetoric, 
there were few attacks on Turkey itself for its past occupation of the region. Nor was 
there much anti-Ottoman propaganda either. Other traditional enemies -  such as Bulgaria
tfi-  a constant threat during the first half of the 20 century, were consigned to obscurity. 
When history was reinterpreted in the 1990s, these other countries were conveniently 
disregarded. Even German invasion was seen as a facilitator of Serbian or Croatian 
genocide, not an evil as such. Collaboration with the Germans or Italians was often seen 
to be worse than the crimes either of these invading countries had done in the region. 
Manufacturing a history of Serbian-Croatian rivalry was much more important, and so, 
elements of a usable past were grafted together with pure fiction, to render a completely 
new vision of the past.
An important reason for this exclusion of historical enemies had to do with a 
teleological view of history maintained by both Serbs and Croats. History was 
reinterpreted, not simply a contest between nations, or countries, but more importantly -  
between religious entities, entities which seemed more important than race, language, or 
tradition. At no time did it appear that nationalism was competing with religion. The 
nation was never elevated to be, as William Pfaff described, ‘a simulacrum of the Deity’.2 
Rather, the Croatian Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church remained 
exceedingly loyal to their respective regimes which in turn promoted religion as a central 
aspect of national identity. While Kecmanovic was correct that there were many ‘pseudo­
religious qualities’ in Serbian and Croatian ‘ethnic identification’ -  nationalism did not 
replace religion -  it absorbed, assimilated, and manipulated it.
Catholicism and Orthodoxy, long submerged through decades of Communism, 
now had the chance to re-emerge. Because Serbs and Croats largely defined their sense of 
national identity by their religious beliefs and their membership in a religious 
community, it was natural that their emerging nationalisms would rely on the moral and 
spiritual legitimacy conferred by the Church. Religion and nationalism were one in 
Communist Yugoslavia. It was impossible for nationalism to replace religion because
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without religion, these nations would, in any practical sense, cease to exist. While the self 
would be defined by religious criteria, imparting certain primordial characteristics to the 
nation, so too would the other come to be defined by their beliefs.
Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis was invoked time and again, to 
explain why peoples of other faiths were dangerous and threatening. Both the Serbs and 
the Croats followed Huntington’s hierarchy of religions, also described by Milica Bakic- 
Hayden as ‘nesting orientalisms’. In this hierarchy, Protestantism was seemingly the most 
enlightened and the most ‘western’, followed by Catholicism, then Orthodoxy, then 
Islam, presented as the most violent, barbaric and backward of all religions. Huntington 
advanced that Islam was the religion responsible for most of the world’s conflicts. These 
categorisations seem to have been assimilated into Serbian and Croatian propaganda.
The Bosnian Moslems, for example, were portrayed as enemies because of their 
religious faith. As Moslems, they supposedly wanted to expand Islam into Europe, wage 
jihad, circumcise young boys, and force women into harems. The common argument that 
the Moslems were ethnic Serbs or Croats made their decision to ‘abandon’ their ethnic 
heritage that much worse. The fact that they chose to embrace a seemingly artificial form 
of national identification made them traitors, and thus dangerous enemies who could not 
be trusted. Both Serbian and Croatian leaders saw the merit in converting the Moslems, 
as if changing one’s religion would magically bestow on the converted a new ethnic 
identity. This implied that Moslems were enemies because they were Moslems, and had 
chosen to adhere to an artificial, constructed form of identity, rather than embracing their 
‘authentic’ ethnic identity.
For the Serbs, the greatest evil was represented by Islam, specifically that used by 
the Kosovar Albanians and the Bosnian Moslems. While Milosevic could happily share a 
weekend at Karadjordjevo with Tudjman, carving up Bosnia, there was no friendliness 
between Milosevic and Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova, or Bosnian President Alija 
Izetbegovic. While these men were seemingly in favour of peace, not war, Milosevic 
preferred the company of a fellow war-monger and opportunist. The Battle of Kosovo 
had seemingly sealed the fate of the Moslems. There could be no reconciliation between 
these two groups.
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A similar dynamic was evident in Croatia. While there were many myths about 
the Bosnian Moslems as ‘Brother Slavs’ and ‘the flower of the Croatian nation’, a strong 
anti-Islamic current informed many Croatian arguments and government policies. 
Tudjman’s hatred of the Moslems seemed both personal and emotional -  this was well 
known among western diplomats who met with him. While one could argue that the 
Croato-Moslem Federation in Bosnia today testifies to the closeness of Croats and 
Bosnian Moslems, this was decidedly not the case. As discussed in ‘Chapter Eight’, 
Tudjman betrayed the beliefs of his nationalist supporters in Hercegovina, in an attempt 
to cast himself as a peace maker.
For Croatian writers, Serbian Orthodoxy was closer to Islam than it was to 
Catholicism, making the Serbs more eastern -  seemingly part of an inferior civilisation. 
Because of this eastemness, the Serbian civilisation was portrayed as less tolerant, less 
democratic, and less enlightened than that in Croatia. From the Great Schism of 395 
onwards, the Serbs were presented as the enemies of the Croats. Like those who 
converted to Islam, the Serbs had seemingly chosen to be part of an inferior, more 
bloodthirsty, more barbaric, and more backwards civilisation.
For the Serbs, Croatian Catholicism was replete with negative traits -  intolerance, 
xenophobia, and the desire to convert non-Catholics by force. Catholics were 
expansionist and genocidal, and because of this, the Croats were seen to be only 
indirectly evil. It was their Catholicism which made them want to kill Serbs, and their 
expansionism was motivated by Vatican plans to enslave the Balkans. Milan Bulajic’s 
insistence that most of the Ustasa death camp officials were members of the Catholic 
clergy reinforced the idea that the Catholic faith inspired violent aggression, as well as 
hatred of the Serbs. Thus, the lengthy debate over Stepinac’s anti-Semitism / philo- 
Semitism, collaboration / resistance also proved to be extremely important. As well, 
Serbian national identity, like that of Croats and Moslems, appeared to hang by a thread. 
That the Serbs could be transformed into Croats in one generation by a Catholic 
education, indicated that national identity was far less primordial than many 
propagandists claimed.
Religion was all-important because it created the conditions for a series of 
covenants with the divine. Throughout this thesis, we saw many examples of covenential
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relationships, as described by Northrop Frye, Conor Cruise O’Brien,4 Donald Harman 
Akenson,5 Martin Buber,6 Hans Kohn,7 and others. Some good examples included the 
Serbian myth of Kosovo. Lazar’s choice created a heavenly people of the Serbs -  a nation 
of martyrs. This covenential relationship was often likened to that made between God and 
the Hebrew people. Both Serbs and Jews had to suffer in order to undergo Redemption. 
Nevertheless, each group was seen to have special divine favour.
For the Croats, the Pacta Conventa could be interpreted as a type of covenant, 
although this was not a Covenant with the divine, but more with History -  with a big 
“H”. As Schopflin described, in his ‘myths of election’, either God or History could 
choose a nation to perform some special mission, because of its unique or noble virtues. 
For the Croats, such myths often included a variety of pseudo-religious qualities, such as 
a nation’s capacity for ‘civility’, ‘literacy’ or ‘Europeanness’. These, as Schopflin argued, 
elevated the nation over its competitors and rivals, giving it the feeling of being morally 
and culturally superior.8 Such myths dovetailed well with Huntington’s theories.
Certainly, the Pacta myth indicated that the Croatian nation had been chosen by 
History, since it was allowed to preserve aspects of its statehood for 1,000 years. 
Similarly, the myth of the Antemurale Christianitatis was seen to be a form of 
covenential relationship. Their adoption of Roman Catholicism made them more peace- 
loving, more honest and fairer in their dealings with others. Their conversion also 
conferred God’s blessing on them, and the promise of protection in case of attack. The 
Croats, through Medjugoije, maintained a more obvious Covenant with the Virgin Mary, 
through her many apparitions during the 1980s. This implied, as Mestrovic and his 
colleagues maintained, that the Croats had been chosen as more western, more civilised, 
more democratic, and more European than the Serbs, who were relegated to the east.
Thus the Croats were chosen to be a western people, and to seemingly defend western 
values against Serbian and Moslem onslaughts.
The Serbs also used Schopflin’s ‘myths of divine election’, arguing that they, and 
not the Croats, were the most enlightened and civilised. Dusan Batakovic, for example, 
privileged the 19th century Ottoman millet tradition as an authentic expression of Serbian 
democratic and European values, seemingly a better method of rule than the xenophobic 
and clerical system found in Croatia.
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Both Serbs and Croats adhered to Frye’s view of a ‘covenential cycle’, where 
every negative event in history was followed by an equally positive reward, or 
Redemption.9 However, neither nation had much interest in exploring a truly teleological 
view of history. History was for both nations a series of Falls, some large, and some 
small, through which nations were forced to labour. There was little emphasis on 
Redemption in these highly revised historical accounts. Thus, Frye’s covenential cycle 
occurred only in the present. While there had been few, if any Redemptions in the past. 
The promise of future Redemptions drove history forward. This lack of interest in the 
great positive heroes of the past was a notable phenomenon in both nationalisms. Heroes 
such as Prince Lazar, Ban Jelacic, Draza MihailovicDand Alojzije Stepinac, were tragic 
figures. They saw their nations through valiant defeat, rather than dazzling victories.
They and not the positive heroes of history were celebrated in the 1990s. It was as if 
nationalists were scared to promote other periods of Redemption, as if it was necessary to 
save up every historic Fall -  and then cash them in for statehood.
Contrary to Smith’s assumptions about the Golden Age, neither Serbs nor Croats 
tried to recapture historic high points in the life of the nation, but rather, focussed most of 
their attention on proving, then overcoming their many Falls. No one really wanted to, 
‘unfold a glorious past’, or ‘a golden age of saints and heroes’.10 Smith’s ‘myth of the 
historical renovation’ -  where the nation was to return to its basic national ‘essence’ -  
was not a top priority.11 The closest example of this type of imagery was the myth of the 
separate Croatian language, which was seen to somehow contain their national essence.
However, the 600 anniversary of Kosovo did, as Smith described, vividly 
recreate the ‘glorious past’ of the Serbian nation.12 The marketing of Kosovo products 
and the ubiquitous use of the symbols and images of the Battle did suggest an obsession 
with a past moment of glory in Serbian history. Nevertheless, this was not truly a Golden 
Age, but a time of Fall, defeat, martyrdom, and despair. Perhaps the willingness to 
sacrifice for an ideal was a captivating theme for Serbian nationalists, but this was not a 
time of high culture, or the spreading of Serbian civilisation around the world. While 
history was to an extent a useable past, nationalists selected myths of Fall, which were 
deemed more necessary for rallying people together to reclaim national greatness.13
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Holocaust Imagery and the Comparative Genocide Debate:
Certainly Serbian and Croatian revisionist historians wove a rich tapestry of 
myths and images. Myths of persecution and Fall were ‘discovered’ in almost every 
period of history. Certainly, we saw many examples of Kecmanovic’s myths of 
‘counteridentification’, myths of ‘plot’, ‘damage’, ‘threat’, and ‘universal culprit’, all of 
which were used with reference to perceived enemies. We saw many examples of Claude 
Lefort’s myth of the ‘people as one’, standing against a series of dangerous and united 
external enemies. We also saw many examples of Schopflin’s myths o f ‘redemption and 
suffering’, ‘powerlessness and compensation for powerlessness’, and ‘unjust treatment’. 
All of these types of myths proved to be extremely useful in articulating Serbian and 
Croatian victimisation. So why invoke Nazism and the Holocaust?
As I discussed in ‘Chapter Two’, Holocaust imagery has become a more and more 
acceptable way of advancing national, social, and political projects. With the 
universalisation of the Holocaust, the symbols and metaphors which have made the 
Jewish people ‘the gold standard of oppression’, to quote Landau, have become readily 
available to other groups. Our tendency to see the Nazis as the ultimate manifestation of 
secular evil, and the Jews as the epitome of the victim, has given nations a template 
within which to structure and understand their national histories. As previously discussed, 
this process has been identified by Steiner, Bellamy, Zizek, Kristeva, Lyotard, Kaplan, 
Finkielkraut, Landau and others.
Calling one’s enemies Nazis proved to be an extremely useful rhetorical device. It 
forced western observers to stand up and take notice. The frequent use of the terms 
‘Holocaust’, ‘death camps’, ‘death marches’, ‘exoduses’, and ‘pogroms’, highlighted the 
victimised qualities of Serbs and Croats. These were combined with distinctly Christian 
images -  ‘Calvary’, ‘way of the cross’, and ‘crucifixion’. Such imagery detracted from 
continuous media reports about Serbs and Croats ‘attacking’ each other, ‘rounding up’ 
Bosnian Moslems, ‘invading’ territory, ‘looting’ property, while committing ‘ethnic 
cleansing’. As such, the use of Holocaust imagery was designed to deflect criticism of the 
many disreputable acts of state-craft deemed necessary by Serbian and Croatian leaders, 
to expand their respective states and consolidate their bases of power.
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In an age when Communism, Fascism, and a variety of other ‘isms’ had been 
discredited, the promise of grand utopian visions was often an empty one. While 
Tudjman and Milosevic pledged to recreate Golden Ages in their respective countries, 
bringing about a utopia was not enough. Creating something positive and noble was not 
sufficient to justify the age old Machiavellian (and later Communist) refrain: “the end 
justifies the means”. Only a sense of persecution and victimisation carried enough moral 
weight and legitimacy to accomplish this task. This preoccupation with national Falls and 
the need for Redemption allowed for little rejoicing. By the mid-1990s, Serbian and 
Croatian troops occupied more than two thirds of Bosnia-Hercegovina. They were 
‘liberating’ territory which had never been theirs before, while Serbian and Croatian 
regions were dotted with various ‘autonomous republics’, each with their own 
parliaments, radio stations, and currency.
The ‘liberation’ of territory was seen part of an historic mission. There was little 
rejoicing in the media whenever a town was conquered. There was little jingoism 
expressing the awesome power of the Serbian or Croatian military machines. War was 
not seen as a means of punishing enemies -  it was portrayed as necessary to protect co­
nationals from the threat of genocide. Military victory was most often portrayed as the 
proper state of affairs, the correction of historic injustices. News reports from liberated 
towns did not exude a sense of victory, but dwelled instead on the devastation caused by 
the aggressor, and the tremendous amount of work yet to be undertaken. There were few 
books detailing Serbian or Croatian victories. What abounded were glossy publications, 
depicting lurid atrocities and bombed out buildings. Indeed, it seemed that the only point 
in ‘liberating’ towns at all was so that the victors could then take pictures of the 
devastation, to buttress their claims of victimisation still further.
In the end, invoking the Holocaust filled in many blanks. Historically, Serbs and 
Croats had not been enemies, they had been fellow Slavs, trapped in neighbouring states, 
controlled by rival empires. Unlike their common hatred of Islam, there was little about 
the other side as such which could provoke the same revulsion as references to a jihad or 
to janissaries and harems. Thus, a form of hatred had to be created.
Claiming that the enemy was a genocidal power in the present and in the past 
allowed each side to reconstruct their own histories, but more importantly -  the history of
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the other. This was the stage at which narratives were inscripted and performative dramas 
were enacted. While Karadzic and Starcevic were contemporaries, they were transformed 
into bitter enemies. Fears of a 19th century ‘Greater Serbia’ confronted the ‘Civitas Dei’, 
and Yugoslavism and Illyrianism were quietly forgotten. While those promoting South 
Slavic unity were condemned as misguided or naive, Juraj Strossmeijer, Ljudevit Gaj and 
other well meaning ‘Yugoslavs’ were not idiots, nor was Ivan Mestrovic. These men 
reflected the reality of their age -  that Serbs and Croats were not yet enemies, nor had 
any reason to be.
Unfortunately, historical accuracy gave way to revisionism and demonisation. 
Rather than interacting with members of the other side as fellow colleagues, Serbian and 
Croatian academics and journalists chose to reinterpret their relationships with their new 
enemies through their newly minted historical propaganda. While academics in Serbia 
and Croatia were dominated by authoritarian, anti-democratic regimes, with strongly 
centralised bureaucracies, and media, intellectuals attacked the other, instead of their own 
regimes. Bodgan Denitch described this phenomenon very well, when he wrote,
Each side consistently presented itself as victims, or potential victims, the Other 
as a threat or potential threat, so that neither party responded to the Other 
directly, but only to its own projections of the Other. Each reacts to the Other as a 
threat, and in its own reactions, reinforces the behaviour that appears threatening.
Nor were these perceptions questioned by those who had increasingly identified 
with their own “people”. Victimisation appeared to be an all-powerful mobiliser 
of ethnic solidarity.14
A sense of persecution appealed to Serbian and Croatian historians, but this was 
somewhat different from that of the Jews. For example, there was a constant emphasis on 
sacrifice for an ideal, which was more a Christian than a Jewish concept. Serbs sacrificed 
themselves at Kosovo to become a chosen and holy nation; they sacrificed themselves at 
the Antemurale Christianitatis, to defend the west against the east. They sacrificed 
themselves in World War I, during the first Yugoslavia, and then during World War II, 
through their contributions to Partisan victory. In the contemporary period, they were 
defending the west against Kosovar and Bosnian Moslem led Islamic expansionism. They 
were also sacrificing themselves to defend the east against the dangers of Roman 
Catholic expansionism.
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The Croatian ideal of sacrifice was not as pronounced, but it existed nonetheless. 
Croats also sacrificed themselves at the Antemurale Christianitatis, to defend the west 
against the east. Croats also sacrificed themselves during World War II, first of all, to 
create an independent state, then, in order to redeem that state in history, by their 
massacre at Bleiburg. They also sacrificed themselves in defending the west against 
Islamic expansionism in Bosnia-Hercegovina. These themes of sacrifice are important, 
because they draw their strength from the crucifixion, not the loss of Israel 2,000 years 
ago, the Jewish pogroms, or the Holocaust. There is no strong sense of sacrifice in 
Zionism, no sense of voluntarism, no decision on the part of Jews to martyr themselves 
for some larger ideal. Jews suffered because negative forces were persecuting them. 
Massada was the exception, rather than the rule.
However, while this myth of sacrifice played an important role in re-evaluating 
Serbian and Croatian history, Schopflin’s ‘myths of powerlessness and compensation for 
powerlessness’, were not commonly used during the 1990s. Such myths were typically 
Christian, as Schopflin explained, ‘makfing] a virtue of fatalism and passivity’ while 
allowing the nation to claim, ‘a special moral superiority for having suffered’.15 While 
the Serbs articulated this theme with regards to their many sacrifices for Yugoslavia 
during the first Yugoslavia and World War n, this was often seen to be a failing on the 
part of the Serbian nation, not a strength. The maxim: “winners in war, losers in peace”, 
underscored Serbian magnanimity, drawing out a sharp contrast between Serbian 
generosity and Croatian duplicity. However, during the contemporary wars, there was 
little interest in turning the other cheek, or passively accepting the collapse of the 
Federation. Both sides fought, and then used myths to legitimate their self-defensive 
activities. They had little interest in passivity or what it implied.
However, Schopflin’s ‘myths of unjust treatment’, were much more popular, 
especially the notion that the nation had been singled out for ‘special, negative 
treatment’.16 Both Serbs and Croats constantly argued that they were the most victimised 
and persecuted nation in Europe, and had, through their suffering, earned the right to 
form their own expanded national states. World War II thus became an extremely 
important time. Through Jasenovac and Bleiburg, Serbs and Croats claimed their own 
Holocausts -  while asserting the need for Redemption. Further, that they were not
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allowed to openly interpret their own instances of victimisation during the Communist 
era made the need for immediate Redemption after 45 years of Communism more urgent.
It was clear from a review of Serbian and Croatian revisionism that the role of the 
enemy (or one or two enemies) was extremely important in consolidating nationalism in 
both countries. Thus, Peter Alter’s conclusions were applicable in these two cases, 
insofar as encounters with ‘alien cultures’, with different languages, religions, customs,
17or social systems, made conationals more aware of their similarities. Rather than having 
a species of generalised Fall myths with a variety of negative agents, Serbs and Croats 
attacked each other.
Both Serbs and Croats exhibited numerous examples of what Kecmanovic termed 
‘counteridentification’. The other became absolutely central for them. Without the ‘group 
enemy’, it is doubtful that either Tudjman or Milosevic would have risen to such heights 
of power, and managed to control events for so long. Certainly it was true, as 
Kecmanovic argued that mistrust and even hatred of outsiders proved integral to national
1 ftharmony and consensus. Claude Lefort’s theory of the ‘People as one’, was similarly 
applicable to these two cases.19 So too was Marc Howard Ross’s theory of attacking 
those enemies who ‘contain unwanted parts of ourselves’. Clearly, negative imagery, 
specifically tailored to one or two others, formed a crucial part of Serbian and Croatian 
image making.
Instrumentalising the Fall:
From an instrumental perspective, negative imagery and myths of Fall were 
crucial to the rise of Tudjman and Milosevic. By portraying national histories as long 
periods of Fall, they argued that their own regimes were historical turning points, 
palengenetic moments when all the Falls of the past would be reversed, and new utopian 
nations would be forged, bigger, richer, prouder, and more authentic. In coming to power, 
both Tudjman and Milosevic seemed to have faith in a national renaissance. They 
understood Henry Tudor’s description of historical teleology, that ‘mythical time is 
reversible’, and that ‘what was done is not forever lost.’21 The promise of recreating the 
past, of reversing the years of hardship and Fall was integral to the appeal of nationalism. 
Kecmanovic’s myths of ‘watershed’ and ‘the right moment’ were often used justify
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Tudjman and Milosevic’s attempts to make ‘a new order emerge.’22 The use of 
Schopflin’s ‘myths of rebirth and renewal’ were equally apparent.23
Curiously, both Tudjman and Milosevic seemed to have embraced a Modernist 
view of nationalism’s practical used for gaining power. Ernest Gellner’s purely 
instrumental explanation for the nation made sense in describing Milosevic’s rise to 
power.24 John Breuilly’s observations also reflected the reality of Milosevic and 
Tudjman’s rise to power, since they both saw nationalism as ‘institutional’ instrument for 
gaining power. Both men used nationalism to gain control of the state, while subverting 
the old non-nationalist order of things.25
Tom Naim’s view of nationalist legitimacy as a ‘popular revolution’ or ‘national 
liberation struggle’ was certainly true. Whether it was ‘Tudjmanism’ or the ‘Happening 
of the people’, the promise of revolutionary change legitimated the rise of nationalism 26 
That nationalist leaders manipulated history to suit their own ends comes as no surprise. 
What was surprising about the conflict was the extent to which ordinary historians, 
political scientists, geographers, even artists, psychiatrists, dentists and architects, were 
willing to submerge themselves fully in these nationalist experiments. Why this was the 
case remains a mystery. Had more people questioned the established truths of what they 
were seeing and hearing, war might have been prevented, or stopped much earlier.
British journalist Cvijeto Job rightly criticised intellectuals in Serbia and Croatia
onfor contributing to the ‘collective madness’ that was going on around them. He made 
the following damning quote in 1993, which expressed, I believe, the fundamental 
importance of propaganda and myth makers during the war,
All nations have self-serving myths, which play havoc with historical truths. But 
the public life in many countries permits the challenge of these myths. Stabler 
and more tolerant cultures leave room for the puncturing of their own egos, but in 
Yugoslavia, the pervasive culture of ethnocentric myths unchallenged even by 
their intellectuals weighs down the lives of the people. Yugoslav peoples have 
indeed been betrayed by their intelligentsias.28
Job’s statement could apply equally well to Croatia. Nationalist intellectuals in 
both countries appeared to have taken leave of their senses, or at very least -  their 
capacity for critical reasoning. By 1993, most of the Serbs and Croats who disagreed with 
their respective regimes had already left. Few objective voices remained, and most of
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these people were purged from government institutions, or faced harassment if they 
spoke against the regime. A strong manichean morality did not allow for any ambiguity. 
One was either a supporter of the nation and its objectives -  whatever the means -  or a 
traitor. While there were often attacks on the governments of Milosevic and Tudjman, 
including demonstrations, few people questioned the rise of nationalism, or the themes 
expressed in nationalist writings.
While it was perhaps permissible to argue that Tudjman or Milosevic were not 
doing enough to promote nationalism, it was unacceptable to question whether the rise of 
nationalism was a positive phenomenon. It would have been impossible to go back to the 
‘good old days’ of Communism. As Slavenka Drakulic lamented during the war, Croatian 
nationalism was like an ‘ill fitting shirt’, with sleeves that were too long, and a collar that 
was too high. But she noted with disdain that, ‘You might not like the colour and the 
cloth might itch. But there is no escape; there is nothing else to wear.’29 Eventually both 
Croats and Serbs would rid themselves of their respective shirts -  there was an escape, 
and it came through the highly fallible democratic processes. The rise of Stipe Mesic and 
Ivica Racan in Croatia, and Vojislav Kostunica in Serbia, all through the democratic 
process, was indeed a miracle.
Was There Ever Genocide in Serbia or Croatia?
Serbs and Croats cast themselves as victims of Holocaust during World War n, 
and genocide in the 1990s, but there was little proof to support such contentions. While 
both nations suffered from massacres during World War II, neither was explicitly 
targeted with genocide. The Croats were certainly in no danger of being exterminated at 
Bleiburg, where Partisans aimed to kill collaborators -  not all Croats. Even though there 
is clear indisputable evidence of Cetnik massacres of Croats and Moslems throughout the 
NDH, there was no concrete proof that the Cetniks aimed to exterminate the entire 
Croatian nation -  nor would they have had the means to do so. The only letter to this 
effect, describing a plan to create an ‘ethnically pure Greater Serbia’, was dismissed by 
impartial historians as a forgery.
Even the Ustasa run NDH was not geared towards annihilating all Serbs. By the 
Serbs’ own admission, only a third were slated for death as part of the Ustasi programme.
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The other two thirds were to be converted or deported. This of course referred only to 
Serbs in the NDH. There were no reported plans to invade Serbia or kill Serbs outside of 
the Ustasa state. In short, there is no proof whatsoever that either side was in danger of 
being annihilated, and more importantly, that either side had any intention of completely 
annihilating the other. Racism and mass violence do suggest a high level of hostility, but 
the fact that both Jasenovac and Bleiburg needed to be inflated suggests that these 
‘Holocausts’ were more performance than reality. We also see a high level of 
performance in the willingness of Serbian and Croatia troops to act out scenes from the 
past, dressing in home-made Cetnik and Ustasa uniforms, singing World War II era 
songs, while carrying weaponry fashioned to resemble that used 50 years before. As I 
discussed in ‘Chapter 6’, both sides destroyed forever the reality of the past. In trying to 
resurrect the bravery and fraternity of the wartime period, they forever tarnished the very 
national heroes they were trying to glorify.
In portrayals of the Communist period, the same old patterns of dominance were 
said to have appeared. Serbs accused the Croats of dominating the Federation and 
reducing their historic power and position. Croats accused Serbs of persecuting them in 
Goli Otok, in denying them their rights to autonomous culture, religion, and language. 
Serbs accused the Croats of similar abuses. In both cases, sinister masterminds working 
for the enemy nation were at work at the highest levels of power -  be it Aleksander 
Rankovic or Stevo Krajacic. Whether it was ‘that Croat-Tito’ or the ‘Serbian centralising 
Tito’, each side soon portrayed the Communist era as a period of national suppression, 
de-historification (to borrow Cosic’s term), and domination. Historic borders were seen 
only to benefit the other side. State institutions were always portrayed as operating 
against the interests of one’s own national group. Serbs accused Croats of stealing all the 
best tourist land, land which had been developed with Serbian funds. Croats meanwhile 
accused the Serbs of taking all of Croatia’s hard-earned tourist income from federal 
transfer payments. The story went on and on, each trying in every way possible, no 
matter how petty, to prove that they were victims first and foremost.
Nevertheless, by 1991, the Croats were clearly the victims of Serbian and JNA 
aggression. At the same time, this aggression was not unprovoked. Tudjman’s insensitive 
and often xenophobic reactions to Croatia’s Serbian population, and his overt support of
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former Ustasa leaders, raised justifiable concerns that Serbian national rights were under 
threat. Of course, the Serbian reaction was not rational, nor an appropriate reflection of 
the level of persecution to which they were being exposed. Milosevic and his allies 
needed little pretext to launch a full-scale invasion of Croatia. While it was true that 
Tudjman brought back elements of an Ustasa past, and remained ambiguous about the 
NDH throughout his life, Milosevic’s actions also demonstrated his interest in the Nazi 
ideal of Lebensraum. But let us be clear - neither nation can be realistically compared to 
the Nazis. Ethnic cleansing was not genocide, and it was not the continuation of the 
Holocaust.
The attempt to form greater national states, to invade and conquer territory while 
violently expulsing populations from it does not constitute genocide. Genocide refers to 
people -  specifically defined national or ethnic groups -  not strategic parcels of land in 
neighbouring countries. Had either Serbs or Croats favoured genocide over irridentism, 
we would not have seen hundreds of thousands of refugees. We would not have seen 
‘collection centres’ where people were beaten, tortured and then released. The level of 
carnage, the number of mass graves, and the number of war criminals would have been 
much higher. Compared with the Nazis, Serbian and Croatian propaganda was relatively 
mild. Nothing the Serbs or Croats ever wrote or filmed could ever compare with the 
chilling Nazi classic Der Ewige Jude, or the proliferation of Nazi textbooks, wall charts, 
and phrenological heads, detailing the subhuman and parasitic nature of the enemy.
The Bosnian case was obviously more complex. Here Serbs and Croats followed 
an almost identical pattern in their dealings with the Bosnian Moslems. Each claimed the 
land for themselves, each claimed the Bosnians as fellow co-nationals. When these 
strategies did not prove successful on their own, they resorted to fears of Islamic 
conspiracies. Within the confines of this thesis, it is irrelevant whether or not Bosnian 
Moslem identity was ‘authentic’ or ‘constructed’. What is of central importance is 
whether or not Serbian and Croatia claims were in any sense true. While I gave a short 
over view of many of the vaguerities of Bosnian Moslem identity and the government’s 
later courting of Iranian and Saudi assistance, it was clear that throughout the conflict, 
Moslems adhered to the ideal of a multinational, multi-confessional state with power-
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sharing and ethnic tolerance for all. Even when the government tried to introduce some 
trappings of an Islamic state, at the height of the conflict, the Moslems refused.
There were no reported Moslem-run ‘collection centres’ in Bosnia during the war. 
By contrast, both Serbs and Croats rounded up, interned, beat, and tortured civilians 
during the 1990s. Neither side made any attempt to deny the existence of these camps, 
nor did either side deny that they had committed ethnic cleansing. They only denied that 
they had been the first to do so -  each claimed that their ethnic cleansing was in self- 
defence. At the same time, the level of collusion between Serbian and Croatian 
governments made it increasingly obvious as the war progressed that these two 
movements were operating in tandem, and were mutually beneficial to the Tudjman and 
Milosevic regimes. Each side needed a strong, powerful and dangerous enemy to justify 
the centralisation and monopolisation of state power within newly created national 
‘homelands’.
While we can attempt to come to terms with the war in Bosnia through a study of 
propaganda, it will ultimately falls short when we encounter the reality of Serbian and 
Croatian atrocities. Killing bus loads of school children, shelling maternity clinics, razing 
entire towns to the ground, pale in comparison to the estimated 20,000 people who were 
raped and beaten at the hands of Serbian and Croatian soldiers. How does one explain 
why, in the town of Kozarac, some 2,500 people were killed in just three days? How does 
one account for the 1.8 million Bosnian Moslems driven out of their homes by 1992, at 
the beginning of the conflict?31 In Bosnia, more than anywhere else, the full duplicity of 
Serbian and Croatian persecution imagery became obvious. At no time during the real 
Holocaust did the Jews ever use their own victimisation to justify the genocide of others.
While perhaps the persecution of the Bosnian Moslems was not genocide, in the 
sense that the mens rea was not apparent, there is compelling proof that both sides 
perpetrated hundreds of acts of cruelty against the very people they claimed were 
persecuting them. While land grabbing activities were clearly behind the official 
strategies of both nations, how does one explain the gratuitous cruelty and vandalism that 
so characterised the war? Did two nations in search of land really have to create 
collection centres? Did they really have to destroy half of Mostar, which even today is a 
burned out shell run by the Hercegovenian mafia? Was it really necessary to destroy well
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over one thousand mosques and churches? In coming to terms with the level of 
destruction, it is unclear why so much of the region had to be reduced to rubble in order 
to construct a better future. These are obviously questions which are far beyond the scope 
of this thesis, but they do bring to mind the obvious contradictions between what Serbs 
and Croats did to the Bosnian Moslems, and what they claimed the Moslems were going 
to do to them.
In the end, fears of Greater Serbia, and the invention of Serbophobia, played 
much the same role for Serbs and Croats as did anti-Semitism to 19th and 20th century 
Zionists. As Hannah Arendt maintained, such generalised fears were, ‘an excellent means 
for keeping the people together... an eternal guarantee of... existence.’32 For both Serbs 
and Croats, the concept of Diaspora was also important. Theodor Herzl’s theory of a 
Diaspora in danger as the guiding principle for a homeland was constantly invoked. 
External threats to the nation unified disparate co-nationals into ‘one people’. For 
Tudjman and Milosevic, as for Herzl, a nation state which included all co-nationals was 
the only adequate solution to the threat of victimisation and persecution, or even worse -  
genocide.33
Certainly, we face the possibility of the Holocaust being manipulated over and 
over again in the service of nationalism. Nevertheless, the problems of over use are clear. 
If Finkielkraut noticed how overuse by other groups made it less significant for the Jews, 
a general over use makes it less significant for everyone. If every nation suffers from a 
Holocaust, and every social movement, from pro-life activists to environmentalists, 
invoke the spectre of a Holocaust, then the term will continue to be degraded and 
denatured, until it ceases to have any real significance.
Curiously, neither Serbs nor Croats adopted the tone of Stannard, Dadrian, or 
Hancock. While they participated in the comparative genocide debate, they were not 
looking for enemies. There were few accusations of the Jews suppressing Jasenovac or 
Bleiburg, primarily because each side was looking to Israel as a potential military ally 
and source of arms. Unlike serious comparative genocide scholars whose nations had 
experienced real genocides, and therefore wanted to promote their histories within an 
academic context, neither Serbs nor Croats seemed interested in the merits of intellectual 
debate with fellow victims, especially outside of the Balkans. David Stannard attacked
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the idea that the Jews were ‘chosen’, and that other groups were by definition ‘un- 
chosen’.34 This was not a strategy favoured by Serbs or Croats. Both were perfectly 
happy for the Jews to be the most important case of genocide. That was fine -  because 
they simply wanted to hitch a ride along the way, and had little interest in serious 
scholarly debate.
Neither Serbs nor Croats feared that the Holocaust was casting too long a shadow,
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as William F. Buckley worried , or that the Holocaust was becoming a ‘new religion’. 
Serbs and Croats were happy for the Jews to maintain their pre-eminent role as the Super- 
Victim, as long as they could continue to expropriate Jewish symbols. For Serbs and 
Croats, the comparative genocide debate was not an end in itself, it was a means to 
another end. Neither side had much interest in having Bleiburg or Jasenovac become a 
major part of school curriculums in North America or Israel. Nothing in Serbian and 
Croatian history was considered a ‘pre-given subject’, to quote Cynthia Weber. The 
‘citational processes’, discussed by Judith Butler were also important, as a means of 
revising history during wartime.37
Nevertheless, as Peter Novick, reminds us, while the horrors of the Final Solution 
and the numbers of dead are real, the ‘Holocaust’ as a unique event, as we understand it 
today, was very much a reinterpretation World War II history. Thus he could argue that, 
“‘the Holocaust”, as we speak of it today, was largely a retrospective construction, 
something which would not have been recognisable to most people at the time.’ Perhaps 
we could argue the same of what we are witnessing now. How Serbian and Croatian 
history will appear in 20 or 30 years time is obviously open to debate.
Western Reactions: Does the Comparative Genocide Debate Work?
The above question is not an easy one to answer. At some level, western 
academics, journalists, politicians and statesmen were certainly drawn into the 
propaganda war between Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Moslems, and Kosovar Albanians. Many 
reacted with horror to the Serbian invasion of Croatia, and then Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
There was no doubt that the majority of the violence had been committed by Serbian 
paramilitary forces. Western journalists frequently cited the parallels between the war in
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Bosnia and World War II. For the most part, however, journalists did maintain a level of 
objectivity.
Nevertheless, there were many western academics co-opted into the debate over 
which nations truly were victims of genocide. Carl Jacobsen at Carleton University in 
Ottawa, Canada, was a good example of an impartial professor of strategic studies who 
allowed himself to be swayed by Serbian arguments early in the war. His Independent 
Committee on War Crimes in the Balkans participated in several fact-finding missions, 
highlighting the rape and abuse of Serbian women, and the desecration of Serbian 
monuments. For Jacobsen, war crimes were those committed against Serbs, rather than 
by Serbs.39
In contrast to this relatively benign example, were the writings of New York- 
based lecturer Barry Lituchy. Lituchy published numerous articles in the United States, 
and on Serbian government websites, describing the American government as, ‘the most 
genocidal nation on earth.’ He also argued that the Americans were the, ‘Nazis of the 
New World Order’, among other things.40 Lituchy emerged from the relative obscurity of 
a Staten Island community college to gain top billing in the Serbian media. For some 
non-Serbs, joining the propaganda war increased one’s international exposure and range 
of opportunities. These are but two of many examples of non-Serbs who found 
themselves fighting against public opinion, and in Lituchy’s case -  against common 
sense.
On the Croatian side, there were numerous non-Croatian propagandists who 
became intimately involved with the regime. C. Michael McAdams, a former US airforce 
pilot and historian, became one of the most well known propagandists during the war, 
with numerous publications and a prolific presence on the Internet. He became a noted 
specialist on the Bleiburg massacre and on various other aspects of World War II history. 
Another good example was Philip Cohen, who also had no ethnic ties to the Balkans. He 
also became intimately tied to the HDZ regime and was decorated by Franjo Tudjman 
with several newly invented medals. Like McAdams, Cohen tried to alert the west to the 
great dangers posed by Serbian expansionism. Both McAdams and Cohen received 
accolades well above their abilities as competent researchers. Their books are still being 
published by the Croatian Information Center.
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Nevertheless, the most surprising convert to the Croatian cause was Alain 
Finkelkraut, whose pro-Croatian bias became so extreme during the war, that he earned 
the unfortunate nick-name ‘Finkeil-croate’. His chef d’oeuvre on the Balkans, Comment 
peut-on etre croate?, appeared in 1992, at a time when many of Croatia’s excesses in 
Bosnia were not well known. Nevertheless, Tudjman had been roundly criticised for his 
autocratic style, his revisionist writings, and his purges of government institutions and the 
police force. While Croatia was the victim of Serbian aggression at that time, Tudjman 
was no saint. Nevertheless, Finkielkraut argued that the Croats were blameless. Words 
such as ‘emancipation’ and ‘democracy’ were bandied about, and Croatian nationalism 
with compared with the rise of Czech democracy. He even compared Tudjman 
favourably to Vaclav Havel.41 Finkielkraut, it appears, was completely swayed by 
Croatian fears that eastern Serbs were attacking a part of the western world. He stressed 
the europeaneite, or ‘Europeanness’ of the Croats, arguing that Croatia deserved to be 
saved, because of its ‘Roman churches, its baroque churches and its Venetian palaces’.42
As others had done with the Serbs, Finkielkraut’s text compared the plight of the 
Croats with his own Jewish nation, and he intimated that each has suffered in a similar 
fashion. For him, the Croats were the victims of a ‘double suffering’, first suffering 
under Serbian attacks, then having the ‘truth of their suffering’ denied or downplayed.43 
He even managed to excuse Tudjman’s historical revisionism as being an attempt to 
show up the victimological pretensions of the Serbs. He went so far as to warn that the 
Serbs were inherently evil because, ‘the Nazis of this history wanted to pass themselves 
as Jewish.’44 Their strategy, as Finkielkraut posited, was to make Slavonia Croatenrein, 
with its obvious connotations to the Judenrein policies of the Nazis in World War II.45
Why Finkielkraut completely revered his arguments, only eight years after his 
Future o f a Negation remains a mystery. While first denouncing groups who manipulated 
Holocaust imagery, he now used such arguments to support a nation whose leader was a 
Holocaust revisionist, at the helm of an authoritarian government. While it is tempting to 
call Finkielkraut a hypocrite, it is possible that he truly believed the propaganda stories 
coming out of Croatia at that time. Much of this information was very persuasive.
Perhaps he truly thought that the Croats were suffering from genocide, and saw the 
practical implications of using Holocaust imagery to highlight their suffering to the
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world. It is more likely, however, that Finkielkraut became opportunistic, and thought the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia a good time for him to write a J ’accuse type of essay, in the 
style of Emile Zola, to assure his place in French intellectual history. Unfortunately, 
Tudjman’s past and present were far more sullied than the life of Alfred Dreyfus.
By far the most common reaction to Serbian and Croatian propaganda was to 
discount all of it. A form of myopia often informed western policy making, particularly 
that of the United States. It became far easier for former US Ambassador Lawrence 
Eagleberger to proclaim, ‘Until the Bosnians, Serbs and Croats decide to stop killing each 
other, there is nothing the outside world can do about it.’46 While the CIA estimated by 
1992 that some 90% of atrocities in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina had been carried out 
by the Serbs, it was far easier for the American government to present all parties as moral 
equals, and therefore to abnegate any responsibility. By believing both all and none of the 
propaganda coming out of the Balkans, US policy makers were able to avoid engaging 
themselves in a conflict which held no geostrategic appeal. One can therefore argue that 
Serbian and Croatian propaganda succeeded in spite of itself.
In reviewing Serbian and Croatian nationalist propaganda from the collapse of 
Yugoslavia until the beginning of 1999, the presence of Fall and persecution imagery was 
an obvious corollary to the horrific ground wars which began after 1991. Clearly, myth- 
makers performed a crucial role in legitimating the rise of Serbian and Croatian 
nationalism, as well excusing the many violent acts of state craft that flowed from the 
expansionist designs of Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic. Clearly, we live in an 
age when history can be revised to suit any contingency. The conflict in Yugoslavia 
demonstrated how dangerous the manipulation of Biblical and Holocaust imagery could 
be in the hands of skilled propagandists.
This conflict also highlighted the dangers of authoritarianism, and a lack of 
critical reflection. Academics, journalists, and politicians, bear a heavy responsibility for 
the nationalist fever which so dominated these countries in the 1990s. George 
Santayana’s banal and over-quoted observation that, ‘those who neglect the past are 
condemned to repeat it’, was thoroughly debunked in both the Serbian and Croatian 
cases. It was precisely this obsession with past mistakes and past injustices that led to the 
tragedies of war. Future generations will now inherit even more painful legacies than did
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their grandfathers and grandmothers in the 1940s. Hopefully they will not make the same 
mistakes all over again.
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